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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a reassessment of Xenophon’s strategies in the Poroi in the light of 
recent scholarly studies of the Athenian mining industry, trade, honours and the 
scholarly debate around the ancient capacity for economically rational decision-
making.  It argues that Xenophon wrote for a wider audience than the Athenian 
citizenry alone, and that an interpretation of the Poroi as proposing a beneficent 
regime in which slaves would live semi-autonomous lives cannot be sustained.  
Primarily it focuses on three specific strands.  Using archaeological, epigraphic and 
literary evidence, it argues that judgements of Xenophon’s proposals as naïve 
underestimate the extent to which the heavy supply demands of the Laurion region 
reached into the lives of many Athenians from the elite to the artisan, and will have 
informed their reception of his plans with a financial literacy that obviated the need 
for detail.  Using modern analyses of economic risk it explores the extent to which 
Xenophon acknowledged economic, physical and socially-constructed risks, 
demonstrating that despite their lack of detailed record-keeping, far from being 
unsophisticated in their judgement of the economic security of their commercial 
undertakings, Athenians had a developed recognition of risk and employed a variety 
of expedients to mitigate it.  Finally, Xenophon’s proposals to use honours to 
encourage commercial activity are discussed in the light of scholarly judgements that 
such awards would be subversive, or reflected mid-century decline.  A detailed 
analysis of honours offered both before and after Xenophon wrote shows that his 
proposals exploited a robust institution that had always adapted to reflect changing 
circumstances and that he set careful boundaries both to the number and the social 
background of potential recipients.  In an early work of political economy which 
attempted to manipulate individual commercial activity in order to manage inter-state 
relationships, Xenophon’s ideas were innovative but sat within the Athenian 
democratic tradition. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
1.1   Chapter introduction 
Xenophon’s Poroi is a remarkable text.  It offers a rich route into the prevailing 
preoccupations of its era – war, peace, foreign policy, state income, immigration, 
trade, wealth, taxation, power and poverty.  It addresses those issues with an 
infectious passion for Athens, and for the first time that we know of in the ancient 
world, it tries to map out ways in which these fields are interrelated in order that 
external relations might be controlled through internal economic change.  It is a first 
attempt to get to grips with ideas of political economy.
1
   
For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Ship owners 
and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine 
and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and 
sophists and philosophers; poets and the people who make use of their works; 
those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or 
hearing.  Besides, where will those who want to buy or sell many things 
quickly meet with better success in their efforts than at Athens?
2
 
This is Xenophon’s beguiling depiction of a peaceful and prosperous Athens, which 
he envisaged could be achieved in consequence of the successful adoption of his 
proposals.  It appears towards the end of the Poroi and echoes a passage from the 
beginning of the work in which he describes the natural beauty of Attica’s topography 
                                                 
1
    Schwahn 1931, p. 258, called the Poroi ‘Wirtschaftspolitik’ in 1931, although he did not believe 
that it was written by Xenophon. 
2
  5.3-4. τίνες γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως οὐ προσδέοιντ᾽ ἂν αὐτῆς ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ ναυκλήρων 
καὶ ἐμπόρων; οὐχ οἱ πολύσιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύοινοι οὐχ οἱ ἡδύοινοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι, τί δὲ οἱ 
πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; [4] καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ 
σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιοθεάτων ἢ 
ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ ὁσίων ἐπιθυμοῦντες; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ δεόμενοι πολλὰ ταχὺ ἀποδίδοσθαι ἢ 
πρίασθαι ποῦ τούτων μᾶλλον ἂν τύχοιεν ἢ Ἀθήνησιν;  
      All quotations and line references are from Xenophon’s Poroi unless otherwise indicated.  English 
translations are adapted from Marchant 1925; manuscript, translation and vocabulary questions 
are discussed when directly relevant. 
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and the wealth of her physical resources.
3
  In the few hundred lines between the two 
passages, he proposes the exploitation of those material assets, most particularly Attic 
silver deposits, but also the natural entrepreneurial skills of her citizens, residents and 
visitors, in order to generate widespread payments to Athenians and thereby provide a 
level of economic and physical security for all.  Xenophon’s proposals, made in 
355/4
4
 aspired to remove Athenian state finances from a reliance on arche, and to 
move the state closer to that most desirable of Greek conditions, self-sufficiency, or 
autarkeia, than she had achieved for perhaps a century.
5
   
 
1.2   The need for a reassessment 
There has been relatively little published work on the text since Gauthier’s important 
commentary of 1976.
6
  In the time that has since elapsed, attempts to model the wider 
shape of the Mediterranean economy have engendered a fierce academic debate which 
was picking up speed as Gauthier published, just three years after the appearance of 
Finley’s hugely influential The Ancient Economy.7  Concurrent with that theoretical 
discussion as to the relative level of sophistication of the economy and the ancients’ 
recognition of economic forces, our understanding of the many individual sectors of 
the fourth-century Athenian economy has deepened thanks to the appearance of 
studies of land, trade, banking, mining, shipping, coinage and the movement of 
commodities such as grain and timber.  Some of these studies have fed the debate, 
whilst others have hoped for a move beyond it.
8
  As an evidential source the issues of 
the Poroi inevitably place it at the heart of these questions.   
                                                 
3
    1.2-8. 
4
  All dates are BC unless otherwise noted. See chapter 1.5.2 for the dating of the Poroi. 
5
  For the desirability of state autarkeia, see Arist. Pol. 1261
b
10-17.  Discussing trade and taxes 
Purcell 2005, p. 217 reminds us that, ‘economic autarky was a dream in a world in which 
interdependence was essential.’  Jansen 2007 discusses types of autarkeia at pp. 212-247. 
Gauthier 1976, pp. 251-252 cautions against confusing modern and ancient ideas of the State, 
particularly in Athens where political responsibility was not delegated to a central power and the 
sole authority recognised by individuals was the law. See the helpful discussion of state-formation 
and the term ‘State’ at van Wees 2013, pp. 5-10. 
6
    Gauthier 1976. 
7
    Finley 1999.  
8
  See for instance R. Osborne 1985a, R. Osborne 1987, Garnsey 1988, Millett 1991, Rathbone 
1991, E. E. Cohen 1992, Gabrielsen 1994, Reger 1994, von Reden 1995, Lambert 1997, Figueira 
1998, Loomis 1998, Samons 2000, Shipton 2000, E. M. Harris 2002, Christesen 2003, Reed 2003, 
Faraguna 2006, Fawcett 2006, Foxhall 2007, Moreno 2007a, Oliver 2007a, Bissa 2009, Engen 
2010, Rihll 2010a, Davies 2011, van Wees 2013 and collections such as Mattingly and Salmon 
2001; Meadows and Shipton 2001; Scheidel and von Reden 2002; Reger 2005, Scheidel, Morris 
and Saller 2007; Verboven, Vandorpe and Chankowski  2008.   
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One approach to the study of mid fourth-century Athens, particularly in the 1970s, has 
been to see it in terms of crisis or decline – of the polis, of the economy, of Athens 
and her foreign policy.  Here again the Poroi is helpfully situated to contribute to that 
study, one scholar recently characterising the Poroi as a ‘response to decline’.9  
Equally importantly, there has been a resurgence of interest in Xenophon since the 
1990s with two international conferences and a wealth of new research on all aspects 
of his voluminous and eclectic writing.
10
 
 
Past reception of the Poroi has been mixed, and recent work in all these fields thus 
provides plentiful grounds for a reassessment of Xenophon’s work at both a 
theoretical and a practical level, and a new analysis of what the Poroi offers to our 
picture of the Attic economy.  Although it is a short text it covers a breath-taking 
number of topics.  Open-minded, resourceful, optimistic and engaging, it has the 
rounded approach of one who has been both an outcast and an insider, by a man 
approaching the end of a lengthy and eventful life.  
 
1.3   Structure and argument of the thesis 
Xenophon’s opening declares  
… But some of the leading men at Athens have stated that they 
recognize justice as clearly as other men; “but,” they have said, “owing 
to the poverty of the masses, we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our 
treatment of the cities.” This set me thinking whether by any means the 
citizens might obtain food entirely from their own soil, which would 
certainly be the fairest way. I felt that, were this so, they would be 
relieved of their poverty, and also of the suspicion with which they are 
regarded by the Greek world.
11
 
Xenophon attempts to navigate the complex territory that leads from an understanding 
of citizen poverty as a motivation for empire, to the achievement of a thriving state 
                                                 
9
     Lambert 2011a, pp. 196-7; for an overview of some of the approaches to fourth-century decline 
see Davies 1995, Herman 2011a and Lambert 2011b. Isager and Hansen 1975, pp. 52-55, refute 
the idea of a general Greek fourth-century economic crisis. 
10
  Tuplin 2004; Hobden and Tuplin 2012. 
11  1.1 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς 
ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι 
εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἐκ τούτου ἐπεχείρησα σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ᾽ ἂν οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ 
τῆς ἑαυτῶν, ὅθενπερ καὶ δικαιότατον, νομίζων, εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἅμα τῇ τε πενίᾳ αὐτῶν 
ἐπικεκουρῆσθαι ἂν καὶ τῷ ὑπόπτους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι. 
14 
 
 
 
secure from external distrust.  He does so by economic means.  Concentrating on his 
mining proposals, his recognition of risk as an economic factor, and his proposals for 
the use of honours to encourage commercial activity, my objective will be to elucidate 
some aspects of the work itself and to assess the ways in which the Poroi can be used 
as an indicator of the development of economic structures of the mid-fourth century.  I 
will also address the extent to which Xenophon’s plans were innovative and invoked 
ideas new to Athenian political life. Thanks to the wealth of evidence the work gives 
us, at its simplest level this thesis therefore attempts to understand what some 
Athenians, including Xenophon, understood of the processes that underpinned their 
commercial transactions and the extent to which that understanding permeated 
Athenian society.  This will involve situating the Poroi within the political, social and 
economic circumstances in which it was composed.  The remainder of this chapter 
will look briefly at Xenophon’s proposals and outline the arguments for his authorship 
and the dating of the text, then examine the situation within Athens and the 
circumstances of her relationships with the wider Greek world in the 350s.  After a 
discussion of the several audiences who Xenophon may be addressing, it will look at 
the way that the text has fared in the hands of scholars during the last century or so.  
 
In chapter 2, I will explore three themes which provide the foundation for my further 
discussion of the text.  First, the evidence for the operation of the Laurion
12
 silver 
mines, their relationship to the Athenian economy and the ways that our other 
evidence, archaeological, epigraphic and literary, relates to Xenophon’s text, along 
with an appraisal of some of the various means by which the state received income 
from the exploitation of the mines.  Silver extraction involved a series of sophisticated 
technical procedures taking place in a variety of locations and was reliant on a 
complex network of suppliers of consumable goods as well as workers who possessed 
a stratified range of technical skills.  It is an industry which frequently provides the 
exception to generally stated rules about the degree of sophistication of Greek 
manufacturing and commerce, and I will argue that it is important to recognise the 
extent to which the industry was integrated within the Athenian economic ‘mentality’ 
                                                 
12
  Xenophon does not say ‘the Laurion’, although his references to Anaphlystos, Thorikos and Besa 
show that this is the region he is discussing (4.43-4.44).  If there was a specific spot known as 
Laurion in antiquity, we do not know its whereabouts today, the modern coastal town of Laurion 
was formerly known as Ergastiria, and renamed much later (Photos-Jones and Jones 1994, p. 309 
with n. 4). I use the term as shorthand for the region much as it was used in antiquity. 
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and to understand that the same men engaged in comparable commercial practices 
here as elsewhere.  Secondly, using Demosthenes’ Against Pantaenetus as a case 
study, I will explore the day to day management of mining enterprises, their scale and 
their place in Athenian legal and cultural life, as well as the ways in which Laurion 
slaves were employed by the Athenians at different stages of the industry and their 
variable opportunities for advancement or manumission, in order to contextualise 
Xenophon’s proposals and to examine recent scholarship which has suggested that 
Xenophon intended a relatively beneficent regime for the state slaves whose purchase 
he was recommending.  Finally I will look at the scholarly discussion about the degree 
of economic rationality evident in the ancient world and the way that our 
understanding of the silver industry contributes to that debate.  This is a field which 
has become of increasing interest in the last twenty or so years as scholars have begun 
to question the received wisdom of the mid-twentieth century that undeveloped Greek 
and Roman record-keeping denied the trader the possibility of a detailed analysis of 
his profitability and hence restricted the potential for growth.
13
  I will argue that the 
far reaching supply needs of the mining industry indicate a hitherto unacknowledged 
level of familiarity with the industry amongst Xenophon’s Athenian audience which 
would have informed their reception of the text, demonstrating that far from 
presenting them with new concepts or naïve grand schemes, he assumes and draws on 
a level of financial literacy that enriched their reading and obviated the need for some 
of the detail that his later critics have found wanting.   
 
The text of the Poroi is full of allusions to the danger and perceived pitfalls of 
Xenophon’s ideas.  Building on the discussion of economic rationality in chapter 2, 
chapter 3 will approach the text from the specific viewpoint of an analysis of 
Xenophon’s understanding of risk.  Scholarship around risk in the ancient world has 
previously focused on subsistence crisis, maritime risk and oracular appeals, and this 
chapter seeks to broaden that discussion.   A detailed examination of the manner in 
which Xenophon identifies and contains a wide variety of economic, physical and 
socially-constructed risks is accompanied by a discussion of the way that he is able to 
recognise the projects’ risks as perceived by different groups and then to readdress or 
reassure.  The wide range of strategies he introduces in order to reduce or avert risk 
                                                 
13
  See for instance de Ste. Croix 1956 and Finley 1999 p. 110-111, 116-117, 142 for the older view, 
and Macve 1985, Rathbone 1991, Christesen 2003, Chankowski 2008b and Chandezon 2011 for 
more recent opinion. 
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suggests that far from being naïve in their judgement of the economic security of their 
commercial undertakings, Athenians had a sophisticated recognition of risk and were 
accustomed to employing a variety of expedients to reduce it.   
 
One of the strategies Xenophon proposes at several different stages of the text is the 
awarding of honours and prizes to citizens and non-citizens, to encourage their 
participation in his schemes, and it is important to factor in to our investigation into 
the economy that such considerations could be pivotal for the ancient entrepreneur 
approaching new undertakings.  Some scholars have found Xenophon’s suggestions in 
this respect ground-breaking or even subversive, whilst the wider awarding of honours 
of the mid- to late-fourth century generally has been seen as an indicator of, and a 
response to, decline.  In testing these assessments, chapter 4 benefits particularly from 
recent research into the fourth-century awarding of honours, and discusses Athenian 
attitudes to philotimia and the honours that Xenophon proposes within a longer 
chronological contextualisation of their earlier and later use by the Athenians.  Far 
from debasing ancient Athenian institutions in an ill-judged response to crisis, it 
becomes apparent that Xenophon’s proposed awards were rooted firmly in the habits 
of the past and do not contribute to a picture of a time of immediate crisis that was any 
wider than the obvious post-war lack of funds.  His proposals exploited institutions 
that had always adapted to reflect changing circumstances and he set careful 
boundaries both to the number and the social background of their potential 
beneficiaries.  
 
Regardless of Xenophon’s capacity to engage at a conceptual level with theories of 
economics and political economy, his text broadens our grasp of the way that 
economic activity was weighed and evaluated in a society where rudimentary record-
keeping was only one of a range of tools available to the effective businessman, and 
offers us a unique insight into the way that one intelligent man could appraise and 
attempt to manage interrelated financial networks across a range of social and political 
structures.  Whilst accepting the limits to the Poroi’s theoretical character, I will argue 
that Xenophon’s grasp of economic processes goes beyond mere observation14 and 
that the schemes in the Poroi are an articulation of an underlying appreciation of the 
                                                 
14
  Finley 1970, p. 4 warns against mistaking simple common sense observation of phenomena well-
known to any ancient farmer for genuine economic analysis. 
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extent to which small operations are a part of a greater whole.  Taking an essentially 
empirical approach my intention is to make a contribution at the micro-level to our 
understanding of how a practical man understood some aspects of the economic and 
political forces of his time, and to deepen our understanding of where his proposals 
are situated on a scale that runs from ground-breaking to derivative.   
 
1.4   Ancient economics? 
‘Economics’ in our contemporary sense of, say, the study of the allocation of 
resources, production, consumption and price levels, was not a science recognised in 
antiquity.  Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, written before the Poroi, was focused on 
household and estate management.
15
  Applying good domestic management principles 
to state finances in any effective way requires not simply an adjustment of scale; a 
leap of imagination is necessary to recognise that localised economic pressure can 
affect regional and inter-state politics, and that state intervention on a local level can 
be used to manipulate these larger political relationships.
16
  Xenophon’s exposition of 
good ‘economics’ in the Greek sense, i.e. relating to the oikos, has been described as 
encompassing ‘the art of managing all aspects of one’s personal life,’17  He had, after 
all, directly linked the two spheres in On Hunting:  
all who benefit their cities and their friends are more attentive to their domestic 
affairs than other men.’18    
In wrestling with the interrelatedness of politics, finance and social affairs, Xenophon 
can be seen reconfiguring not only the fiscal aspects of household economics but also 
applying the processes of managing all aspects of one’s personal life to the 
management of all aspects of the state’s life.  Well aware of the basics of the 
Micawberish equation between sufficiency for one’s needs and happiness,19 
                                                 
15
    Similarly Aristotle’s Oeconomicus, although it also begins to identify types of state and 
fundraising strategies. On Aristotle and the economy, see Polanyi 1957, Finley 1970, Meikle 
1979, Meikle 1991, Booth 1993, pp. 55-72, Bresson 2000, pp. 109-130 and Audring and 
Brodersen 2008. 
16
  See Bresson 2000, pp. 247-261 for examples of the intersection of public and private revenues 
across the classical and Hellenistic Greek world and what they demonstrate of Greek recognition 
of the reciprocal relationship between the promotion of state policies and individual financial 
welfare. 
17
  Danzig 2003, p. 66. 
18
  On Hunting 12.10. 
19
  Oeconomicos 2.4; Memorabilia 4.2.37-38. ‘Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure 
nineteen pounds nineteen shillings and six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, 
annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.’ Mr Micawber, David Copperfield 
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Xenophon’s achievement is to map out an approach that is far more than just a scaling 
up from the domestic, or a straightforward Attic balance sheet.  Mining the Poroi for 
Socratic influences can lead into complex territory,
20
 but whilst the text has frequently 
been criticised for what it does not achieve (of which more below), when seen in the 
context of the other thinkers of the day, and when Xenophon’s own theoretical leap is 
fully appreciated, it is clear that what he does achieve is ground-breaking.   
 
In treating the Poroi principally for its economic aspects, this reappraisal does not 
necessarily place itself in opposition to some late twentieth-century work which saw 
the economic proposals as a means rather than as an end and which set the work on 
the ‘political’ side of a divide which viewed the ancient Athenian as homo politicus 
rather than homo economicus.
21
  It seems to me that, however one may interpret 
Xenophon’s underlying motivation, his ends are political – they are ultimately about 
inter-state relationships.  But the means by which they can be achieved are economic.  
Nevertheless, 5.3-4 makes it clear that Xenophon’s ultimate vision is not simply a 
state at peace and a citizenry that has a basic level of subsistence and better festivals.  
It encompasses a mode of living which actively welcomes men of all classes, Greeks 
and foreigners, not only because they yield revenue but as both commercial and 
intellectual partners whose presence will enhance the city in itself.
22
  Income alone 
distributed to citizens, without the supporting infrastructure he plans for its 
achievement, would not create the cosmopolitan city he envisages.  If a part of the 
‘means’ is the variety of talented men who will be attracted to Athens in order to take 
advantage of Xenophon’s proposals, furnish income and enrich the artisanal and 
creative life of the city, it is clear that their presence and their cultural contribution to 
the city is also an end in itself. 
  
Xenophon has often been accused of failing to pursue any theoretical framework for 
understanding ‘the economy.’23  Underlying his proposals nevertheless, is an 
_______________________ 
 
chapter 12. 
20
  See for instance Schorn 2012.  
21
  eg. Gauthier 1976, p. 30; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 4.  See Humphreys 1978, pp. 159-160 for an 
overview of this Weberian dichotomy and the way it has shaped twentieth-century discussions of 
the ancient economy. 
22
    See Dillery 1993 for a comparison of this passage with Pericles’ vision of Athens in the funeral 
speech at Thuc. 2.41.1. 
23
  eg. Finley 1999, p. 19; Mossé 1975. 
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expectation that when faced with specific sets of economic circumstances or 
opportunities, not only will most individuals behave in pre-ordainable ways,
24
 but the 
exploitation of, and market for, commodities will predictably alter as well.
25
  Thus 
particular environments may be created within which certain events will inevitably 
evolve because of imperatives which are in part about (1) an assumed desire across all 
strata of society for an increase in personal wealth; and (2) an expectation that certain 
less definable social factors such as more pleasant trading environments and the 
receipt of honours will be motivating factors in the choice of trading partners.
26
  
Recognition of such patterns is essential for the successful pursuit of economic 
rationality, and the mining industry in particular had already shown itself able to 
implement the fine tuning of every stage of the industry necessary to achieve optimum 
profit.  The Poroi may not demonstrate an articulation of any systematisation of 
abstract knowledge, but a perceived, structured network of actions and reactions 
underpins Xenophon’s understanding of economic forces.  
 
1.4.1   The proposals 
Before we go further it will be useful to extract the essential proposals from the Poroi: 
2.2  Relieve metics of the obligations which impose indignities on them but do 
not help the city. 
 Exempt metics from serving as hoplites. 
2.5 Grant metics the right to serve in the cavalry. 
2.6  Allow approved metics to build houses within the city walls (enktesis).
27
 
2.7 Appoint a Board of Guardians of metics and honour the Guardians who 
enrol the most metics.  
3.3 Offer prizes to τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ - the port magistrates - for the 
speedy and fair resolution of disputes so that merchants may sail away 
again quickly. 
3.4   Give permanent theatre seats (proedria) and dinner in the prytaneion 
(xenia) to merchants and ship-owners who have been of service to the 
state. 
                                                 
24
  eg. 4.7-8: when states are prosperous and there is plenty of silver people hoard it or take pleasure 
in personal adornment. 
25
  eg. 4.10 - when gold is plentiful, silver rises in value but gold falls.  
26
  3.4. 
27
  The honours and privileges Xenophon proposes are discussed in chapter 4.2. 
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3.9   Establish a capital fund for further projects, the income from which will 
ultimately be three obols per day for each citizen. 
3.11 Encourage foreigners to subscribe to the capital fund by inscribing their 
names as euergetai. 
3.12  At the harbour, build state lodging houses (katagogia) for ship-owners and 
for visitors, and places for buying and selling for merchants. 
3.13    Put up houses and shops (πωλητήρια) for retail trade in Piraeus and the 
city. 
3.14     Investigate the acquisition of a fleet of state merchant vessels to be leased 
out in the same way as other public property. 
4.17-24  Purchase large numbers of slaves to be leased to mine operators, 
beginning with twelve hundred and using twenty talents of the annual 
rental income thus obtained in order to buy more slaves, whilst retaining 
the rest for other needs until there are three slaves for every citizen, 
yielding three obols per citizen, per day, and one hundred talents per year 
once ten thousand slaves are acquired. 
4.30 Offer an equal number of mine slaves to each tribe so that the tribes may 
pool their luck and share the proceeds. 
4.35-38  If necessary, proceed with each scheme slowly to reduce the need to raise 
large sums of capital.  
4.40 Raise the money for the plan by spending only the equivalent of the taxes 
raised before the peace and save the additional state revenues received 
through the growth of peacetime trade for investment. 
4.42  In the event of war, use the slaves in the infantry or as rowers. 
4.44     Build a fortress at Besa between those at Thorikos and Anaphlystos to 
improve the defence of the mines. 
4.49 Derive revenue from the furnaces, market, state-owned houses and other 
sources near the reinvigorated silver mines. 
5.1 Set up a board of εἰρηνοφύλακες – guardians of the peace. 
5.9 Send embassies throughout Greece with a view to making Delphi 
independent. 
6.2-3 Enquire at Dodona and Delphi whether it would be better to manage 
things this way in future, and which gods should be worshipped for things 
to go well. Then make sacrifices and begin.   
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1.4.2   Politics and rhetoric 
Xenophon’s stated aims are the encouragement of trade and industry in order to 
promote an increase in state revenues which can be used to enhance individual citizen 
prosperity.  This will lead in turn to better relationships with other poleis and the re-
establishment of Athens as a respected Greek state.
28
  The poverty of the Athenian 
masses leads directly to unjust treatment of other Greek cities, causing suspicion 
abroad and must be addressed.
29
   
 
But even that apparently clear agenda to improve state income, provide a daily 
allowance for all citizens and thereby restrain Athenian injustice in pursuit of coerced 
income, has been subject to shifts of scholarly focus, frequently led by readings that 
look for an implicit Socratic influence.  Whilst they are not the central questions of 
this thesis, it is inescapable that scholars have argued at length over Xenophon’s 
underlying motivations.  His ultimate goal might be the daily triobol payment but to 
effect it would need a far wider economic regeneration of trade and silver mining – 
was this part of his grand plan or simply a side effect?
30
  Was he a democrat or an 
oligarch?  That is, did he plan to promote greater citizen engagement with, or 
widespread disengagement from, Athenian political processes (Gauthier promoting 
the former, and Schütrumpf the latter, views)?
31
  Others have debated  whether 
Xenophon was one of a growing movement looking for peace within the Greek world, 
perhaps with a re-focusing of Greek attention towards Persia; or whether he was part 
of a ‘party’ or a looser group of influential citizens looking for ways to overhaul 
financial management.  Some have considered the extent to which the political ethos 
of the text is rooted in the Xenophontic Socrates, pursuing universal citizen 
eudaimonie alongside moral improvement
32
 or whether the true aim was to regain 
leadership of a Greek economic hegemony.
33
  The text has also been used to 
                                                 
28
    Relations with other states: 1.1, suspicion; 5.5-8, the Greeks chose Athens as their leader after the 
Persian wars, and restored that role to her when she restrained from acts of injustice; the Thebans 
and the Spartans both put themselves under Athenian leadership in return for generous treatment; 
5.10, if his schemes succeed, ‘all men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers’ after 
their own country; 6.1, ‘we shall be regarded with more affection by the Greeks, shall live in 
greater security.’ 
29
   1.1. I can find no justification for J. D. Lewis’ suggestion (2009, p. 372) that Xenophon was 
alluding to the ‘ethical poverty’ of the masses. 
30
    Giglioni 1970, p. LXXXVIII. 
31
  Gauthier 1976, Schütrumpf 1982.  
32
  Schorn 2011. 
33
  5.2; Higgins 1977, p. 138. 
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demonstrate aspects of Xenophon’s understanding of the requirements of Socratic 
leadership and the achievement of ‘willing obedience’ from those who are led,34 and 
has been shown as an exemplification of the role of an Athenian orator.
35
  Hobden and 
Tuplin argue that Socrates’ project, as represented by Xenophon, had been to benefit 
his associates and make them better, and that this ethos underpinned Xenophon’s 
writing from first to last.
36
  Stefan Schorn has gone further, suggesting that 
Xenophon’s programmes in the Hiero and the Poroi,  
aim at nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the state along 
the precepts of the Socratic-Xenophontic philosophy.
37
 
We will return to these analyses of the Poroi later in this chapter.  However whilst 
they cannot be overlooked, these interpretations do not form the focus of this work.   
 
1.5   The text, its context and reception 
The following sections will address issues of authorship, dating and the social, 
economic and political circumstances that gave rise to the appearance of the Poroi. 
 
1.5.1   Authorship 
Diogenes Laertius included the Poroi in his list of Xenophon’s works and Xenophon’s 
authorship appears to have been widely accepted in antiquity.
38
  Modern philologists 
have been similarly unified; nevertheless some historians at the end of the nineteenth 
and into the early twentieth century had difficulty equating the resourceful soldier of 
the Anabasis with the putative economist of the Poroi.  These judgements had perhaps 
more to do with modern characterisations of genre than with Xenophon.
39
  The 
Memorabilia after all had shown that the Xenophontic Socrates believed that a would-
be statesman would be well advised to understand state revenues and expenditure, and 
fluctuations in mining receipts
40
 and in the Hiero Simonides remarked that trade 
brings good to a community and advised that a competitive spirit in agriculture would 
                                                 
34
  Gray 2011, on the Poroi, pp. 36-37; willing obedience, pp. 180-196.  
35
  Farrell 2012, p. 290. 
36
  Hobden and Tuplin 2012, p. 22.  
37
  Schorn 2012, p. 702.  
38
  Diog. Laert. 2.57; Ath. 6.272.c; Etym. Magn. 644.4; Men. Rhet. Peri Epideiktikon 3.345.22.  
39
  See Gauthier 1976, pp. 254-257 for the work of editors from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries.  
40
  Gauthier 1976, pp. 2-3; Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.3-12.  
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increase personal incomes.
41
  The Poroi might even be read as a response to 
Xenophon’s own suggestion in the Hiero that the discoverer of a means to make 
money without harm should be honoured by the state, a remarkable foreshadowing of 
some of the issues of the Poroi.
42
  
 
In 1922 Thiel authoritatively established Xenophon’s authorship through a close 
comparison of the subject, vocabulary and style of the Poroi with his other works.
43
  
Nevertheless in 1931, eschewing the philological arguments, Schwahn argued that 
Xenophon could not be the author because the writer of the Poroi was in possession 
of economic information and was moreover clearly a democrat.
44
  Schwahn found 
echoes of the Poroi in Eubulus’s administration of the theoric fund, and instead of 
Xenophon, preferred Eubulus or one of his associates as author, by virtue of his role 
as the promoter of peace at the end of the Social War and as the first statesman with a 
conscious economic policy.
45
  He also identified apparent contradictions between the 
Poroi and the Memorabilia, and in particular suggested that there was an 
irreconcilable problem with the two texts’ respective discussions of the origins of the 
wealth of Nikias – one from mining and the other from leasing slaves.46  But as 
Momigliano pointed out the following year, these were very slight contradictions on 
which to base so confident an assertion,
47
 and in 1934 Wilhelm addressed Schwahn’s 
arguments in some detail,
48
 criticising Schwahn’s assertion that Sosias the Thracian 
was somehow ‘mysterious’ and that Hipponicus and Philemonides were fictitious, 
adducing evidence that Xenophon’s depiction of ancient slave-owning and income 
were supportable.
49
   
 
Rostovtzeff returned in 1941 to the proposition that the work was not by Xenophon, 
                                                 
41
  Xen. Hiero 9.7-10.   
42
    Aristotle also emphasises the importance of an understanding of state income for public life: Rhet. 
1.4.7-8; (1359b19-32); 1.4.11 (1360a12-17). 
43
  Thiel 1922, pp. XIII-XXIII. 
44
  Schwahn 1931, pp. 258-259.  
45
    Schwahn 1931, p. 258. The theoric fund: Ath. Pol.  43.1; and see Rhodes 2013, pp. 219-222.  
46
    Memorabilia 2.5.2; Poroi 4.14. Schwahn also found inconsistencies 1. between Memorabilia 2.7-
2.10 in which Socrates advocates that women should work to support the household, and the tone 
of the Poroi which promotes state support and 2. between the slave price of 180 drachmas on 
which the Poroi relies and the 2 minas mentioned at Memorabilia 2.5.2. But in this passage 
Socrates quotes a wide range of slave prices in order to make a comparison with the varying value 
of friends. 
47
    Momigliano1932, p. 252 n. 1. 
48
    Wilhelm 1934. 
49
    Sosias, Hipponicus and Philemonides, 4.14-15. Schwahn 1931, p. 256; Wilhelm 1934, pp. 20-28.    
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also denying that it could be by Eubulus
50
 and in 1975 Hopper suggested that it was  
a ‘votes-catching’ work from someone on the more lunatic fringe of the 
party of Eubulus.
51
 
But on the whole, in the second half of the twentieth century, on the basis of the 
philological evidence, Cawkwell, Giglioni, Gauthier and Schütrumpf all upheld 
Xenophon’s authorship52 and there has been no recent scholarly dispute. 
 
1.5.2   The date 
The dating of the Poroi has remained relatively uncontroversial for some time.  
Detailed study during the nineteenth century established a consensus that it was 
written in the winter of 355/354, and most twentieth-century commentators including 
Thiel, Delebecque, Giglioni and Gauthier endorsed this view.
53
  In 1955 Sealey 
suggested tentatively that the balance might perhaps be tilted in favour of 346.
54
  A 
robust response by Cawkwell in 1963
55
 probably appeared too late for Thomsen, for 
whom Sealey’s argument cast enough doubt that he thought it safest to disregard the 
Poroi’s references to eisphora in his authoritative survey of the timing of eisphorai 
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.
56
  The issue arose again in a challenge to the 
dating of 355 made by Cataudella in 1984, who argued once more for a date of 346.
57
  
A detailed refutation of Cataudella’s analysis by Bloch in 2004 provided a very useful 
survey of the generally overlooked nineteenth-century scholarship
58
 and most recently 
Schorn has looked again at refining the date to within a matter of months.
59
 
 
The text is scattered with small signposts that have been used to construct or bolster 
the dating question.  The building blocks of the arguments are Xenophon’s references 
to: (1) the cost of slave labour before the events at Decelea of 413,
60
 which we gather 
                                                 
50
    Rostovtzeff 1941, p. 1328, n. 27. 
51
  Mussche, Spitaels and Goemaere-De Poerck 1975, p. 195. 
52
    Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63 n. 91; Giglioni 1970, pp. VII-XI; Gauthier 1976, pp. 1-4 and 256; 
Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 1-2. 
53
    Thiel 1922, pp. VIII-XIII; Delebecque 1957, pp. 470-473; Giglioni 1970, pp. VII-VIII; Gauthier 1976 
pp. 4-6.  
54
    Sealey 1955, p. 76. 
55
    Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63, n. 90.  
56
    Thomsen 1964, p. 231, citing Sealey 1955. 
57
    Cataudella 1984. 
58
  Bloch 2004.  The following survey of the issues draws on Bloch’s very comprehensive analysis.   
59
  Schorn 2006. 
60
  4.25, cf. Thuc. 7.27. 
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a very few of those listening might still be able to remember; (2) recent occasions 
when the Athenians had raised money for troops, dispatching 400 cavalry under 
Lysistratus to support the Arcadians after the Elean attack during the Olympic Games 
in 364 and later sending 6,000 to support Hegesilaus at the Battle of Mantinea in 
362;
61
 (3) the fact that a particular war has just ended,
62
 pinning it either to the end of 
the Social War in 355 or following the negotiation of the Peace of Philokrates with 
Philip II in 346;
63
 (4) peace at sea
64
 and (5) the Phocians’ occupation of Delphi, which 
continued until 346.
65
  Thus at the very least the date falls after the Battle of Mantinea 
in 362, but before it becomes so late that not even elderly Athenians could remember 
the period immediately before the Spartan occupation of Decelea of 413.   
 
Nineteenth-century discussions in favour of 346 had focused, among other points, on 
a reading of 5.9 which appeared to imply that at the point of writing, the Phocians had 
already left Delphi, which they did not do until 346.  As all other signs pointed to the 
end of the Social War, Boeckh dealt with this in 1817 by pushing back the date of 
composition to 356, before the Phocian occupation, on the grounds that the Phocians 
were perpetually laying claim to the administration of Delphi, and that Xenophon 
referred simply to this, rather than to their violent occupation which took place the 
following year.
66
  
 
However in 1871 Madvig proposed a textual emendation at 5.9 from the imperfect 
ἐπειρῶντο to the optative πειρῷντο, thus implying that the possibility of abandonment 
by the Phocians was an uncertain, future event and thereby returning the focus to 355.  
This emendation was widely accepted and maintained by Thiel in 1922.
67
  More 
recently Jansen has argued that the emendation is unnecessary and that the original 
text may still be read in this sense without changing the traditional interpretation.
68
 
                                                 
61
  3.7; cf. Xen. Hellenica. 7.5.3; Diod. Sic. 15.84 and Xen. Hellenica 7.4.29; Diod. Sic. 15.77. 
62
  4.40, 5.12. 
63
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Sealey’s proposal of 1955, which he admitted was inconclusive, was based on the 
suggestion at 5.12 that revenues had increased since the peace at sea, implying that 
peace must have existed long enough for the Athenians to have noticed an increase in 
income, pushing the date to 346 again.  But Cawkwell’s response juxtaposed this one 
sentence against the tenor of the whole work, which is premised around Athenian 
poverty, no longer the case by 346.
69
  
 
In 1984, Cataudella proposed an entirely new argument for 346, based on Xenophon’s 
reference at 4.40 to the raising of eisphorai (i.e. plural) during the late war, and citing 
Isocrates’ On the Peace 8.20 and Demosthenes’ Against Androtion to show that there 
was at most only evidence for the imposition of eisphora on one occasion during the 
Social War.
70
  Brun’s 1983 survey of eisphorai had demonstrated that they were 
imposed four times between 376 and 369 and then twice during the Social War,
71
 and 
as Bloch suggests, Isocrates’ argument, that an advantage of peace would be the 
absence of eisphorai, would be much weaker if there had in fact been no recent 
eisphorai in any case.
72
  Bloch further argues that even if an eisphora had been 
imposed only once during the Social War, Xenophon might have used the plural for 
more vivid effect, implicitly recognising the effect that the wide distribution of the tax 
debt had on a large number of individual citizens.  A further counter to Cataudella’s 
argument lies within Demosthenes’ Against Androtion which Cataudella cites in 
support of his proposal.  Demosthenes refers to three unwelcome choices that faced 
Athenians in 355 after the failure to collect the full eisphora in the previous year – 
either to break up the sacred plate, to impose a fresh tax, or, the option they chose, to 
chase in the outstanding money from the defaulters.
73
  Cataudella argues that this 
shows that an eisphora was imposed only once.
74
  Bloch however contends that it 
would have been perfectly possible for a further tax to have been imposed after this 
choice were made, either later in 356 or in 355, and that given the parlous state of 
Athenian finances this would actually have been quite likely.
75
  As Schorn pointed 
out, by 346 the theoric fund, widely seen as an interpretation of Xenophon’s triobol 
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proposal, had become well established.
76
   
 
Delebecque had also argued for 355, and both he and later Schorn narrowed the date 
still further.  Delebecque proposed autumn or winter 355, shortly after the end of the 
Social War in summer 355, and prior to the offensive by the Phocian general 
Onomarchos of Spring 354, arguing that Onomarchos’ success would have made the 
chance of fruitful arbitration improbable, whilst the intervention of Philip shortly 
afterwards, made it impossible.
77
  Working from Xenophon’s references to the end of 
‘the recent war’78 and the resumption of trade by sea,79 Schorn however argued that 
maritime trade could not have begun again until the spring, when the dual risks of the 
winter seas and military uncertainty were past and the sea was safe for civilian travel.  
Assuming at least a couple of months for the re-establishment of seaborne commerce 
to have become widespread enough for Xenophon to be able to speak of its increase, 
and given that a later date could not be possible because Philip II’s increasing 
expansionism draws no comment from Xenophon, Schorn pinned the text down to 
May/June 354.
80
   
 
But Beresford’s recent study of the high level of technical skills amongst ancient 
mariners and known instances of seafaring outside the generally accepted annual 
spring-through-autumn window has shown that the assumption that Mediterranean 
sailing was not year-round is influenced by the prejudice of ancient writers against 
technical skills in general and against trade in particular.
81
  The argument for dating 
based on maritime trade therefore looks weaker.  Once peace pertained, if sailing were 
possible, it would seem likely that merchants would take the earliest opportunity to 
resume business and optimise the commercial opportunities amongst communities 
who had been deprived of access to externally supplied commodities for some time.  
Even if trade were not yet at its full seasonal peak, an autumnal rise in traffic might 
still have been apparent enough for Xenophon to refer to it, meaning that 
Delebecque’s proposed late 355 remains a fair suggestion. 
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  Schorn 2006, pp. 25-40. 
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  Beresford 2013.  
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1.5.3   Place of composition - Athens 
Xenophon displays a close familiarity with a city whose internal social and economic 
circumstances had changed markedly since his departure at the start of the century.
82
  
As long ago as 1842 Boeckh had argued against other scholars, that 2.7 and 6.1 in 
particular proved that Xenophon returned to Athens from exile.
83
  Diogenes Laertius 
tells us Eubulus proposed his return
84
 and scholarly opinion is generally in favour of 
the view that he must at least have visited Athens after his exile was lifted, perhaps to 
check on his restored family estates.
85
  Most recently Jansen has argued in some detail 
for a return to Athens between 366/5 and 362, noting Xenophon’s engagement with 
her leading figures; circumstances such as Athens’ unfriendly relations with Corinth, 
Xenophon’s last documented residence; that Xenophon’s sons Gryllus and Diodoros 
could only have served in the Athenian cavalry at Mantinea if they had been Athenian 
citizens, and specifically, that Xenophon’s use of spatial and temporal vocabulary in 
the Poroi situates the composition of the text within the city.
86
  
 
 
1.5.4   The context – external relations 
Probably in 358/7,
87
 maintaining her anti-Thebes policy of recent years, Athens 
involved herself unsuccessfully in the internal strife of Euboea, supporting the 
Eretrian tyrant Plutarch in opposition to Thebes.
88
  Meanwhile her onetime allies in 
the Second Athenian Confederacy, Rhodes, Kos and Chios, took the opportunity of 
this Athenian preoccupation and revolted, supported by Byzantium and Mausolus of 
Caria.
89
  The war which followed, probably over at least three years, involved the 
mobilisation of substantial Athenian and allied forces, beginning with a siege and 
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naval blockade of Byzantium supported by sixty ships, in the course of which the 
Athenian naval commander Chabrias was killed.  A further sixty Athenian ships were 
then dispatched, with Timotheus and Iphicrates sent to support Chares, who was 
already in command of the Athenian infantry.  The rebel states and their allies sacked 
Imbros and Lemnos and lay waste the countryside of Samos, besieging the city and 
ravaging other islands loyal to Athens in order to raise funds to further their 
campaign.  Athenian plans for a naval engagement at Embata near Erythrae went awry 
due to inclement weather, and the resulting recriminations led to the recall and 
prosecution of Timotheus, Iphicrates, and his son Menestheus, leaving Chares in lone 
command.  Now needing to fund the continuing campaign, Chares entered into an 
arrangement with the rebel Satrap Artabazus, putting his forces at Artabazus’ disposal 
in a victorious battle (which Chares proclaimed to be as great a victory as Marathon)
90
 
against the army of the Great King in return for a generous reward.  This short-term 
advantage however proved to be a long-term misjudgement, as the King expressed his 
displeasure and threatened to weigh in on the side of the rebels to the extent of three 
hundred ships.  Combined with the fall of Amphipolis, Pydna and Potideia to Philip in 
357,
91
 Athens found herself financially exhausted and militarily outplayed, and the 
Athenian assembly had little option but to make terms in 355/4.    
 
It is unsurprising that this combination of political and economic circumstances led to 
the appearance of both the Poroi and Isocrates’ On the Peace and there is no reason to 
suppose that there may not have been other pamphleteers reflecting dismay at Athens’ 
predicament and offering solutions.  We cannot be sure that the ‘dramatic date’ of On 
the Peace was the actual time of writing,
92
 but it purports at least to be written in 355 
just as the terms of peace were in negotiation.  Isocrates refers to ‘proposals which 
have been put before you by the prytaneis’93 although the suggestion that these 
proposals were drafted by Eubulus, based on the scholia to Demosthenes’ Third 
Olynthiac, does not bear scrutiny.
94
  Sometimes described as a ‘companion piece’ to 
the Poroi,
95
 On the Peace offers a different perspective on the recent war and relations 
with Greek and non-Greek states.  Isocrates analyses Athenian actions and compares 
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them to those of their ancestors both when under threat from the Persians and at the 
outset of the Delian League, calling for piety, moderation, justice and virtue in her 
relations with other states.  Unlike Xenophon, Isocrates argues that there is a moral 
imperative for the exercise of these qualities which will in themselves lead to 
beneficial ends.
96
  For Farrell, the biggest difference between the two works is that 
where Isocrates simply advocates peace and chastises the demos, Xenophon makes a 
practical plan for future action once peace is achieved.
97
  Nevertheless, both are united 
in giving a clear impression that thanks to the recent wars, Athens has been 
abandoned by her regular visitors and that there is an urgent need to attract traders 
back to the city.
98
  
 
1.5.5   The context – internal politics and finances 
There is a wealth of datable sources for both Athenian state and individual activity in 
the 350s, much of it focused either on interstate relations or internal economics.  
Political and legislative activity for which we have evidence ranges from the trial of 
the three generals after Embata,
99
 to a series of measures designed to shore up state 
revenue which provide the immediate backdrop to Xenophon’s proposals.  Athenian 
income in the year that the Poroi was written may have been as low as 130 talents,
100
 
compared with 1,000 talents at the start of the Peloponnesian War,
101
 from which the 
expenses of Athens’ many festivals, her army, navy and political and judicial offices 
were all met.
102
  The extant poletai leases from the period 367-350 for the Attic silver 
mines show only levels of activity which, when compared with the next twenty-five 
years, demonstrate that full capacity was not being reached.
103
  The integrity of her 
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silver coinage was an essential aspect of the strength of Athens’ trading power, but in 
374, forged coins of inferior silver content, probably struck abroad, had become a 
sufficient problem that legislation was required to weed them out in order to reinstate 
confidence.
104
  In 363, Athenian coinage may well have been recalled and restruck in 
order to extract a 3% or 5% minting fee from those holding coined wealth in larger 
denominations.
105
  In 361, Timotheus had been forced to pay part of the military costs 
of taking towns in Chalcidice himself, although trierarchs providing their own 
equipment were not necessarily uncommon.
106
  A general assessment of 378 had 
suggested that total citizen property was valued at 5,750 talents,
107
 and taxation 
through the eisphora, imposed frequently after 378/7, would, if met in full, have 
yielded 200 talents on each occasion.
108
  But eisphorai were not being fully 
collected
109
 and some of the wealthy were additionally defaulting on their liturgical 
duties.  Already by the late fifth century one trierarchy had been frequently shared by 
two men or more, and in 358/7 it had been necessary to introduce legislation to 
compel incoming trierarchs to recover equipment appropriated by their 
predecessors.
110
  The same year a law of Periander had attempted to tighten up a 
‘general attitude of leniency towards naval defaulters’111 by instituting twenty 
symmories of sixty citizens each, spreading the burden over larger numbers of citizens 
who would bear a financial role in the support of the trierarchs,
112
 but deficiencies 
continued and there is evidence of the use of increasingly heavy handed measures and 
even violence in the attempt to extract payment.
113
  In 357/6 there was not enough 
equipment in the dockyards to fit out an emergency force,
114
 and anyone refusing to 
sell their naval equipment to the state might be threatened with the confiscation of 
their property.
115
  Of 283 state-owned ships, only 89 could be fully equipped by the 
end of the year.
116
  The epimeletai (naval commissioners’) record of 356/5 is a 
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remarkable witness to the detail and complexity of the state’s naval administration, as 
more meticulous (or more permanent) record keeping was introduced, supporting the 
impression that trierarchs were increasingly failing to return their vessels with a full 
complement of equipment at the end of each year.
117
  In the same year the boule failed 
in its obligation to ensure the provision of new ships after the treasurer for trireme-
building had apparently absconded with the money.
118
  This inability or unwillingness 
to pay on the part of the wealthy affected the lower classes who traditionally relied on 
naval service as a source of income; the discrepancies between the sizeable number of 
state-owned triremes and the numbers of manned ships actually available in times of 
military need may be a reflection of the under-funding of the navy.
119
  The greater 
availability of salaried naval posts during periods of conflict may have affected thetic 
opinions when it came to assembly votes for military action,
120
 and in that sense the 
Poroi is a remarkable re-focussing of those tensions, reversing the push to war in 
pursuit of income to a push for income in pursuit of peace.  
 
An enquiry of 356/5 occasioned by Aristophon directed anyone who knew of sacred 
or public money in private hands to give information to a commission.
121
  The same 
year, Leptines introduced a law which removed exemption from financial service 
from all except the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, with the intention that 
all the wealthiest would be obliged to perform liturgies.
122
  Even whilst attacking this 
law the following year, the young Demosthenes admitted of a scenario in which it 
would be plausible to speak of the treasury being empty
123
 and by 352, Demosthenes 
would himself make the accusation that the Athenian treasury did not have the 
reserves to cover even a day’s emergency expenditure.124 
 
The year after the Poroi was written, Demosthenes called for reforms to Periander’s 
law which would increase the symmories from the original 1,200 to 2,000, to take 
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account of the losses from the list caused by discounting ineligible categories such as 
wards and orphans, in order to leave a true twelve hundred to share the burden.
125
  In 
the same speech Demosthenes was to urge restraint against those who were alarmed 
by rumours of Persian naval preparations, proposing that rather than face a further 
eisphora, private wealth should remain in the hands of its owners ‘for the benefit of 
the state.’126   
 
For perhaps the first time in the classical era, the economic interests of mass and elite 
in relation to the pursuit of arche no longer coincided.
127
  Crediting Eubulus with 
policies which may even have averted stasis, Badian has argued that the Athenian 
demos clung to the ‘ghost of empire’ long after the wealthy had recognised that their 
former foreign landholdings were irrevocably lost and that war reduced their personal 
wealth without increasing Athenian prosperity.
128
  Furthermore, whilst land-
ownership remained an essential factor in assessment for individual taxation and for 
military and political participation,
129
 the breadth of alternative sources of personal 
wealth made available with the fifth-century expansion of empire may have led to 
tensions between the traditional liturgical class and those whose more liquid assets 
were trickier to assess.
130
  Demosthenes’ apparent defence of the wealthy elite early in 
his career may be reflective of the tensions evolving in the city around these issues.
131
  
Simply further squeezing the rich was not a long-term solution, and an aspect of 
Xenophon’s presentational skill in the Poroi is that he addresses the whole of the 
Athenian citizenry without apparent differentiation, whilst offering each individual 
class what it most wants to hear.  He recognises the political need to provide regular 
support for the poor, offers improved opportunities in commerce for the 
entrepreneurial individual of modest or greater means, and situates his major scheme 
within the traditional elite comfort zones of the silver mining industry and slave-
ownership.   
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This immediate topicality in the Poroi implies a commentator sensitively in touch 
with the city’s urgent financial position and the social, political and military 
implications of making the right – or wrong – choices, suggesting that Xenophon was 
more open to innovative solutions than his younger contemporary.  From the 
frequency and enormity of these legislative measures we quickly begin to see why 
Xenophon chose to focus so intently on state finances.   
 
This leads us to note, importantly, what we do not have.  Despite a wealth of 
information about the sources of income (if often and frustratingly lacking associated 
figures), aside from very occasional references, we lack a full understanding of the 
way that the Athenians perceived the management of their state’s finances, or detail as 
to the administrative processes of legislating, accounting and auditing.  Seventy years 
earlier Athenians had been accustomed to seeing tribute literally paraded in front of 
them and Athena’s share inscribed in stone.132  By the mid-fourth century without this 
very public income, other sources of revenue had become more important and gross 
figures may have been less easily accessible, because their diverse nature caused them 
to be recorded separately at several different sites.  Only a small proportion of citizens 
will have had an opportunity to be even briefly involved in the detailed administration 
of state finances as they took their turn as bouleutes, and it would have taken a degree 
of determination to acquire the information and experience necessary for a holistic 
assessment of the way the state was managing her finances.
133
  For the period after the 
Athenian Tribute Lists we have only very infrequent allusions to levels of state 
reserves or income.  Because these references are usually made at times of difficulty, 
they tend to convey an impression of ad hoc financial crisis management rather than 
considered policy.
134
   
 
But from the context in which the figures appear, Athenians clearly knew that 130 
talents was a poor annual income and 400 talents substantially better,
135
 and although 
the principles and procedures behind any long term financial planning are harder to 
judge, the funding of the city’s activities was sophisticated.  From at least early in the 
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fourth century there was a process of μερισμόϛ, the allocation of monies throughout 
the year by the ἀποδέκται, ‘receivers’ of income, into individual funds such as the 
stratiotic and theoric funds,
136
 a system which implies some level of budgeting against 
which the apodektai could make their distributions.
137
  Individual citizens could make 
proposals regarding the merismos but they would first have to navigate them past the 
nomothetai and the boule.  Later, men appointed ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει may have had 
particular responsibility to make such suggestions,
138
 but again the implication is that 
there was a sufficient accumulation of oversight of city finances amongst these 
various post-holders to weed out the less providential proposals.  The treasurers of 
some funds were elected rather than appointed by lot, and the post of theoric treasurer, 
probably established shortly after the Poroi was written, became particularly 
powerful, receiving all the surplus funds of the other treasuries.  Eubulus’ popular 
distribution of the theoric fund during his tenure of the post has been seen as a 
fulfilment of Xenophon’s triobol proposal.139 
 
Xenophon makes references to forward planning, reminding his readers that in 
peacetime large revenues had been received which were all spent in wartime, and 
suggesting that state administration costs should be reduced to the level of income 
previously raised by peacetime taxation (ie, without eisphora income) in order that a 
surplus may be accrued as a result of the additional income that will be raised through 
encouraging metics and merchants.
140
  The neccessity of a balanced equivalence 
between income and expenditure cannot have been a revelation, and it is difficult to 
judge whether or not he is proposing something radically new.  At the very least, 
however, Xenophon’s suggestion implies that the structures are in place for a review 
of future budgets and a planned restraint in expenditure to within predetermined 
levels.   
 
Despite the rich snapshot of Athenian economic life that the sources supply, we must, 
as always, be on our guard for the political dispositions and personal enmities that 
colour some of the activities described in our sources.  Equally importantly, those 
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activities must be placed in a context that recognises the continuity and fluidity of 
economic and political change.  Of central importance in the Greek world, the 
popularity of Piraeus as a market had been noted before;
141
 Athens was to intervene in 
Euboea again as soon as 349/8
142
 and, as Gauthier points out, the problem of ‘the 
poverty of the masses’ was hardly a new one.143  It is usual to begin discussions of the 
Poroi with a statement to the effect that it was written as Athens emerged from the 
Social War in financial crisis.
144
  Such a statement may then be counterpointed with a 
discussion of events enacted during the years that followed, such as the rebuilding of 
Piraeus, the increase of mining activity or the granting of honours to non-Athenians, 
in order to show the extent to which Xenophon may have been in touch with, or may 
even have influenced, leading politicians such as Eubulus, or else was verging to a 
greater - or lesser - degree on a breakthrough in economic thought.  Bracketing the 
Poroi with Isocrates’ On the Peace strengthens the implication that a turning point 
had been reached.
145
  But this approach can imply that events somehow came to a 
standstill whilst Xenophon (with or without Eubulus) deliberated, and Attica held its 
breath.  It quite possibly overestimates the significance that this piece of Xenophon’s 
writing held for his contemporaries.  Cawkwell rightly points out that Athens’ 
immediate financial difficulties were more likely a result of longer term military and 
economic events than the effect of a single war of perhaps only twenty months.
146
   
We will explore the extent to which Xenophon’s proposals seem to have taken life 
during the years that followed the writing of the Poroi, but it is important to see these 
ideas as only a part of a series of changes which had begun much earlier.  The many 
initiatives of the 350s are testimony both to economic difficulty and to individual 
ingenuity and Xenophon was not the first citizen to try to address Athenian finances.  
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Nor was he the only Athenian to recognise that those revenue-producing merchants 
and metics who were important to her economic vitality had largely abandoned the 
city.
147
  What Xenophon attempted to reach in the Poroi was a synthesis of social, 
political and economic activity that recognised the specific needs and circumstances 
of the many strata of Athenian society and planned to use their interconnectedness to 
manage change.   
 
1.5.6   Xenophon’s audience 
Whilst we cannot know the circumstances in which the Poroi was first presented or 
received, we may make inferences from the text as to those it was intended to reach.  
Discussing the Hellenica and citing the Poroi as evidence, Tuplin points out that the 
most interested and sizeable readership was to be found in Athens.
148
  A natural first 
audience might have been a group of like-minded elite citizens such as a hetaireia, not 
necessarily in the sense of the supporters of a leading politician, but a circle of 
acquaintances, ‘who met for drink, talk, amusement and political jobbery.’149  Farrell 
has demonstrated the ways the text evidences Xenophon’s place within a tradition of 
Attic orators,
150
 whilst Jansen has argued that it was a bouleutic text produced for 
colleagues with whom Xenophon was already in collaboration and circulated by 
pamphlet.  Jansen lists Adams’ categories of men for whom such a pamphlet might 
have been useful: those wishing to propagate doctrine that could not be discussed 
openly, those without access to the bema, those wishing to reach a small reading class 
with ideas that demanded greater deliberative thought than could be expressed in the 
assembly, and those wishing to influence public opinion abroad.  He argues 
convincingly that the Poroi was intended to be read rather than ‘performed’ and 
suggests that Xenophon’s target audience  was a small reading class who could 
deliberate his ideas.
151
  We will however return to these categories in due course.   
 
Unlike his other work, which may have been written with a Spartan as well as an 
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Athenian audience in mind,
152
 the addressees here seem clear.  Xenophon writes self-
confidently in the first person; as it has come down to us, ‘I’ is the first word of the 
text.
153
  He may never say ὦ ἄνδρεϛ Ἀθηναῖοι but he uses the first person plural 
continuously throughout, identifying himself as an Athenian, placing himself within 
the citizenry,
154
 adding immediacy of place and sharing his vision with his fellow 
citizens.  It is those citizens, after all, who would benefit from his proposals and who 
held the power to enact them.  Thiel saw it as an imaginary speech to the assembly,
155
 
and Gauthier maintained that Xenophon only considered his plans from the point of 
view of Athenian citizens, albeit having to make concessions thanks to a dichotomy 
between the homines politici who would vote for them and the homines oeconomici 
who would have to fund them.
156
  But as we look more closely at the proposals and 
the individuals whose participation would be vital for their fulfilment, we may see that 
Xenophon is aware that many classes of free men, Athenian and others, would need to 
engage actively in his projects and would only do so if they had confidence in the 
likelihood of a successful outcome.  Xenophon refers directly to many categories of 
free men (and once, to women
157).  ‘Athenians’ figure prominently: as active 
participants in his schemes; as vicarious owners of slaves via the state, and as passive 
recipients of τροφή.158  But they are also described within their formal political and 
military categories: as citizens, οἱ πολῖται159 and τοῖς ἀστοῖς;160 as councillors, τῇ 
βουλῇ;161 as treasurers, τῷ δημοσίῳ;162 as members of the ten tribes, the δέκα 
φυλαί,163 as hoplites, cavalry and patrolling the countryside, ὁπλίτας, ἱππέων, 
περιπόλων,164 as torch race superintendents, ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι and as 
peltasts and those on garrison duty, οἵ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις οἵ τε 
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πελτάζειν.165  Political appointees - τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ166 - would play an 
important role in managing mercantile disputes and two entirely new boards are 
proposed for the promotion of metic settlement and the maintenance of peace.
167
  It is 
clear that these proposals are to be carried out entirely within the democratic 
mechanisms of the city and will be ‘guaranteed by the polis, which is to all 
appearances the safest and most durable of human institutions.’168  If any citizen had 
harboured a lingering doubt as to Xenophon’s oligarchic tendencies, his language is 
reassuring. 
   
Athenian working men also populate the text, such as farmers, coppersmiths and iron 
workers
169
 whose professions are used to illustrate general truths and whose presence 
engenders a sense of inclusiveness of all ranks of the citizenry.  Undoubtedly then the 
Poroi was written for and about Athens and her citizens.  In the opening paragraph 
wider categories set the scene; the many poor, τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν, the leading 
men of Athens, οἱ προστάται and all other men, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.  Those who 
are to be helped, the poor; and those who should provide solutions, the leading men; 
are posed against a generality of all other men who set a standard of justness against 
which Athenians are measured, and indeed are found wanting.  Athenians having just 
been defined as the combination of the leading men and the masses, the implication 
here is that those ‘other men’ who are judging Athenian behaviour must be non-
Athenian.  Thus in his very opening Xenophon sets up Athenians to be judged by 
outsiders and in particular by the Greek world.
170
  Some of these outsiders will play a 
pivotal role in his plans as providers of revenue and it is instructive to see how 
Xenophon talks about them. 
 
Non-Athenians appear frequently.  Kings, tyrants and satraps are likely to be attracted 
to invest in the city and receive her honours.
171
  Such high-status foreigners might be 
unlikely to move to Athens, but resident aliens are to be an important source of 
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income through the metic tax.
172
  Barbarians may be troublesome for other Greek 
states who share borders with them but in Athens metics such as Lydians, Phrygians, 
Syrians and even the stateless are to be encouraged, relieved of certain unwelcome 
military duties and given privileges which will encourage them to settle and trade.
173
  
Metics should have unwelcome disadvantages removed and merchants should be 
treated with consideration;
174
 this is neither the language of exploitation nor of 
exclusivity. 
 
Gauthier writes that Xenophon deplored the presence of non-Greeks in Athens
175
 but 
it is hard to square this with his encouragement of non-Greeks to invest,
176
 his neutral 
reference to the state having opened up mining to foreigners, and his suggestion that 
foreigners might become managers.
177
  Nowhere does he specify that he only intends 
Greek metics and Greek foreigners to participate.  If Xenophon found barbarians too 
numerous, it seems unlikely that he would have offered them the opportunity to serve 
in the cavalry, a proposal he had also made in On the Cavalry Commander where he 
spoke highly of the reputation of foreign contingents in other cavalries.
178
  Although 
he suggests freeing non-Athenians from the requirement for hoplite service this is 
presented as a benefit to them and he simply says that it would be an ornament to the 
state if the hoplite force consisted only of citizens.  Gauthier’s suggestion elsewhere, 
that barbarians did not make good hoplites
179
 seems explanation enough, without the 
need to extrapolate the passage to a wider comment on non-Greeks in Athenian 
society.   
 
Nevertheless, thus far the Athenian/non Athenian opposition is clear.  What is 
remarkable is the number of instances when Athenian and foreigner are lined up side 
by side, or even indistinguishable.  Xenophon’s proposals are not for a state-run 
industry; they are instead about bolstering the support needed by entrepreneurs, 
Athenian and others, to encourage the generation of income.  This entails that a 
detailed understanding of the risks and difficulties of those enterprises, mining and 
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maritime trade, is essential in order to provide support systems that will promote them 
and to persuade his listeners that the proposals will be effective.  Tentative mine 
operators, not necessarily Athenians, are offered de facto financial support; the state 
will meet the initial purchase cost of slaves, reducing the capital outlay and risk 
inherent in large-scale acquisitions of manpower at the outset of an enterprise.  The 
state has already opened mining to foreigners and given them equality of taxation 
(isoteleia) with citizens
180
 and many, both Athenians and foreigners, would gladly 
become managers of mines.
181
  Individual private operators (οἱ ἰδιῶται, οἱ περὶ τὰ 
μέταλλα) are not defined by their origins but by their occupation.182  The backgrounds 
of other tradesmen are similarly ambiguous.  The ship-owners and merchants who are 
to be encouraged to unload their goods in Piraeus are foreigners who have a choice of 
ports against which Athens must compete,
183
 but improved facilities and a wider range 
of incoming goods similarly encourage Athenian traders, importers and captains.  
Such incentives would equally benefit citizens and non-citizens.  Xenophon moves on 
to discuss places of exchange in Piraeus and market facilities in the asty through 
proposals that are again attractive both to the foreigner and to the Athenian listener 
who will also benefit from a wider range of commodities available for sale.
184
 
 
Beyond such recipients, there may be yet another audience.  Having established in his 
opening that Athens is perceived as unjust towards other cities, Xenophon 
demonstrates that past Athenian hegemony has been gained through goodwill and lost 
through arrogance.
185
  In the Memorabilia he had argued that  
many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who 
can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided 
power of persuasion.  And such a man has no occasion to shed blood: for who 
would rather take a man’s life than have a live and willing follower?186  
This idea of the use of persuasion rather than force to attract willing followers is 
central to the Poroi.  Xenophon’s vision is not pacifist, but it does describe a non-
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aggressive state which seeks to entice rather than to dominate other poleis.  Whilst he 
admits of the possibility of future wars, any adversary is left unnamed, referred to, if 
at all, simply as ‘the enemy’,187 and his ambition is that the other Greek states will one 
day pray for Athenian safety.
188
  His final proposal concerns a pan-Hellenic sanctuary 
and concurrent with the avowed appeal for divine approval, is self-evidently destined, 
subject to the endorsement of his fellow citizens, to reach a pan-Hellenic audience 
through Athenian embassies dispatched for the purpose.
189
  Through the medium of 
his text, Xenophon reconfigures interstate relationships by positioning Athens as a 
peaceable, devout, prosperous and attractive city that is generous to her allies and has 
learned lessons from her past behaviour.  
  
Let us return to Jansen’s discussion of the various potential recipients of pamphlets 
such as the Poroi.
190
  Given the recognition of interstate issues, the intensive appeal to 
non-Athenian Greeks and to non-Greeks, and the success with which his proposals are 
focused to appeal to all groups, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that, to the 
extent that wider dissemination were practicable (an important caveat), his paper is 
aimed at a very general readership and we may not exclude the intention to influence 
public opinion abroad.  It seems likely that Xenophon had in mind both a domestic 
and a foreign audience.  His language is non-coercive and open and is as focused on 
attracting individual entrepreneurs from the wider Greek world and beyond as it is on 
persuading his fellow citizens to adopt his ideas.  Presenting his schemes solely from 
the viewpoint of those citizens who would benefit, would risk making them appear 
exploitative, and it is a remarkable aspect of Xenophon’s worldview that he 
encompassed so many different perspectives.  
 
Seen in this way the Poroi emerges as a complex and multi-layered text which 
addresses both a domestic and foreign audience.  Within the Athenian citizenry, the 
wealthy, apparently struggling under the burden of recent taxation and liturgies, are 
enticed by the prospect of relief from the expense of war; the poor can anticipate 
sharing the profits of mining through their tribes
191
 and ultimately may expect to be in 
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receipt of daily τροφή, whilst mercantile and mining opportunities will be opened up 
for the entrepreneur.  Non-Athenians are offered the possibility of honours and 
privileges, relief from certain military services and profit through trading 
opportunities supported by a better legal and physical market infrastructure.  The 
language towards non-Greeks is equally friendly; Xenophon distances Athens from 
those Greek states who have poor relations with their barbarian neighbours and offers 
those barbarians the same opportunities that are available to Greeks.  He avoids 
presenting his proposals as solely exploitative of the skills and taxation potential of 
non-Athenians in the way that he might do if he were only talking to fellow citizens.  
In order to establish that they have potential for success Xenophon has assessed his 
propositions from the point of view of these non-Athenians.  The engagement of long-
term resident metics is essential; they might well be expected to hear or read 
Xenophon’s ideas and to provide an influential, if non-voting, opinion.  To secure 
their economic participation they would have to be persuaded by the arguments from 
their inception.  Nothing in the text is overtly discriminating towards these vital 
elements in Athenian society, who are presented as valuable contributors to be 
honoured and encouraged to settle in the asty.
192
 
 
Beyond these individual recipients of his arguments, the ship-owners, mine operators 
and importers, we may also discern a broader appeal.  As we have seen, there is a 
repositioning of Athens in relation to other states.  A revitalised Athens is presented as 
friendly and peaceable rather than exploitative and aggressive.  Sensible precautions 
for war may be inevitable, but no potential enemy is identified, not even the Persians, 
ever the traditional Greek rallying point,
193
 then holding the balance of power.  Even 
were the proposals not taken up, an idea of a different Athens, sensitive to her past 
errors and open to future alliances, has begun to be created.  In this sense, Xenophon’s 
further audience is the broader population of the Greek and non-Greek world in an era 
when all her relationships were once more being reassessed.  
 
1.6   Earlier scholarship 
The many evaluative comments made by scholars about Xenophon and the Poroi, 
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which range from ‘fantastic’ (Cawkwell)194 to ‘the Father of Economics’ (Doty)195 
tend to reflect the political and scholarly obsessions of their times whilst mirroring the 
evolution of the wider assessment of Xenophon’s writing, and it is difficult not to 
sympathise with Noreen Humble’s dismay at the ‘still all too common tendency to 
criticize Xenophon for what he has not done.’196  For the admirer of Xenophon, there 
is a sort of grim pleasure in reporting some of the ruder verdicts that have been 
pronounced on the Poroi in the past: ‘corruption or graft in its most odious form’ from 
Andreades in 1933 is particularly worthy of repetition.
197
  Looking more widely at 
Xenophon’s corpus however, modern scholars are now finding him a more subtle and 
complex writer.
198
  Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship had 
concentrated particularly on the economic viability of Xenophon’s proposals and on 
textual issues, dating and authorship,
199
 whilst the scholarship of the later twentieth-
and early twenty-first centuries has tended to assess the quality of his economic 
thought, to appraise his political motivation and to look for the philosophical 
underpinning of the work.   
 
The Poroi has frequently been the object of conflicting interpretations.  Given the 
brief and at times allusory nature of the text, it is inevitable that contextualisation has 
played a heavy role in eliciting useful readings.  Two very recent studies have found 
Xenophon in the Poroi to be both anti-imperialist, and not anti-imperialist.
200
  Further 
back, Gauthier and Schütrumpf argued for widely different interpretations of 
Xenophon’s motives in introducing a triobol payment, on the one hand as a support to 
democratic participation and the other, as a suppressant of it.
201
  A surface reading 
may not always provide the richest interpretation, but such conflicts argue for a 
careful analysis of what is actually in the text, and acknowledgement of those points 
where references are too fleeting for useful enlargement.   
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1.6.1   Economic debates  
Given that my interest lies particularly in what the Poroi can reveal of ancient 
Athenian economic understanding, a study of secondary literature also requires 
recognition of the substantial body of late twentieth-century discussion on the nature 
of the classical economy, much of which sprang from the opposing ‘primitivist’ and 
‘modernist’ models, and took its energy predominantly from the 1973 publication of 
Moses Finley’s The Ancient Economy.202  Building on the work of Max Weber203 and, 
more recently, Karl Polanyi,
204
 Finley argued for an anthropologically situated model 
of the antique Mediterranean economy that saw levels of economic activity controlled 
by social and political factors – ‘embedded’ in cultural attitudes to trade and ideas of 
individual status.  These prioritised agriculture, leading to limited technological 
innovation and growth, with activity based around small-scale agricultural production 
for home and local consumption with little inter-regional exchange or competitive or 
interdependent markets.
205
  The quest for profit existed, but 
… the citizen-élite were not prepared in sufficient numbers, to carry on those 
branches of the economy without which neither they nor their communities 
could live at the level to which they were accustomed.  The élite possessed the 
resources and the political power, they could also command a large personnel. 
They lacked the will; that is to say, they were inhibited as a group (whatever 
the responses of a minority), by over-riding values.
206
   
This oft-quoted assertion was made in relation to the management of both the 
Athenian corn trade and Roman provincial tax collection, and whilst Finley was 
careful to admit always of exceptions (indeed The Ancient Economy is a more 
nuanced text than some of his detractors might at times suggest), one of the 
difficulties of his approach is that it intentionally creates a model over a wide 
geographical area and a lengthy time span, neither of which, on closer examination, 
necessarily offers the unity of environmental, social or political circumstance implied 
by the suggestion that ‘in its final centuries the ancient world was a single political 
unit, [with a] common cultural psychological framework’.207   
 
This more sophisticated development of the ‘primitivist’ model became known as 
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substantivism and had itself been in part a response to the work of modernist 
economic historians such as Rostovtzeff
208
 whose tendency to identify economic 
phenomena in contemporary terms was an approach which subsequently developed 
into formalism, succinctly described by Cartledge as a view of the ancient economy as  
a functionally segregated and independently instituted sphere of activity with 
its own profit maximising, want-satisfying logic and rationality, less 
‘developed’ no doubt than any modern economy but nevertheless recognisably 
similar in kind.’209   
Such a very brief overview of a complex debate is inevitably only a limited 
introduction and cannot begin to do justice to the vast amount of intensive discussion 
that has taken place even over the last forty years or so.  But for our present purposes 
it serves to describe the way that these differing vantage points inevitably colour the 
way that scholars have both understood Xenophon’s work and have taken its details as 
supporting evidence for one or other viewpoint.  It also underlines the necessity for 
care in our choice of terminology.  Athenian economic activities look remarkably like 
ours and the use of modern economists’ terms such as ‘profit maximisation’ and 
‘capital’ may be inescapable when processes that are familiar to us today are clearly 
seen at work in fourth-century Greece.  But that is not to assume that it is appropriate 
to map modern capitalist or utilitarian theory on to ancient evidence.
210
  Economic 
terms, in both Athenian and contemporary society, may be ethically value-laden or 
evoke wider, modern associations which do not necessarily marry with ancient 
understanding or practice.  Similarly, using the modern economy as a yardstick 
inevitably sets up the ancient world to fall short of evaluative, developmental staging 
points which do not always help us to understand processes as they actually took place 
on a daily basis.  Conversely, whilst it would be foolish to attempt to define an entire 
economic system on the basis of one brief text, it is noteworthy that many of the 
patterns of behaviour, both social and economic, that have formed the basis for 
scholarly opinions on all sides of the debate about the nature of the ancient economy, 
are both described and challenged by Xenophon, making it all the more remarkable 
that the text has been so frequently dismissed.  Xenophon presupposes that certain 
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economic choices might be made due to considerations of honour and status
211
 but his 
entire project assumes that at least some Athenian and non-Athenian individuals will 
be motivated by consideration of the acquisition of wealth through means unrelated to 
land, many of them taking up individual and shared enterprises.  This does not 
necessarily entail that we are looking at a ‘utilitarian’ economy where profit is the 
only motivator, if indeed such an economy exists anywhere.  However it is 
noteworthy that all of Xenophon’s proposals will fail if there are not sufficient ship 
owners, ship-builders, merchants, retailers, slave traders, mine operators, smelters, 
timber suppliers and a myriad providers of ancillary services to the mining industry, 
with not only the available surplus but the commercial nous to extend their operations 
when profitable opportunities open up for them.  We will explore the varied facets of 
the silver industry as they relate to the Poroi in chapter 2.  On the other hand, at least 
some of those operators (some foreign merchants and some resident metics) may be 
swayed in their trading choices by additional, non-profit considerations such as the 
comfort and convenience of harbour and market facilities and the opportunity to 
receive honours such as theatre seats and hospitality.  Status considerations, yes, but 
certainly not confined to the ancient economy - what twentyfirst-century client has not 
made commercial choices on the back of an excellent lunch courtesy of a supplier, or 
a free seat at a sponsor’s gala night?  At a first glance we may judge that no Athenian 
citizen is necessarily required personally to enter a mine, involve themselves in 
commerce or undertake manual labour in order to benefit financially from a scheme 
which relies on investment by citizens in the (largely unfree) labour of others.  But as 
we see from the list of suppliers above, it is untenable to believe that Athenian citizens 
should not be involved in many of the industries necessary for its success.
212
 
 
Mining may have been open to metics
213
 but the majority of fourth-century mine 
leaseholders and associated operators were, and remained, Athenian.
214
  The eventual 
outcomes of Xenophon’s schemes may be the funding of state beneficence with the 
objective of inter-state peace, but they are dependent on profit-seeking individuals for 
their fulfilment.  The motivations of those individuals may be complex and we should 
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avoid unnecessary simplicity in our analysis.   
 
1.6.2   Scholarship overview 
In 1842 Boeckh’s severe criticism centred on Xenophon’s proposals for metics, which 
he believed would have put Athenians in a perpetual state of war, with noble families 
becoming extinct whilst metics appropriated all the land and wealth and lived in 
security.
 215
  Boeckh’s emphases on the purity of the nobility and the usurious 
practices of foreigners betray the ethos of an earlier age and a difference in critical 
textual approach; only Xenophon’s ‘exhortation to peace’ is found to be ‘entirely 
unobjectionable.’216  Elsewhere Boeckh’s criticism is of the point picked up perhaps 
most consistently by commentators, Xenophon’s delusory expectation that the silver 
resources of the Laurion would never run out.
217
  But Boeckh is ultimately reconciled 
to Xenophon’s ‘sincere conviction and earnestness’218 and he uses the Poroi to 
support his essay on the operation of the Athenian silver mines, also drawing on visits 
to the region by Hobhouse.
219
  Lewis’ English edition of 1842 added further 
information from the visits of Dodswell and Wordsworth,
220
 and although later 
supplanted by Ardaillon and then Conophagos,
221
 Boeckh’s essay remains in many 
respects a coherent analysis of the operation of the silver mines in antiquity. 
 
A hundred years later, Andreades took issue with Boeckh’s strictures, emphasising 
that the financial basis for some of Xenophon’s arguments was sound and maintaining 
that the economic benefits of attracting more metics were unquestionable.
222
  For 
Andreades, the Poroi reflected the views of an oligarchic party whose programme 
involved, ‘the bribing of the populace,’223 making the triobol scheme ‘repugnant to 
our sentiments;’ again as with Boeckh, revealing contemporary attitudes.  Despite 
admiration for his economic skills, Andreades cannot hide a distaste for Xenophon’s 
central scheme, and he makes the unlikely suggestion that one of the reasons it was 
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216
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never put in place was the Athenians’ ‘instinctive humane feelings’ which would have 
rejected the idea of industrial exploitation of slaves, with its Laconising 
implications.
224
 
 
Hasebroek’s Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece,225 influenced by Weber and 
appearing in English in the same year as Andreades,
226
 took a broader view of the 
Poroi that read it, not as an oligarchic work, but as a programme of economic reform 
that demonstrated the Greek city’s primary duty, the maintenance of its people, and 
was an affirmation of the Athenian understanding of the relationship between the 
economy, the state and the empire.
227
  Hasebroek nevertheless saw fourth-century 
Athenian commerce in terms of limited development, with small manufacturing 
establishments unable to increase efficiency because capital accumulation, investment 
and the institution of slavery were problematic and demand could not be forecast.  
Hasebroek argued that Hipponicus, Philemonides and Nikias did not hire their slaves 
into large scale production.
228
  But Hasebroek’s analysis overlooks the combined 
developmental power of many small enterprises engaged in highly intensive, profit-
driven silver mining, which we will look at in more detail in chapter 2.    
 
In 1941 Rostovtzeff dismissed the Poroi as ‘rather in the nature of political 
propaganda than a serious suggestion by an experienced financier,’229 and in the 
1950s, Romilly picked up the focus on underlying Athenian politics.  Romilly argued 
that Xenophon’s Socrates deplored Athenian citizens’ attitude to the state, a dismay 
which motivated the Poroi, although the passage she cites in the Memorabilia is in the 
voice of the son of Pericles, and Socrates’ response is more optimistic as to the 
possibility of change.
230
  Shortly after, Delebecque suggested that Xenophon rallied to 
Isocrates' programme and seemed to compose the Poroi as a promulgation of the ideas 
of The Areopagiticus and On the Peace.
 231
  Forgetting Persia, and closing his eyes to 
Philip, Delebecque says, Xenophon optimistically expressed ideas that would not take 
shape for another twenty-five centuries – for in the Poroi one can see the first model 
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for nationalisation and the United Nations.
232
  
 
Like Andreades and Schwahn,
 233
 these two scholars illustrate a further theme within 
interpretations of the Poroi, the alignment of Xenophon with supposed political 
groupings.  In 1963 Cawkwell examined the links between Xenophon’s proposals and 
the known or assumed work of Eubulus, suggesting that whilst the theoric 
commission was perhaps a fulfilment of Xenophon’s proposed board of guardians of 
the peace, Eubulus might have been less optimistic about the extent of the silver 
deposits, even if he didn’t recognise the pitfalls of increasing the silver in 
circulation.
234
  Nevertheless Xenophon provided ‘a theoretical exposition of the 
advantages of the policy actually pursued by Eubulus.’  He also noted that until the 
Poroi there was no hint anywhere that Athenian prosperity was grounded in trade,
235
 
and points to a passing suggestion in Aristotle that state slaves may have been 
purchased for hiring.
236
  Otherwise, much of the remainder he found naïve, an 
adjective with which we will become increasingly familiar.
237
   
 
Twentieth-century scholarship has been dominated by the commentaries and editions 
of Thiel, Giglioni, Gauthier and Schütrumpf.  Thiel’s commentary had appeared in 
1922, and was particularly valuable for its careful comparison of the language of the 
Poroi with that of other works of Xenophon, which conclusively established 
Xenophon’s authorship,238 whilst his Latin commentary also emphasised the links 
between Xenophon and Eubulus, seeing Xenophon as a conduit for Eubulus’s 
vision.
239
  Giglioni’s Italian translation and commentary was not to appear until 1970; 
although criticised by Lewis for the unevenness of its introduction and apparatus 
criticus,
240
 Giglioni turned the spotlight away from the practicability of Xenophon’s 
plans and onto their theoretical underpinning.
241
  Addressing ways to connect the 
issues of peace, autarchy, hegemony, pan-Hellenism and the struggle against Persia 
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and Macedonia, Giglioni rejected the idea that Xenophon’s board of eirenophylakes 
would be the precursor to a panhellenic movement unified initially in defence of 
Delphi and then moving in opposition to Asia and Macedonia, because to be 
successful, at least at first, Xenophon’s other plans required peace.242  For Giglioni, 
the main thrust of the Poroi was economic revival, demonstrating an understanding of 
the laws of supply and demand, and budgeting in which expenditure was not reliant 
on unpredictable income.
243
  The triobol payment, shortly to be hotly debated between 
Gauthier and Schütrumpf, was not Xenophon’s principal consideration.244  Rather, in 
an interpretation which Gauthier described as, ‘through a very modern lens,’245 
Giglioni outlined a Xenophon whose innovation was to see economic phenomena as a 
coherent and organic whole.
246
   
 
Despite this proposed new focus, the next ten years or so saw a flurry of work which 
generally did not see either Xenophon or his treatise as economically-minded, with 
Meiggs setting the tone in 1972.  Discussing the elusiveness of the Greek economy for 
modern commentators he said that Xenophon recognised some essential truths, but 
found most of the work naïve.
247
  Finley, in his seminal work on the ancient economy, 
has had a significant influence over academic opinions of Xenophon for some time.  
On the Poroi:  
Xenophon’s ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the 
conventional limits
248
 
 and referring to Xenophon’s Oeconomicos, Finley finds  
not one sentence that expresses an economic principle or offers any economic 
analysis, nothing on efficiency of production, “rational” choice, the marketing 
of crops.
249
 
Finley used the Poroi to illustrate two key aspects of his analysis of the ancient Greek 
economy.  Referring to Xenophon’s statement that a glut of copper and iron leads to a 
reduction in prices and the retirement of the coppersmiths,
250
 he argued that this 
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showed that Xenophon thought only of a local market and therefore that export 
markets for manufactured goods other than pottery were effectively non-existent.
251
  
Xenophon’s proposals to encourage metics without making any changes to the metic 
tax, demonstrated that the Greek conceptual world did not recognise the impact of the 
tax system on the economy: taxes (and honours) were not used as economic levers to 
encourage home production or imports.  Instead, choices about revenues were made 
through consideration of tradition and social psychology, combining the imposition of 
liturgies with the avoidance of property tax.
252
    
 
But whilst Xenophon does not articulate the use of tax to manipulate trade, it is clear 
from his description that he anticipates that an increase in imports will lead to a 
corresponding increase in goods being exported, as merchants attracted by improved 
harbour facilities will carry away Athenian goods (or silver),
253
 and he recognises that 
demand stimulates production – a boule announcement that slaves are to be purchased 
will induce traders to supply them for sale.
254
  Elsewhere, Finley cited the Poroi as 
evidence that the Athenians believed that the economic realm was best left to 
outsiders - slaves, non-citizens and foreigners.
255
  But as will become apparent in the 
following chapters, such an analysis ignores the extent to which Xenophon’s schemes 
are woven into Athenian social and political structures and fails to appreciate the 
manner in which the mining proposal is reliant on the participation of every citizen as 
both beneficiary and operator.  Finley also argued that whilst Xenophon observed the 
phenomenon of specialisation he only saw its benefits insofar as it could affect the 
quality of goods produced, and did not make a connection between specialisation and 
increased productivity.
256
  Mossé too, despite her promising title, Xenophon 
Économiste, found that the search for economic thought in the Poroi was ultimately 
disappointing.  Writing shortly after The Ancient Economy, she deduced that whilst 
Xenophon was an articulate witness to the economic transformations of his era and 
aware of certain economic phenomena, he was ultimately unable to be an 
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economist.
257
  In Athens in Decline, Mossé expressed astonishment at Xenophon’s 
proposal that the state should effectively replace the individual, given that the state’s 
prosperity relied on the wealth of the individual.
258
  Mossé found that for Xenophon, 
specialisation and division of labour were not about producing more, but about 
producing better, with no augmentation of techniques of production.
259
   
 
Mossé’s aim, like Finley’s, was less about establishing the viability of Xenophon’s 
plans and more about trying to characterise his thinking about the economy, its 
originality and its limits.
260
  She noted that Xenophon recognised the laws of supply 
and demand; that land could be an object of speculation; and other phenomena, such 
as prices reducing when too many metal workers flooded the market; or farmers 
abandoning their land for commerce when times were tough.  She also found that he 
saw a link between certain economic phenomena and their social consequences,
261
 but 
whilst he recognised that Athenian pre-eminence was partly due to how highly her 
silver coinage was valued, he did not explain the phenomenon.  Xenophon 
nevertheless partially redeems himself in Mossé’s eyes.  Had he not progressed his 
thinking further, she suggests, then he might have been just another in the tradition of 
fourth-century political thinking that dreamt of living on slave-income.  But he saw 
that there was no point in the state acquiring slaves if entrepreneurs hesitated to open 
new concessions, and he made the state itself into an entrepreneur without ending 
private enterprise.
262
  Therefore, although she saw it as limited, for Mossé 
Xenophon’s interest in economic problems was exceptional for the first half of the 
fourth century, but ultimately she emphasises that like Aristotle, Xenophon’s thinking 
was based less on theoretical reflection and more on experience, rooted in a social 
reality, wherein the notion of production was not yet disengaged from the idea of the 
quality of the producer.
263
   
 
Yet as will become apparent when we look in more detail at silver extraction and 
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processing,
264
 silver mining was one industry where division of labour through 
technical specialisation was essential to a degree far greater than we see in other 
aspects of ancient commercial life, relying on a multiplicity of individual processes 
carried out by differently skilled operators, in purpose-built workshops.  Over several 
centuries, specialisation had evolved specifically through the most efficient use of, 
and access to, scarce resources in order to increase productivity and minimise waste 
and expenditure.  Specialisation as a stimulus to increased production was therefore 
already well known and in daily operation.   
 
Two years later, Austin and Vidal-Naquet’s Economic and Social History of Ancient 
Greece, still an important source book for the study of the Greek economy, called the 
Poroi, ‘a remarkable commentary on the economic mentality of a Greek City in the 
classical period,’265 but urged caution: 
But one must be careful: in the aftermath of the failure of the second 
imperial adventure of Athens, Xenophon is suggesting to his fellow 
citizens that they should divert towards ‘economic’ activities the spirit of 
enterprise and audacity which had characterised their political 
adventures.
266
   
It is not clear how recognition of Xenophon’s motives is reason to take care when 
analysing the development of his economic thinking; one might wonder what is wrong 
with enterprise and audacity in economic ventures.
267
  They also stress that, ‘there is 
no trace of mercantilism in this work;’268 the Poroi is not an attempt to address the 
balance of trade to Athenian advantage.  As for giving more metics the right to build 
in the city,
269
 they argue that whilst Xenophon might appear subversive, in practice 
his proposal took account of a fourth-century antithesis between city and countryside, 
the result of the weakening of the ‘peasant class’ and Xenophon would not have 
dreamed of letting metics own agricultural land, the inalienable right of Athenian 
citizens.  The authors therefore see Xenophon’s restriction on ownership as a 
reflection of a whole system of archaic values linked to land, which was not a genuine 
marketable commodity to be exploited for economic possibilities.
270
  Yet Xenophon 
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himself contradicts this suggestion, when he predicts, as an economic advantage, that 
plots of land near the developing mining region could become as valuable as those in 
the city.
271
   
 
The prevailing mood of seventies substantivism went unchallenged by Gauthier, 
whose 1976 commentary still remains the most comprehensive modern work on the 
text.  Gauthier combined a detailed historical and linguistic commentary with an 
analysis of Xenophon’s programme which saw him as a champion of democracy who 
understood that the question facing Athenian citizens was, whether democracy could 
prosper in the absence of empire, whilst avoiding conflict between rich and poor.
272
  
So far, so good; however Gauthier questioned the extent to which the treatise should 
be seen as a programme of economic reform. Influenced by Finley and distancing his 
views from those of Hasebroek and Cawkwell he suggested Giglioni could only have 
found an expert economist in Xenophon, ‘en songeant avec émotion que K. Marx 
avait lu les Poroi.’273  Gauthier denied that the Poroi was a work of political 
economy, describing it instead as a treatise whose goals were political, but whose 
aims entailed the use of fiscal means.
274
  Like Andreades, Gauthier found echoes of 
Sparta.  In an interpretation which he was to modify in 1984, he argued that 
Xenophon’s ultimate aim was the enabling of all Athenian citizens to take the fullest 
part in the democracy in the way that the Spartans were able to leave the day to day 
running of their estates to their helots in order to engage in their civic 
responsibilities.
275
  But in the early days, as the scheme was getting under way and 
income was achieved more slowly, Gauthier believed that the three obol payment 
would be intended solely as payment for assembly attendance and jury service, 
payment of which had at times been erratic.
276
  As income grew, payments could be 
extended to other democratic institutions such as attendance at the Great Dionysia or 
ephebic patrols, until ultimately there was sufficient revenue for a universal triobol.
277
   
_______________________ 
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Gauthier argued that for the purposes of Xenophon’s proposals the word trophe was 
intended to represent the totality of misthoi payments made to citizens for assembly 
attendance and dicast service and that the new revenues from Xenophon’s projects 
would be assigned to meet that expenditure.  The perspective was political - the poor 
were to be recompensed in order that the democracy might function.
278
  Countering 
the ‘reticence’ of modern scholars in accepting this solution, Gauthier noted two 
explanations.  The first is that Xenophon himself barely distinguishes between a 
trophe paid to the demos, and other misthoi, of which the assembly and court pay 
were seen by him and probably most Athenians as being the most onerous.  The 
second explanation lies in the equivocal nature of trophe.  Gauthier drew a distinction 
between payments for food, such as were made to slaves or ephebes, and a salary.  
Apart from the very needy, most citizens had no need to be ecclesiasts or dicasts in 
order to live – their income came from being farmers, craftsmen and tradesmen, as 
long as their work was not interrupted.  The trophe was not the means of existence, 
but an additional compensation for political service that would mean that direct 
democracy could become a reality.
279
  Thus in 355, assembly and dicast pay – and by 
extension, Xenophon’s scheme, was not about feeding the human being as much as 
about feeding the ‘political animal.’280  
 
Whilst admiring Gauthier’s careful commentary, Cawkwell took issue with some 
aspects of his interpretation.  In particular he found it unlikely that Xenophon, the 
‘devotee of the Peloponnesian ethos, the life of the landed aristocracy, at its best when 
free of  ‘troublesome demagogues’ who was to be found in Hellenica,’281 could have 
become a supporter of the fullest democracy so soon after completing that work.
282
  
Rather, Cawkwell saw Xenophon’s projected provision of trophe as an attempt to 
dissuade Athenians from their obsession with Amphipolis and the Chersonese.  The 
same year, Hopper’s wide-ranging survey of Greek trade and industry once more 
found Xenophon’s understanding of the silver supply naïve.283 
_______________________ 
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The desire to identify an undeclared political subtext was pursued by Schütrumpf in 
1982.
284
  Schütrumpf’s German commentary and translation had a very different 
understanding of Xenophon’s political programme and was to provoke a response 
from Gauthier in 1984.
285
  Schütrumpf also found Xenophon to be less interested in 
the efficiency of trade and securing markets for import and export, than in political 
economy.
286
  The state would no longer live hand to mouth, maintenance of the demos 
would be secure and the rich could be assured that their property would no longer be 
appropriated.
287
  But, denying that Xenophon’s proposals were about radical 
democracy,
288
 he argued that in 355 even the most assiduous assembly and jury 
attendee would be lucky to achieve an annual income of 180 drachmas – therefore 
three obols per day could not be intended to replace such payments.
289
  Xenophon did 
not propose that the payment be made in return for political service, but instead, 
wished to replace those sums with a daily payment for all citizens.
290
  This would 
have the effect of entirely changing the nature of the Athenian democracy.  Assembly 
attendance would no longer be paid; the poor would receive their three obols without 
the requirement of political participation, and thus would no longer dominate 
assembly and court proceedings.
291
   
 
This interpretation assumes that Xenophon believed that the poor only went to the 
assembly to claim their payments and had no interest in attending otherwise, an idea 
which at the least seems at odds with the vigorous citizen engagement with 
democratic processes that we hear of from the orators.  Xenophon certainly does not 
express that intention in so many words and Farrell observes that such interpretations 
are borne of an elitist viewpoint based on a cynical expectation of the outcome of 
Xenophon’s proposals.292  But Schütrumpf positions Xenophon with those mid-
century Athenians who wanted to curtail the influence of the demos and thus he finds 
it hardly surprising that Xenophon might choose not to emphasise this aspect of his 
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plan.
293
  Analysing 6.1, Schütrumpf finds that Xenophon separates out two outcomes 
from his project – the feeding of the demos and the freeing of the wealthy from heavy 
taxation on the one hand, and the financing of other enterprises such as festivals, 
building programmes and payments to officials such as councillors and the cavalry on 
the other.
294
  Because, in listing officials’ payments at 6.1, Xenophon omits to 
mention assembly and jury payments, Schütrumpf suggests that there are echoes of 
the oligarchy of 411, with its reduced levels of democratic participation and abolition 
of certain political payments.
295
  Engaging directly with Gauthier, he finds it 
unconvincing that Xenophon wanted to make it possible for citizens to live a political 
life undisturbed by the need to work.
296
  The triobol alone would not be sufficient to 
support a citizen, and thus he would still be obliged to undertake gainful employment.   
 
Despite the more nuanced debate that later emerged between Gauthier and 
Schütrumpf, inescapably whereas one saw daily payments as a plan to support citizen 
participation in democracy, the other saw them as an intentional inhibition to it; and 
such observations are tied in turn either to a belief that everyone would willingly take 
part in democratic processes as long as they had the economic freedom to do so, or to 
an oligarchic viewpoint that imagined that the demos generally only turned up to 
debate, judge and vote if they were paid.  Neither outcome is well-supported by the 
text, and the debate is a prime example of the way in which the limited information 
Xenophon gives in some areas allows for widely varying interpretations of both the 
practicalities and the motivations underlying his proposals. 
 
Replying to Schütrumpf, Gauthier revised some of his arguments. He widened his 
interpretation of the subsidy, to include not just payments for assembly and law court 
attendance but all the civic subsidies including, ultimately, the triobol, suggesting that 
it was implicit in the text that in the early days when income was still too low to 
institute the full triobol payment, it would be used to shore up civic payments.
297
   
 
But Xenophon simply does not say how the more limited income was to be spent in 
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the early days, and his only clearly expressed intention is to create a universal 
payment.  The discussion thus highlights two issues worthy of consideration: the 
apportionment of income in the early days of the scheme, and the period required for 
its full development.  If, as Xenophon appears to suggest, only 20 talents of slave 
rental income were to be reinvested yearly once slave numbers reach 6,000,
298
 at a 
cost of around 180 drachmas each this sum would purchase perhaps 670 slaves every 
year.  To finally attain the 90,000 slaves required to furnish three for each citizen and 
thus three obols each per day
299
 would take more than another 125 years beyond the 
initial five or six.
300
  Therefore the question of how Xenophon intended to share out 
the income in the early years before the full distribution could be achieved is 
pertinent, but the answer seems to be clear enough.  The advantage of the slow growth 
of his schemes is a theme Xenophon refers to several times
301
 and he is clear that 
however fast they grow, there will be benefit.
302
  Rather than raise all the capital at 
once, income from a reduced initial scheme might fund the initiation of other aspects, 
for instance.
303
  But every time Xenophon mentions the individual citizen recipients of 
the triobol, his description is inclusive – at 3.9-10, some Athenians will get high rates 
of return on the initial contribution, but most will get over a hundred percent – the 
entire citizenry falls into one category or the other.  At 4.17, there will be three slaves 
for every citizen, at 4.33, all the Athenians will be maintained; at 4.49 and 6.1, the city 
and the demos respectively will be fed.  Whenever he discusses making a general 
distribution, as opposed to investing in infrastructure projects, Xenophon’s language 
is inclusive.   
 
After the deduction of twenty talents to purchase further slaves, the 100 talents annual 
income Xenophon mentions at 4.24 would yield 16 drachmas each even to as many as 
                                                 
298
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299
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30,000 citizens,
304
 more to a smaller number, and this annual sum is achieved 
relatively early in the development of the project.  In order for the scheme to be 
effective, the poverty of the masses would need to be addressed quickly, and the 
possibility of a wide distribution of even quite small sums should not be overlooked.  
It is also important to recognise the effect that relatively small sums of money can 
have on the lives of those living at or just above subsistence level.  From Plutarch’s 
story of a distribution by Lykourgos, we may infer that sums such as 50 or 100 
drachmas would not have been unwelcome,
305
 whilst the story told by Herodotus and 
Aristotle of the proposed citizen distribution of silver mining proceeds a century 
earlier indicates that the sharing of 100 talents, or the individual receipt of ten 
drachmas, although a very long way short of a daily triobol, was not to be sniffed 
at.
306
 
 
But Gauthier also accepted that there were unresolved issues arising from his 
interpretation of the triobol as payment for daily ‘full-time’ citizenship: such 
wholehearted citizen involvement would leave Athenians with no time to be, ‘hard at 
work, driving the economic machine,’ in the way that Xenophon’s plans required of 
them and in practice only the very poorest would find the subsidy essential and for the 
slightly better off, it would not alone be sufficient to deter them from their usual 
economic activities.
307
  Gauthier emphasised that in the Poroi poverty and wealth are 
seen from a political viewpoint; Xenophon was not interested in developing land 
because of what he sees as ‘supplementary resources’ that it might yield for - poor - 
individuals, he was concerned with increasing revenues which would then go to the 
state to be equally shared between all citizens.  The ‘poverty of the masses,’308 which 
prevents many citizens from engaging with democratic processes, would be alleviated 
in the future by replacing imperial revenues with state income which would in turn 
provide civic trophe. ‘Thus the trophe of the demos is the maintenance of the political 
animal,’ and Xenophon’s vision that  
the democratic trophe
 would be abundant ‘for all Athenians’ understood 
that the majority among them would continue to attend to their own 
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habitual occupations.
309
 
Gauthier concedes that Xenophon’s measures would require the effort, and 
consequently the enrichment, of individuals, but notes that Xenophon does not 
mention this because his aim was, ‘not the economic development of Attica, nor the 
extinction of poverty.’310  But this analysis denies two particular aspects of the 
complexity of Xenophon’s vision.  In particular it denies the fact that individuals 
seeking personal or shared profit are not only recognised and encouraged by 
Xenophon’s plans, but are absolutely vital to it.  The possibility of profit is equally 
available to individuals, partnerships, groups, tribes and the polis.
311
  Tribes are an 
entirely political construction and yet their potential profits are not deemed any more 
desirable than that of the individual.  Xenophon shows himself to be completely au 
fait with the idea that entrepreneurs have to be nurtured in order to engender wider 
wealth and is ingenious in the many methods he devises to reassure potential 
speculators that they should engage with his plans, not only by contributing to a 
capital fund, but by engaging in the industries that will ultimately yield revenues for 
the state.
312
  Rather than simply acquiring revenue from a pre-existing resource on an 
opportunistic basis, Athenians were being urged to promote and encourage activities 
specifically in order to increase the resulting duties. 
 
Xenophon also clearly does wish to promote the economic development of Attica.  To 
this extent it makes no sense to separate the means from the end, and the ‘end’ is 
entirely predicated on the possibility of increasing imports and exports, lettings and 
visitor income, promoting a huge increase in the slave trade, and in the production, 
refining and distribution of silver.  Simply to wish that everyone should have a daily 
triobol without addressing ways to achieve it would indeed be a utopian scheme.  In 
order to become the thriving city that Xenophon describes at 5.3-4, Athens will have 
to have gone through the mechanics of infrastructure improvement and economic 
regeneration that Xenophon proposes.  Giving citizens three obols a day without any 
of the other activity Xenophon describes, would not be sufficient to establish Athens 
as the celebrated and cosmopolitan centre he predicts.  
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The Gauthier/Schütrumpf debate tended to polarise scholarship that followed it, 
particularly any which moved towards an analysis of Xenophon’s underlying 
philosophy.  Azoulay and Schorn in particular have argued for a Xenophontic/Socratic 
tendency to suppress the opinionated demos.  Azoulay’s 2004 exploration of charis 
and reciprocity in Xenophon argues that the Poroi encourages commerce only to the 
extent that it can be controlled within a defined space and devolved to foreigners,
313
 
and ultimately encourages the political passivity of the demos through a relationship 
of gratitude which turns them into docile and useful subjects.
314
  The judicious 
bestowal of epimeleia on metics will similarly place them in a position of ongoing 
gratitude at the removal of dishonourable conditions,
315
 and honours are to be 
awarded not simply in recognition of past good, but as a means of inspiring gratitude, 
with on-going benefits for, and obligations to, the city, without great expenditure.   
 
Azoulay’s emphasis on the lack of costs associated with Xenophon’s proposals gives 
a somewhat skewed reading of the text – in a piece devoted to raising income, it is 
inevitable that the cost of each measure should be noted, but when Xenophon says 
such measures would cost little,
316
 he is discussing several measures including prizes 
for Athenian magistrates, and importantly, he is not implying that the awards of 
honour in themselves are valueless.  The reference is also a structural device; 
Xenophon is effectively saying, ‘these are some ideas which will cost little, now here 
are some which need investment’.  As we will see in chapter 4, Athenian motives 
around the award of honours were complex, and Xenophon’s suggested use of them 
has careful boundaries and draws on precedents which imply that their use would 
continue to be relatively parsimonious.  Xenophon is live to the complex relationship 
between Athens and the various businessmen and benefactors he wishes to attract, but 
his appreciation of the mutual benefits to be achieved is more nuanced than Azoulay’s 
reading suggests.  In the first instance, it is Athens who needs the goodwill of non-
citizens, rather than the other way round. 
 
Along similar lines to Schütrumpf, Schorn, who finds the scheme utopian,
317
 also 
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assumes that a concealed purpose underlies the outward message of the text.  Schorn 
argues that if the assembly was no longer dominated by those who had promoted 
imperialism, then Athenians would no longer be unjust to her allies.  Xenophon, he 
suggests, intended to abandon the allowances for assembly attendance but was 
‘cautious regarding this sensitive topic’ and therefore many readers might not have 
noticed.
318
  Yet if Xenophon’s purpose was to remove this payment and yet not reveal 
his intention, one wonders why he would have cited a list of offices at 6.1 at all.  If the 
omission of just one is so apparent to us today, surely it would have been yet more so 
to the original readers.  Alternatively, perhaps assembly payments were simply 
inviolate and needed not to be mentioned. 
 
Comparing the Poroi with passages in the Hiero, Schorn argues that Xenophon 
appeals to Athenian citizens through schemes to increase their wealth, in order that 
they will be convinced by reform programmes which in reality ‘aim at nothing less 
than a fundamental transformation of the state along the precepts of the Socratic-
Xenophontic philosophy.’319  But because Xenophon once counselled using the lure of 
financial advantage as a strategy for a tyrant, must this always entail that wealth can 
only be offered as a ruse?  Schorn further suggests that with the abolition of assembly 
pay, the lower classes would need to work and so could not attend the assembly, and 
he agreed with Schütrumpf that the triobol would not be enough to meet basic 
requirements.
320
  Yet given that the triobol would be paid week in, week out, and that 
assembly and dicast pay was intermittent, those poor who were currently reliant solely 
on political payments would be better off under the new arrangement, not worse, and 
so the suggestion that the lower classes, ‘will be forced to hold down a job,’321 when 
they were not previously, is not a logical deduction.  Ultimately, Schorn argues, 
citizen prosperity would increase but also the ‘boisterous masses’ would become 
obedient and morally better.  Schorn seems to accuse Xenophon of an anti-democratic 
confidence trick, with a plan that is both going to make citizens personally wealthier 
and at the same time ensure that they are worse-off and need to seek employment.  
And where, one might wonder, are the ‘jobs’?322 
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In considering some of the interpretations discussed above it may be noted that at no 
point does Xenophon refer directly to assembly or jury duty payments or suggest that 
his triobol is intended either to support or to replace them, nor does he refer to any 
recent difficulty in making political payments.  There is no direct evidence in the text 
that Xenophon does not intend the triobol to be paid in addition to any civic 
allowances for political participation, in which event there would still be further 
income to be made from active attendance, and Schütrumpf’s argument falls, because 
even when in receipt of the triobol, Athenians would still have a financial incentive 
for political participation.  Both interpretations are based to a great extent on 
imputations as to Xenophon’s political motivations, not in itself an impossible task 
given the volume of his other writing, his affinity with Sparta and his affection for 
Socrates.  However they prioritise Xenophon’s ‘hidden’ agenda above his simply 
stated ends – the relief of internal poverty in order to improve relations with the rest of 
the Greek world.  The detail of Xenophon’s text carefully proceeds to build proposals 
to achieve just this.  Both readings are interesting, but read more into the text than 
may be there.  Xenophon was dealing with the reality of Athenian finances as he 
found them.  Given the delicacy of his previous situation in relation to the state he 
would have been foolish to profess any level of oligarchy, (and Schütrumpf’s reading 
assumes that the average Athenian citizen was just too simple to read between the 
lines), whilst Gauthier’s case seems oddly undermined by Xenophon’s failure to 
mention that he wishes to promote political participation.   
 
Away from this controversy, in 1992 Burke looked for ways to explain the increased 
commercialism of the fourth century within the context of a status-driven ethic, and 
took the Poroi as one of his models.
323
  Whilst describing some of Xenophon’s 
assumptions as ‘remarkably innocent,’ Burke used the Poroi to explore grants of γῆϛ 
καὶ οἰκίαϛ ἔγκτησιϛ,324 the dikai emporikai (maritime courts), and awards of 
citizenship, the first two apparently directly connected to Xenophon’s proposals.325  
_______________________ 
 
143-146 for example, notes that whilst agricultural hired labour was a familiar phenomenon, it 
was of low status and seasonal, with opportunities at deme level for informal hiring on a casual 
basis at short notice.   
323
  Burke 1992. 
324
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He found increasingly in the mid- to late-fourth century ‘the taking of public action to 
promote economic activity, notably maritime commerce’ in the steps the state took to 
attract metics to the city, promoting commercial advantage by giving foreigners equal 
status to citizens in the dikai emporikai regardless of their nationality.  After the 
Social War he noted an increase in grants of enktesis, and a parallel increase in the 
granting of citizenship, nine such grants being made to ‘bankers or men otherwise 
engaged in maritime commerce.’326  For Burke these reflected the beginning of a 
move towards genuine market trading in the years after the Social War, the start of the 
‘disembedding’ of an economy which, on the Finley model, Burke saw as ‘controlled 
by a complex of social and political institutions and practices, with economic 
behaviour shaped by familial, religious, and socio-political values.’327  This 
‘disembedding’ he suggested, was not stimulated by the laws of a disembedded 
market economy, but made possible by ‘the erosion of an ethic bound to status, by the 
experience gained from economic exigency, and by the circumstances of an imposed 
peace.’328  ‘Economic exigency’ sounds somewhat like another way of describing the 
very rules of utilitarian economics whose influence Burke denies.  However, Burke’s 
‘adjustments’ were still a step too far for some.329  
 
The following year, looking at parallels between oikos and polis economic 
management, Booth concluded that Xenophon omitted to mention the encouragement 
of individual citizen producers or their protection against foreign competition.  
Booth’s explanation, that the promotion or protection of native industry was not seen 
as a requirement of polis government,
330
 overlooks the reliance of Xenophon’s plans 
on the enterprise of citizens, whether as mine operators, sea captains or merchants.  
Far from protecting citizens’ interests against foreign competitors, in the mining 
industry, opportunities and tax benefits had been extended to non-Athenians in the 
state’s best interests.331  
 
Also in 1993, Dillery demonstrated the manner in which the Poroi used the fifth-
century rhetoric of Athenian imperialism in order to present a vision of the Greek 
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world in which it was not necessary to have an empire to survive.  Xenophon 
maintained the idea of Athenian centrality, for instance, but ascribed it to her 
geographical situation rather than her naval supremacy.
332
  Xenophon’s ‘radical 
insight’ was that internal economic growth could replace interstate war as a means to 
support the population.
333
  Building on this, Dillery argued that the Poroi could help 
shed light on the later parts of Hellenica, written at around the same time, in which he 
suggests there are echoes of the ‘pacifist and conciliatory tone’ of the Poroi.334  
Dillery’s strong textual analysis of the Poroi and Hellenica is supported with readings 
of Isocrates, but whilst one cannot fail to be moved by the sense of desolation in the 
final lines of the Hellenica, and Dillery (following others) draws strong parallels 
between the two Xenophontic works, it is important to distinguish the positioning of 
On the Peace with its rejection of empire reaching back to the early fifth century, 
from that of the Poroi.
335
  Xenophon may recognise the advantages of peace, but he 
does not deny the possibility of war, and does not assume that such war might not be 
initiated by Athens herself.  Xenophon still sees the diplomatic opportunities available 
to Athens through seizing popularity by uniting her allies in the protection of 
Delphi
336
 and depicts a defensive alliance which would offer support to a vengeful 
Athens in the event that she were attacked.
337
  Isocrates, with his bitter complaints 
against the influx of non-Athenians, would not have taken delight in the promotion of 
metics into the cavalry and the encouragement of foreign entrepreneurs advanced by 
Xenophon.
 338
 
 
The most recent editions of the Poroi are Ralph Doty’s 2003 translation into English, 
and Audring and Brodersen’s 2008 translation into German.  Closer to my own 
reading, Audring and Brodersen stress that it was not Xenophon’s intention that the 
populace live a carefree life, but rather that the triobol was simply a maintenance grant 
and that Xenophon’s plan required the active engagement of Athenians in 
commerce.
339
  Doty's evaluation of Xenophon's economics is an unavowedly 
modernist comparison with Keynesian macroeconomics, describing Xenophon as 
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more worthy to be called the Father of Economics than Adam Smith.  For Doty, 
Xenophon sees that government investment would be necessary to encourage trade, 
further develop the silver mines and stimulate consumption, thus raising private 
investment and increasing sources of revenue.
340
  There are some concepts in Doty’s 
discussion that require caution; for instance Doty’s discussion of calculus and the 
investment multiplier seems somewhat abstruse as these are concepts plainly 
unavailable to Xenophon,
341
 and his claim that Xenophon was aware of the 
(Keynesian) principle that  
to justify any given amount of employment there must be an amount of 
current investment sufficient to absorb the excess of total output over 
what the community chooses to consume when employment is at the 
given level 
is something of a stretch.
342
  Whether or not we may recognise their effects in 
Xenophon’s description, we should be careful in discussing the extent to which such 
ideas were identified or applied by Xenophon.   
 
Jansen’s doctoral thesis of 2007 builds on Dillery in its understanding of the Poroi as 
a, ‘unique anti-imperialistic discourse,’343 which uses innovative methods to achieve 
conventional ends.  Jansen focusses on the Poroi’s literary and biographical 
features,
344
 arguing that Xenophon was not a pacifist but intent on showing that 
empire was not necessary for survival.  With a careful analysis of the evidence of the 
literary uses of ‘misthos’ and ‘trophe’, he shows that the two words were not 
synonymous, concluding that because trophe refers to food or money for food, that 
the Poroi is not about payment to citizens in return for political activity.
345
  Although 
he emphasises that Xenophon discovered the concept of marginal utility
346
 and 
proposed a partial break-down of the citizen/non-citizen status divide, Jansen finds 
Xenophon to be a reformer rather than a revolutionary, with homo politicus alive and 
well within the text.
347
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J. D. Lewis’s article of 2009 takes Doty’s discussion a step further.348  He maintains 
that Xenophon lays out principles that are, ‘fundamental to political economy as a 
science,’ and attempts to establish which particular economic model best describes 
Xenophon’s proposals.  He proposes, contra Doty, that Xenophon was not proto-
Keynesian, believing his views to be more akin to the ideas of Jean Baptiste Say.
349
   
He finds in Xenophon a justice-centred approach (as opposed to power-centred or 
state-centred) that is compatible with the pursuit of material prosperity, ‘a goal 
directed conception of economic action for the purpose of self-interested gain,’ but 
criticises it as a production-oriented, as opposed to consumption-oriented, plan.
350
  
Despite his caution against using modern economic terms to describe ancient 
practices, and endorsing the view that the Greeks did not conceptually isolate 
economic forces from their social context, he presents a formalist analysis.
351
  This 
means that whilst he does not engage with them, J. D. Lewis’s attempt to extract a 
level of economic theory from Xenophon’s practical proposals is in direct opposition 
to the views of some earlier scholars and distinctly less reliant (although not 
completely so) on superimposing on to the text ideas of democracy or Socratic 
influence.  Although it fails to recognise the extent to which Xenophon understood the 
importance of entrepreneurs to the economic equation, it is nevertheless a further step 
on the route to demonstrating the extent to which Xenophon understood economic 
processes.  In a more measured although passing reference to the Poroi Oliver also 
suggested that it would be surprising if contemporary scholars maintained Gauthier’s 
view that the Poroi was not an economic text.
352
 
 
The theme of Xenophon’s proposed use of honours was raised again by Engen’s 2010 
study of the relationship between honours and profit.  Engen argued that the use of 
honours for the ‘traditionally disesteemed’ activity of trade had a negative effect on 
traditional values.  Nevertheless he found that the honours appearing in the later 
fourth century which mirrored Xenophon’s ideas were ‘testament to the practical 
nature’ of Xenophon’s treatise.353  Xenophon’s apparent extension of the award of 
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honours as incentive continued to engage scholars, and as we have seen, in his study 
of fourth-century Athenian honours Lambert characterised the Poroi as ‘a response to 
decline.’354  Both Engen’s analysis, and Lambert’s work on the inscriptions of 
Athenian honours, are important starting points for any further assessment of this 
aspect of Xenophon’s schemes and we will return to them both in chapter 4. 
 
Farrell’s careful analysis of the political ethos of the Poroi demonstrates that the work 
is consistent with the ideas of governance and leadership expressed throughout the 
Xenophontic corpus, the trophe enabling both more leisure and more opportunity for 
political participation.  Contrary to Schütrumpf and Azoulay he argues that the 
proposals are not oligarchically-inclined, but reflect Athenian democratic ideology 
and that his promotion of homonoia reflects Xenophon’s Socratic education.355  He 
also argues that Xenophon was not anti-imperialist, 'rather befitting an Attic orator, he 
attempts to realign democracy including its imperial aspirations, with its own 
professed ideals.'
356
  
 
In 2012 Figueira returned to the question of Xenophon’s economic thinking, using the 
Poroi amongst other texts, as a case study to reassess Finley's judgements on Athenian 
economic thought.  Whilst careful to protect himself against charges of modernism
357
 
he stresses Xenophon's appreciation of the challenges of increasing marginal utility 
across several types of enterprises.
358
  Finding Finley’s assessment, ‘minimising and 
tendentious,’ ultimately Figueira characterises Xenophon as nearer to a contemporary 
management guru than a discoverer of the economy, finding that Xenophon is 
sensitive to economic phenomena, but that he and his contemporaries did not have a 
concept of ‘the economy,’ because their, ‘conceptual boundaries were circumscribed 
by their limited abilities to count, measure, record, and calculate.’359  We will return in 
chapter 2 to questions as to whether unsophisticated record-keeping obstructed the 
ability to recognise and theorise about economic phenomena or to make rational 
economic choices.
360
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1.6.3   Conclusion 
Inevitably, due to the scarcity of ancient evidence, the Poroi has been a point of focus 
for those in search of recognition of economic theory in the ancient world.  In 1957 
Polanyi had argued that the lack of a concept of the economy was essentially because 
economic processes were hard to identify in a society where they were embedded in 
institutions that were non-economic.
361
  But as we will see, the Poroi does identify 
certain familiar mechanisms, such as supply and demand,
362
 whilst the thriving 
complexity of economic practices available in the fourth century entailed that for 
every type of activity that might be regarded as socially framed or grounded in 
principles of reciprocity, there was an alternative available of a more impersonal, 
profit-seeking nature, from eranist loans to bottomry, gift-exchange to market trade, 
with a graduated range of transactions in between.   
 
The following chapters will address aspects of the text as they reflect social and 
economic life in fourth-century Athens, and I do not intend to explore the political and 
philosophical aspects of the work in greater depth.  It will however be apparent from 
the preceding overview that I do not give credence to the view that Xenophon 
intended to suppress mass political participation, nor however do I think that he was 
looking for a way to enable the opposite.  My general theme is moderation – it is 
necessary to contextualise the Poroi within Xenophon’s whole corpus, but that does 
not mean that we can import wholesale ideas which are simply not expressed in the 
text, or indeed are in conflict with it, on the grounds that Xenophon could not speak 
freely because he sought to deceive the masses but wrote knowing that his agenda 
would be understood by an elite readership.  Nor, despite an inclination towards 
admiration of his percipience, can one engage in detailed discussion as to which 
nineteenth-century economist Xenophon most nearly approximates with any very 
fruitful result for our understanding of the Athenian economy.   
 
In considering the economic aspects of the text some later scholarship has tended 
towards a formalist approach, although certain sections of the most recent American 
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scholarship has perhaps run a good deal further with this line of thought than the text 
might justify.  But on the whole, late twentieth-century scholarship parked itself fairly 
wholeheartedly in the substantivist camp, taking individual examples from the text to 
demonstrate, for instance, apparent citizen disinclination against involvement in 
commerce and a preference for state revenues achieved from rentier income and metic 
tax rather than citizen labour.  Yet in the context of a proposal whose schemes will 
simply fail if there are not very many people, citizens as well as metics and foreigners, 
sufficiently profit-oriented to engage with them, it is difficult to see how Xenophon 
might have believed his proposals could meet with success if there were not in Athens 
‘sufficient numbers’ of citizens who would be prepared to become involved.  
Discussing Spartan attitudes to commerce, he had after all contrasted them with other 
Greek states where ‘all men make as much money as they can.  One is a farmer, 
another a ship-owner, another a merchant, and others live by different handicrafts,’363 
indicating that Xenophon saw nothing unusual in Athenian citizens taking up 
commerce.  One might see in Xenophon’s persuasive language an attempt to cut 
through not just caution but deeply-rooted social attitudes which he may have 
recognised as culturally situated inhibitors to growth.  
 
Perhaps what emerges most clearly is that the Xenophon of the Poroi seems able to be 
all things to all men.  That quality in part explains the text’s continuing allure.  It may 
be a flaw – or a strength, and it may be that Xenophon’s skill in reaching out to all 
sections of Athenian society entails that different readers can continue to receive his 
words in different ways.  But it is also a warning.  There has been a tendency to look 
for the unspoken, to impose onto the Poroi a political or economic programme that is 
undeclared but reinforced by Xenophon’s other work, by his debt to Socrates, or his 
aristocratic upbringing.  Such contextualisation is vital of course, but it should be used 
with care.  Xenophon wrote the Poroi as he neared the end of his life.  He had lost a 
son to Athenian hegemonic pretensions; he had a passion for Athens and certainly no 
reason to avoid using the word democracy.  The Poroi is packed with vibrant ideas 
and it may not be necessary to dig more than a small way beneath the surface to 
understand what Xenophon was promoting. 
 
Arguments that compare the nature of Xenophon’s thought with those who followed 
                                                 
363
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him two thousand years later are only of use if they can then shed light back on the 
text and its contexts; discussed in isolation they can contribute little to our 
understanding of ancient politics or economics.  If we choose to lay a particular 
political interpretation on Xenophon’s programme, which does not pull its punches in 
the clarity of its views, then we must immediately also ask why Xenophon chose not 
to articulate the specific political philosophy that allegedly underpinned his proposals.  
Why would he be wary of appearing to be a democrat looking to feed the masses?  If 
he were an unreconstructed oligarch, why make proposals that would entail yet more 
expenditure by the wealthy?  To what extent would regular payments either promote 
or deter regular assembly attendance and political participation?  
 
Gauthier stressed, in his 1984 article, that because of the lack of detail Xenophon 
gives us about the practical implementation or the political and economic motivations 
of his proposals, that:  
… interpreters are driven to extend Xenophon’s observations, credit him 
with certain attitudes of mind or political ulterior motives, bring in 
comparisons with other authors; in a word interpret his proposals in the 
manner that appears to them appropriate.
364
 
The following pages will try to be wary of this tendency.   
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Chapter Two - The mines, their slaves, state income and rationality 
 
2.1   Chapter introduction 
The following chapter will explore and contextualise Xenophon’s ideas for the mining 
industry within three specific areas: firstly, our understanding of the way that the 
Laurion silver mines operated and the financial relationship between the mines and 
the city; secondly, the use of slave labour in the silver mines; and thirdly, the level of 
sophistication of Athenian financial management.  This will lead to a closer 
examination of the way the text can inform us about the Athenian understanding of 
entrepreneurial risk that follows in chapter 3 and Xenophon’s proposed use of honours 
in chapter 4. 
 
2.2   The Laurion silver mines – introduction   
We have a surprising amount of evidence as to the practical and administrative 
operation of the silver mines and of the role of silver in the assumption and retention 
of Athenian power.  Before trying to unpick the financial benefits yielded by the 
industry in section three of this chapter, it is useful to look briefly at some of these 
sources to understand how the Athenians viewed their relationship with Laureotic 
silver and to discuss the way that slave ownership, which lies at the heart of 
Xenophon’s proposals, was already providing a cash income for slave owners on both 
a large and small scale.  We cannot fully appreciate Xenophon’s ideas without 
recognition of the technical and economic complexity of the industry and the extent to 
which its enormous inputs and outputs must have affected every aspect of daily Attic 
life.  In sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 I will look at some of the sources available to us and 
discuss some of the scholarly controversies to which the partial state of the evidence 
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has given rise, along with an overview of the processes of mining and refinement.  
 
The role of mining income in the analysis of Attic prosperity and power was not a 
new theme for Xenophon.  In the Memorabilia, teasing Glaucon about his political 
ambitions, the Xenophontic Socrates proves him unprepared to lead because he is 
uninformed in a variety of fields which Socrates argues are essential for the well-
being of the State.
1
  One by one he demonstrates Glaucon’s ignorance of the extent 
and sources of the city’s revenues, of the city’s expenditure and how it might be 
reduced, of the contrasting military strengths of Athens and of her enemies, of the 
specifics of the placing of defence garrisons, of the quantity of corn required to feed 
the population and of strategies to deal with the falling income from the silver mines.  
To Glaucon, Socrates says    
“If you wanted to add to a friend's fortune, you would set about making him 
richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer?”2 
Not only do city revenues and particularly income from silver, clearly occupy a 
central place amongst Xenophon’s concerns for state prosperity and interstate 
security, but Socrates’ dismissal of Glaucon’s suggestion that the city should be 
enriched by her enemies
3
 is echoed in the opening lines of the Poroi.
4
  In his final 
work, Xenophon is still concerned with the silver industry and promoting the need for 
locally-sourced revenue which does not have an adverse effect on inter-state relations.  
In the Poroi these themes have become inextricably linked.   
 
The Peloponnesian wars had brought a decline in mining activity.  Thucydides tells us 
that as early as 430 BC the Spartans penetrated as far as the Laurion area and fifteen 
years later Alcibiades is seen persuading the Spartans of the importance of depriving 
Athens of the revenue from her silver mines, a loss second only to the loss of her 
allies’ tribute.5  Although Thorikos appears to have continued to be inhabited 
throughout the Decelean War,
6
 and Xenophon himself throws some doubt on the 
extent that an invading army could take advantage of the Laurion’s mineral 
                                                 
1
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.2-18.    
2
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.4. 
3
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.7-8. 
4
  1.1. 
5 
 Thuc. 2.55.1; 6.91.7. 
6
  Hanson 1983, p. 133.  
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resources,
7
 the Spartan occupation of Decelea caused enough disruption in the region 
that the silver supply did indeed diminish.  As the Athenian cavalry struggled to 
protect farms and livestock from hostile incursions,
8
 Thucydides tells us that more 
than twenty thousand slaves escaped.  Many of these must have been involved in the 
silver industry, whether directly employed in it or involved in the production and 
supply of agricultural or other resources to its huge labour force.
9
  By 406/5 Athens 
was forced to issue gold coinage
10
 and shortly afterwards, silver-coated copper, with 
silver currency only regaining prominence as a result of Conon’s victorious return 
from Asia Minor.
11
   
 
The recovery was slow.  A fourth-century plaintiff, challenging his opponent to 
antidosis, tells him, ‘those engaged in mining have suffered reverses while you 
farmers are prospering beyond what is your due’.12  Later, after the battle of 
Chaeroneia, Hypereides tells us that, ‘excavation of new mines, neglected previously 
because men were afraid’ (διὰ τὸν φόβον νῦν ἐνεργοί) is now in progress, and the 
city’s revenues from these are increased,’13 and there is evidence that the state did 
make some attempt to ease the strains of those involved in the industry by reducing 
their tax burden.
14
  In testament to Xenophon’s recognition of the potential value for 
the state in encouraging silver prospecting, numismatic evidence shows that by the 
second half of the fourth century, silver coins began to be produced once more in 
‘massive’ amounts.15  
 
Archaeological evidence supports the literary references to late fifth-century decline 
and a subsequent rejuvenation in mining enterprise.  The deme of Thorikos, whose 
prosperity was closely linked to the fortunes of the mining activity which took place 
under its very foundations, had started to build an unusual Doric peristyle temple, 
                                                 
7
  4.46-48. 
8
  Although the extent of the devastation caused by the Spartans is a matter of debate – see Hanson 
1983, pp. 133-143 for the limited effects of the Spartan occupation on agriculture and 
Constantakopoulou 2007, p. 150 for a discussion of the scholarship. 
9
  Thuc. 7.27.5. See the fuller discussion of the effects of the Decelean occupation later in this 
chapter.  
10
  Figueira 1998, pp. 516-519. 
11
  Hopper 1979, p. 178; Kroll 1993, pp. 5-10.   
12
  Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.21. 
13
  Hyp. In Defence of Euxenippus 4.36.  See chapter 3 for a discussion of the use of the word φόβος 
in relation to business risk.  
14
  Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.18 (see also the section on tax exemption at chapter 2.3.2.12).  
15
  Kroll 1993, p. 8.  
76 
 
 
 
probably dedicated to Demeter and Kore, whose construction seems to have been 
halted after 421.  Between 525 and the beginning of the fifth century, the deme had 
built a theatre, the earliest that we currently know of to have been built of stone,
16
 and 
had enlarged it between 480 and 425.  Remaining adequate for its purposes, we may 
surmise, until around 350, it was then increased in capacity by the addition of an 
upper koilon and two access ramps, indicative of increased local wealth and 
population,
17
 the rural Dionysia at the Thorikos theatre now being ‘sufficiently 
glamorous’ to merit competitive tendering for the role of choregos.18  Elsewhere in 
Thorikos there is an indication of an interruption in industrial activity between around 
404 and 375 BC, whilst in the third quarter of the fourth century the archaeological 
evidence shows an increase in population, with many houses hastily and carelessly 
constructed and the character of the town becoming ‘markedly industrial’.19   
 
2.2.1   Athenian mine slave ownership and the Poroi 
When Diocleides cowered behind the statue of a general in the early hours of the 
morning, an unwilling witness as three hundred men gathered in the prelude to one of 
classical Athens’ most significant events, the mutilation of the herms, he had, he told 
the jury, been on his way to the Laurion to collect the earnings of a slave.  It is 
probable that his slave was hired out to the mining industry.  Whilst Andocides did his 
best to cast doubt on much of Diocleides’ reliability as the accuser of those involved 
in the outrage, this mundane activity draws no comment.
20
  Discussing this passage, 
MacDowell remarks that Athenians invested in mine-slaves the way a modern 
businessman buys shares on the Stock Exchange.
21
  This analogy provides an 
interesting lens through which to view Xenophon’s plans.  In addition to their more 
immediate use within the workshop, farm or home, Athenians were accustomed to the 
notion of slaves as an ‘investment’ realising monetary income.  Even if not everyone 
could expect to afford it personally, Athenian social expectations led them to aspire to 
slave ownership
22
 and D. Lewis suggests that there may have been a prevailing 
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  Wilson 2007, p. 129, Goette 2001, pp. 218-219.  
17
  Hopper 1968, p. 295. 
18
  Wilson 2007, p. 128.  
19
  Mussche 1998, p. 64 and Mussche 1975, p. 53. 
20
  Andoc. On the Mysteries 1.37-39.  Hired slaves also for instance at Isae. On the Estate of Ciron 
8.35. 
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  MacDowell 1962, p. 88. 
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sentiment that it was ‘more proper that the city should own a large number of slaves,’ 
estimating that in the fourth century Athenian public slave numbers may have reached 
four figures.
23
  The activities of state-owned slaves encompassed policing, silver 
assaying, prison guarding, operating court proceedings, road building, the 
maintenance of shrines, assisting in the theatre of Dionysus and in the dockyards, 
maintaining various official records and carrying out death penalties.
24
  The prospect 
of state ownership of three slaves per citizen thus spoke directly to that desire for 
private and public self-esteem through slave ownership in a context that was within 
Athenians’ daily experience.  Putting all these factors together, we can see that 
Xenophon’s proposals targeted the citizen’s sense of himself as an individual and as a 
member of his demos in a compelling manner.  
 
Like the Poroi itself, this chapter is not intended to be a treatise on ancient mining 
techniques, and it is not relevant for our purposes whether or not Xenophon wholly 
understood the detailed technicalities of silver mining, although I believe that there 
was a greater collective awareness of the industry than has often been acknowledged, 
or whether his proposals could have been successful.  But recent work has 
demonstrated the significant scale of the silver mining industry and the extent to 
which its very weighty supply needs permeated every aspect of the Attic economy.
25
  
Whilst it may have had a contained geographic location, this was not a cottage 
industry which could be operated in isolation from mainstream society.  Its 
manufacturing processes required substantial quantities of materials from charcoal to 
bones; artefacts such as baskets, rope, pots and hides, and the skills of masons, 
wheelwrights, woodworkers, ironmongers and engravers amongst others.
26
  The 
majority of these ancillary operations will have been provided by Athenian tradesmen, 
for whom a healthy silver industry provided a substantial consumer. 
 
_______________________ 
 
Callias 5.5 as indicative of a general assumption of domestic slave ownership.  Todd 2007, p. 396, 
calls it ‘extremely dangerous’ to use the Lysias remark in order to draw demographic conclusions, 
nevertheless for our purposes it is enough that to be effective the texts imply a general expectation 
of, or aspiration to, wide slave ownership.    
23
  D. Lewis 1990, p. 257. Braund calls the number of public slaves ‘statistically insignificant,’ but he 
is talking of the Greek world in general; Braund 2011, p. 114. 
24
  D. Lewis 1990, pp. 254-257 and Rihll 2011, pp. 60-61. 
25
  See in particular the work of Tracey Rihll who has made an unassailable case for the scale and 
technological complexity of Attic silver mining in Rihll 2001, Rihll and Tucker 2002, Rihll 2008, 
Rihll 2010a and Rihll 2010b. 
26
  Rihll 2001, p. 133. 
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Xenophon was a keen horseman; when he describes the strategic positions of the forts 
at Anaphlystos and Thorikos and proposes building a third at the high point of Besa,
27
 
it is reasonable to suppose that in his youth he had some familiarity with the region 
and would have encountered the mining operations in the surrounding territory even if 
they were depleted in volume.
28
  The Xenophontic Socrates could hardly have scoffed 
at Glaucon for not having visited the region, if Xenophon had never done so either.
29
  
 
Undoubtedly, then, Xenophon recognised the importance of the mines to state 
prosperity, and if he practised what he preached in the Memorabilia he would have 
had a working knowledge of the mechanisms by which the state exploited the product 
of the mines and the sums the state could realise.  To provide a context for his 
proposals therefore it is useful here to refer to some of the very important work that 
took place in the second half of the twentieth century and the continuing scholarly 
analysis of the various ways in which the industry may be thought to have created 
income for the state.  We may then look at the specific aspects of the relatively 
complex legal and economic relationships within the industry in which Xenophon 
proposed state intervention.  
 
2.2.2   The evidence for Attic mine operations – speeches, lease inscriptions and 
archaeology 
Frustratingly, despite a wealth of evidence – literary, epigraphic, numismatic and 
archaeological – it is well-nigh impossible to pin down the missing links which would 
tell us by precisely what processes and in what sums the state took its share of income 
from silver prospecting.  Several major studies have appeared since Cunningham 
explored the mining region in 1962 and subsequently bemoaned the lack of 
archaeological investigation or publication of the many surface structures which were 
evident even then.
30
  The bulk of our information about Attic silver mining in the 
fourth century comes from two sources.  The first is the voluminous but fragmentary 
body of mining leases issued by the poletai, the board of ten magistrates responsible 
to the boule for various sales and lettings, including confiscated lands, tax collection 
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  Xenophon’s deme of Erchia was near modern Spata; Vanderpool 1965. 
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  Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.11-12. 
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and mine leases, whose work was recorded on stelae originally displayed near the 
bouleuterion and tholos in the Athenian agora and later excavated by the American 
School at Athens.
31
  The great bulk of the work on the poletai leases was undertaken 
originally by Crosby in 1950, with a (re)publication of existing and new material by 
Langdon in 1991 bringing all the poletai records together in one place.
32
   
 
The other significant source is the profusion of archaeological remains in southern 
Attica.  Excavations took place from the 1970s alongside virtually continuous rescue 
excavations, particularly in the coastal and the still-active industrial regions, and the 
works carried out by Kakavoyannis at Pasa Limani, by the Belgian School at Thorikos 
and by the British School at Agrileza.
33 
 In addition there are literary references such 
as that by [Aristotle] to the role of the poletai in awarding mining leases
34 
and an 
entire Demosthenic speech, Against Pantaenetus, relating to a mining dispute.
35
  
There is also a variety of passing references in other sources, such as to those made 
wealthy by mining,
36
 to mine purchasing and related loans,
37 
to the renting of slaves to 
the mines,
38 
to state aid to support mine operators and to the general vicissitudes of the 
enterprise.
39
 
 
Scholarly discussions of the silver mining industry remain complex and questions are 
still unresolved, but notably the discussion over fifty years has moved from an 
interpretation of the issues based on the internal evidence of the leases to a far wider 
ranging debate involving the archaeology of the region, the scientific analysis of pre-
industrial mining techniques and the comparative evidence of slavery.  Over a period 
of twenty five years Hopper drew on Crosby’s publication of the poletai leases and 
the gradually appearing excavation reports to publish three surveys of Attic silver 
                                                 
31
  Ath. Pol. 47.2-3; see Langdon 1991, pp. 57-69 and Papazarkadas 2011, pp. 53-57 for the history 
and functions of the poletai.    
32
  Crosby and Young 1941; Crosby 1950; Crosby 1957; Langdon 1991.  Langdon includes a 
complete concordance of all the published leases and inventory numbers (pp. 211-216).  I will 
refer to individual leases by their catalogue and line number from Langdon with cross reference to 
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  Kakavoyannis 1977, Kakavoyannis 2001, Kakavoyannis 2005, and the Thorikos series of reports 
by Mussche et al published by the Comité des fouilles belges en Grèce between 1967 and 1998.  
For Agrileza: J. E. Jones 1982; J. E. Jones 1985 and Photos-Jones and J. E. Jones 1994. 
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  Ath. Pol. 47.2. 
35
  Dem. 37 Against Pantaenetus. 
36
  Hyp. In Defence of Euxenippus 4.35; Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.20; Plut. Nicias 4.2. 
37
  Dem. Against Boeotus II 40.52. 
38
  Andoc. On the Mysteries 1.38. 
39
  Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.18, 21. 
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mining as well as a detailed chapter within his Trade and Industry in Classical 
Greece.
40
  In 1980 Conophagos published a comprehensive description of ancient 
industrial techniques, metallurgy and the topography and archaeology of the region 
alongside analyses of some of the ancient sources, replacing Ardaillon’s Les Mines du 
Laurion of 1897 which had hitherto been the standard reference work.
41
  In 1985 
Osborne’s succinct analysis of the poletai leases drew conclusions about the economic 
and geographical relationships between the various parties engaged in the industry 
and the way the industry impacted on settlement patterns in the Laurion region.
42
   
 
Most recently, Rihll, Bissa, Shipton and Faraguna have paid close attention to the 
industrial processes, the work of the slaves and the individual operators, and the 
technical processes are now generally understood.  But for readers of the Poroi, one of 
the most vexed questions to emerge relates to the income that mining enterprises 
yielded for the state, and in particular, how to understand the evidence as to the length 
of the concessions, the frequency of lease payments, and whether or how tax was 
levied on silver production, a debate which will be examined in chapter 2.3.
43
  
 
2.2.3   The practicalities and processes of silver mining and refinement 
Tacitus gives a flavour of the arduousness of ancient silver mining even for free men: 
… Curtius Rufus obtained the same honour. He had opened mines in the 
territory of the Mattiaci for working certain veins of silver. The produce was 
small and soon exhausted. The toil meanwhile of the legions was only to a 
loss, while they dug channels for water and constructed below the surface 
works which are difficult enough in the open air. Worn out by the labour, and 
knowing that similar hardships were endured in several provinces, the soldiers 
wrote a secret despatch in the name of the armies, begging the emperor to give 
in advance triumphal distinctions to anyone to whom he was about to entrust 
his forces.
44
 
The mines themselves would begin with the digging of a vertical reconnaissance 
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  Hopper 1953; Hopper 1961; Hopper 1968; Hopper 1979, pp. 164-189. 
41
  Conophagos 1980; Ardaillon 1897.  
42
  R. Osborne 1985a, pp. 111-126. 
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  Shipton 2000 and Bissa 2008 for investment patterns; Faraguna 2006 for the role of the state; 
Bissa 2009, pp. 51-55 on lease categories and more generally, chapter 2 for government 
involvement in the silver mining industry; Rihll 2001 for the industrial processes, and Rihll 2008 
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shaft, which may have taken in the region of two years to complete
45 
and the deepest 
of which yet found is 119m, a depth rarely seen in ancient mining anywhere in the 
world.
46 
  In the event of a successful strike, horizontal galleries then followed the 
seam and might be interconnected or divided to promote ventilation.  Some galleries 
were only three foot high, others substantially bigger, requiring pit props or rock 
pillars left in situ.
47 
 The rock was extremely hard, and operators generally preferred to 
re-work old seams than to sink new shafts, sometimes returning to much older 
workings once improved metallurgical skills meant that seams which had been 
abandoned could be more effectively exploited.
48 
 The ore was then hand sorted, with 
richer ore (i.e. that containing more than about one-third lead) being sent straight for 
smelting.
49
  The remainder was first ground and milled to prepare it for separation
50
  
at one of the washing tables of which there remain today several remarkably complete 
examples along with their allied systems of connecting cisterns, which provided the 
large amounts of water required to separate out the argentiferous lead ore by a process 
of sedimentation.
51
  The washing tables ranged in complexity from a simple flat 
circular or rectangular drying area surrounded by channels which fed the ore-bearing 
water around their edges via sedimentation tanks, to complexes such as the Agrileza 
‘Washery C’ which included grinding spaces, store rooms and (probably) slave 
quarters.
52 
 Once the sediment had been recovered and dried, the lead and silver were 
extracted and separated at smelting furnaces that were sometimes situated further 
away, either on higher ground or at coastal sites, although there may be evidence of 
some separation taking place in the washeries.
53 
 The smelting process involved 
harmful fumes, particularly dangerous to dogs, according to Pliny the Elder,
54
 and the 
release of lead oxide in the form of a white ash that was extremely toxic if inhaled.
55
  
Therefore furnaces were sited where they could do less harm, perhaps on higher 
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  Ardaillon 1897, p. 25. 
46
  Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 333; Morin, Herbach and Rosenthal 2012, p. 9.  
47
  Cunningham 1967, pp. 149-150; J. E. Jones 1982, p. 176. See Morin, Herbach and Rosenthal 
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  Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 333. 
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  Rihll 2001, p. 117.    
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  The lead also had a commercial value: Arist. Econ. 2.1353a.  
52
  J. E. Jones 1985. 
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  Kakavoyannis 1977; AR 1980 p. 17; J. E. Jones 1982, pp. 172-173 and fig. 1; J. E. Jones 1985, p. 
120. 
54
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ground.
56
  Then later, once deforestation took hold thanks to the industry’s heavy 
demand for timber, coastal sites suggest that forethought also had to be given to the 
necessity of easy access to imported fuel.  Nevertheless, the region may have smelled 
permanently sulphurous.
57
   
 
From the above brief résumé it will be obvious that a considerable investment was 
required to enable the effective exploitation of the ‘virgin and silver-laden hills.’58  An 
initial cutting required time-consuming, labour intensive work with no guarantee of 
success, but despite this, over 1,000 ancient mine shafts have been discovered in the 
region.
59
  The numerous surface buildings from the classical era were well made, 
often terraced and partially roofed.  High quality fine hydraulic cement and careful 
engineering achieved the requisite gradual flow of water through the system.
60 
 
Cisterns, sometimes involving major earthworks, were required not only for the heavy 
water consumption of the washeries but also for the support of the large numbers of 
slaves and managers in residence.
61
  The workforce had to be equipped with tools, 
clothed, housed and fed, and as the landscape became stripped of its woodlands and 
productive soil, timber and other materials had to be brought in with the concomitant 
need for sea transportation, waggons and animals for haulage.
62
  Given the challenges 
of victualing such a large population (at a conservative estimate, perhaps anything up 
to 11,000 at any one time at the height of productivity
63
) it seems a fair hypothesis 
that the series of grain crises of the late fourth century might have played a part in the 
industry’s decline.64  With goods and manpower clearly being transported into and out 
of the region in some quantities it is hardly surprising that two agoras have been 
identified in the region.  In the later fourth century Leucius of Sounion, a landowner 
appearing in the poletai leases, donated land at Cape Sounion for the necessary 
enlargement of the agora because of lack of space, which may well have been due to 
                                                 
56
  Hopper 1953, p. 204, n. 5; Hopper 1968, pp. 295, 307; Hopper 1979, p. 175; J. E. Jones 1982, fig. 
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57
  Rihll 2001, p. 126.   
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  Conophagos 1980, p. 163. 
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the increased volume of the mining industry,
65
 and a large site on the south-east coast 
at Pasa Limani has been interpreted as an ‘agora or depot of the metallurgical trade’.66 
  
Despite this ample evidence of industrial activity, less clear are the precise 
relationships between the various parties involved in silver extraction and, most 
importantly for our purposes, the ways in which the state ultimately profited.  In the 
following section we will look at the way the city and her inhabitants benefited from 
the industry. 
 
2.3   State income from silver mining - introduction  
Xenophon anticipates that his plan, when implemented, will yield lease income from 
the increasing volume of slave hire.  But it is clear that with the re-energising of the 
industry he expects more than that: he talks about revenue from busier markets, 
harbour dues and state owned houses, and reminds his readers of the income the state 
received through slavery before the Spartan occupation of Decelea.
67
  Xenophon’s 
readers will undoubtedly have been aware of the state income yielded by the mines in 
happier times and an examination of such income sources, both those referenced by 
Xenophon directly and those which are not, demonstrates that Xenophon well 
understood the wider income achievable beyond the slave lease receipts and that these 
will have been recognised by his readers.  Nevertheless as we will see, quantifying 
essential inputs and outputs of the mining industry such as slave numbers and 
production costs, or the proportion of bullion to minted coinage, is complex and 
ultimately unachievable, whilst levels of production varied over time such that even 
generalisations can be tendentious, thus this account is ‘qualitative and descriptive.’68   
 
It is surprisingly difficult to untangle precisely what mechanisms enabled the silver 
mines to contribute to state prosperity.  Bissa has shown that the state legislated to 
protect the works, administering their leasing, regulating the quality of the product 
and providing the prospector with a safe operating environment,
69
 but what did the 
state receive in return?  The following section will attempt to give an overview of the 
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direct and indirect ways in which income could be realised for the state through 
Xenophon’s plan for the silver mines.  
 
2.3.1   The poletai leases - introduction 
The poletai issued leases which licensed the right to mine; mine operators did not 
necessarily mine under land they owned themselves, although in general landowners 
appear to make the most money from the industry and they (as well as others) 
probably operated the various surface works and presumably hoped to profit from the 
leaseholders’ need to process their ore in a relatively convenient location.  Osborne 
suggests that landowners may have invested in the infrastructure on their land, for 
which mine operators would have had to pay ground rent, in addition to making lease 
payments to the poletai.
70
   
 
From at least shortly before 367/6, leases appear to have been inscribed annually.  
They usually name the registrant and lessee (generally Athenians); the owner on 
whose land a concession is situated; adjacent identifying features such as ergasteria, 
roads, and boundaries with other properties; the classification and price of the lease, 
and a reference to any earlier stele on which the mine had previously been registered.  
Analysis of the surviving stelae and projections relating to the missing years suggest 
that there may have been in the region of 2,500 leases registered between 367/6 and 
around 300.
71
  Although they are rarely securely dated, letter forms and the occasional 
reference to an archon from an earlier lease have made it possible to arrange them in 
roughly chronological order.  All the scholars discussed here work on the assumption 
that the surviving stelae, representing 39 out of the 67 years from the first inscription 
through to the end of the century, present a random representative sample.
72
 
 
2.3.1.1   The Athenaion politeia and the poletai leases 
The history of the way that mining rights came to be ‘owned’ and administered by the 
state is probably irretrievable, although it has been surmised that mining territories 
had been confiscated from the Peisistratids.
73
  The extant inscribed leases do not 
reflect a system evidenced to be in operation very much earlier than the 370s, 
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although mining has been demonstrated to go back as far as the Early Helladic era at 
Thorikos
74
 and the institution of the μεταλλικός νόμος, law which dealt with 
transgressions within the mining industry, demonstrates the way that codification and 
organisation of mining operations evolved to cope with increased activity.
75
  The stele 
of 367/6 refers to certain renewed leases being from the stele, ἐκ τῆς στήλης, without 
reference to an archon for the earlier stele, whereas the same formula used on 
successive stones identifies an archon for the earlier lease period.  Crosby posits that 
there might thus only have been one earlier inscribed stele.
76
  Hopper suggests that a 
change from direct state operation to private leasing might have taken place either 
under the Oligarchs or immediately after.
77
  If the state had indeed operated the mines 
in the late fourth century, then the slaves from whom Nikias made such profits
78
 
would have been leased to the state, in an exact reversal of the lessee/lessor 
relationship that Xenophon proposes, but from a reference in Aristophanes’ Knights 
we know that the mines were in state hands in the second half of the fifth century.
79
  
 
Hopper and Osborne assume that the adoption of inscribed leases was in response to 
some procedural change,
80
 whilst Langdon is more inclined to see the move to 
inscription as a straightforward change from recording on tablets, in order to make an 
existing lease a more accessible matter of public record.  Langdon argues that if any 
major change in mining administration did occur, it was more likely to have been in 
the second century, when a known revival in mining does not seem to have been 
accompanied by inscribed leases, possibly indicating that mines were no longer 
individually leased and the state was taking possession of all silver ore for coinage.
81
  
By way of comparison, temple accounting on Delos saw big alterations in recording 
methods at the beginning of the second century and Migeotte has suggested that the 
changes may have been instituted there because of a period of negligence; it is not 
impossible that a similar motivation led to a change of leasing procedure in Athens.
82
  
It is also quite possible that, as with many aspects of public life which began to appear 
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on stone in fourth-century Athens, only the manner of recording, and not the 
procedure, was innovative.  Nevertheless, we do not know for sure whether we are 
comparing like with like when we try to make some comparison between state income 
from silver and the mechanisms by which it was achieved in the fifth and fourth 
centuries.   
 
The Ath. Pol. refers to two categories of lease, ἐργάσιμα, let for three years and 
συγκεχωρημένα, ‘those that have been conceded’ according to Crosby, 83  let for 
perhaps three, seven or ten years: there is controversy over the papyrus in the British 
Library.
84
  However the inscribed categories of mine on the stelae do not precisely 
coincide with those of the Ath. Pol. and scholars have disputed at length how best to 
marry them up.  There are conflicting opinions even as to the word συγκεχωρημένα 
which has also been read as συγκεχωσμένα, ‘filled up’.85  Whilst the Ath. Pol. gives 
just two categories of leases, the inscriptions describe four types of mine, ergasima, 
anasaxima, palaia anasaxima and kainotomia.  Not only is it tricky to ascertain the 
length of the lease terms, but the inscriptions tell us how much the payments were 
without telling us how frequently they were to be paid, which could be one-off, 
annually, monthly or per prytany throughout the term, making it impossible to 
calculate the full costs.  It has also proved difficult so far to identify with certainty any 
individual leases which are renewals of earlier registrations.  Therefore, central to 
understanding the way the system of payment operated together with the sums 
yielded, is clarification of both the lease term on the Ath. Pol. papyrus and the 
relationship between [Aristotle’s] categories and the classifications of the poletai 
inscriptions.  The depth of the scholarly debate over the Aristotelian passage and the 
interpretation of the poletai leases is indicative in part of the fragmentary nature of the 
leases themselves but also of an increasing understanding of the actuality of mining 
operations which have proved resistant to the simplistic mapping of a small number of 
terms onto a wide range of specialised undertakings.  The sophistication introduced 
into the debate by the discussion of operational issues such as a natural preference to 
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extract the richest ore first and the regular return to re-work older cuttings as 
metallurgical skills improved
86
 demonstrates the complexity of the industry.  The 
unknowable productivity of any mine from one month to another may mean that the 
poletai categories provided at best a rough schema within which the industry could be 
categorised.  Whilst we have evidence that a blind eye might be turned when it suited 
the state to encourage speculation,
87
 regular inspections and constant vigilance 
amongst neighbours would have been essential to ensure that the system could remain 
fair. 
 
2.3.1.2   Income to the state from the leases 
A further issue that quickly arises from the study of the poletai leases, is that whilst 
there are occasional high figures, many of the lease payments are very low indeed – 
20 drachmas or so – and whether these represent single payments or even, say, 
payments made every prytany for ten years, it is difficult to see how they might have 
yielded any significant level of income to the state.   
 
Whilst the volume of those leases which can be securely dated does show a steady 
increase up to just beyond the mid-century before declining once more,
88
 nevertheless 
they do not seem to provide evidence for the sort of state income suggested by the 
famous trireme-building episode of Herodotus and the Ath. Pol,
89
 although this too 
presents interpretative challenges.
90
  The ten drachmas per head distribution of 
Herodotus’ account would equate to no more than 50 talents even if the Athenian 
population were estimated at 30,000, and at, say, a talent per ship such a sum could 
thus represent only a partial contribution to the cost of the two hundred triremes 
Herodotus tells us were built.  Aristotle’s account achieves half this number – only 
one hundred triremes - for 100 talents, perhaps double the expenditure described by 
Herodotus, a substantial disparity.  The episode clearly has a level of myth about it; 
Loomis rightly advises that the two accounts should not be merged
91
 and Gabrielsen 
views the increase in the fleet as:  
a gradual build-up over a relatively longer span of time, rather than a crash 
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programme that produced 200 triereis within two years’ time.92   
It is in any case impractical to imagine that one year’s production yielded such an 
immediate windfall and Picard argues that it would have taken a matter of years, 
perhaps as many as thirty, for the benefits of the newly discovered ‘third contact’ to 
be exploited to the extent that such a surplus might be mined, refined and amassed.
93
   
As Hopper suggests, it might be better to ignore the events of 483 when trying to 
ascertain fourth-century procedure, although scholars return frequently to a putative 
100 talents when trying to reconstruct a formula for annual state income in this 
period.
94
 
 
Sales by the poletai were by auction
95
 although the regular appearance of the sum of 
20 drachmas throughout the fourth century for new cuttings and re-opened workings 
may suggest a pre-fixed ‘reserve’ and/or a lack of competition.  Of the seventeen 
mines leased in 367/6, the year of our earliest extant records, only five were set at 
more than this, in a range from 50 to 1,550 drachmas.
96
  Later in the century the 
highest figures appearing in the leases are 6,100
97
 and 17,550 drachmas.
98
  Langdon 
dates this highest figure to 346/5 and it is interesting that this, the most elevated price 
yet discovered, appears just as the evidence of the leases suggests that mining activity 
is approaching its fourth-century height, and just as Nicobulus and Evergus embark on 
their fractious business relationship with Pantaenetus over an ergasterion and slaves 
mortgaged for 105 minas.
99
  But the figure of 17,550 drachmas is apparently quite 
exceptional and otherwise amongst the known leases the income received by the state 
seems disappointingly low for those seeking the source of Athenian wealth, even 
allowing for the depressed state of the industry.  As we have seen, the stelae do not 
record either the length of the lease or the frequency of the payments, only the sum.  
Xenophon is called on as a witness by Crosby, in considering whether the listing of 
leases by prytany is evidence for payments also made on this basis, ie ten times per 
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year over the term of the lease.  By way of example Crosby calculates potential 
income from the lease list of 367/6 if payments were made per prytany, at just over 
twenty talents
100
 and from the list of 342/1 the total income calculated by this method 
would have risen to in the region of 160 talents.
101
  Crosby, admitting that she is 
arguing ex silentio, therefore rejects the suggestion of payments per prytany on the 
basis that had Xenophon’s proposal to increase mining activity come to fruition, 
increased lease income would have been significant and it is unlikely that Xenophon 
would not have mentioned it.  Therefore, she argues that lease income must have been 
relatively low and that if lease payments represented the sole direct state mining 
revenue, the sums must have been payable annually (ie three or seven times over the 
life of the lease) rather than once per term, although ultimately she can suggest no 
basis on which to choose between the two theories.
102
   
 
Hopper finds an annual payment of, say, twenty drachmas ‘ridiculously small’ and 
infers not only from the organisation of the lease lists by prytany but also from the 
evidence relating to other poletai receipts that the payments were made by prytany 
and contrary to Crosby, suggests that an increase in rent payments lay behind 
Xenophon’s desire to see an increase in mining activity.  In particular, he finds the 
individual sums thereby derived per mine and the putative 160 talents for 342/1 to be 
figures in line both with the reference to an individual mine ‘purchase’ for 90 minas in 
Demosthenes’ Against Pantaenetus and with the increase in annual city revenues from 
130 talents to 400 talents described in Demosthenes’ Fourth Philippic.103   
 
Other interpretations abound.
104
  Faraguna, for instance, has made a sound case for 
two payments - the initial fee, shown on the poletai inscriptions, represented a filing 
fee to register the lease and set the boundaries, and the second, a share of the results of 
extraction, greater or lesser depending on the operator’s success.105 
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Returning to Crosby’s observation that Xenophon does not mention lease income, 
Conophagos’ explanation of the omission is twofold and ingenious: he argues that the 
συγκεχωρημένα mines, the second category found in the Ath. Pol., was an entirely 
separate lease category from those appearing on the inscriptions.  These were the 
productive, fully operational mines and should not be looked for in the poletai leases 
at all.  Their higher productivity would not be known in advance and so they would be 
subject to annual variable assessments to determine their lease payments, which 
would have to be recorded elsewhere.  Therefore he argues that Xenophon does not 
refer to receipts from ἐργάσιμα mines, because they are unimportant, and he does not 
mention receipts from συγκεχωρημένα mines because they are well known by all, and 
that Xenophon chose only to focus on the new income source derived from his 
scheme – the hiring of state slaves.106   
 
Conophagos also suggests that some of the mines which were known to have 
employed 500-1,000 slaves must have employed them on several neighbouring 
concessions – the fact that these large neighbouring concessions with the same lessees 
do not appear on the poletai lists he takes as further proof that wealthier, successful 
mines were recorded elsewhere.
107
  But the evidence for large slaveholdings comes 
from Xenophon who does not say that such slaves were all leased to the same or even 
to just a few individual operators and cannot be taken alone as proof of single 
individual enterprises substantially greater than the average.
108
  Instances of large 
numbers of slaves might equally be evidence of many individual renting arrangements 
for the supply of smaller numbers of slaves between slave owner and multiple mine 
operators.  Against Pantaenetus
109
 shows the potential complexity of such renting 
arrangements and the speed with which the ownership of groups of slaves might 
change hands even whilst employed at one establishment.  
 
Only Osborne has, briefly, rebutted Conophagos’ analysis of the leases and their 
terms
110
 (although Langdon, referring en passant to his ‘radically different 
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interpretation’ directs readers to the ‘more convincing orthodox view’ of Hopper).111  
Almost certainly, we do not have the evidence finally to assess the way that the leases 
were costed and administered, and Conophagos’ imaginative interpretation of the 
evidence demonstrates the way in which an apparently large body of evidence might 
be open to wider re-interpretation than the earlier debates suggest.  It seems almost 
certain that we have to look beyond the initial mine registrations for the bulk of 
income received by the state.   
 
2.3.1.3   The poletai leases – conclusion 
We are left, then, with various interpretations of the leases, (not all of which have 
been discussed here) and whilst the scholarly explanations may suggest more 
ingeniously complex solutions, none of them sufficiently ties up all the loose ends.  If 
state income is to be found only in the lease records, Hopper’s explanation remains 
the most convincing.  But this would entail that the poletai would be reliant solely on 
the competitive bidding process to achieve the greatest income, and such income 
could take no account of the wealth that might subsequently be achieved by a lucky 
strike.  That Xenophon does not reference lease income, does not in itself demonstrate 
either that such income was insignificant, or that it was so well known that it need not 
be remarked upon, but I tend towards the latter interpretation.  Even when the lease 
income appears to be low, there is sufficient evidence of the considerable financial 
advantages accruing to the state from silver production that either the lease income 
alone, or such income along with allied taxation on production, can hardly have been 
ignored by Xenophon and his audience even if they are not enumerated within his 
text.  The many other routes through which the demos may have profited from the 
mining industry are discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3.2   Tax income on mining and associated activities - introduction 
Xenophon refers several times to tax income.  At 2.1 he mentions the metic tax; at 
4.25 he looks ahead to the income from taxation on the sale of the slaves; at 4.40 he 
says there will be revenues from the harbours and markets; at 4.20 he refers in passing 
to tax-farmers and at 4.49 to a tax on furnaces and the markets in the mining region.  
He is evidently alive to all the income-potential for the state.  Figueira suggests that at 
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the height of production during the pentekontaetia, annual state income from direct 
and indirect taxes drawing on the output of the mines would have been in the region 
of 75-100 talents.
112
  Some of the ancillary activities that supported the industry were 
taxed, and there were other ways in which the industry made contributions to the life 
of the demos.  Our evidence is scanty and certainly not sufficient to enable 
quantification, but the economic repercussions of the industry permeate Athenian life.  
When Xenophon says, ‘and all the other sources of revenue,’113 this catch-all phrase 
must wrap up within it many contributions by the silver industry to public resources 
which Xenophon’s audience will be aware of but which he does not detail, and 
furnishes the answer to those who question why Xenophon does not mention the 
leases explicitly.
114
   
 
As we have seen, there can be little doubt that the state took a share in addition to the 
lease payment.  In Demosthenes’ Against Pantaenetus we hear of a καταβολή, an 
instalment due to the state from a mine operator, of 90 minas, a substantial sum that 
cannot be easily squared with the lease payments we know of.
115
  In its definition of 
Ἀπονομή, the Suda describes ‘The apportionment, whether in the case of the city 
taking some part of the proceeds from the mine-workings or in the case of a division 
amongst a multiplicity of contractors, so that each takes some part’116 clearly implying 
that the state received a part of a mine operator’s profit.117 
 
Rejecting Faraguna’s idea of a levy on the final product of the mines, Bissa argues 
that state resources were traditionally either managed directly by the state, or 
exploited by lease arrangement.
118
  But Athenian silver resources held a unique 
position in public life.  Athens’ wealth and power are, and were, widely attributed to 
Laurion silver.  If the leases cannot provide a satisfactory answer in the search for 
public revenue, then it is inevitable that we must look elsewhere.  What becomes clear 
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from a study of the sources and the scholarship, however, is that the most we can 
achieve is an impressionistic picture.  Some assumptions are based on (varying) 
interpretations of the income from the leases; others take an assumed annual yield of 
bullion and work backwards.  The overview that follows therefore quite deliberately 
does not attempt any sort of quantitative analysis and whilst I draw on the sometimes 
impressive calculations of others, the wide variety of assumptions on which they are 
based means that it is important to avoid the implication that they form a coherent 
whole; a level of scepticism remains essential and any integrated synthesis is 
impossible.   
 
It is informative, for instance, to consider what the operators might actually afford to 
contribute out of their profits.  Aperghis takes a notional 500 working mines, and 
calculates, based on a rather large number of hypotheses, that it would have been 
possible for an ‘average’ mine to make an average payment of 1,200 drachmas a year, 
and therefore yield between them an annual income to the state of 100 talents.  This 
set of calculations suggests tax levied at 10% of production, and would still leave the 
operator with 6,000 drachmas in hand that might be shared with the landowner, 
ergasterion and furnace operators.
119
  Over several closely worked pages 
Conophagos, on the other hand, takes a notional 20,000 kg annual silver bullion yield 
and assesses each stage of production in some detail; manpower and associated 
expenses such as fuel, food and clothing are separately quantified for extraction, 
washeries, furnaces and cupellation.  Aperghis’ calculations, which he calls, ‘my very 
rough analysis,’ lack the detail of Conophagos’ work and are intended to show simply 
that a mine tax would have been feasible, but although Aperghis draws on some of 
Conophagos’ observations, it is not possible to merge the two exercises usefully.  
Both, however, project an average annual payment to the state of 100 talents at the 
peak of production, Conophagos specifically looking at the fifth century and Aperghis 
at the fourth, and their very different approaches indicate that, however exacted, the 
industry could bear such a cost.
120
  Most recently, Davis has argued that both scholars’ 
projections would lead to operators making losses and that taxation must have been 
lower.
121
  The following sections will look at the evidence for various mechanisms 
through which the state might have extracted its share. 
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2.3.2.1   The pentedrachmia – the five drachma tax 
There are only two clear references to mine taxation in our sources, one of which is 
very late.  A poletai record of 342/1-339/8 records the confiscation of an apartment 
house in Piraeus belonging to Meixidemos of Myrrhinous, in settlement of a bond 
owed to the public treasury which Meixidemos had guaranteed for Philistides, son of 
Philistides, for the levying of a tax:     
ἐγγύην ἐν τοῖϛ ἔργ-       
οιϛ τὴν πεντεδραχμίαν ἕκτην καὶ ἑβδόμην κ- 
αὶ ὀγδόην τρεῖϛ ταύταϛ ἑκάστην τὴν καταβ[ο]- 
λήν: ΗΔΔΠ: δραχμὰϛ122 
Both Meritt and later Langdon interpret this as a five drachma mine tax;
123
 Shipton 
qualifies this with the thought that even if it were ‘not an actual tax, it was clearly a 
regular payment due each prytany, by those exploiting the mines.’124  Shipton noted 
that the ‘remarkable’ aspect of all the known lease prices was that all were divisible 
by five and suggested that this was the key to understanding this inscription and the 
lease costs, suggesting that there was a 5 drachma charge per prytany, such that a 
three year lease would cost 150 drachmas.  A 20 drachma price would reflect the 
nominal fee at the opening of an old cutting (a palaion anasaximon), and fees of more 
than 500 drachmas (ie. ten years) would represent a multiplicity of mines within a 
single concession, perhaps shared by several partners. 
 
Shipton was right to pay attention to the pentedrachmia, which had hitherto been 
barely addressed.  Ηowever there is an inevitable need for imaginative thinking in 
finding ways to construct a plan that allows for a range of prices from 20 to 6,100 
drachmas.  In particular it is not clear why it should be so very remarkable that lease 
prices increased in five drachma stages – Athenian coinage may not have been 
decimal, but her numbering certainly was, and five is a convenient point between zero 
and ten.  The exceptionally highly priced leases do need some explanation, but 
Shipton’s own gloss on the highest price – 12 concessions x 5 drachmas x ten 
prytanies x ten years – only adds up to 6,000, the same sum, as she says, that we see 
quoted in Demosthenes 42.3, but not actually the precise 6,100 we see recorded on the 
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  Meritt 1936, pp. 393-413, 10.129-130; pp. 393-406 = Traill 1986, pp. 82-83, n.3 = Walbank 1991, 
pp. 147-207; P26.474-475. 
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  Langdon 1991, p. 65.    
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  Shipton 1998, p. 59. 
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stele.  The lower prices are also unhelpful, as Faraguna points out; a 20 drachma lease 
would represent a term of four prytanies, not long enough for any useful activity.  
Fawcett rejects the five drachma tax in favour of the 1/24
th
 of the Suda (see below), 
although he does not go into any detail.
125
  Ηowever this assumes that only one or the 
other tax must be correct.  It is quite possible, given the stages of leasing, extracting 
and refining, that different charges could be levied at different stages, and it is equally 
possible, given the lateness of the Suda as a reference, that the taxes existed at 
different times.  
 
2.3.2.2   The one twenty-fourth  
The Suda tells us that when a new mine was registered, one twenty-fourth was 
promised to the state:  
Prosecution for an unregistered mine.  When those who worked the silver 
mines wanted to begin a new working, they would notify those the people had 
put in charge of mines and would register a twenty-fourth part of the new mine 
as a tax payable to the people. So if someone appeared to be working a mine in 
secret, anyone who wanted could indict and expose him for not having 
registered.
126
 
This charge is not mentioned in the Ath. Pol. at 47.2 where the allocation by the 
poletai of mine leases and tax contracts is discussed, and Rhodes suggests that it may 
have been levied at a later period, when activity was declining.
127
  On the other hand, 
other taxes are not individually itemised there either, and other scholars have 
discussed the implications of the Suda reference in relation to fourth-century mining 
in some detail.  Hopper suggests that the only way it might have been imposed would 
have been to make a second charge, based on a mine’s productivity, beyond the initial 
lease payment.  Thus one twenty-fourth of the previous year’s production might 
perhaps equate to the cost of the forthcoming lease.  Following Andreades and 
Ardaillon, Hopper points out that if the one hundred talents the state received in 483 
were only one twenty-fourth of production, the total silver production would have 
been 2,400 talents worth, achieved by digging 945,000 tons of ore, ‘chose impossible’ 
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  Fawcett 2006, pp. 62-65. 
126
  Suida s.v. Ἀγράφου μετάλλου δίκη: οἱ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλα ἐργαζόμενοι ὅπου βούλοιντο καινοῦ 
ἔργου ἄρξασθαι, φανερὸν ἐποιοῦντο τοι̂ς ἐπ' ἐκείνοις τεταγμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ 
ἀπεγράφοντο τοῦ τελει̂ν ἕνεκα τῶ δήμῳ εἰκοστὴν τετάρτην τοῦ καινοῦ μετάλλου. εἴ τις ου ν̂ 
ἐδόκει λάθρα ἐργάζεσθαι μέταλλον, τὸν μὴ ἀπογραψάμενον ἐξῆν τῶ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι καὶ 
ἐλέγχειν. Suda on Line, Trans. Anne Mahoney, 27 August 1998 http://www.stoa.org/sol-
entries/alpha/345 . 
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as Conophagos puts it.
128
   But as we have seen, we do not know whether Aristotle’s 
100 talents was an annual income, a windfall, or a steady accumulation; all this ore 
need not have been dug in twelve months.
129
  And if there is doubt that the charge had 
yet been imposed in the fourth century, there must be still greater doubt that it already 
existed in the early fifth.   
 
Conophagos and Kakavoyannis both focus on the Suda’s reference to τοῦ καινοῦ 
μετάλλου which they believe implies that the one twenty-fourth applied to new 
cuttings alone.  Conophagos believed that new cuttings were leased for a term of three 
years, with no advance payment whatever, registered, at most, for a minimal fee of 5 
drachmas.  This registration would then be followed by a payment of one twenty-
fourth of the value of any ore found during the lease term.
130
  But even in the 
fragmentary state of the records, anasaxima and palaia anasaxima mines appear more 
frequently than kainotomia, suggesting that if Conophagos is correct, any income to 
the state based on one twenty-fourth of the product of kainotomia cuttings alone must 
have been low and probably unpredictable.  Alternatively Kakavoyannis suggests that 
such mines were not recorded with other leases until later in the fourth century.
131
   
 
Hopper argued that if payments were calculated on instalments by prytany, rival 
bidding for leases on productive mines would ensure that the state profited from 
operators’ success.  Summing up the arguments of his predecessors who tried to 
construct different combinations of lease payments and twenty-fourths, he concludes 
wisely that, ‘In fact, the one twenty-fourth is a nuisance if an attempt is made to fit it 
in with other probable modes of payment.’132  Undeterred, following Aperghis’ 
attempt to model what the industry was likely to be able to bear in tax, recently Davis 
has argued that the most likely mode of taxation was a combination of the registration 
fees and the one twenty-fourth, although as we have seen, such exercises rely on a 
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  Andreades 1933, p. 271; Hopper 1979, p. 184; Conophagos 1980, p. 438. 
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  Chapter 2.3.1.2. 
130
  Conophagos 1980, p. 438, basing his argument on the fact that the extant kainotomia leases 
appear to have no price. Of the previously unpublished leases appearing after Conophagos wrote, 
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P51 (previously unpublished) and P56. 
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  Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 335. 
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  Hopper 1953, pp. 229, 238; Hopper 1979, pp. 184-186.  
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large number of hypotheses.
133
  Thus despite its superficial precision, when we try to 
unpick the implications of the Suda reference, its lateness and lack of detail mean that 
there are too many unknowns to enable us to draw clear conclusions. 
 
2.3.2.3   The Attic demes  
Aperghis tentatively proposed that the demes in which the mines were situated, noted 
on the poletai leases, were in some way involved in mine registration and may 
possibly have levied a local tax.
134
  We have very little evidence from which to guess 
at the level of involvement, if any, that demes may have played in the administration 
of the industry.  An inscription from Eleusis shows that stone quarries could be leased 
by demes,
135
 but Osborne notes that apparently to do so was a new idea to the 
Eleusinians in 332/1 and he cautions against the assumption of automatic public 
ownership, showing that payments to suppliers of stone from Eleusis were for the 
work of cutting, not for the stone itself.
136
  There are further differences between what 
we know of mine leasing and the Eleusinian quarry: the Eleusinians honoured 
Philokomos, the proposer of the leasing enactment and also the lessee Moirokles.  
Papazarkadas argues that the Eleusinians saw Moirokles not only as an entrepreneur, 
but as pious, implying a quasi-liturgical aspect to deme leases, and points to similar 
recognition afforded to the lessees of a Piraeus theatre.
137
  This liturgical and/or 
religious aspect is missing entirely from mining enactments as far as can be seen.   
 
These differences probably make any use of quarrying as a comparator unreliable.  
Had demes profited from the mining rights there would have been a disproportionate 
effect on the relative wealth of those demes in the mining region and it is perhaps 
more in keeping with democratic ideology that what registration or leasing income 
was to be had from an Attic resource should be managed on behalf of the whole 
demos. 
 
2.3.2.4   The Athenian mint 
From the Coinage Decree we learn that there was a margin of 3% or 5% between the 
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nominal and intrinsic values of Athenian silver coins.
138
  Faraguna suggests that this 
represents a margin retained by the city in order to give it a share of the miners’ 
profits and that the absence of silver in the excavations of the ‘mint’ in the Athenian 
agora (despite the plentiful presence of bronze blanks and rods) may imply that, at 
least in the first stage of Athenian coinage, the minting of coins may have taken place 
in the Laurion – they were, after all, described by Aristophanes as Laurion owls.139  
There is certainly evidence pointing to the minting of bronze coins at Sounion,
140
 and 
possibly to the preparation of coin blanks for minting at Thorikos.
141
  The hoard of 
282 recently minted early third-century Athenian tetradrachms discovered at 
Thorikos,
142
 coming ‘immediately from the mint through three or four deposits’ 
provides, at least, food for thought as to why uncirculated coins would be found in the 
Laurion, although it is entirely reasonable that a mine operator would return from 
Athens and bury the coins he had had minted from his own ingots.
143
   
 
It should be remembered of course that not all silver will have been coined, and so 
this could not be an across-the-board tax; Bissa suggests that when Xenophon talks of 
the profit available from the export of Athenian silver, he is speaking specifically of 
the export of bullion,
144
 but this margin is still likely to have yielded significant 
revenue.  And it is interesting to consider whether all payments due to the state 
(however calculated) relating to the proceeds of silver mining were required to be in 
coined money – when Pantaenetus’ slave was waylaid by Antigenes, where had he 
been taking the argurion instalment that failed to reach the state and keep him debt-
free?
145
  Was it silver ore, either as direct payment or on its way to be minted, or was 
it already coined money?  If payments were to be made only in coin, this would 
represent a compulsory additional deduction from the operator’s annual production.  
                                                 
138
  IG I³ 1453 C.12-13; ML 45.5 with discussion at p. 113 and Kroll 2011, p. 236 n. 23; both prefer 
3%. Le Rider 1989, p. 163 describes several analyses of the silver, copper, gold and lead content 
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  Ar. Birds 1106; Faraguna 2006, pp. 144-145.  Bissa 2009, pp. 57-58, n. 42, is sceptical of the 
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On the other hand the Athenian argurokopeion remains to be found
146
 and may yet 
yield important information as to the location of both minting and reminting of 
Athenian coinage. 
 
2.3.2.5   The furnaces 
One of the sources of state revenue which Xenophon specifically expects to increase 
once the mines become busier is the furnaces (καμίνων).147  Bissa suggests that the 
furnaces might have been state operated, or owned and leased out by the state, 
although she has to dispose of a small amount of apparent evidence for privately 
owned furnaces in order to make her case,
148
 arguing against Faraguna, who suggested 
that the furnaces might levy a proportion of all silver processed in situ in the Laurion. 
Faraguna supports his argument with a wide range of evidence, including the same 
reference in the Poroi, by analogy with the Vipasca tablets of the second century AD 
which regulate copper and silver mining activity, and with an as yet unpublished and 
incomplete law from fourth century Athens which refers to silver purification and the 
furnaces.
 149
  Bissa however focusses on Faraguna’s reliance on lexicographers and 
says that such a tax would be unique, direct taxation being generally avoided in 
Athens.
150
  But again, the silver industry surely presents an entirely unique set of 
circumstances.  The traditional view that Greeks avoided personal taxation because 
they viewed it as tyrannical has been challenged by both Gallo and Fawcett, Gallo 
arguing that the known examples of direct taxation under tyrannies all appear under 
regimes characterised by ancient writers as moderate, and finding evidence elsewhere 
that ancient references to the absence of direct taxation (for instance on Thasos) make 
it clear that such a lack is the exception rather than the rule.
151
  Fawcett further argues 
that the reason most states fail to introduce direct taxation is because of the 
complexity of administering thousands of separate sets of arrangements, rather than 
because of any cultural disinclination.
152
  Tax at the point of silver refinement would 
not be all that different from tax at the point of sale or import/export, whilst on a 
practical level the furnaces would furnish the best opportunity for the on-the-spot 
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assessment of the precise amount of silver processed by individual mine operators.  
This must otherwise have been extremely difficult – it seems unlikely that volume 
could realistically have been measured from as far away as the city.  Whether or not 
the state owned the furnaces, Faraguna’s proposal, involving as it would have done, 
administration of silver revenues in the field, seems to me to provide the most 
effective means of ensuring that the city could monitor mining yields.  
 
2.3.2.6   A tax on slave sales? 
There are other ways in which mining activity might have raised taxation income.  
Calling as witness those old enough to remember the era before the Peloponnesian 
occupation of Decelea, Xenophon reminds the reader how much the tax on slaves 
used to bring in:  
ὅτι δὲ δέξεται πολλαπλάσια τούτων μαρτυρήσαιεν ἄν μοι εἴ τινες ἔτι εἰσὶ τῶν 
μεμνημένων ὅσον τὸ τέλος ηὕρισκε τῶν ἀνδραπόδων πρὸ τῶν ἐν Δεκελείᾳ.153 
Here Xenophon is a prime source, in a passage that is more usually cited as a part of 
the evidence for Attic slave numbers.  At 4.24 and 4.25 he proposes that by increasing 
slave levels to at least 10,000, a state income of 100 talents could be achieved,
154
 and 
far more than that.  ‘Far more’ has been taken by Gauthier (citing Lauffer and 
Thiel
155
) as an indication by Xenophon of the number of slaves that he believes might 
potentially be employed in (‘received by’) the mines, i.e. the mines have the capacity 
to employ many more than 10,000 slaves, as witnessed by the high slave taxation 
income pre-Decelea, thereby implying that there had been many more than 10,000 in 
the mines before 413.   
 
Alternatively the subject of δέξεται might be the state, the implied recipient of the 100 
talents, which could receive ‘many times more’ in income, and Marchant explicitly 
translates, ‘But the state will receive far more than that.’156  Gauthier argues that 
Xenophon would have used ἀπολαμβάνειν or κομίζεσθαι rather than δέξεται if he was 
referring to receipts by the city treasury, suggesting that rather than propose a 
                                                 
153
  4.25. ‘But the state will receive far more than that, as anyone will testify who is old enough to 
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  10,000 slaves each earning an obol per day would yield 3,600,000 obols per year, i.e. 600,000 
drachmas = 100 talents. 
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  Marchant 1925, p. 213.  
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hypothetical future projection, he refers his reader to a known past when the mines 
had 20 or 30,000 slaves.  Thus he translates the passage as ‘quelle somme produisait 
la taxe des esclaves avant les événements de Décelie.’   
 
Conophagos discusses but rejects a further reading, ‘à quel prix la cité trouvait les 
esclaves avant Decelea,’ that is, how much the city paid for slaves before Decelea.157  
Gauthier however, although he does not address this possible interpretation, 
demonstrates a clear connection with Xenophon’s use of τέλος at 4.40, which is 
unambiguously about tax.
158
  Whichever way one reads the passage, the additional 
income Xenophon refers to is from a telos.  Gauthier dismisses Boeckh’s suggestion 
that there was an annual, though small, tax on slave ownership of around three obols, 
for two reasons:
159
 such a tax is otherwise unknown in the Greek world, and would 
have been made difficult to administer because owners would sell or buy slaves 
during each year, despite which, no examples of fraud have survived.  Instead he cites 
taxes imposed on slaves sales in other Greek poleis and suggests that this is an import 
tax (see below).
160
  Xenophon is showing that tax income would be available to the 
state in addition to slave rental income and would seem to be referring to an import 
tax and/or a sales tax, and his words show a clear line of thought – there is a potential 
state income of 100 talents from slave leasing; this income could be many times 
greater, because of the tax revenue on slave sales, which is evidenced by pre-Decelea 
slave tax in general and – he continues – because there is no limit to the number of 
slaves the mines can accommodate and still be productive.   
 
Given that the creation of more state income is central to Xenophon’s agenda, it is 
unlikely that he could refer to historic taxation income simply as a signifier of the 
number of slaves that could be inserted into the mines without noting the significance 
of that tax for future revenues.  A general increase in productivity will have other 
financial benefits for Athens of which neither he nor his readers can be unaware.  
Assuming that this is indeed a sales tax, then it is probably either the eponion or the 
pentekoste. 
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2.3.2.7   The eponion 
The Attic Stelae documenting the sale of the property of the Hermokopidae show tax 
paid on a variety of goods including slaves, and are our main source for the eponion. 
Once thought to be levied on confiscated goods only, it is possible that the term refers 
to a more widespread sales tax.
161
  Calculated either in bands or as a simple 1%, it was 
probably paid by the buyer on sales administered by the poletai.
162
  In Athens 
forthcoming sales of slaves were probably announced by the public herald and the 
slaves themselves were sold from ‘rings’ in the agora, or from the anakeion.163  Rihll 
convincingly dismisses Garland’s assertion that slave sales were held only monthly.164  
But with the Athenian port as a likely point of arrival it seems reasonable to assume 
that slaves were also sold at Piraeus, whilst the agoras at Sounion and Pasa Limani 
would also have been convenient trading points for the mining industry, and Thorikos 
itself was situated on a convenient bay.  Given the lack of evidence of specific 
locations acting as particularly busy slave markets, Braund stresses rather the diversity 
of the trade and the slavers’ inclusion of slaves as just one of a variety of commodities 
to be carried.
165
   
 
Public sales in the Athenian agora would only have been necessary for sales where a 
buyer was not prearranged; there is a gap in our understanding of the way sales of 
slaves were handled where owners made a private agreement.  Unless taxation 
demanded it or witnesses and a public recognition of the transaction were required by 
either party, there would be no value, and additional costs, in bringing them to the asty 
for public sale and thus it may be reasonable to suggest that slaves intended for the 
mines might have been sold at Thorikos where buyers would have been conveniently 
found.  However it is difficult to reconstruct quite how a tax could be assessed on 
sales such as those in Demosthenes’ Against Pantaenetus, where slaves pass between 
owners several times without leaving their workshop.
166
  As we have just seen,
167
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Gauthier considers whether Xenophon is referring to a capitation tax, perhaps payable 
monthly by slave owners in order to keep pace with the exchange of slaves taking 
place throughout the year, but rejects this, because there is no evidence of any actions 
for fraud on account of such a tax although opportunities would have been 
widespread.
168
  Gauthier therefore concludes that at 4.25 Xenophon is talking of the 
pentekoste tax, discussed below.  But the eponion should not be rejected outright.  The 
large-scale slave sales that would be necessary for the fulfilment of Xenophon’s plans 
were to be arranged by announcement of the boule,
169
 bringing them quite possibly 
within the orbit of the poletai, who would be still more likely to have a role in any 
later sales made by the state back into the private sector.     
 
2.3.2.8   Import/export taxes and harbour fees: the ellimenia and the pentekoste 
The vibrancy of seaborne trade towards the end of the fifth century is attested by the 
Athenians’ anticipation that a tax of one twentieth on goods moved at sea by their 
subject states, could replace and increase the revenues previously yielded by the 
phoros, tribute.
170
  Harris has estimated that the value of goods imported in to Attica 
in 401/400 might have been in the region of 2,000 talents, and would have increased 
substantially during the course of the following century.
171
  Greek ports charged tax 
on goods departing as well as entering, and at 4.40 Xenophon says that with more 
imports and exports there will be revenues from the ellimenia.  Chankowski describes 
widely varying usage of the term ellimenia across the Greek states, and argues that at 
times it may be a general term referring to a variety (or the totality) of harbour duties 
and tithes levied on goods as well as charges for the use of harbour facilities.  In fifth-
century Sounion for instance, we see levies related to tonnage rather than the value of 
goods, and later in Pollux, payments are due prior to embarkation at Athens.
172
  
Purcell also notes that it is not easy or useful in most cases to detach customs 
payments from charges for services connected with the movement of materials or 
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people
173
 and Migeotte concludes that the meaning of the term varied according to the 
reality of linguistic usage and the differing intensity of trade practices in Greek cities, 
although he rejects Chankowski’s argument that ellimenion (singular) always referred 
solely to harbour usage fees.
174
   
 
Thus there are at least two and perhaps more interpretations of Xenophon’s use of the 
term ellimenia.
175
  Gauthier suggests that he may be referring specifically to the 
pentekoste,
176
 a tax which had been in place since the turn of the century and which, 
by the Lykourgan era, had become the city’s biggest revenue provider,177 consisting of 
a 1/50
th
 (ie. 2%) sales tax levied on all imported and exported goods passing through 
Piraeus.
178
  For Migeotte, however, Xenophon does not give us enough context for 
clarity.
179
  Yet at 4.40 Xenophon is talking in general terms about the outcome of his 
schemes, juxtaposing three pairs of contrasting opposites: ‘with considerate treatment 
of resident aliens and merchants’, ‘the growth of imports and exports’ and ‘the 
expansion of harbour dues (ellimenia) and markets.’180  This indicates, I would argue, 
that by ellimenia he alludes not to a specific levy but to the totality of fees, taxes and 
tithes (including, but not limited to, the pentekoste) available to the state through 
harbour activities, as opposed to those realised from the markets.  
 
2.3.2.9   The metoikion, xenicon and market taxes  
Representing for Xenophon just one of the benefits that resident aliens brought to the 
city, the metoikion was the tax paid by metics who took up residence in Attica, levied 
at twelve drachmas per man and six per independent woman.
181
  Xenophon was more 
than aware of the contribution of the metic tax and refers to it specifically at 2.1.  
Estimates of the income yielded by the metoikion are dependent of course on an 
accurate estimate of the size of the resident metic population – Isocrates tells us that 
merchants, foreigners and resident aliens were all fewer in number after the Social 
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War.
182
  The census carried out by Demetrius of Phaleron in 318/7 reputedly counted 
10,000 metics,
183
 although van Wees has argued that this number was heavily inflated 
by the addition of recently disenfranchised Athenians who no longer met the property 
requirements for citizenship.
184
  Based on 10,000 men and 1,000 independent women, 
Boeckh calculated an annual revenue of 21 talents, an exercise which provides some 
insight into the potential scale of income realised by the metoikion at its fullest.     
   
We are also told at 4.40 that revenues received through the markets will increase. It is 
not entirely clear what this revenue source is, but given Xenophon’s particular focus 
on the role of metics in Athenian trade, it is likely that this is the xenicon.  In addition 
to the metoikion, a second tax was payable by those metics who wished to trade in the 
market.
185
  A woman’s metic status might even be proved by reference to her payment 
of the xenica: 
If she was an alien, they ought to have examined the market-tolls, and have 
shown whether she paid the alien's tax.
186
 
Xenophon’s other schemes might promote the mass return of metics to the city, but 
mine leasing, whilst available to them, was less likely to be taken up by large numbers 
given the capital required for successful exploitation, even if the need for heavy outlay 
on slaves could be avoided.  The metoikion then, may have a smaller direct 
relationship with the mine industry than some other forms of levy, but the return of 
peace and the growth of the industry in general would lead to greater supply 
opportunities, a field in which metics could participate more fully, thus promoting 
income from both the metoikion and the xenicon. 
 
2.3.2.10   State owned houses near the mines  
At 4.49-50 Xenophon indicates that the state will receive revenue from various 
interests associated with the thriving population that will grow up in the mining 
region, including state owned houses and other revenues - ἀπ᾽ οἰκιῶν περὶ τἀργύρεια 
δημοσίων and ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πρόσοδοι ἂν πολλαὶ γίγνοιντο.  The reference 
is too brief to elicit much information, but notably the idea of state-owned dwellings 
                                                 
182
  Isocrates On the Peace 8.21. 
183
  Ctesicles, FGrH 245 F1. 
184
  Van Wees 2011, pp. 101-106.  
185
  Fawcett 2006, p. 72. 
186
  Dem. Against Eubulides 57.34. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ξένη ἦν, τὰ τέλη ἐξετάσαντας τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, εἰ 
ξενικὰ ἐτέλει.  
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near the mines is not presented as new, indicating that such a system was already in 
operation. 
 
2.3.2.11   The Hephaistic fund 
The demos might also benefit from the wealth produced by silver mining in less direct 
ways.  The Laurion region had furnished funds to the Acropolis building programme 
at least twice and probably more frequently in the fifth century, with the Parthenon 
accounts for 439/8 and the Propyleia accounts for 434/3 both showing contributions  
[παρὰ ταμ]ιȏν ℎεφα[ισ]τικȏ ἀπὸ Λ[αυ]ρ[είο] 
‘from the treasurers of the Hephaestic fund from Laurium.’187   
Hephaistos was the god for whom metal workers had a special affection.  Metal 
workers carried out their trade around the Hephaistion in the Athenian agora; there is 
a reference to Hephaistos and possibly Athena in the Coinage Decree which may be 
about a debt to the gods but is difficult to interpret,
188
 and Rihll and Tucker note that 
metics took part in the Hephaistia, possibly because they were allowed to operate 
mines on the same terms as citizens.
189
  It is not surprising that there should have been 
a strong engagement with his cult in the mining region, and that those who made their 
living through the mines should make offerings to him.  We do not, however, know 
where the Laurion sanctuary was, how the fund was administered, or indeed whether 
it was still in operation in the fourth century, but in the fifth it had helped to beautify 
the city’s monuments just as Xenophon anticipated his scheme might achieve in the 
fourth.
190
  When he predicts the restoration of the city’s temples, this historic link 
between the wealth of the Laurion’s sanctuaries and the sacred structures of the city 
may not have been far from his mind.   
 
2.3.2.12   Tax exemption 
Some indication of the value of the silver industry to the state is evident from the fact 
that those with mining interests had their mining property exempted from assessment 
for liturgical responsibilities.  Mining property was apparently exempt from tax by 
grant of ateleia and not included in property inventories for the purposes of liturgy or 
antidosis.
191
  Hopper views this as an indication that mining was not always 
                                                 
187
  439/8, Parthenon: IG I³ 444.249; 434/3, Propyleia: ML 60.14 = IG I³ 465, translation RO p. 181.  
188
  ML 45.7, p. 114; IG I³ 1453, C.17-18.  
189
  Rihll and Tucker 2002, pp. 283-284.  
190
  6.1. 
191
  Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.18. On the reading of laws within Attic speeches generally see 
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profitable,
192
 whilst Davis reads it as a reflection of the extent to which capital 
investment was a ‘wasting asset,’193 but it is more likely that it was for the purpose of 
encouraging the mining entrepreneur by relieving him of some taxation.  We know 
from the poletai leases that a significant number of operators were wealthy enough to 
be of the liturgical class, 19% of the known lessees are either liturgists or the 
immediate ascendant/descendant of a liturgist.
194
  Boeckh suggests that immunity 
from taxation was not to encourage mining, but rather a legal principle because the 
property was leased from the state.
195
  But even demes were liable to pay tax, whilst 
land owned by demes was taxable and this principle alone would not really explain 
why any Athenians, particularly those perceived to be wealthy ones, would be 
exempted from tax.
196
  A better explanation is provided by Hypereides, from whom 
we learn that mine operators were indemnified because a small short term gain for the 
state would be at the expense of a greater one, as operators could be deterred from the 
industry.
197
  Given the number of known liturgists involved in the mining industry 
then, this is potentially a major concession.  Significantly, and perhaps not sufficiently 
recognised in scholarship, this is an example of taxation policy used to promote 
industrial expansion.  The fact that such a law could have been passed is indicative of 
a wide understanding amongst the demos, many of whom must have had some 
economic relationship with the enormous consumptive demands of the Laurion, both 
of the extent to which the various aspects of the industry benefited wider society and 
the degree to which the mines’ successful exploitation was reliant on the risk-taking 
of a few. 
 
2.3.3   Income from mining and associated activities – conclusion 
Despite our difficulty in interpreting the evidence presented by the mine leases and 
creating a cast-iron case for the taxation of silver production, what has become clear 
are the many ways in which the state stood to benefit directly from the rejuvenation of 
_______________________ 
 
Canevaro 2013, pp. 1-3, however in this instance the law itself has not survived. 
192
  Hopper 1979, pp. 186-187. 
193
  Davis 2014, p. 270. 
194
  Shipton 2000, pp. 30-31 with her chart MINES 1.  
195
  Boeckh 1976, pp. 673-674.  
196
  Deme taxation: Finley 1985, p. 93; Whitehead 1986, p. 155. 
197
  Hypereides In Defence of Euxenippus 4.36-7. Hypereides talks of  δασμολογήσαντες τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν, 
‘subjecting the mine-workers to tribute’ (trans. Burtt), which has a different connotation to simply 
excluding mine property from an assessment, but the principle of giving some protection to 
mining entrepreneurs seems clear. 
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the Laurion mines; through direct receipts related to the output of the mines and 
through levies on personnel, import/export and market activities associated with the 
industry, the exploitation of state owned resources such as housing, and from 
donations to religious funds which might contribute to the restoration of the city’s 
festivals and sacred structures.  As well as these additions to state-held funds, the 
enormous daily consumption by the industry and its workers of tools, timber, slaves, 
building materials, animal power and agricultural produce created a vast demand for 
goods and services which promoted manufacturing and farming both locally and 
abroad, creating income streams at all levels of Attic society and ultimately 
stimulating the production of goods for the export market created by those foreign 
traders who provided commodities to the industry but preferred to carry away a return 
cargo rather than silver.  Xenophon recognises this high level of interdependence and 
its importance to the city’s economy,198 countering the views of those such as Booth 
who argue that he omits to mention the idea that citizen commercial activity should be 
promoted because the city did not recognise such promotion as a requirement of 
governance.
199
  
 
With the possible exception of the Suda’s one twenty-fourth, all of these revenue 
sources, as well as the interdependency of the many supply chains, will have been so 
central to the Attic economy as to be understood by both Xenophon and his 
readership.  Whatever one produced: foodstuffs, baskets, shoes, quarried stone or 
wool, one possible outlet for it was to be found in the Laurion.  Xenophon’s proposal 
was intended to motivate silver production and create a new source of income through 
slave hire, but it is impossible that the associated stimulation of agricultural and 
manufacturing activity across Attica and also abroad could be overlooked by his 
contemporaries.  
  
2.4   The Laurion slaves, Demosthenes’ Against Pantaenetus and the 
mining industry - introduction 
Demosthenes’ speech Against Pantaenetus of 347/6200 provides a colourful insight 
                                                 
198
  4.49.  
199
  Booth 1993, pp. 56-66. 
200
  After completing the initial transaction, Nicobulus sailed to Pontus in Elaphebolion in the 
Archonship of Theophilus, March 347, (37.6).  There is a good deal of scholarly discussion of this 
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into some aspects of mining economics, and although it does not assist us in 
unravelling the system of lease payments or taxation, it provides a good understanding 
of the level of complexity, mortgaging and re-mortgaging, not revealed by the leases, 
that might be undertaken where a property was regarded as a sufficiently attractive 
risk.  It also provides useful evidence of the way in which slaves were traded and 
employed in the mining industry. 
 
Some scholars have viewed the paragraphe case, in which Nicobulus tries to prevent 
Pantaenetus from prosecuting him, as a dispute over a mine,
201
 but it is clear from the 
vocabulary that Pantaenetus purchased a workshop and thirty slaves; we hear at the 
outset that the loan was ἐπ᾽ ἐργαστηρίῳ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐν Μαρωνείᾳ καὶ τριάκοντ᾽ 
ἀνδραπόδοις202 with the phrase τὸ ἐργαστήριον καὶ τἀνδράποδα recurring in different 
contexts.  The building where Nicobulus’s slaves ‘sat down’,203 a κεγχρεών, was 
interpreted by Murray as a foundry
204
 but it seems more likely the word refers to a 
part of the workshop
205
 or an activity that was part of the purification process, perhaps 
milling or grinding, an interpretation supported by the Suda.
206
  
 
2.4.1   The actions and transactions of the speech  
As Nicobulus tells the story, Pantaenetus bought an ergasterion and thirty slaves from 
Telemachus.
207
  To pay Telemachus, he borrowed a talent from Mnesicles.  We hear 
_______________________ 
 
speech in relation to what it tells us about both property law and mining: see for instance Isager 
and Hansen 1975, pp. 191-196; E. M. Harris 1988, pp. 370-377; E. M. Harris 1989a, pp. 342-343; 
MacDowell 2006, pp. 128-131; E. M. Harris 2008, p 194; MacDowell 2009, pp. 266-271 and E. 
M. Harris 2012, pp. 437-438. 
201
  eg. Murray 1939, p. 371.  
202
  ‘of a mining property in Maroneia and of thirty slaves.’ Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.4; also at 
37.9, 12, 25. 
203
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.26. 
204
  Murray 1939, p. 393, n. c. Murray translates as ‘And then having persuaded my slaves to sit in the 
foundry to my prejudice,’ 
205
  MacDowell 2009, p. 268, n. 46; Bissa 2009, pp. 55-56. 
206
  Κεγχρεών: Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πανταίνετον γραφῇ: κἄπειτα ἔπεισε τοὺς οἰκέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς 
καθέζεσθαι εἰς τὸν κεγχρεῶνα. ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς τὸ καθαριστήριον, ὅπου τὴν ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων 
διέψυχον κέγχρον. ‘Demosthenes in the indictment [-speech] Against Pantainetos [writes]: "and 
then he induced my slaves to go and sit in the foundry".  Meaning, in the purifying-place, where 
they used to dry the granules from the silver-mines.’ Suda On Line, trans: David Whitehead, 30 
November 2000 http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/kappa/1221.  LSJ p. 933 gives us a ‘place where 
iron is granulated and made malleable.’   
207
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.5.  Isager and Hansen say that Pantaenetus owned the property and 
then took a loan from Telemachus against it, but it seems clear from the wording that Telemachus 
had previously owned the property outright: καὶ γὰρ ἐώνητ᾽ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ τούτῳ παρὰ Τηλεμάχου 
τοῦ πρότερον κεκτημένου, ‘for he had purchased them for the plaintiff from Telemachus, the 
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that he also owed 45 minas to Phileas of Eustor and Pleistor, probably a loan which 
had also helped to fund the original purchase.
208
  
 
Mnesicles then introduced Nicobulus and Evergus to each other and the two men went 
into partnership.
209
  Together they loaned Pantaenetus 105 minas, this was paid to 
Mnesicles, relieving Pantaenetus of his obligation to Mnesicles and using the 
workshop and slaves as security.  Evergus put in 60 minas and Nicobulus 45, on the 
understanding that they would be paid interest at the rate of 105 drachmas, i.e. 1% of 
the loan, each month, Pantaenetus having the right to repay the full sum and take over 
the title to the workshop and slaves within a specified time.
210
  
   
With matters apparently concluded, in spring 347 Nicobulus left for Pontus.
211
  But in 
his absence Pantaenetus stopped making the interest payments and Evergus took 
matters into his own hands, taking possession of the property and slaves and also 
perhaps the silver ore that was then on the premises.
212
  Nicobulus returned to find 
himself in the unwelcome position of either having to go into business with Evergus 
and run the workshop in partnership, or to give Evergus full control, with Evergus 
thus becoming Nicobulus’ debtor.213  At this stage, further creditors of Pantaenetus 
emerged, unsavoury characters who had also advanced loans to Pantaenetus on the 
security of the property.  After an unsatisfactory meeting with these new creditors, 
Pantaenetus then implored Nicobulus and Evergus to sell the property to them entirely 
_______________________ 
 
former owner’ in Murray’s translation.  There is a lot of obfuscation about ownership in the 
speech but there seems little advantage to Nicobulus in confusing the issue over this particular 
part of the narrative.  I am reliant on E. M. Harris 2008 generally and E. M. Harris 2012, pp. 437-
438 in particular for the view that the central transaction in the case was a loan made by Nicobulus 
and Evergus against which the ergasterion and slaves were not substitutive security, but collateral 
security reclaimable only in the event of a default on repayment of the principal sum.  Thus, there 
having been no default in repayment of the principal, Evergus was wrong to take possession of the 
security simply because of a default in interest payments. This is contrary to MacDowell’s 
reading, which sees Telemachus, Mnesicles/Phileas/Pleistor and then Nicobulus/Evergus as the 
successive owners, with Pantaenetus paying rent/interest and retaining the right to purchase 
(McDowell 2009, pp. 266-267) but Harris’ argument seems to me to provide the clearest 
untangling of the confusing and sometimes conflicting ownership issues in the case.   
208
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.4. Pantaenetus had separate debts of one talent and 45 minas to 
Mnesicles and Phileas respectively - the same sums as were later loaned by Nicobulus and 
Evergus against the workshop and slaves.  Phileas vanishes from the narrative and we do not hear 
whether he got his money back, although it may be that the 105 minas paid to Mnesicles was 
shared between Mnesicles and Phileas. If not, then Mnesicles made a substantial profit.   
209
  See also the brief discussion of Athenian business partnerships in chapter 3.8.3.2. 
210
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.4-5. 
211
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.6. 
212
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.6-7; 28. 
213
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.10. 
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and, by now, more than willing to be rid of this toxic asset, they agreed.  The sale 
price received by Pantaenetus was three talents, two thousand six hundred drachmas, 
indicating either a speedy increase in value, or that the original loan was for only a 
part of the property’s original cost.  The fact that Pantaenetus had been able to take 
out further loans against the security of the property probably indicates that it was not 
previously secured fully against the first loan made to him, and the new creditors 
indicate as much,
214
 although if credence is given to Nicobulus’ description of 
Pantaenetus, he might be suspected of not being even-handed with those he borrowed 
from and they may not have known that the property was already secured against 
loans taken elsewhere. 
   
Despite obtaining a written release from Pantaenetus to show that final settlement had 
been agreed and all claims were discharged, Evergus was subsequently sued by 
Pantaenetus over his forcible acquisition of the property and the silver ore, and prior 
to the hearing recorded in Against Pantaenetus, Pantaenetus had been awarded 
damages of two talents.
215
  Pantaenetus then brought a charge against Nicobulus, 
accusing him of ordering his slave Antigenes to waylay Pantaenetus’ slave and take 
possession of a consignment of silver that the slave was carrying as a mine instalment 
payment (a καταβολή) to the state, thus causing him to be inscribed as a state debtor 
for 180 minas, twice the sum he says he paid for the mine.
216
  Nicobulus’ counter 
arguments were several - Evergus had already been successfully charged over these 
events, and in any case Nicobulus had been out of the country at the time with no idea 
of what was happening and in no position to order his slave to do anything; he had a 
written discharge from Pantaenetus showing that all matters were completely settled; 
and most significantly, the mining courts were not the right place to bring such an 
action.   
 
It is a complicated sequence of events, and scholarly interpretation of the types of 
collateral that Athenians might offer against a loan has changed our understanding of 
just who regarded themselves as the rightful owner of what, regardless of how they 
may present the facts in court, but several points emerge from this speech.  First, 
Pantaenetus’ operation involves both running the ergasterion and leasing at least one 
                                                 
214
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.12. 
215
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.46. 
216
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.22. 
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mine, whose material is dug by his slaves and processed in his workshop.
217
  Ηe does 
not seem to be processing on behalf of another mine operator as there is no suggestion 
that the ore forcibly obtained by Evergus did not belong to Pantaenetus.  Secondly, the 
speed with which the property, including the slaves, notionally and in fact changes 
hands; thirdly, the large sums involved: 105 minas for the original loan; 3 talents, 
2,600 drachmas for the final sale as well as the 90 mina καταβολή payable to the state, 
and an unquantified amount of silver ore in the workshop.   
 
By way of comparison, in Hypereides’ In Defence of Euxenippus of around 330-324, 
we hear that there has recently been an accusation that three years’ excavation of an 
illegally dug mine had yielded 300 talents for its operator, Epicrates of Pallene.  The 
jury seem to have decided that the mine was legal, and that Epicrates and his partners 
- some of the richest men in Athens - could keep their profits.
218
  We cannot tell 
whether the figure of 300 talents was real or not but evidently the mine was visibly 
successful and its operators wealthy enough, that the man who brought the case 
expected a jury to give credence to an astonishingly large sum, whilst Hypereides 
could expect that the jurors hearing Euxenippus’ case would be familiar with the case 
of Epicrates.   
 
Given the involvement of such sizeable and probably visible amounts of money, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that some unappealing individuals were attracted to the industry.  
Phokian commanders looking for ways to pay their mercenaries may have found 
support motivated both by politics and profit amongst mine operators willing to 
undertake the clandestine exchange of Laureotic silver for looted Delphic gold, a 
demand that may even have contributed to the mid-fourth century growth in 
production.
 219
  The frontiersman character of mining society is revealed in the list of 
matters which Nicobulus tells us are governed by the mining laws: boring beyond 
one’s boundaries into another’s property, smoking someone out, making an armed 
attack, and actions against one another by men who have gone into business together.
 
220
  To this list we can add, operating an unregistered mine and removing a mine’s 
                                                 
217
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.28.  
218
  Hyp. In Defence of Euxenippus 4.34-5. 
219
  Davies 2007c, p. 81; Davies 2010, pp. 97-98. 
220
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.34–38. 
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supporting pillars.
221
  All are suggestive of a potentially fractious and competitive 
industry where each man knew the worth of his neighbour’s property - of neccessity if 
he were to bid successfully when leases were renewed - and might take the law into 
his own hands, supported by a threat of violence if he thought he could get away with 
it.   
 
But the most striking aspect of the story is the number of men willing to risk 
substantial sums in a mining enterprise.  Despite the fact that Pantaenetus had got 
himself into serious financial difficulty, his lenders must have perceived his business 
as an operation with potential, if ill-managed.  Were Pantaenetus’ mine to become less 
productive, he could not produce the ore to keep the workshop active or ultimately the 
income to pay his various creditors.  If he processed only his own ore, the value of the 
workshop rested solely on his own rate of production, and if his output fell, unless he 
could acquire other customers it would become almost worthless.  Hopper suggests 
that washeries would not depreciate in value in ‘slack’ times,222 but whilst that may be 
so over very short periods, the pattern of the relatively speedy increase and decrease 
of mining activity over the last two thirds of the fourth century suggests that in the 
medium term, there would be little value in an ergasterion that was not able to be 
operated as a going concern, and it is arguable that in that event, only the slaves would 
have a resale value, which would quickly decline if every operator found themselves 
in the same position.   
 
From the seventeen mines leased in 367/6 the annual count of mine leases seems to 
have slowly increased through the mid-century, reaching as many as 140 in the period 
345 - 342/1, ie up to 500 mines in simultaneous operation in any one year,
223
 followed 
by a swift decline down to single figures by the end of the century.  Just as Xenophon 
had indicated, silver mining was not a secure undertaking; however the boom of the 
mid-century appears to have encouraged quite a degree of speculation. In a 
community which might call to mind the successes of the past in support of its 
arguments but which still had few written records with which to quantify those 
histories, such an increase may indicate a short-term approach to trade and investment 
                                                 
221
  Plut. Moralia 843d, MacDowell 2006, p. 131. 
222
  Hopper 1961, p. 148. 
223
  Crosby 1950, p. 245; Aperghis 1998, p. 18. 
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based on stories of glory days as exemplified by the Poroi,
224
 rather than a close 
examination of any accurate records which might still exist from the height of 
productivity in the fifth century or a careful projection of future turnover.  Notably 
however Xenophon supports his recollection of the past with a structured business 
plan which takes account of expenditure, income and a range of trading conditions.
225
  
When a mine operator calculated his outgoings he would be likely to prioritise 
payments to the state because of the serious risk of the debt doubling in the event of 
default, whilst immediate running costs would have to be met next to keep the 
manpower fed and the mine in operation.  In the event of any difficulty, interest 
payments such as those to Nicobulus and Evergus might well have had a lower 
priority.  An interest payment of 105 drachmas per month appears to be higher than 
many lease payments, but the ninety minas payment to the state, whatever it 
represented, indicates that we have here a very successful mine which attracted a 
particularly high premium.  Potential lenders were clearly aware that Pantaenetus was 
in control of a wealthy operation, and less than a decade after the Poroi was written, 
mining had become a risk worthy of consideration not just as a primary activity, but 
against which to lend considerable sums of money in the reasonable expectation of 
repayment.  The importance of the issues of business risk and entrepreneurial 
confidence will be explored further in chapter 3.  Strikingly however, the leading men 
in our story do not appear to have any passion for industry or interest in effective 
management or the pastoral care of their workers.  Probably only Pantaenetus and 
perhaps the ultimate buyers truly want to be actual mine operators – Nicobulus says 
he was dismayed when he thought he might have to run the mine himself
226
 - and even 
Pantaenetus cannot have been in full time residence at the mine – he was away when 
his slave was bringing the silver, and when Antigenes allegedly took control.   
 
2.4.2   Slave numbers, skills and costs 
In 1973 Finley remarked that, ‘Throughout antiquity free miners were a negligible 
element,’227 and although various scholars have assumed that some free miners 
                                                 
224
  See eg. 4.25 and even the Edwardian case study at chapter 3.3.  
225
  See chapter 2.5.5. 
226
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.10.  
227
  Finley 1999, pp. 72-73. 
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worked their lease holdings alone,
228
 a glance at the sort of labour needed simply for 
the hauling up of ore and spoil would suggest that only the most cash-strapped would 
wish to undertake such tasks without a second pair of hands, one at each end of a rope 
and bucket. When the plaintiff who challenges Phaenippus to antidosis exclaims that  
From my silver mines …I formerly by my own bodily toil and labour reaped a 
large profit’229  
we should not be misled into thinking that reaping mining profits of an order large 
enough to maintain liturgical status could be achieved by one man alone.  Rihll has 
demonstrated that the nature of the industry entailed that whilst a sole owner-operator 
might just manage (slowly) to produce raw ore, every other stage of production was 
highly labour-intensive.
230
  In proportionate terms actual mine-working probably used 
only just over a third of the total labour force necessary for industrial scale silver 
production: Conophagos’ estimates suggest 36% would actually be employed in the 
mines themselves, 17% in the ergasteria, 15% in metallurgy, with the remaining 32% 
working in support activities: cistern maintenance, building, carting, accounting, 
minting, stoneworking etc. and at the ports.
231
  
 
In a non-mining context the extent to which additional help was always unfree is by 
no means clear – Lysias’ On the Refusal of a Pension232 is often quoted as evidence 
that the first resource of a citizen looking for assistance outside his family would be 
the slave market.  But whilst the extent of free waged labour in Attica, particularly in 
agriculture, has been a matter of some debate,
 
 (see below) it is generally assumed that 
the mine labour force consisted almost exclusively of slaves who were probably non-
Greek and unlikely to have been born into slavery in a Greek household.
233
  Yet 
Xenophon tells us clearly that there were free men, both Athenian and foreigners, who 
would gladly earn a living as mine managers.
234
  This is not the only occasion when 
Xenophon suggests that managers might be free men.
235
  We must be careful therefore 
not to categorise the workforce in the Laurion as simply made up of thousands of men 
of little or no skill employed solely to dig.  Both small and large scale free contractors, 
                                                 
228
  eg. Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 102-103, say categorically that ‘free prospectors worked 
on their own, whereas groups of men working for someone else were made up solely of slaves.’  
229
  Dem. Against Phaenippus 42.20. 
230
  Rihll 2001, pp. 134-135. 
231
  Conophagos 1980, p. 348, but see below for some reservations about these figures. 
232
  Lysias On the Refusal of a Pension 24.6.  
233
  eg. Finley 1959, p. 101; Jameson 2002, p. 168, Braund 2011, pp. 116, 126.  
234
  4.22.   
235
  Xen. Oeconomicos 1.3-4; Xen. Memorabilia 2.8.3. 
116 
 
 
 
some, but not necessarily all, supported by slaves, would have supplied consumables 
either through markets or direct to workshops and furnaces.  Free individuals, both 
citizens and metics, will have managed their own mines, workshops and furnaces, all 
of which were privately owned.  Some slaves, such as the one Pantaenetus trusted to 
carry his silver as a καταβολή for payment to the state, would be trusted managers236 
and each individual site will have required an overseer.  Great skill was needed 
particularly in the furnaces, which had to be heated to above 810ºC and below 950ºC; 
this and complex chemical processes were judged solely by eye and experience.  
Metallurgists would also have had to be familiar with processing zinc, iron, antimony, 
arsenic, copper and gold, all of which were found in the region, as well as producing 
different coloured ochres for the Attic pottery industry.
237
  Such men must inevitably 
have commanded a higher price than the unskilled labour used for breaking up ore or 
hauling it from the mines and washeries to the furnaces.  Calculating work rates, Rihll 
notes that in the nineteenth century rock breaking was undertaken by women and 
children,
238
 and there is evidence of women employed in stone grinding in Roman 
quarries
239
 whilst artefacts found in ergasteria and with burials in the Laurion region 
indicate the presence of women and children, perhaps free family units, or slaves 
performing traditional domestic duties to provide support for the vast work force.
240
  
Garlan sees little reason to believe that Laurion miners performing unskilled tasks 
such as ore extraction and rock grinding would not have suffered the same terrible 
conditions as the Egyptian miners described by Diodorus, with no leniency or respite 
despite illness or old age,
241
 in what Rihll describes as ‘chain gang labour in horrible 
conditions.’242 
 
What is important to stress is not only the wide variation of roles from unskilled rock 
breaker to highly skilled technical specialists but also that ‘Laurion miners’ 
commonly referred to as a homogenous group were far from being one large mass of 
slaves literally down the Laurion mines making income for a few wealthy absent 
Athenians.  The smaller operators in particular would have needed an understanding 
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237
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of the full range of requisite skills in order to run their establishments efficiently.  In 
turn this means that because of the wide range of independently run supply and 
manufacturing outlets involved in the various stages of production, free men from 
one-man operators to large workshop owners will have been involved at every stage 
of every operation and it is likely that at least some level of familiarity with aspects of 
the industry will have permeated Athenian society. 
   
Xenophon’s proposal does not of course deal with the detail of slave employment or 
welfare, although he certainly knew that simply the difference between good and poor 
management might mean that some household slaves had to be fettered to stop them 
running away whilst others stayed willingly,
243
 and that the Laureotic region was 
considered unhealthy and best avoided.
244
  It is unclear, particularly in relation to 
mining activity, what split of wage there was, where there was any, between owner 
and worker.
245
  On Xenophon’s figures, an ‘average’ slave at an ‘average’ price of 
180-190 drachmas, leased out at one obol per day, would repay his purchase price in 
three years, beyond which he represented pure profit as long as he was permanently 
let out and his owner was not responsible for his upkeep or for maintaining the 
numbers – and hence transaction costs – when his slaves were in someone else’s 
employ.
246
  A skilled or highly skilled slave could attract a higher rent as he gained 
experience and moved from establishment to establishment and might perhaps be in a 
position to negotiate small concessions from an owner who relied on his skills for 
greater financial gain.  Slaves with accounting skills might be more commercially 
valuable than others – in 221/220 public slaves keeping accounts received a daily 
allowance of three obols.
247
  At the other end of the scale, hiring slaves at the lowest 
price for the most menial work might leave budgetary headroom to pay a higher sum 
for the employment of more skilled workers or an overseer.  This overseer might be a 
slave, and the obvious hierarchy that starts to emerge is also indicative of the sliding 
scale of pain and reward incentives that might be applied for greatest productivity.
248
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Scholarly estimates of the total number of slaves employed in the silver mines vary 
considerably.  Central to every discussion is the controversy over the number of slaves 
employed in agriculture
249
 and Thucydides’ description of the loss of 20,000 slaves 
after Decelea, many of whom were ‘χειροτέχναι.’250  Wisely Austin and Vidal-Naquet 
commented only that many of these ‘artisans’ must have been miners, but one cannot 
deduce from this figure of 20,000 any statistical data on the number of slave miners, 
pointing out that silver production does not seem to have come to a sudden halt.
251
  
Applying a detailed linguistic analysis to the text and re-examining contemporary 
references, Hanson argued that Thucydides based his number on his understanding 
that the hoplite and cavalry ranks, most of whom would be farmers, numbered 
between 18,000 and 25,000.  Hanson suggests that Thucydides simply assumed an 
average one slave per landowner, and probably intended only to refer to rural, 
agriculturally employed slaves.
252
  
 
This clearly does not help to quantify the slaves in the mining industry.  However for 
the present discussion, it is perhaps more relevant to look at the number of actual or 
potential slaves after the reduction of mining activity in the late fifth century.  But 
here too, the calculations are well-nigh impossible.  From the varying prices of leases 
we may deduce that individual mines and their consequent manning levels must have 
differed considerably, whilst washeries vary from single tables to large building 
complexes.  We cannot take evidence about individual operations and assume that 
these were representative; we can only make rough guesses at the number of mining 
explorations taking place at any one time, and despite the continued appearance of 
new archaeological evidence we can only guess at the number of washeries and 
smelting operations and the quantity of manpower required to keep them in operation. 
Conophagos estimates the number of slaves needed across the Laurion in order to 
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achieve an annual production of 20,000kg of silver at 11,000, with around 100 mining 
concessions in operation at any one time, and he therefore rejects arguments for 
20,000 slaves.
253
  Conophagos’ calculations range from the minutely detailed – such 
as the workforce in the furnaces over the two stages of reduction – to the very broad – 
the final number is arbitrarily inflated by 25% to achieve a provision for ancillary 
workers on the grounds that there would be a natural tendency to use extra slaves 
because they were cheap.  Greek slaves were indeed comparatively cheap compared 
with those in other eras
254 
but in an industry motivated foremost by profit there is no 
reason to suppose that operators would have unnecessarily over-staffed, particularly in 
the smaller operations where every man would be expected to pull his weight. 
 
Hypereides’ proposal of 338 to free slaves suggests a population of 150,000:  
that is in the first place the slaves both from the silver mines and up and down 
the country, more than a hundred and fifty thousand in number
255
  
and Hopper rightly argues that this raises the same interpretative issues as 
Thucydides’ 20,000.256  But the figure of 20,000 has retained its ostensible authority 
as a round number of slaves when the region was working with good productivity – 
Aperghis, for instance, takes it as a basis for his calculations without reference to its 
original source or to either Conophagos or Hanson;
257 
Rihll and Tucker, and
 
Cartledge 
both assume that most of the escaped slaves had been associated with silver mining;
258
 
Wood takes what she calls a conservative figure of 15,000-20,000, and Osborne 
points out that, however calculated, this was a significant proportion of the Athenian 
population.
259
   
 
Davies lists industrial slavery in workshops and the silver mines as probably the most 
important of the sources of personal wealth emerging during the fifth century, with 
large individual slaveholdings leased out into the silver mines.  Xenophon is our main 
source for the largest of these reputed slaveholdings in the fifth century, citing Nikias 
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with 1,000, Hipponikos with 600 and Philemonides with 300, each slave yielding one 
obol per day for his owner,
260
 but there are many other instances of smaller numbers 
in a variety of industries from lyre and flute making to shield manufacture.
261
  As we 
have seen, Nicobulus and Evergus loaned 105 minas to Pantaenetus to enable him to 
pay for a workshop and thirty slaves,
262
 but it is inevitable that such evidence as 
reaches us through the courts is more likely to relate to cases involving larger 
undertakings and greater sums of money, and it is thus difficult to know where to 
place Pantaenetus in the wider scale of industrial slave ownership.  The knife makers 
in Demosthenes’ father’s factory were, Demosthenes claimed, generally worth 5 or 6 
minas each, and at the least no less than 3 minas.
263
  On the other hand the male slaves 
of Kephisodoros, confiscated and sold in 414 after the Mutilation of the Herms, only 
attracted prices of between 105 drachmas and 301 drachmas, although their sale price 
may have been affected by the taint of impiety.
264
  In his Memorabilia, Xenophon 
suggests a range of values from half a mina to two, five and ten, with a whole talent 
allegedly paid for a mine manager by Nikias son of Nikeratos.
265
  Nikias does 
however seem to play a Croesus-like role in Xenophon’s imagination, always 
occupying the superlative position and to whom any excessive number may be 
attached without fear of challenge.  Xenophon would not be the only Athenian to have 
miscalculated Nikias’ fortune - Lysias describes with surprise the discrepancy 
between the 100 talent fortune Nikias was believed to have left behind, and the 14 
talents his son handed down in his turn.  If Aristophanes is to be believed in this 
speech, public over-estimation of the fortunes of the wealthy was not unusual.
266
 
 
It is difficult to assess what proportion of mine slaves might necessarily be skilled or 
highly skilled, but the implied average price in Xenophon’s scheme is 180 – 190 
drachmas.  If, as Conophagos’ figures suggest, around half to two thirds of the mining 
slaves need have little or few skills, then their lower price would leave a surplus with 
which to purchase those with more technical ability.  If any of them might have been 
women or children the average price may perhaps come down still further.  In any 
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case, given the numbers Xenophon anticipates, it is highly unlikely that large numbers 
of new slaves already skilled in cupellation or managing a washery would be suddenly 
available and in most cases training must have taken place on site, with those showing 
most aptitude acquiring greater levels of skill and, concomitantly, greater resale or 
leasing value.  
 
Scheidel suggests that two fundamental preconditions are necessary for the emergence 
of large scale slavery across economic sectors – first, a relative shortage of labour and 
second, access to slaves.  Further variables include a demand for the goods and 
services produced by the slaves, high real wages among the free labour force, and the 
accumulation of capital for slave purchase.
267
  Applying these signifiers to the 
situation in the industry as Xenophon was writing we see that virtually all appear to be 
present.  Xenophon, at least, foresees neither difficulty in accessing slaves,
268
 nor any 
lack of demand for the final product of silver mining;
269
 there are, he says, always 
more jobs than the labourers can deal with and everyone in mining says they are short 
of labour.
270
 
 
The well-rehearsed arguments as to the time consumed by the military and democratic 
commitments of the citizenry, their approach to waged employment and expectations 
of payment for participation in democratic processes may well in the past have 
suggested that even if there were substantial numbers of ‘unemployed’, mining was an 
acceptable choice only for the most desperate.
271
  But mining was unpleasant and such 
work might well not be popular amongst the free work force even if pay was 
reasonable, prejudice against paid labour did not exist, and there was little else 
available.  Perhaps more significantly, using equivalent wheat values and a food and 
housing regime more generous than the notoriously mean level of slave maintenance 
indicated by the Roman Cato, Scheidel has demonstrated that ‘no reasonable amount 
of fiddling can alter the basic fact that it must have paid to buy slaves instead of 
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relying on hired labour.’272 
 
At the end of Scheidel’s list of necessary conditions for the emergence of large scale 
slavery is the accumulation of capital with which to purchase slaves.
273
  Again 
Xenophon tells us clearly that this is not an issue – there is capital in abundance.274  
Why then, given the coincidence of these factors, was mine slavery so much lower 
than in the fifth century?  Missing I think from Scheidel’s determinants are the 
individuals foresighted enough and on occasion foolhardy enough to spot the 
opportunity and get into business.  Athens has not been short of such entrepreneurs in 
the past and Xenophon, in analysing the state of the industry and addressing all the 
above, shows that in another life he might have been one of them.
275
  What he well 
sees to be holding back such entrepreneurs is the element of risk – there is money to 
be made, but also to be lost,
276
 and his aim is to kick start the exploitation of the 
mines, which we might see as a commercial inevitability.  As we will discuss in 
chapter 3, he does this by reducing risk, and Xenophon’s prescience in this regard is 
remarkable.  As it was, the economic environment combined with entrepreneurism, 
and entailed that only ten years later, as Against Pantaenetus demonstrates, 
speculators were again willing to risk large sums in the Laurion.  
 
2.4.3   Choris oikountes?  
These insights into the lives of manufacturing slaves working in heavy industry are 
particularly interesting in the light of some recent opinions on Xenophon’s attitude to 
slaves in the Poroi.  Jansen has argued that Xenophon envisaged the mine slaves in 
his project occupying a status similar to choris oikountes: 
It looks like Xenophon is trying to incorporate these slaves into the city’s 
economy of charis by treating them as quasi-euergetai: in exchange for their 
willing and active support both in the mines and the military, the possibility of 
manumission and further status mobility are to remain open.
277
 
Discussing the large number of slaves who would be in the mining region as 
Xenophon’s project took shape, Jansen argues that because their masters would be 
                                                 
272
  Scheidel 2005, pp. 14-15. 
273
  Scheidel 2008, pp. 115-116. 
274
  4.22.  
275
  See eg. Xen. Oec. 3.1-4. 
276
  4.28-29.  
277
  Jansen 2012, p. 740.  
123 
 
 
 
largely absent, deputising management to non-citizens or slave managers: slaves 
would not be subject to direct domination in the way that household slaves might be, 
enjoying, ‘a degree of freedom and autonomy in their daily lives greater than most 
common chattel slaves.’278   
 
We do not know for certain whether mining slaves were shackled, although Xenophon 
certainly expects that the mines slaves will be branded,
279
 and as Rihll remarks, a 
slave living independently might indeed work harder if each obol earned took him 
nearer to freedom.
280
  But silver mining was a tough industry carried out in truly 
unpleasant conditions and slaves were unlikely to whistle their way to work without 
some degree of compulsion.  Recent comparative discussions of slavery have 
examined the degree of punishment and reward used to motivate chattel slaves in 
antiquity.  Scheidel has argued for a more nuanced version of a model proposed by 
Fenoaltea, wherein those in the least skilful, effort-intensive roles (quarry workers, 
plantation slaves) are subjected to low subsistence levels and close supervision with 
the use of pain incentives whilst those whose work is care-intensive (viticulture, 
animal husbandry) require rewards to reduce ill-will and theft, the ultimate reward for 
a slave who has pleased his master or earned sufficient being manumission.  Whilst 
Scheidel refined this model, he classified mining as an effort-intensive activity at one 
extreme end of the scale,
281
 although we have seen that some aspects of refinement 
required great skill.  Ill-will at this, the sharpest end of silver production, could be 
costly indeed.  Within the silver industry, a more nuanced assessment of pain/reward 
incentives is probably necessary, but the majority of occupations in the industry 
would nevertheless fall into the effort-intensive category. 
 
Laurion slaves are not as entirely anonymous as we might imagine; there is evidence 
provided by epitaphs and dedications of slaves achieving, if not freedom, then wealth 
accumulation and relatively high status.
282
  To reinforce the link between mine slaves 
and manumission, Jansen cites an Anaxandrides fragment which tells of a slave-
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resident of Sounion gaining his freedom,
283
 and further argues that mine slaves leased 
out by the state under Xenophon’s scheme might be able to buy their freedom because 
they could take on additional work during slack periods and earn money which they 
could keep, or even because they already possessed personal wealth when they were 
first leased.  Many slaves paid a portion of their wages to their owners as apophora, 
keeping the rest for themselves, and Rihll suggests that the margin that the slave 
retained was an incentive for him to work unsupervised.
284
  As we have seen, 
Diocleides earned sufficient from his Laurion slave to be worth the early start and 
lengthy walk from the city, but he probably did not go every week; even if he went 
every full moon, at, say, an obol per day, he would collect less than 5 drachmas each 
trip and it is unlikely that more than a fraction would be shared with the slave, 
particularly in the case of an unskilled manual labourer supervised by someone other 
than his owner, whose work was more likely to have been incentivised by pain than 
by income.
285
   In a highly competitive, profit-driven industry it is unlikely that this 
retained income could be very high and it is hard to see on a practical level how slaves 
leased under Xenophon’s scheme could amass any significant sums.  We do not know 
enough about the apophora system, or at least precisely how it functioned in the case 
of large scale slave leasing, or whether Xenophon envisaged that the operator leasing 
the slaves would still be expected to pay the state even if his slaves were under-
employed or had no work at all.  It would seem likely, at least, that in such mass 
slave-leasing the financial arrangement would be with each hirer, rather than the state 
having to manage thousands of individuals’ work patterns and income, and this is 
certainly the way that Xenophon’s proposal and his description of Nikias’ 
arrangement with Sosias the Thracian is most easily interpreted.
286
  An operator with 
underemployed slaves on his hands for whom he still had to pay the state would look 
to lease their work out elsewhere in order to recoup his outlay, and in any case 
Xenophon’s project is predicated on there being an unceasing supply of work.  This 
would not lead to any additional excess of income available to the slave through 
finding himself independent temporary employment.  On the other hand, were each 
slave individually paying over a portion of their wages, in slack times, even if they did 
as Jansen suggests and found work elsewhere, the only nearby opportunities would be 
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within the mining industry and on similar pay rates.  Again, this would not provide 
any additional income to the individual slave after the state had taken its share.   
 
Reading into Xenophon’s admittedly unusual use of the word polis to describe this 
expanding population,
287
 Jansen suggests that the word is chosen to represent the 
unorthodox nature of this community who had a greater chance than other slaves of 
being freed.
288
  But Gauthier’s gloss on the passage provides a less complex reading: 
he notes that Xenophon elsewhere compares the Laurion to a fortress, shows that the 
addition of a fort at Besa would bring all the works together (συνήκοι) into a whole,289 
perhaps like a town sheltered by its walls, and he compares the future value of land in 
the Laurion to that in the outskirts of the Athenian asty.
290
  Such a reading 
contextualises the use of the word polis at 4.50 as part of an extended metaphor rather 
than a subtle reference to a new world order. 
 
Xenophon’s suggestion that during war, slaves might be useful in the navy or 
infantry
291
 is where, according to Jansen, ‘Xenophon shows his true feelings towards 
the slaves’, because he recommends that they be treated with care, and because in the 
past a slave’s bravery in war might lead to his manumission.292  But as Giglioni 
cautions, this is not sentimentality – a slave is an instrument of production which must 
be maintained, because a job too exhausting might reduce his efficiency.
293
   
Xenophon knows well enough the level of care required to nurture a loyal, trained 
fighter, and Gauthier’s interpretation of ‘therapeuein’ at 4.42 – that Xenophon 
probably refers to food and clothing – seems closer to the mark.294  Hunt reminds us 
that the difficulties of recruiting and motivating armies from disaffected populations 
have been overcome throughout history.
295
  In any event, manumission after battle 
may not always have been straightforward; owners might simply have retained both 
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their slaves and a share of their wages,
296
  and Hunt has argued that the mass 
manumission and enfranchisement of slave rowers after Arginusae might have been 
controversial enough to colour the demos’ reaction to the accusations in the notorious 
trial and execution of the generals, and a contributing factor to the ultimate verdict, as 
the notional purity of the citizenship was diminished and slave owners lost both their 
property and the income slaves provided.
297
   
 
Returning to Jansen’s proposal, his suggestion that,  
The master/slave relationship envisioned here appears to be based on the kind 
of mutuality befitting of friends, where kindnesses, favours, and gifts come 
with the expectation that the recipient will one day requite all past 
benefactions out of a sense of gratitude (charis).
298
  
may well echo the relationship promoted by Ischomachus’ wife towards her 
household servants,
299
 but there is barely room for it in an industry involving 
thousands and thousands of workers impersonally leased for exploitation in an 
unremittingly harsh environment.  Whilst Ischomachus’ servants might be allowed to 
share in the estate’s success,300 Pomeroy remarks that Ischomachus expects that his 
household slaves will remain with him permanently.  Xenophon makes no reference 
to their future sale or manumission.
301
  A trusted bailiff might be rewarded with 
treatment akin to that of a free man
302
 but that is not the same as freedom itself.  
Privileged and skilled workers may have more independence, but the unskilled 
majority was probably less lucky.  There would be good managers and bad ones, and 
on an individual basis Xenophon might well believe that the better managers will treat 
their slaves well and achieve greater productivity and loyalty.  But above all we need 
to remember the scale of Xenophon’s plan.  To portray this as a scheme in which (tens 
of) thousands of slaves would have relative independence and self-determination with 
the possibility of manumission and even citizenship is over-generous.  As a soldier 
Xenophon had spent time regularly taking and selling off slaves and the campaign of 
the Cyreans in Thrace was largely about securing booty.
303
  In the Cyropaedia Cyrus 
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reassured his men that they need have no qualms about taking slaves
304
 and in Hiero 
Xenophon depicted the freeing of slaves as an aspect of tyranny.
305
  In the 
Memorabilia, Socrates asked of Euthydemus, “Now suppose a man who has been 
elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, shall we say that he acts unjustly?”  
The required answer was, “no.”306  
 
If the enslaving of captives en masse is depicted in Xenophon as an accepted facet of 
Greek life,
307
 it seems clear from the Hiero passage that for Xenophon freeing slaves 
is a feature of tyranny and does not fall within the natural world order.  We only have 
to pause a little longer to take on board the significance of his words ‘and filled all 
vacancies as they occurred’308 to understand the situations this provides for: slaves 
who become injured, infirm or even die whilst they are leased out, are described 
simply in terms that reflect the lessor’s financial liability.  What we know (because 
Xenophon, amongst others, tell us so
309
) of the unwholesome environment around the 
mining region suggests that life will be cut short.  Some may indeed achieve freedom, 
but the vast majority will die ignominious, anonymous deaths.  
 
2.4.4   The Laurion slaves - conclusion 
Several themes have emerged over the preceding discussion.  By the mid-fourth 
century, speculators were willing to invest huge sums in the Attic silver industry in 
the expectation of generous rewards, sometimes investing third hand in the enterprise 
or the debt of those with more direct participation.  It was an industry in which the 
wealthier Athenians, landowners and the liturgical class, participated and profited, but 
which could not be accused of any of the romantic associations attached to wealth 
acquired through agriculture which has been a feature of some discussions of the 
_______________________ 
 
plunder he allows the Greeks to take from Parysatis’ lands and at 7.2.6, 400 of the Greeks are 
themselves sold by the governor of Byzantium. At 7.4.24 matters are more nuanced, informed by 
both vengeance and mercy – or possibly pragmatism: offered the opportunity to punish the 
Thynians, Xenophon says “Why, for my part I think I have abundant satisfaction as it is, if these 
people are to be slaves instead of free men.”  
304
  Xen. Cyropaedia 7.5.73; see also 4.2.26.   
305
  Xen. Hiero 6.5. 
306
  Xen. Memorabilia 4.2.15. 
307
  See Braund 2011, p. 113 for the mechanics of slave supply and ‘the normality of enslavement, 
slave-trading and the commodification of human beings.’ 
308
  4.14 τὸν δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἴσους ἀεὶ παρέχειν. 
309
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.12 and see chapter 2.2.3. 
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ancient economy.  The resurgence in mining activity of the 340s is likely to have been 
similar to that seen in the heyday of the fifth-century industry.  The conditions for 
such a renaissance, including the optimum conditions for the use of slave labour 
which we can analyse today with the benefit of comparative evidence, were once 
again in place for a revitalisation of the industry.  Laurion slaves came from a wide 
range of backgrounds and undertook tasks which ranged from the unskilled, repetitive 
and physically strenuous to the technically proficient.  The vast majority exercised 
little or no control over their fate, whilst the lucky few might accumulate savings or be 
trusted with the supervision of others.  We have virtually no direct evidence of their 
living conditions, but what becomes apparent, both from an examination of 
contemporary practice and the very slight allusions within the text, is that Xenophon’s 
expectation was that the state slaves employed in his industrial-scale project would be 
managed in order to extract the greatest profit from their work.  As an experienced 
commander of sometimes unwilling forces, he recognised that this might entail careful 
management, but Xenophon was not idealistic or ground-breaking in his treatment of 
slaves; manumission, honours and citizenship were not part of his incentive package. 
 
2.5   Silver mining and economic rationality - introduction 
The preceding sections have demonstrated the extent to which the intent and the 
possible success of Xenophon’s plans rested on schemes undertaken entirely for their 
potential to achieve profits for individual entrepreneurs in order to yield income for 
the state.  Given the extraordinary scale of Xenophon’s project, the substantial income 
and expenditure involved in the silver industry, and the high risk of losses, success 
could only be expected if ancient entrepreneurs had a sound basis on which to make 
their business choices and a continuous ability to analyse profitability.  The remainder 
of this chapter will situate the text within the wider debate about the capability of 
ancient managers to make economically rational choices.  This in turn should inform 
our understanding of the wider recognition of economic forces which lay behind the 
writing and the contemporary reception of the Poroi.   
 
Weber’s succinct overview of measures of rational economic action provides for: ‘(1) 
the systematic allocation of utilities between the present and the future; (2) the 
systematic allocation of available utilities to various uses in order of urgency ranked 
according to the principle of marginal utility; (3) the procurement through production 
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or transportation of utilities for which the necessary means of production are 
controlled by the actor himself; and (4) the acquisition of assured powers of control 
and disposal over utilities.’310  In the study of the ancient world this emphasis on a 
model centred on the accretion of marginal utility has collided with views which see 
Greek economic choices as heavily subject to social factors such as status and 
honour.
311
  Given that Xenophon’s proposals include the use of honours and 
privileges as motivating factors in the encouragement of both Athenian and non-
Athenian investors and merchants, it is apparent that we need a model which allows 
for both the primacy of profit maximisation but also for the influence of status 
considerations.  In his analysis of economic rationality within silver mining which we 
will discuss later in this chapter, Christesen argues for a more flexible model, that of 
‘expressive rationality’ which ‘assumes that individual agents are self-consciously 
reflexive about their preferences and that they are sensitive to social norms’ when 
formulating choices about investment.
312
  This, he argues, better helps us to analyse 
the real-world economic choices made by economic agents.  Engen, in his analysis of 
the bestowal of honours in relation to trade, follows Christesen in his adoption of this 
‘…“middle ground” between “oversocialized” and “undersocialized” conceptions of 
economic action,’313 and this is the overview of rationality that I will adopt.  It will 
become apparent however that whatever the motivating factors involved in an initial 
decision to become involved in the mining industry, most of its day to day aspects are 
intensively competitive and profit-driven.  Christesen draws our attention to a line in 
the Politics in which Aristotle categorises mining as an intermediate type of 
acquisition between natural and non-natural, because its product comes from the 
earth.
314
  Christesen suggests that this categorisation gave mining a special attraction, 
although one might consider that intermediacy is hardly a ringing endorsement; 
mining does not appear to be an industry either which attracted approbation, or which 
one took up in anticipation of social recognition.   
 
2.5.1   Record keeping and financial analysis 
The mid-twentieth century search for the ancient ability to make economically rational 
                                                 
310
  See Weber 1968, pp. 71-74. 
311
  See Engen 2010, pp. 20-36 for an overview of the theoretical discussion.   
312
  Christesen 2003, pp. 32-34, Christesen’s italics.   
313
  Engen 2010, p. 32. 
314
  Arist. Pol. 1258b28-32. 
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choices focused on the degree of sophistication of record-keeping, the extent to which 
analytical record-keeping was, or was not, the only reliable tool for informed financial 
decision-making, and whether such records are the only evidence available to us for 
the identification of economically rational decision-making in the ancient world.  De 
Ste. Croix’s influential study of Greek accounting established what became for some 
time the prevailing view, that the limitations of Greek numbering systems and their 
manner of recording transactions ensured that the ancient economy was unable to 
expand, because double-entry bookkeeping never evolved.  Proponents of this view 
argued that the ancient entrepreneur lacked the financial records which would enable 
him to balance the relative success or failure of different aspects of his ventures, and 
bearing in mind an apparent absence of the concept of amortisation, he would have 
had only the limited possibility of promoting economic growth.
315
  De Ste. Croix 
argued that the Greek acrophonic and alphabetic numeral systems both lacked place 
value,
316
 which meant that modern style columnar journals might not easily be kept 
and ‘surely helped to prevent the advanced antithetical concepts of debit and credit 
from emerging.’317  For de Ste. Croix, more sophisticated bookkeeping did not emerge 
because the economy did not develop to such a stage where it would have been 
necessary.  For Finley, the failure of economic development was partly attributable to 
the lack of information that would have been available from more complex accounting 
systems, whilst:  
the widespread use of slaves in agriculture and manufacture restricted the 
scope for free labour and blocked expansion of the market. It also hindered, 
and effectively prevented, increasing rationalisation of production: given the 
uncertainty of the market and the fluctuating costs of slaves (for both 
procurement and maintenance), the slave-owner had to be free to dispose of a 
portion of his slave force at a moment’s notice, or to exploit them in ways 
other than direct employment in production.
318
   
                                                 
315
  De Ste. Croix 1956. See Finley 1999, pp. 110-111 and 116-117 for an influential example of this 
view. 
316
  Place value is the convention we are familiar with from our own numbering system which entails 
that the value of any digit is implied by its position within the whole number – in the numbers 123 
or 456, numbers 1 and 4 signify quantities of hundreds, ie one hundred and four hundred 
respectively; numbers 2 and 5 signify quantities of tens, ie twenty and fifty respectively, and 3 and 
6 are single units.  Were 3 placed elsewhere within the number, its value would be changed 
according to its position.  Thus for the purposes of, say, addition or subtraction we can place  
123   and  
456   
in lines above each other and thereby group all the units, tens and hundreds in their own columns. 
317
  De Ste. Croix 1956, p. 60. 
318
  Finley 1981, p. 15. 
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There is a lot here worthy of discussion, not least that these observations led Finley to 
the conclusion that the slave-owner of antiquity was a rentier rather than an 
entrepreneur.  The essence of entrepreneurship is the taking of risks in order to exploit 
opportunities and reap rewards.  To see slave-owners involved in manufacturing as 
rentiers suggests a passivity on the part of the owner which, if the risks were truly as 
great as Finley describes in the passage cited, could not have been the case.  Active 
management of just the sort he outlines – the search for different ways to exploit 
underemployed workers, the acumen to respond to differing conditions and the 
flexibility to purchase or dispose of assets, are all indicative of a degree of ‘hands-on’ 
management and entrepreneurial skill.  Taking silver mining as a case study, our 
increasing understanding of the level of specialisation in the manufacturing stages of 
silver extraction, and Christesen’s analysis discussed below, all argue strongly against 
the case that there was a lack of rationalisation in industry due to the use of slave 
labour.  If the uncertainty of the market and the fluctuating cost of slaves were 
obvious to Finley, they do not seem to have been an inhibiting factor to Xenophon or 
one which he anticipated would unduly concern his audience.  Xenophon’s analysis 
was that costs were straightforward and predictable, and the market for silver was 
stable.  Whether these observations were correct is another matter, but the Poroi could 
be seen as first hand evidence that they were not perceived as constraints by the 
individuals responsible for entrepreneurism and growth. 
 
2.5.2   Other case studies in the analysis of profitability and economic rationality 
Earlier scholarship tended to look across the entire Greek and Roman worlds for 
evidence and view them as well-nigh unitary in their accounting methodology, but 
more recently there has been a tendency to focus on specific sectors and individual 
examples which have led to a more nuanced picture of the evolution of the 
management of financial affairs over a longer period.  Such detailed studies throw 
more light on the potential for economically rational decision-making than de Ste. 
Croix’s study, which looked at both Greek and Roman accounting with a small 
number of mainly Roman examples.  
 
In the earliest direct response to de Ste. Croix’s views on ancient bookkeeping, Macve 
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argued that a double entry system was not required for the demonstration of 
profitability
319
 and found that:  
We should not conclude that the state of ancient accounting would have 
systematically misled people into making irrational decisions.
320
   
So we must look elsewhere than ancient bookkeeping for evidence of the ability to 
tally up one’s financial position and pre-judge potential financial outcomes.  For third 
century AD Egypt, Rathbone demonstrated a detailed level of monthly accounting on 
the Appianus estate which monitored inputs and outputs, with the majority of the 
estate’s produce being sold, indicating a high level of economic rationality.321  Closer 
in time to the Poroi, but again in Egyptian estate management, Chandezon offers an 
assessment of Hellenistic financial management practices, focussing particularly on 
Grier’s study of the Zenon papyri,322 and finds that in large estates, innovation 
evolved with the emergence of managers, complex accounting systems and the 
opening of agricultural processes to the sales markets.
323
  He does not however engage 
with the mining industry, arguing that we must look to agriculture not industrial 
workshops for the real heart of ancient economics.
324
  But the complex and large-scale 
web of manufacturing supply and production evident in the Laurion argues against the 
sole emphasis on agriculture in any analysis of Attica.   
 
It has been argued that Rathbone’s analysis of a large-scale Egyptian landholding does 
not demonstrate economically rational choice because very wealthy Romans had no 
other investment opportunities available to them, and therefore no ‘choice’ was 
made.
325
  For the potential investor in the silver mines, however, alternatives were 
available, and Xenophon not only recognises this but promotes the better return 
available through his own scheme by comparison with maritime investment.
326
  He is 
specifically asking his audience to engage in economically rational decision-making.  
 
                                                 
319
  Macve 1985, pp. 239-40. 
320
  Macve 1985, p. 247. Zaid’s 2004 study of early Islamic state accounting systems also questions de 
Ste. Croix’s assertion that double entry bookkeeping did not emerge until thirteenth-century 
mediaeval Europe. 
321
  Rathbone 1991, pp. 399-400; see Andreau and Maucourant 1999 for a critique of Rathbone’s 
argument. 
322
  Grier 1934; Chandezon 2011, pp. 108-114.  
323
  Chandezon 2011, p. 119. 
324
  Chandezon 2011, pp. 117-118. 
325
  Christesen 2003, p. 36. 
326
  3.9. 
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Our most detailed evidence for Greek financial management and record keeping in the 
classical and Hellenistic periods comes from the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos.  In the 
fifth century the varied sums arriving in Athens by virtue of the Delian League 
entailed the development of financial management skills at a speedier rate than 
elsewhere
327
 and as we shall see, a continuing exchange of methods took place 
between Athens and Delos. 
 
The Delian temple accounts served two main functions.  Firstly they held magistrates 
accountable; this could be achieved through examination of the underlying records 
and each end of term audit,
328
 but inscription left a permanent record, for all to see, of 
the probity or otherwise of officials.  Secondly, the monumentalisation summed up a 
year’s activity and exalted the sanctuary’s wealth for the appreciation of worshippers 
and also her current and potential debtors.  Inscription therefore was about achieving 
different ends from the papyrus accounts we have discussed from Egypt and from the 
sanctuary’s daily records, which must have underpinned the intricate series of 
transactions throughout the year.  We can extract from the annual totals a good 
indication of the complexity of the day to day management of sanctuary income and 
expenditure, which should not be underestimated.  ID 98 for the years 377/6 down to 
374/3 shows that over a four year period which included the quadrennial Delia 
festival, receipts from a large number of sources totalled 61,656 drachmas and 
exceeded expenditure (including monies newly loaned, which are regarded as an 
expense) by just 91 drachmas.
329
  Over half of the income (33,318 drachmas
330
) came 
from interest received on loans made both to cities and individuals, yet elsewhere the 
inscription lists debtors from earlier periods who have repaid none, or only some, of 
the instalments due during the period in question.
331
  Given that anticipated receipts 
might be erratic, careful, constant recording and a tight grip must necessarily have 
                                                 
327
  Rhodes 2013, p. 203. 
328
  In Athens magistrates may have been depositing underlying accounts in the Metroon for 
consideration by the boule as early as the mid-fifth century (Sickinger 1999, pp. 125-127).  In 
Delos during the Independence, monthly accounts were displayed in the agora (Migeotte 2008, 
pp. 62-63).   
329
  Chankowski 2008a, pp. 314-317 for a tabulation of the relevant sums and pp. 417-424 for the 
inscription and translation into French. Today money out on loan would be regarded as an asset, 
because the lender still owns it.  In contrast, ML 53.5-9, 22-24, 28-30, 35-37, an inscription from 
Rhamnous of the 440s, shows that the deme recognised that loans of the goddess’s money 
remained an asset.  
330
  ID 98 Aa 11–14 (interest from cities) and ID 98 Aa 15-23 (interest from individuals). For 
simplicity figures of less than one drachma are omitted here. 
331
  ID 98 Ba 1-10. 
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been maintained on all income and expenses throughout the year in order to balance 
so finely over such a period.  The year 376 for instance, saw an unlooked-for windfall 
in fines of 10,000 drachmas each, imposed on seven men for their asebeia, in having 
chased the amphyctions outside the sanctuary and attacked them.
332
  The narrative of 
this inscription first calculates a surplus for the four years of 11,861 drachmas and 
remarks that of this sum, the bulk of it was loaned at interest.  This narrative cannot 
have reflected the cash position – the assessment of how much to spend or loan out 
was not made yearly or quadrennially after the income had been counted; had this 
been so, and a true cash balance of only 91 drachmas remained after four years, this 
would have left sufficient reserve only to pay one official for three months.
333
  
Balancing income and expenditure must have been a rolling process requiring 
thorough local knowledge of the reliability and changing fortunes of the sanctuary’s 
historic and prospective debtors.  Sacrificial and festival expenses will have occurred 
irregularly although predictably throughout the year and accurate estimations of the 
likelihood that debts would be repaid on schedule would be essential in assessing how 
much cash would be available for future loans.   
 
Not only was housekeeping efficient, but there is a clear sense of building a reserve 
that is immediately put to use to generate further income.  The level of financial 
acumen required to manage these fluctuating circumstances suggests that there is here 
a fine line between careful husbandry and income maximisation.  Chankowski draws 
our attention to the way that reserves must have accumulated through the receipt of 
aparche during the second quarter of the fifth century up until the transfer of the 
treasury of the Delian League, in order to fund the monumentalisation of the sanctuary 
and yet leave sufficient reserve to generate enough interest to sustain sanctuary 
activity.  She estimates that a sum acquired through aparche not exceeding 50 talents 
was available for loan to the cities who had effectively furnished it in the first 
instance, and that as such loans were repaid, the capital was loaned to cities once 
more, whilst any excess of annual income over expenditure was loaned in small 
amounts to individuals.
334
  Thus already an operating distinction is drawn between 
capital funds, loaned out to cities to provide income, and running costs paid for from 
                                                 
332
  ID 98 Ba 24-27.   
333
  Five amphyctions and their secretary each received one drachma per day. Chankowski 2008a, p. 
310. 
334
  Chankowski 2008a, pp. 317-320. 
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that income, which is enshrined in the accounting; ID 98 does not have the integration 
of capital and running accounts or the move towards debit and credit that we see from 
the early second century;
335
 it is essentially a running account, and it is evident from 
the store of information it contains that detailed underlying records must have existed 
relating to both the current year’s activities and the pre-existing arrangements with 
earlier debtors whose payments were so important to the life of the sanctuary.   
 
Delian record keeping evolved over time and, importantly, did not exist in a vacuum.  
After Independence in 314, Delian methods of making private loans in instalments 
mirrored fourth-century Athenian private practice; entries akin to debits and credits 
appear from the mid-third century and a constant exchange of expertise between the 
temple administrators and the banking sector enabled the hieropoioi to appropriate the 
more specialised techniques of the bankers.
336
  Later, the exemplary record made by 
the hieropoios Silenus, thought to be a banker, in 179 suggests that specialised 
methods could be appropriated immediately if the expertise were available.
337
   
 
2.5.3   Record keeping and economic rationality in fourth-century Athens 
In the early part of the 320s, Athenogenes was derided in court for suggesting that 
despite receiving monthly accounts, he did not know the level of his debts, or that the 
sale of his assets would not cover them.  Some modern scholars might be content to 
think that ancient traders could not analyse their profitability; an Athenian jury might 
not be so forgiving.
338
  Whilst we have less systematic operational detail, several case 
studies have identified the capability to recognise and implement financial 
management practices and quantify profitability in fourth-century Attica.  In 
particular, Bresson and Bresson
339
 have conclusively demonstrated that the 
sophistication of the calculations involved in setting interest rates for maritime loans 
show that lender and borrower could relate the level of shipping failure to interest 
rates, were able to make complex judgements about the use of capital for the best 
return on investment, and used these skills to plan the spreading of risk across 
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  Migeotte 2008, p. 74, referencing in particular ID 442, the complete account for the year 179, and 
the records for the years 180-168, ID 440-453; 455-465; 467-468, discussed in Chankowski and 
Feyel 1997, pp. 117-118. 
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  Chankowski 2008b, pp. 79-81, 88. 
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  ID 442; Chankowski 2008b, pp. 80, 88. 
338
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different projects.  Drawing together a wide variety of sources Faraguna subsequently 
built on Macve’s discussion with an analysis of means of calculation, commercial 
transactions, and sacred and public financial management from the archaic era 
through to the fourth century.  Faraguna argued convincingly that the extensive use of 
the abacus made up for any deficiency in numbering systems, and that the Greeks 
were able to estimate profitability, developing forms of economic behaviour that were 
aimed at profit maximisation.
340
   
 
Similarly, on the small scale, Cohen demonstrated that Demosthenes’ speeches 
against his guardians show that Athenians understood the concepts determining the 
profitability of business operations without the need for double entry bookkeeping.
341
  
On the larger scale, Davies has shown that Chabrias’ money-raising strategies in 
Egypt in July 362 – July 359 show ‘a high level of sophistication and an ability to 
‘read’ an economy for the sake of extracting revenue from it.’342  Osborne has 
established that the heavy cash requirements placed on the liturgical class entailed that 
the wealthy Attic landowner might manage a variety of agricultural activities 
alongside business interests such as mining in order to secure the necessary monetised 
income,
343
 and Moreno has made a case for a far greater involvement in the grain 
trade by the Athenian wealthy than has previously been recognised.
344
  Analysing the 
financial provisions put in place by Lykourgos a little later in the fourth century, 
Davies concluded that:  
… we have to view the Athenian political class as collectively (and 
competitively) possessing a knowledge of fiscal possibilities and techniques 
probably unrivalled anywhere else in the Mediterranean.
345
 
This is the class of Athenians who purchased leases, invested in mining operations 
and owned the land on which the mines were situated.  Given the apparent success of 
the mid-fourth century mining industry it seems evident therefore that the question 
should not be, whether the Greeks had the numerical and accounting sophistication to 
manage and develop their enterprises effectively, but how they did it.   
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  Faraguna 2008. 
341
  Dem. Against Aphobus I-III; E. E. Cohen 1992, p. 124, n. 56.  
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  Davies 2004b, p. 493. 
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  R. Osborne 1991, p. 137.  
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  Moreno 2007a, pp. 259-260. 
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2.5.4   The ore washeries and economic rationality 
Returning to the silver industry, Christesen has shown that the heavy investment made 
in the construction and running of silver ore washeries in the Laurion in the classical 
era demonstrates the pursuit of profit maximisation in the Athenian silver mining 
industry.  Grinding and washing the lower grade, silver bearing ore prior to 
cupellation was not strictly necessary, but it saved expenditure on the large amounts 
of charcoal that would have been used had the ore not first been refined and reduced 
in volume.
346
  Conophagos estimated the cost of processing ore at about 61 drachmas 
per ton when the raw ore was taken straight to the furnaces, as against 38 drachmas 
per ton for pre-refined, sorted material.  As Conophagos estimates the average income 
per ton of material dug at 70 drachmas, the importance of not overspending on the 
refining process becomes self-evident.  This, Christesen argues, demonstrates the 
Athenian ability to employ careful cost analysis and economically rational decision-
making.
347
   
 
We may take this analysis further.  Conophagos’ figures are averages; not every 
operator would have achieved 70 drachmas of income (before costs) per ton of 
material dug.  Some would have been lucky enough, on some days, to dig ore of such 
high quality that it did not need pre-refining.  Others might have dug for some time 
before finding anything even worth crushing.  Crushing and grinding produced 
concentrated ore, ‘middlings’ and ‘tailings.’  Tailings would usually be discarded; 
middlings still had useful ore caught within the gangue (the material that could not be 
commercially processed), and might be refined further.  Without the benefit of 
modern analytical techniques, this was a judgement to be made from experience 
alone, on the basis of cost.
348
 
 
Thus operators had to assess not only the simple cost/benefit equation above, but also 
had to take into account the risk that no silver at all might be produced for some time 
or that some would require greater levels of pre-furnace processing at the washeries.  
In such circumstances the flexibility of the labour supply and of access to washeries 
                                                 
346
  Photos-Jones and Jones 1994, p. 332. Agrileza was primarily an ore-dressing site: pp. 327-358 
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only when their services were needed would have been paramount in order to avoid 
maintaining underemployed and expensive slaves and installations, suggesting that 
perhaps only the large and regularly productive mines (such as that operated by 
Pantaenetus) would make the ownership of a dedicated ergasterion economically 
viable. Smaller operators would probably ‘outsource’ the refinement of their ore.  
Choices would have had to be made on the basis of long term projections taking into 
account the unpredictability of the silver supply.  Given this risk, for any individual 
operator it would make sense to employ the most efficient means of purification not 
simply as a general rule that profit should be maximised, but as a protection against 
the constant possibility that a seam may disappoint and that last week’s profits might 
be spent on this week’s wasted labour.  Even an operator who was digging mostly 
high grade ore might still want to refine the lower grade ore he digs and send it to a 
washery in order to protect against the unevenness of the quality of supply. 
 
Whilst Christesen focuses on fourth-century Attica, the archaeological report by 
Kakavoyannis from which Christesen draws much of his evidence also shows the 
existence of rock-cut washeries crammed together along one of the water courses of 
the Bertseko Valley dating from at least the start of the fifth century and perhaps 
earlier.
349
  This profusion of more primitive versions of the later washery complex 
with its own associated cisterns demonstrates that the benefits of pre-processing the 
ore were long recognised, and is indicative of both the technological evolution of the 
process and a demand for greater capacity as silver mining increased.  We cannot tell 
what the financial and proprietorial relationship was between the rock-cut washeries 
and the individual miners, but in the fourth century we know from epigraphic 
evidence that washeries might be owned independently of the mines.
350
  
Kakavoyannis posits that although washeries might have been originally built by a 
mine owner in association with an adjacent mine, as a lease ended or a mine became 
exhausted the owner would look for a further mine to lease nearby in order to avoid 
additional building and would let out its services to other operators.
351
  The 
calculation thus becomes even more sophisticated.  A potential washery builder, an 
existing owner deciding whether to keep a washery in operation, or an individual 
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making a loan against the purchase of a washery, all had to factor in a range of issues 
when deciding on the income-potential of an individual workshop.  As well as having 
a good understanding of its running costs, such as site maintenance and the support of 
slave labour, he would have to be able to estimate the amount of use to be made of it 
in processing ore from the owner’s own mine and the likely level of demand for, and 
income from, its services to other nearby mine operators.  Therefore he would have to 
consider the factors taken into account by likely customers – the relative costs of 
processing the ore in a washery before taking it to the furnace, measured against the 
higher cost (because of the heavier requirement for charcoal) of the cupellation of 
larger amounts of lower grade ore.  If the price of using a washery was higher than the 
additional cost of cupellation, then the miner might as well miss out the washery stage 
and pay for the furnace.  A lower limit could be set by a washery operator who had a 
good grasp of his outgoings and understood the need to estimate and ensure that he 
covered his overheads, whilst remaining competitive, particularly if a large job meant 
bringing in – probably hiring – more slaves.  In between, given the profusion of 
washeries in the Laurion, it seems perfectly possible that there would be something 
akin to a market rate for processing.  Washeries reasonably adjacent to each other and 
to the mines that used them might have to compete for business; where there was only 
one washery near to a mine, that washery might have something of a monopoly, 
unless his price was so high that it was cheaper to pay for slaves to carry the ore 
further afield to a less costly workshop. 
   
As I hope I have demonstrated, with a fair amount of independent but heavily 
interdependent industrial activity taking place in a very small area there can be little 
doubt that the most successful managers must have been those who could make quite 
fine financial judgements.  These would not simply have been, as Christesen 
describes, choosing whether to spend large sums on building a washery to go with 
one’s mine, but on a daily basis, forecasting short-term activity.  As a washery owner, 
this entailed understanding one’s overheads and the choices available to potential 
customers in order to judge the competition and set one’s prices for services as a 
provider.  As a mine operator, it necessitated being able to judge the difference 
between the differently costed processes of washing and cupellation and their different 
levels of associated preparatory costs.   
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2.5.5   The Poroi and economic rationality – conclusion.  Xenophon’s 
economically rational planning 
The silver industry then was already the object of constant analysis of cost to profit 
ratios as the quality of the ore led to daily assessment of alternate processing strategies 
alongside a necessarily intensive and probably competitive ancillary supply system.  
The industry’s importance as a provider of state income, and the way in which its 
heavy supply requirements will have touched many Athenian tradesmen and farmers, 
mean that Xenophon’s precise calculations and familiarity with the industry should 
not be a surprise.  Can the Poroi add to our picture of economically-rational decision 
making in the fourth century? 
 
Careful examination of temple accounts, legal speeches, historical episodes and 
industrial archaeology reveal a sophisticated degree of financial planning and the 
ability to maximise profit across a range of sectors.  The evidence of Delos and our 
knowledge of the Athenian liturgical system suggest a high degree of cross-
fertilisation of management practices and accounting methods between the sacred and 
secular spheres.  Contemporary readers of the Poroi from across the Greek world 
would be familiar with the administration of these religious and political financial 
institutions, which were not confined either to Athens or to democracies.  It is 
therefore productive to readdress Xenophon’s plans, bearing in mind that his audience 
would have had this level of financial and commercial literacy.  
 
In the first instance, we should note that the arithmetical logic of Xenophon’s 
argument is compelling.
352
  How then does Xenophon’s business planning stand up to 
scrutiny?  Rostovtzeff, we may recall, pronounced it a political piece rather than ‘a 
serious suggestion by an experienced financier’.353  But at the very least, it furnishes a 
validation of Cartledge’s claim that  
..the Athenians’ purchase and use of slaves were in the first instance the 
outcome of hard-headed prudential calculation – as that was then 
understood.
354
 
Westermann suggests that Xenophon does not make any allowance for amortisation in 
his calculation of income,
355
 yet once the workforce reaches 6,000 Xenophon 
                                                 
352
  See chapter 1.6.2 for the calculations involved.    
353
  Rostovtzeff 1941, p. 1328, n. 27. 
354
  Cartledge 2002b, p. 164. 
141 
 
 
 
proposes that the resulting income of sixty talents for that year should be split, twenty 
to buy further slaves and forty for the state.  The polis thus recoups the initial 38 talent 
outlay in this year,
356
 as well as owning a workforce worth 180–200 talents.  
‘Investors’ are ultimately to be rewarded through the triobol distribution; we are even 
told at what rate.
357
  If 20 talents continued to be used to buy slaves each year, there 
would be almost 10,000 slaves by the end of the twelfth year and if at that stage no 
more slaves were purchased, these 10,000 slaves would yield an annual state income 
of 100 talents.  Xenophon may not address any of the practicalities: moving, housing, 
feeding and clothing the workforce immediately after purchase or between 
employment, or the personnel involved in organising such a large undertaking, but 
this is big-picture thinking.   
 
In making his proposals, Xenophon analyses the future potential of the extraction 
industry,
358
 draws parallels with previous and current practices
359
 and assesses the 
markets for silver and for slaves using comparative indicators from other fields of 
production, recognising that demand drives production at every stage of the enterprise 
such that demand for silver will drive demand for slaves.
360
  He identifies sources of 
initial capital;
361
 recognises that potential investors have a choice over where to place 
their funds, and therefore not only calculates rates of return for investors but compares 
them favourably with other investment opportunities.
362
  He suggests ways to reinvest 
profits in order to promote further business activity
363
 and insures against 
embezzlement, by the use of guarantors.
364
  Ancillary income is noted in the form of 
additional tax revenues,
365
 depreciation is to an extent considered, in that the lessee 
has to pay for replacement slaves
366
 and whilst Xenophon only supplies a few of the 
figures, his numbers are carefully put together.  It may be audacious in its scale and 
alien to a modern readership in its exploitation of human capital, but this is a well-
_______________________ 
 
355
  Westermann 1955, p. 15. 
356
  4.2-3, 4.24. 
357
  3.9. 
358
  4.2-5, 4.25-27. 
359
  4.13-16. 
360
  4.6-9, 4.22. 
361
  3.7, 3.11. 
362
  3.10. 
363
  3.12-14. 
364
  4.20.  
365
  See chapter 2.3.2. 
366
  4.14. 
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considered business plan that looks above all to maximise profit for the state by 
offering profit maximising opportunities to its participants.    
 
2.6   Chapter conclusion 
Through a contextualisation of Xenophon’s proposals for the silver mines, the 
preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate the probable level of appreciation by 
the Poroi’s first audience of the position occupied by the silver industry within a 
complex web of transactions at personal and state level.  Both the conception and 
reception of the text will have been informed by a far wider recognition of the 
economics of silver extraction and the role of the Laurion in daily Attic life than has 
generally been recognised; Xenophon’s suggestions may appear artless or naïve to a 
modern reader, but we lack the Athenians’ familiarity with the particulars of slave 
ownership and industrial and commercial practice that obviated the need for detail.  
Recognition of the economic benefits of the silver industry and a familiarity with the 
nuts and bolts of its operation permeated every aspect of Athenian society, whether as 
a beneficiary of its levies, as a supplier, an investor, a user of its coinage or a seller of 
its leases.  Vast numbers of slaves and free men worked directly in extraction, 
supplied the industry, and crafted and spent its final product.  As will have been seen, 
I am cautious about the extent to which Xenophon concerned himself with the welfare 
of slave workers other than to the extent that benign management might extract 
greatest profit.  I do not believe he planned manumission or independence as a 
cornerstone of his proposals – the incentives he offers are all for free men.   
 
Xenophon’s proposals rested on the firm foundation of a wider recognition amongst 
his audience of the industry’s history and a financial literacy that is only in recent 
years becoming apparent.  They also played on Athenians’ sense of themselves, their 
pride in their coinage and the part played by silver in their history and the Persian 
wars.  The Poroi is aspirational in its promises of widespread slave ownership and the 
regeneration of the city’s institutions.  Within ten years of its appearance, the 
economic forces which to an extent Xenophon recognised, had had their inevitable 
effect, and large sums were again being risked by investors.   
 
Notably, status considerations or negative attitudes to participation in manufacturing 
and trade do not appear to have had any detrimental effect on the exploitation of 
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Laurion silver.  There is no indication in our sources, and certainly not in the Poroi, 
that wealth-generation through citizen involvement in mining, at least at the level of 
supervisor or owner, carried with it any sense of dishonour.  The incentives Xenophon 
offers to mining participation are essentially to do with profit and reflect the profit-
driven motivations of those mine operators we have seen portrayed by the orators.   
 
However other aspects of his schemes, particularly those which were to rely on the 
involvement of non-Athenians, might need additional inducements.  Xenophon was 
aware of the ways in which Greek philotimia, love of honour, might be manipulated to 
encourage economic activity and in chapter 4 we will look further at the Athenians’ 
manipulation of honours in order to engineer economic choices that were not wholly 
driven by profit considerations.  Whilst the debate about Athenian citizen attitudes to 
economic activity remains vibrant, we have seen that Athenians with cash to spare had 
investment choices available to them and that given the right conditions, investment in 
the silver mines presented an economically rational choice in itself.  The silver 
industry was profit-driven, competitive and involved constant rational decision-
making in the pursuit of the maximisation of what we would call marginal utility 
during refinement and processing.  Fourth-century evidence supports a picture of the 
financial sophistication of those who had had any experience of sacred, political or 
military administration, of shop keeping, banking or estate management, unhindered 
by the relatively rudimentary nature of recording techniques.  Xenophon and his 
audience had first-hand experience of many of these sectors.  His essential proposal, 
that the state should purchase thousands of slaves and profit from their rental, was 
innovative and daring, but it was offered to an audience whose commercial expertise 
should not be underrated.  In the following chapter, we will see that the text has much 
to reveal about the sort of considerations that Athenians might contemplate in making 
their investment choices in an exceptionally risky industry.   
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Chapter Three - Managing risk and promoting confidence 
 
For when anxiety is attached to earning and saving, who will want to take the risk? 
Hypereides
1
 
 
Business repays men, not only for their labors, but for their fears
 
Clark 
2
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, I want to investigate further the extent to which an analysis of the 
Poroi can contribute to the debate about economic rationality in the ancient world, 
focussing specifically on what Xenophon’s text reveals about ancient understanding 
of, and attitudes to, risk.  We have seen in Against Pantaenetus the number of men 
who were willing to chance large sums in mining, whether as financiers or operators.
3
  
On what basis did they make these judgements?  How had confidence in the industry 
turned around in the few years since Xenophon had said that no-one wanted to take 
the risk of a new cutting?
4
  Schorn contrasts Plato’s caution over the feasibility of his 
project in the Republic with Xenophon’s unquestioning optimism at the practicability 
of his plans, but as the following analysis will demonstrate, Xenophon’s overt 
confidence is belied by his cautious approach.
5
  
 
The concepts of risk and rationality are inextricably intertwined in post-modern 
thought, particularly so in the field of economics.  Here I will focus on Xenophon’s 
                                                 
1
  Hypereides In Defence of Euxenippus 4.37; ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ φοβερὸν τὸ κτᾶσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, τίς 
βουλήσεται κινδυνεύειν; 
2
  Clark 1892, p. 40. 
3
  Chapter 2 4.1. 
4
  4.28. 
5
  Schorn 2012, p. 720 and n. 121. 
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approach to risk and what it reveals of the strategies available to ancient entrepreneurs 
in their analysis of their economic undertakings.  As Eidinow asks in relation to her 
study of oracles and curses at Dodona, is risk ‘good to think with?’6  I hope to 
demonstrate that despite the danger of imposing contemporary concepts on to ancient 
activities, in the study of the Greek economy the answer is emphatically ‘yes’.  
Polanyi, building on the proposal that the Greeks pioneered market trading, rather 
than the Sumerians, Babylonians and Assyrians, asked,  
whence then did the Hellenes … derive their arts of individual business 
initiative, risky and gainful?'
7
   
Whatever one’s view of the developmental stage of the economy of the fourth 
century, in the evolution of economic processes from gift exchange, reciprocity and 
barter to the non-personal exchange of goods for profit, the conscious undertaking of 
‘commercial’ risk is a key step, pivotal to the analysis of the emergence of ideas of 
individual entrepreneurism.  Risk has not been used hitherto as an analytical tool in 
the study of the Poroi and it yields fascinating and informative results about the way 
the Greeks managed their enterprises. 
 
3.1.1   Chapter outline 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of modern approaches to risk and then apply 
some of the concepts discussed to two non-Attic texts, one fourth-century and one 
Edwardian, in order to demonstrate the value of the model.  I will then look at the 
vocabulary that Xenophon uses, identifying the manner in which, whilst lacking a 
specific word, he describes different degrees of risk by juxtaposing concepts of danger 
and safety.  This is followed by a brief survey of ancient strategies for tackling 
subsistence and lending risk.  The bulk of the chapter is an analysis of the manner in 
which Xenophon presents the reader with the daily risks faced by the various agents 
whose activities he discusses alongside the specific risks inherent in each of his 
proposals, and then offers strategies to contain and reduce them.  The discussion is 
grouped around particular categories of men who would be involved in the projects – 
the individual entrepreneur, the polis, the non-Athenian, the wealthy and the 
impoverished.  Finally, I categorise the different strategies that Xenophon 
                                                 
6
  Eidinow 2007, p. 16. 
7
     Polanyi 1957, pp. 64-65, my italics. 
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demonstrates for exploring and managing uncertainty to show that the businessman in 
the ancient Greek world could, if he chose, exercise sound analytical skills in 
identifying economic opportunities as well as threats, and plan his enterprises from 
the outset with a clear strategy for long-term development whilst holding in reserve 
pre-planned short term tactics that would respond to specific, foreseen sets of 
scenarios.   
 
3.2   Definitions and derivations 
Athenian recognition of an apparently self-evident, but pivotal principle of 
entrepreneurial risk, that whoever risked their capital in a commercial enterprise was 
entitled to any profit it yielded, is clearly demonstrated in Lysias’ Against Diogeiton.  
Amongst a catalogue of ill-dealings, Diogeiton is accused of having used two talents 
of his wards’ inheritance to fund a merchant shipment to the Adriatic, telling their 
mother that the enterprise was at the boys’ risk (ἔλεγε πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτῶν ὅτι τῶν 
παίδων ὁ κίνδυνος εἴη).  The boys stood to lose their capital, yet when it was 
successful, Diogeiton unscrupulously claimed the profits as his own; such behaviour, 
the court is told, providing proof of the ease with which he enriched himself at other 
people’s expense.8 
 
Lysias uses the word κίνδυνος to describe the risk taken with the boys’ money, and 
Eidinow rightly warns against the ambiguity of modern usage of the word risk and 
argues that there is a negotiation to be undertaken between ancient and modern 
systems of meaning.
9
  We should then establish what we mean by risk for the 
purposes of this discussion.  The word ‘risk’, from the Latin riscum, did not 
apparently become current until the mediaeval era, where usage appears to have 
evolved in relation to maritime activity and focused only around ‘acts of god,’ rather 
than referring to dangers rooted in human fault and responsibility.
10
  This idea of man 
as subject to external and uncontrollable forces
11
 evolved significantly in the 
Renaissance with the introduction of the concept of man as a rational actor able to 
control outcomes through purposive actions.  The Enlightenment brought with it the 
                                                 
8
  Lysias Against Diogeiton 32.25. 
9
  Eidinow 2007, pp. 18-20. 
10
     Lupton 1999a, p. 5. 
11
  Which the ancients might have regarded as τύχη: see Eidinow 2011, pp. 119-142. 
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application of science and the mathematics of probability to enable the calculability 
and control of alternative objectives,
12
 whilst Adam Smith developed the idea of ‘the 
invisible hand’ by situating the idea of the rational actor within the field of 
economics.
13
  This conceptual evolution from man as the object of unpredictable 
events to man as an active agent in control of his universe has entailed that, in the 
twenty first century, regularly employed terms such as ‘risk management’ imply that 
all risk can be predicted, managed and contained.  Within economic theory, the idea of 
the rational actor, who will whenever possible act with a view to utility 
maximisation,
14
 has assumed primacy.
15
 
   
When Knight wrote his influential Risk, Uncertainty and Profit in 1921,
16 
he was in 
part responding to the attempt to define categories of (economic) risk and the way that 
they related to categories of profit.  Thirty years earlier, distinguishing between the 
entrepreneur, the capitalist, and the worker,
17
 Clark had argued that the entrepreneur 
does not carry risk; rather the capitalist undertakes risk and receives the reward of 
risk-taking.  As profit equates to 'excess of price of goods over their cost,' then income 
from risk-taking was not part of profit.
18
  In response, Hawley argued that profit was 
to be explained exclusively in terms of risk.  Risk-taking is the essential function of 
the entrepreneur and therefore the basis of his peculiar income.
19
  Responding to Clark 
and Hawley, Knight reformulated the question by drawing a distinction between 
‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ risk.20  After all, that which was measurable, known 
either a priori or from statistical analysis, was insurable:  
                                                 
12
     Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 20-22. 
13
   ‘By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [every individual] intends only 
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.  Nor is it always the worse 
for the society that it was no part of it.  By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that 
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.’ (Smith 1776, book 4, 
chapter 2, p. 351). 
14
   ‘Utility maximisation’ describes the theory that quantities of goods and labour are chosen 
optimally so as to increase utility, where utility, first discussed by Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, is a scale of individual happiness or welfare, an increasing function of goods 
consumed, and a decreasing function of work carried out. 
15
   Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 25, 41-47. 
16
   Knight 1921. 
17
   'Working is one thing, lending "money" is another, and hiring men and money and setting them at 
work is still another.’ Clarke 1892, p. 45.  The entrepreneur is frequently regarded as a fourth axis 
of the ‘land, labour, capital’ configuration.  
18
    Clarke 1892, p. 46. 
19
    Hawley 1893. 
20
    Knight 1921, pp. 46, 233. 
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There is a fundamental distinction between the reward for taking a known risk 
and that for assuming a risk whose value itself is not known.  It is so 
fundamental, indeed, that … a known risk will not lead to any reward or 
special payment at all.
21
 
(Financial) risk then, for Knight, was a far narrower category than the uninitiated may 
imagine, not simply because it comprises only financial hazard, but because it can be 
narrowed down still further to hazard that is quantifiable.  To clarify the distinction, 
Knight classified any other sort of risk as ‘uncertainty.’  The application of research 
and the introduction of knowledge may turn ‘uncertainty’ into ‘risk’.  
 
Where chance events are concerned (‘aleatory’ uncertainty), we might today try to 
quantify our uncertainty, perhaps through mathematical probabilities or using 
historical data, taking past frequencies of an event as an indicator of future 
occurrences.
22
  But neither the scientific calculation of probability nor statistical data 
were available to the classical entrepreneur
23
 and so the bulk of the financial risks 
Xenophon identifies would, in Knight’s terminology, be ‘uncertainties.’ 
Other commentators in the fields of anthropology and the social sciences have 
identified and enlarged on further distinctions – objective versus subjective risk,24 and 
culturally conceived risk, which we will explore below.  Before we go further down 
the theoretical path, and as a vehicle for demonstrating how these various post-
modern approaches are instructive for the analysis of an ancient text, two examples of 
attitude to risk are instructive.   
 
3.3   Timodamos and the Edwardians 
The first of my two brief case-studies took place somewhere between 350 and 320 
BC, when a Greek called Timodamos travelled to Dodona to ask the oracle of Zeus 
whether or not he should ‘do business by land and by sea, using his silver mine’ or 
perhaps, ‘using his money.’25  The second example is more recent.  In the early 
                                                 
21
    Knight 1921, pp. 43-44. 
22
  Spiegelhalter 2011, pp. 18-21, although he goes on to argue that ‘probabilities are based on 
existing knowledge and therefore contingent.’ 
23
    Although to stay afloat the banker making maritime loans must have had some measure of the 
frequency with which cargoes were lost. 
24
    Knight refers to the contemporary currency of these terms but does not enlarge on them other than 
to say that they are akin to his definitions.  Our use of them here is in a wider, anthropological 
sense.  
25
  Side A: Gods.  Good luck. O Zeus, will you tell Timodamos that these things are best: to do 
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twentieth century, British investment in mining enterprises in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
was surprisingly popular, despite the fact that most mining companies failed.
26
  
Aside from the pleasing coincidence that both perhaps relate to mining, what is 
interesting about these cases is the way that those directly at risk in commercial 
operations made their choices about how to proceed.  Timodamos, facing the 
unknown in assessing his commercial choices, relies on a source of information that 
probably came quite naturally to him, and asked the oracle of Zeus.  Over 4,200 
oracular lamellae have been uncovered at Dodona
27
 and he was by no means alone in 
his search for business guidance; fifth- and fourth-century enquiries include questions 
about the advisability of specific professions, such as whether to keep cattle,
28
 be a 
bronze smith
29
 or become a ship-owner,
30
 and whether or not to take up the family 
business.
31
  As Bresson points out, ‘if it was believed that some devices could be used 
either to predict or to manage the future, it became perfectly ‘rational’ to use them.’32 
Two questions which ask whether travel would make trading more successful, one 
perhaps from a Rhodian, are particular testimony to the distance consultants might 
travel to make their enquiry and the level of risk in foreign trade that made an 
_______________________ 
 
business by land or sea, using his money/his silver mine, for however much time he chooses?   
      Θεοί· Tύχαν ἀγαθάν· 
ο Zεῦ, ἀναίρει T[ι]μοδά- 
μοι ἐμπ[ο]ρεύεσθαι 
καὶ κατὰ γ[ᾶ]ν καὶ  
κατὰ θάλασσαν 
τἀπὸ τ  [ἀ]ργυρίο, ὅσσον 
καὐτὸς [h]έληται χρόνον 
ταῦτα κράτιστα; 
     Side B: Gods. Good fortune. Dwell in the city and work as a trader and do business, and give up 
the share in the boat.   Trade on land and sea, selling and buying.  
  Θεοί· τύχαν ἀγαθάν· Ἐν τ ι 
ἄστει οἰ[κ]ῆν καὶ καπηλεύ- 
ην καὶ ἐμ[π]ορεύεσθαι, τὰ δ’ἐ- 
ν τ ι γαυ.. ἐγδιδόμεν · 
ἐμπορε[ύ]εσθαι δὲ χρήματα 
ἄγοντα [καὶ] κατὰ γᾶν καὶ κα- 
τὰ θάλασ[σα]ν, πωλ ντα καὶ 
ὠνόμ[ε]νο[ν] 
      Trans. Eidinow. SEG 43.341; BE 1993: 346; PAE 1968, 53-4; Lhôte 2006: no. 95. Salviat 1993, 
pp. 61-64, does not think that the reading of a mine is decisive. Lhôte 2006, p. 205 translates as 
‘son capital’.  Discussed in Eidinow 2007, pp. 97-98. 
26
  Mollan 2009. 
27
   E. Meyer 2013a, p. 20. 
28
  Eidinow 2007, p. 95, no. 1 = Parke 17; SGDI 1559; Karapanos 1878: pl. 37.1. 
29
  Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 5 = SEG 15.403; BE1956:143; PAE 1952: 304, 18.  
30
  Eidinow 2007, p. 98, no. 11 = SGDI 1583; Karapanos 1878: pl. 37.3. 
31
  Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 6 = Parke 18. 
32
  Bresson 2012, p. 239. 
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expensive journey to Dodona a good investment.
33
 
 
The Edwardian gentleman investors did not have the detailed information that they 
needed to make informed investment decisions any more than did Timodamos (in 
fact, at such a great distance from their enterprise, they quite possibly had less), and 
yet Mollan tells us that they went ahead thanks to the, ‘gentlemanly nature of the City 
of London,’ and ‘inaccurate notions of mineral wealth located in the colony.’  
Remarkably, ‘A nexus of social, organisational and financial interests centred on the 
City of London’ and, ‘popularised myths of exotic lands and easy riches promoted by 
writers such as Rider Haggard in novels like King Solomon’s Mines,’ played a vital 
role in their attitude to investment risk.
34
  Much of the excitement centred on the 
presence in the Sudan of ancient mine-workings.  We may hazard that there is some 
correspondence between this semi-mythologising of ancient fortunes in Africa and the 
unspoken romantic appeal of the Athenian silver mines to a fourth-century citizenry 
who were regularly reminded by the orators
35
 of the naval glory achieved by the fleet 
built with the proceeds of the silver strike of the early fifth century.
36
  
 
Different societies highlight different areas of threat in their daily lives, focussing on 
some more than others for reasons which may be specific to their shared history and 
experience.  As Douglas and Wildavsky put it, ‘common values lead to common 
fears’37 and so we may not assume that the issues that the Athenians identified as 
‘risky’ and worthy of countermeasure and containment would have been the same as 
those we might choose to prioritise today, nor, more relevantly, can we be sure that 
we may entirely understand Athenian attitudes to risk even when we take care to 
examine the cultural setting.  However a society may choose which specific risks it 
will prioritise, the way that it approaches those risks is subject to further cultural 
factors.   
 
In the cases just described, we can see that in different ways our ancient and 
                                                 
33
  Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 7 = Ep. Chron. 1935:254, 12. Rhodian: Eidinow 2007, p. 97, no. 6 = 
Parke 19, Syll.
3
 1166.  
34
  Mollan 2009, pp. 229, 231 and 232.   
35
  eg. Dem. Against Androtion 22.13. 
36
  Hdt. 7.144; Arist. Ath Pol. 22.7, see chapter 2.3.1.2. In a circular twist, Hilton (2011) has recently 
shown the high degree of classical influence reflected in Haggard’s African romances due to his 
friendship with the classical scholar Andrew Lang. 
37
  Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 8. 
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Edwardian prospectors have attempted to deal with uncertainty by using sources of 
information they regarded as reliable in order to turn uncertainty into a more 
knowable risk. Resources such as geological surveying and actuarial forecasting were 
unavailable to Athenian entrepreneurs, who were unable to achieve the sort of 
rigorously testable knowledge that a modern scientist might recognise.  But both 
Greek and Edwardian were able to enquire of sources they trusted, whether a 
persuasive investment prospectus or an oracle, in order to build a fuller picture of the 
degree of hazard in a given proposal. 
 
This brings us to the distinction between ‘objective’ risk, the sort of risk that a 
physical scientist can measure with research and statistics, and ‘perceived’ (or 
‘subjective’) risk, the individual’s understanding of risk in their daily life.38  In this 
instance, the relative value of the information available to the risk-taker is measured 
by his estimation of the reliability of the informant, whether a deity or a fellow club 
member, and his assessment of the risk is determined by this evaluation as well as by 
cultural factors such as shared mythology or club membership.  What becomes clear is 
that perceived risk is culturally constructed, through individual experience, belief and 
even moral values.  In practice how, or even whether, objective and subjective risk 
can be reconciled remains an area of debate between physical and social scientists.
39
  
Where perceived risk comes into contact with quantifiable risk it can skew 
calculations, as perceived risk leads individuals to change their behaviour in ways that 
may or may not be ‘rational’ when risks are analysed through statistics alone.40   
Subjective assessment of risks may therefore lead to unnecessary prudence.  Thus in 
response to perceived risk, objective risk changes, because behaviour, and so 
outcomes, change, and here we come back to Xenophon.  As we shall see, in making 
propositions relating to maritime trade and silver mining, two aspects of Athenian 
commerce that were generally regarded as risky, he not only applies knowledge but 
contextualises his plans in an attempt to modify perceptions of risk and to influence 
behaviour.   
 
These two non-Xenophontic examples demonstrate that we cannot assume that what 
may seem obvious pros and cons to us from a twenty-first century perspective 
                                                 
38
    Adams 1995; the following is taken from pages 7-9 and 25-27. 
39
  Economists may be more inclined to agree with the physical scientists - Adams 1995, p. 7. 
40
  Adams 1995, p. 13. 
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necessarily appeared so to the Greeks, whose fates were pre-ordained by what 
Eidinow memorably describes as a ‘vast bureaucracy’ of entities forming a 
‘supernatural civil service.’41  Much of the argument that Xenophon presents has a 
surprisingly modern ring to it, his voice is clear and persuasive and his description of 
economic processes is very accessible, but it is important to bear in mind that whilst 
assessing his approach to the risks involved in his projects, we must remember to give 
weight to the unspoken cultural context which underpins it.   
 
3.4   Definitions once more 
 As we will discover, Xenophon addresses a variety of risks which are physical, social 
and economic, and it will not always be appropriate to use economic determinants to 
analyse the categories of risk he addresses, nor can we confine ourselves to 
anthropological theory without losing some degree of analysis of the economic.  A 
useful and more neutral, ontologically based, definition of risk is provided by Rosa:  
A situation or event in which something of human value (including humans 
themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.
42
 
This is the definition I shall use for the purpose of this study.  It is particularly useful 
because it does not specify a category of what is risked, except that it is something 
which has value to the person for whom it is at stake; it does not operate in a discrete 
social or economic sphere, nor does it indicate any distinction between quantifiable or 
unquantifiable risk, or between perceived and objective risk.  This broader definition 
enables us to gather together a range of types of risk addressed by Xenophon.  
Nevertheless, as I hope the preceding discussion has shown, our understanding of the 
text will be enriched if we remain alive to these distinctions and to the cultural 
indicators that are at play.  
 
3.5   Xenophon’s vocabulary 
The Poroi is sprinkled with vocabulary related to fear and danger, counterpointed by 
words related to safety.
43
  The use of these words in a context where he is not 
                                                 
41
    Eidinow 2011, p. 6. 
42
    Rosa, 1998 discussed in Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 17-18 
43
  Five instances of words derived from fear;  4.32  φοβεῖσθε, 4.39 φοβερώτατον, φόβου, 4.41 
φοβοῦνται, φοβερώτερος, five of words derived from danger; 2.2 κίνδυνος, 4.28 κίνδυνος, 4.29 
κίνδυνον, 4.32 κινδυνεύειν, 5.8 κινδύνων, seven of words derived from safety; 3.1 ἀσφαλεστάτας, 
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describing physical threats makes it clear that what Xenophon is describing is what 
we would refer to as risk.  κίνδυνος for the Greeks could also carry implications of 
hazard,
44
 and translations of the Poroi generally imply this, for instance both 
Marchant and Doty translate κίνδυνος as ‘risk’ at 4.28, 4.29 and 4.32, as does Todd 
when Antisthenes describes those ‘who although possessors of large resources, yet 
look upon themselves as so poor that they bend their backs to any toil, any risk 
(κίνδυνος), if only they may increase their holdings.’45   
 
Words such as ‘fear’, ‘danger’ and ‘safety’ in relation to financial undertakings 
apparently define the extreme places where actions might take Xenophon’s readers, 
without the middle ground wherein the two extremes might be negotiated in the way 
that is implied by our term ‘risk’.  Describing the choice made by Apollodorus 
between running a shield factory and a bank, the former a less ‘risky’ business 
proposition than the latter, Demosthenes defines the factory as ἀκίνδυνόν and the 
bank as ἐπικινδύνους,46 and Hypereides similarly uses φόβον, φοβερὸν and 
κινδυνεύειν in describing the worry involved in investing in silver mining, translated 
by Burtt as ‘afraid,’ ‘anxiety’ and ‘risk.’47    
 
‘Danger’ may be too strong a word for modern translators to apply to concern about 
economic activity but we have to be wary of the modern connotations of the word risk 
in a world where the concepts of aversion, assessment and management have become 
intertwined with danger to imply something more containable than the variety of 
unknowns wrestled with by the ancients.  For our current purposes however we are 
stuck with the word risk, and if we wonder whether its use may represent the 
imposition of a modern concept on to an ancient sensibility, it is interesting to note the 
more complex phrase that Xenophon uses further on in the Poroi.  At 4.32 he abuts 
the idea of safety against the concepts of fortune and danger; τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστερον 
_______________________ 
 
3.10 ἀσφαλέστατόν, 4.30 ἀσφαλέστατα, 4.32 ἀσφαλέστερον, 4.44 ἀσφαλές, 6.1 ἀσφαλέστερον, 
ἀσφαλείας.   
44
  LSJ, p. 952. See Kremmydas 2012, p. 2 for examples of the use of κίνδυνος to denote the risk of 
penalty in a legal case; [Aristotle] Oec. 1344b20 warns that produce should be employed so as not 
to risk all one’s possessions at once. ὅπως μὴ ἅμα κινδυνεύσωσιν ἅπασιν. 
45
  Xen. Symposium 4.35. The context is the praise of poverty, but the implication is clearly that men 
exist who pursue additional wealth even when they may not be thought to ‘need’ it. 
46
  Dem. For Phormio 36.11. ἀκίνδυνόν without danger; ἐπικινδύνους dangerous, insecure, 
precarious. LSJ, pp. 50, 638. 
47
  Hypereides In Defence of Euxenippus 4.36 and immediately again at 4.37, cited at the head of this 
chapter.  
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κινδυνεύειν.  The verb κινδυνεύω can refer to situations in which danger is incurred 
and/or may imply ideas of being daring and engaging in a venture.
48
  This phrase 
suggests that the translation into the word risk, despite its multi-layered modern 
connotations, is a fair representation of Xenophon’s recognition of our more modern 
concept at its simplest level.  He implies that an unknown outcome or fate (τὴν τύχην) 
to a dangerous venture, may be made safer (ἀσφαλέστερον) by the application of 
certain strategies.  This is the attempt to manage risk. 
 
3.6   Subsistence crisis and maritime risk 
Modern scholarship relating to risk in the ancient world has essentially focused on 
three spheres: the methods employed by agriculturalists to limit their vulnerability to 
food shortages;
49
 the study of interest rates on maritime loans in order to ascertain the 
ways in which financial risk could be rewarded or at least balanced across several 
risky enterprises;
50
 and the study of the rich range of daily activities from love affairs 
and family disputes to politics, farming and seafaring whose unknowable outcomes 
led many Greeks to turn to oracles and curses as a means of control.
51
  Such 
scholarship has generally not examined the areas of concern for businesses which are 
highlighted, for instance, in Eidinow’s study of the Dodona oracles, and so it is 
illuminating to see the extent to which Xenophon goes in order to identify, evaluate 
and contain the risks that he expects his readers to foresee.
52
   
 
3.6.1   Grain shortages 
Xenophon wrote the Poroi two years after Athens had been hit by grain shortage.
53
  
Gallant, in his study of risk in the rural domestic economy, has shown that ‘a delicate 
web of risk-buffering strategies’ was in place in order to protect subsistence farmers 
from the effects of famine.
54
  There may not have been any theoretical structure for 
the appraisal of risk, but for many the idea of risk and its avoidance must have been a 
                                                 
48
  LSJ, p. 952.  
49
    Garnsey 1988, Garnsey and Morris 1989 and Gallant 1991. 
50
  Cohen 1989, Christesen 2003 and Bresson and Bresson 2004. 
51
   Eidinow 2007, pp. 72-124 and Eidinow 2011. 
52
  Bresson 2012, pp. 238–240, usefully summarises recent scholarship on economic and business 
risk and notes that much remains to be said. 
53
  Dem. Against Leptines, 20.33; Oliver 2007a, p. 28. 
54
  Gallant 1991, p. ix. 
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daily preoccupation.  Less so perhaps for some men of Xenophon’s wealth, but an 
issue with which he had become closely familiar during his military career as he dealt 
with provisioning for large numbers of men in hostile territory.  
 
The crisis of 357 was addressed in part through grain imported by the good will of the 
Bosporan ruler Leucon.
55
  The need for such external aid may not have sat 
comfortably alongside the ideal of individual and polis autarkeia,
56
 inextricably 
entwined with Athenians’ concept of Attica as an island.57  But that ideal might not 
have been attainable for the city’s grain supply in the fourth century,58 and the ability 
to raise the cash or call on foreign friends to make good the shortfall through safe 
open seaways was an essential state function.   
 
3.6.2   Local support networks 
At an individual level, phratries and demes may have provided access to the elite for 
those who needed their assistance in crises, these relationships being built within both 
ritualised structures and in day to day economic transactions such as the provision of 
wage labour.
59
  Such periodic reliance on individuals risked increasing levels of 
indebtedness as loans of grain or cash had to be repaid after the emergency receded, 
whilst even farming households became subject to what Gallant describes as a 
‘vulnerability cycle’ which reduced their capacity to recover from each crisis as land, 
slaves and tools were sold and livestock and stored foodstuffs consumed in the 
urgency of short-term survival.
60
  Millett has argued that what small evidence we have 
for activity akin to patronage suggests that it was seen as counter-democratic and that 
instead of patronage, the needy relied on state political payments supported by eranos 
loans.
61
  Zelnick-Abramowitz suggests that instead of patronage per se, ‘philia’ 
relationships operated.  These were unequal power relationships that brought with 
                                                 
55
  Dem. Against Leptines, 20.33.  See chapter 4.4.1 for the Athenian relationship with the Bosporan 
kings. 
56
  Arist. Pol. 1252
b
27; 1261
b
10-15; 1328
b
16 and particularly 1326
b
27.    
   
 
57
  1.7; Constantakopoulou 2007, pp. 100-101. 
58
  See Oliver 2007a, pp. 15-47 and Moreno 2007a, pp. 3-33 for overviews and recent scholarship 
relating to production, import and consumption of grain in classical Attica.  Garnsey 1988 and R. 
Osborne 1987 had argued for low dependency on imported grain whilst Whitby 1998 and Moreno 
2007a suggest that Athens was more dependent on imports than Garnsey had calculated. 
59
  Gallant 1991, pp. 162-166. 
60
  Gallant 1991, pp. 121-141. 
61
  Millett 1989, pp. 37, 41. 
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them certain obligations for an exchange of services over time but were ‘of a shifting 
nature.’ 62  But there is no evidence that wealthy individuals took on wide-scale and 
consistent responsibility for the support of large numbers of citizens; that was the role 
of the polis, which intervened where necessary to ensure the availability of grain and 
the attractiveness of Attica as a destination for foreign grain traders.
63
  Athenians 
seem to have been able to put in place a variety of long term social and political 
relationships with a reciprocal aspect, which mitigated against the most basic risk of 
starvation.   
 
3.6.3   Investment rates of return 
Strategies such as crop diversification, seed storing and fragmentation of landholdings 
respond to agricultural risk by bolstering the potential for higher yields and, 
importantly, we should also note that in areas of economic activity, managing risk is 
only a very short step from maximising profit.  If a banker demands high interest rates 
on maritime loans because there is a risk that they may not all come good, and yet all 
the loans are repaid, then rather than simply covering his outlay and making a modest 
return, he may well make a substantial surplus.  Such a return might nevertheless be 
balanced out against a string of disasters the following year, but clearly the banker has 
demonstrated that he has the skill to maximise his return as long as he can offer terms 
that are competitive with his neighbours in the agora.  The same applies to the Poroi; 
as we shall see, Xenophon’s responses to risk are partly psychological, he presents 
large scale projects but reassures any sceptical readers that slow realisation is the key.  
But they are also designed to encourage risk-taking by highlighting the potential for 
profit.  
 
Christesen has shown that the rate of return on a range of investments available to the 
fourth-century Athenian rose in relation to the risks encountered, and in the light of 
such apparently clear links between risk and reward and the evidence of repeated 
patterns of return in differently demarcated sectors, the ability of an Athenian investor 
to make rational choices about investment opportunities is undeniable.
64
  Christesen 
                                                 
62
  Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000. See also Rhodes 1986 on political activity and Mossé 2007a and 
2007b on political patronage. 
63
  Bissa 2009, pp. 153-191. 
64
  Christesen 2003, p. 52. See chapter 2.5 for a further discussion of Christesen’s findings. 
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evidences interest rates, albeit with sometimes quite wide ranging percentage points, 
across the investment categories of real property (8%), land and domestic commercial 
loans (10–18%), slave-ownership (15–25%) and maritime lending (25–50%).  
However he finds that the returns on silver mining are ‘too variable to state a 
meaningful average.’  There, one might argue, lies the rub.65  For an industry where 
the balance of risk is high, the Poroi offers a rare opportunity to see at first hand the 
concerns an investor might take into consideration when approaching a new venture 
and the set of strategies that might be available to try to make the risk more attractive. 
 
3.7   Xenophon and commerce 
When we compare Xenophon with the great thinkers of his day, we might note that 
neither Aristotle nor Plato had much time for trade.  Aristotle cites with apparent 
approval an ancient law of Thebes preventing anyone who had engaged in trade in the 
previous ten years from holding public office.  He found the calling of market trader 
to be without virtue, regretting that their work put them in easy reach of assembly 
meetings, and would ideally have designated a separate agora for artisans.
66
  Plato 
recognised that a class of retailers was necessary to prevent farmers having to waste 
time selling their produce, but he implied that there was no more to successful 
commerce than sitting waiting for the right price to come along.  Farmers could 
simply leave their spare produce in the marketplace in the care of those who were 
unfit to do anything more productive, a view which did not recognise the skill of 
buying and selling or indeed the risk the retailer had to negotiate.
67
  Zeus, on the other 
hand, judging from his response to Timodamos, had no problem in recommending 
trade as a suitable calling.
68
  There was apparently a prohibition forbidding the 
reproach of anyone for working in the agora, implying that attitudes to those engaged 
in trade were more complex than the philosophers might suggest.
69
  Prejudice must 
have existed but may well have been seen as anti-democratic, hence the regulation.  
                                                 
65
    It took a long time for anything to change.  In 1921 Knight commented that ‘Under old-fashioned 
methods there is no question that prospecting for the precious metals involved in the aggregate 
enormous losses.  Recently the search for precious metals has been placed on a much more 
scientific basis and there is doubtless in the aggregate less discrepancy than formerly between the 
returns realized and a normal competitive return on the resources invested’ (p. 338).  
66
  Arist. Politics 1278a8, 1319a20-29; 1331b1-13. 
67
  Plato Republic 371c. 
68
    See chapter 3.3. 
69
  Dem. Against Eubulides 57.30. 
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Nevertheless large-scale lending, and buying in bulk to sell at a profit, may have been 
more likely to arouse suspicion than the small-scale trading of oikos-produced 
consumables by those with no land and no other way to make an income.
70
 
 
But it should be acknowledged that some Xenophontic texts imply that Xenophon did 
not necessarily believe that tradesmen made the most fitting citizens.  In the 
Oeconomicos, Socrates suggests that they compare badly with their rural compatriots 
in both their fitness and willingness to defend their country.
71
  What Xenophon does 
value however, is leadership and the ability to motivate others, and in the 
Memorabilia he goes so far as to suggest that a successful business man could make a 
good general.
72
  There is perhaps a distinction between artisans who toil day in, day 
out producing life’s essentials, and those with the vision to inspire others, negotiate 
successfully and serve their community.  The entrepreneurs who will be necessary to 
fulfil Xenophon’s schemes will all ultimately be relieved of the taint of commerce 
because they are part of a larger scheme for the benefit of the entire demos.  And on 
that basis, it may be acceptable to honour some of them.  Put in this context, we may 
see that Xenophon was way ahead of his philosopher contemporaries, recognising the 
importance of commerce to the city’s well-being, and appreciating that it was possible 
to control it.  In the Memorabilia Xenophon acknowledged that those involved in 
trade made up a significant section of the demos, which included: 
The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the 
merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but 
buying cheap and selling dear?  For these are the people who make up the 
assembly.
73
   
Again, Socrates does not appear to value these people particularly highly, together 
they comprise an audience of ‘mere dunces and weaklings.’74  But note that they 
include farmers, the very group that received such praise in the Oeconomicos.  Here, 
Socrates is intent on showing Charmides that his potential audience in the assembly 
are nothing to be alarmed by, and it suits him to downplay their intellectual 
                                                 
70
    Ober 1989, pp. 274-277.  
71
  Xen. Oeconomicos 6.6-7. 
72
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.8–10.  See chapter 4.1.1.     
73
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.7.6. πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γναφέας αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς σκυτέας ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας ἢ τοὺς 
χαλκέας ἢ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορῷ μεταβαλλομένους καὶ 
φροντίζοντας ὅ τι ἐλάττονος πριάμενοι πλείονος ἀποδῶνται αἰσχύνει; ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων ἡ 
ἐκκλησία συνίσταται. 
74
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.7.6. 
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capabilities.  For our purposes, what this passage tells us is that all these craftsmen 
and traders were citizens.  Some scholarship has a tendency to group all the traders 
Xenophon references in the Poroi into one group, essentially non-citizen,
75
 and we 
should bear in mind that whilst his proposals highlight the role of resident aliens and 
foreigners, he understood the centrality of Athenians to Attic commercial life.   
 
Xenophon recognised that successful trading entailed far more than sitting and 
waiting for a likely customer.  None of his proposals in the Poroi could be effective 
unless large numbers of men, citizens and non-citizens alike, engaged at the sharp end 
of his projects.  However despite the fact that the state had opened access to mining 
concessions to non-Athenians and had given them equality of taxation in mining,
76
 the 
bulk of leases were still sold to Athenian citizens.
77
  From the poletai leases we know 
that whilst small numbers of wealthy liturgy-paying families appear repeatedly as 
lease holders, 59% of attested concessionaires are not found elsewhere in our 
records.
78
  It is these less prominent and perhaps less wealthy individuals who 
Xenophon needed to encourage.  As he tells us:  
... operations have only lately been resumed, and a man who makes a new 
cutting incurs a serious risk. If he strikes good stuff he makes a fortune; but if 
he is disappointed, he loses the money he has spent. Therefore people 
nowadays are very chary of taking such a risk.
79
 
Indeed on closer inspection, in a piece which on first appearance is strikingly upbeat 
about the glories of Attica, the possibility of financial success and the potential for 
peace, there is a surprising amount of attention paid to the chances of failure.  At the 
same time as he grapples with fundamental economic principles Xenophon shows 
himself to be aware that to be a trailblazer in any economic field is to take risks where 
no-one else has yet dared.  When, with hindsight, we look at the pattern of increasing 
take-up of mining leases,
80
 the way that Athenian income from mining increased in 
the twenty or so years after he wrote,
81
 and the rise in trade of the second half of the 
fourth century, it is apparent that Xenophon foresaw that conditions were right for an 
                                                 
75
    We have seen Boeckh’s horrified response at chapter 1.6.2. 
76
   4.12. 
77
   Crosby 1950, pp. 189-297: pp. 293-297; Shipton 2000, pp. 45-46.  
78
   Shipton 2000, pp. 31-37. 
79
   4.28-29. νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται: κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ καινοτομοῦντι: [29] ὁ μὲν γὰρ 
εὑρὼν ἀγαθὴν ἐργασίαν πλούσιος γίγνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εὑρὼν πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν ὅσα ἂν δαπανήσῃ. εἰς 
τοῦτον οὖν τὸν κίνδυνον οὐ μάλα πως ἐθέλουσιν οἱ νῦν ἰέναι. 
80
   See chapter 2.3.1 for a discussion of the poletai leases. 
81
  Hyp. In Defence of Euxenippus 4.36. 
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economic resurgence which need not be predicated on military power.  But what he 
also understood was that someone had to make the first move.  The first expansion 
would be undertaken by the least risk-averse – some of whom had already started.  
After all, some mines were being dug and some merchants were already coming to the 
city.  Xenophon wanted to find ways to persuade the next wave of investors and 
businessmen to follow in their steps, and he does so by pinpointing and quantifying 
the risks involved, thus making them less daunting.  He does not simply demonstrate 
that an opportunity exists.  As we will see, his schemes are almost all aimed at 
creating conditions where the individual businessman, whether Greek, metic or 
foreigner, can engage more profitably, with greater capacity – and at reduced risk. 
 
3.8   The risk-takers 
Beyond agricultural practice and short term crisis support, how did Athenians respond 
to risk as it affected their daily lives?  In the following sections I will look at the way 
Xenophon’s proposals address risk for the different categories of their participants. 
 
3.8.1   Risks for Athens  
For the city, the greatest risk addressed by Xenophon is the possibility of war.  Each 
of his plans is part of a scheme to keep Athens on friendly relations with her 
neighbours, by making the city and port attractive and regulated places to do business 
and by yielding enough income that there is no longer a need for imperialist demands 
for tribute from her subject/allies and the military activity that necessarily supports 
such impositions.  In that sense, the entire text is a response to external geo-political 
risk.  Xenophon describes this moment as ‘an opportunity to win back the Greeks 
without trouble, without danger, and without expense.’82  He does not enumerate the 
risks of returning to a condition of ill relations with the other Greek states – his 
readers need no reminding of their recent hardship, and Xenophon’s purpose is not to 
persuade them that war may be undertaken without risk.  In that sense it is the very 
opposite of Pericles’ speech to the assembly at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
War, in which every financial and military resource was quantified and every danger 
                                                 
82
   5.8  νῦν δέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχὴν παραπεπτωκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ 
πόνων καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ ἄνευ δαπάνης ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας. 
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countered.
83
  Hornblower points out that Pericles does not specifically mention either 
income from the silver mines, or Athenians’ private resources: 
It might not sound very encouraging to say “and if the worst comes to the 
worst you can dig a bit deeper into your own pockets.”84   
This presents an interesting contrast with Xenophon, who is actively persuading 
Athenians to invest their capital in the cause of inter-state harmony.  Athenians now 
have bitter experience of the cost of war and can balance it against the cost of peace.  
One of Xenophon’s final proposals is that a board of Guardians of the Peace should be 
set up to ensure that the peaceful conditions necessary to acquire the fullest revenue 
might be obtained.  Whatever their political subtext, Xenophon’s schemes are 
designed to maintain peace, and peace is necessary in order to enact all the proposals.  
It is a circular proposition but it leaves no doubt for his audience that the threat of war 
is the ultimate reason why Xenophon’s plans should be enacted.    
  
Nevertheless when it suits his purpose, Xenophon does indeed mention the war.  After 
a lifetime of observing combat, he cannot help but note the military advantages to his 
plan for peace, should the state one day find itself in extremis.
85
  This is not merely an 
idealistic plan for the promotion of universal peace.  Citizens who are in regular 
receipt of their three obols will show more alacrity on garrison duty or on patrol, 
whilst silver is useful in wartime to pay for mercenaries.  There was already a 
precedent for slaves fighting for Athens
86
 and the large numbers of mine slaves could 
be equipped to row or to fight on behalf of the state.  In the quest for the unity 
amongst the Greek states, Athens will lead a defensive alliance in protection of 
Delphi
87
 which, we may assume, would make war along with her allies should the 
sanctuary be attacked.  Xenophon craftily appeals to the warmonger as well as the 
peacemaker in his audience, turning his plan into a defence (or attack) strategy.   
 
3.8.2   The entrepreneurial polis  
But this chapter will be more concerned with strategies around economic risk.  What 
                                                 
83
   Thuc. 2.13. 
84
    Hornblower 1991, p. 253. 
85
   4.51-52; 4.9; 4.42. 
86
   After Arginusae, slaves who had been in the battle were freed with limited citizen rights.  Burford 
1972, p. 46; Hunt 1998, pp. 87-95; see chapter 2.4.3. 
87
  5.9. 
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are the risks that Xenophon identifies for the polis if it is to undertake his proposals?  
He refers to several: 
(1) the silver in the Laurion might run out or lose value leading to the collapse of 
the whole industry;
88
 
(2) the operators hiring slaves from the state might default on their payments;
89
 
(3) the lessees of the mining slaves might steal the slaves;
90
 
(4) the quantity and quality of the mine slaves available to be purchased might 
decline due to over-demand;
91
 
(5) the operators might hire from other slave owners instead of the state;
92
and 
(6) the state may not be able to find enough people to hire the slave labour.
93
 
It is essential to the plans that the individual operators can expect to be successful, that 
existing operators can be persuaded to expand, and that new prospectors can be 
encouraged to take up the industry.  If the operators are not confident, they will not 
invest in the mines, take up mine leases or hire slaves from the state.  Therefore 
Xenophon counters these objections in detail.   
 
3.8.2.1   Silver deposits may become exhausted or lose their value 
Xenophon points out that the silver producing hills are still far larger than the size of 
the spoil dumps and the silver yielding area continually expands such that there has 
always been more work available than the labour could keep up with.  Miners, he 
says, find no limit to the number of galleries they may open up.  He takes the 
apparently elusively unquantifiable risk that the mines will become exhausted, and 
reformulates it using the evidence of precedent and topography to re-state it as a 
quantifiable risk with a near-certain outcome.  As to demand, silver itself is always 
popular: if there is a surplus, people love to decorate their homes or to wear or hoard 
it, whilst in war or famine, cash is necessary to pay for food.  Furthermore, he says, 
when gold falls in value, silver rises.
94 
 
 
Xenophon’s observations about the attractions of silver appear confident and 
irrefutable.  His expectations as to its volume and value may not be quite accurate – 
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    4.11. 
89
    4.20. 
90
    4.21. 
91
    4.36. 
92
    4.19.  
93
    4.22. 
94
   4.3; 4.9; 4.10, also at 4.11 and 4.26. 
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the silver did one day run out and the gold-to-silver ratio probably fell during the fifth 
century, although gold recovered some of its comparative value in the early fourth.   
The evidence for the relative values of gold and silver is complex and technical, 
encompassing literary and epigraphic material relating to exchange rates with 
Babylonian talents and the Cyzicene stater; the value of gold dedications; epistatai 
accounts for the purchase of gold for the chryselephantine statue of Athena, and the 
changing cost of gold crowns.
95
  It may be unrealistic to expect Xenophon to be 
conversant with these long-term adjustments, but what is significant is that he 
understands the hazards such adverse trends might pose to the potential entrepreneur, 
and the success of his project is dependent on entrepreneurial confidence.  He 
counters both risks with certainty and conjures visions of silver supplies so limitless 
that it will be displayed, hoarded and even used for décor.  We can, he says, be 
confident that the ore will never run out and that silver will never lose its value.
96
  It is 
a rich picture which disarms and persuades.   
 
3.8.2.2   Slave hirers might default on their payments  
Against the risk (2) that slave hirers might default on their payments, Xenophon 
suggests that rental payments might be guaranteed upfront in the same manner as the 
sale of tax farming rights and the renting of sacred lands.
97
  Thus like tax farming, the 
scheme would not allow of concessions should the lessee’s anticipated revenue fail; in 
fourth-century Athens a telones who was unable to meet his obligations to the state 
could be declared atimos as a public debtor.
98
  Whilst exacting such surety was 
nothing new in the realm of state and religious transactions, Xenophon’s use of it here 
is a novelty: Gauthier notes that Nikias and Hipponikos after all would not have taken 
such a security from their customers, and highlights the way that Xenophon’s 
                                                 
95
    Figueira 1998, pp. 511-527, proposes that the ratio was 1:14 before the Peloponnesian War but 
‘bottomed out’ at 1:10 and rebounded in the early fourth century.  Lambert 1996 addresses the 
issues specifically in relation to the cost of the known weight of gold phialai dedicated in the 
320s.  Jansen, (2007, pp. 375-377 and n. 279) following Bresson, sees 4.7 as an allusion to silver 
money as distinct from bullion: though interesting for our recognition of the sophistication of 
Xenophon’s observation, for the purposes of the present discussion the distinction is less 
important.  
96
  4.11. 
97
   4.20. 
98
   Rubinstein 2009, p. 117. The more usual form of atimia would have entailed exclusion from the 
agora, a ban on addressing the assembly and boule, on serving as a juror, giving evidence, suing 
in a private action, or holding any public office or priesthood, and exclusion from sacred places 
and participation in public rites. Providing these conditions were observed, there was no bar on 
remaining in Attica or owning property (Harrison 1971, pp. 170-171, 175-176; Sealey 1991, pp. 
153-154).   
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vocabulary closely aligns with official texts.
99
  Xenophon has appropriated to the state 
a ‘commercial’ means of income-generation and bolted on to it one of the functions 
the state regularly uses to protect itself from negligence or fraud.   
 
It has to be acknowledged that such a sanction would in practice make the state slaves 
a less advantageous proposition to the hirer than those rented from a private slave 
trader, unless such an advance payment were accompanied by other favourable terms.  
If an attraction of hiring was the avoidance of the large capital outlay involved in 
slave purchasing, the requirement to pay a guarantee would diminish that benefit to a 
mine operator careful about his cash flow, unless he were able to procure a guarantor.  
As we have seen, we do not know enough about the Greek arrangements for payment 
of slave hire to guess the normal hire term and how that might relate to the level of 
any advance payment.
100
  There is no reason why different terms might not be offered 
to different lessees, but as Xenophon gives us no further insight into his thinking we 
cannot tell whether his idea is well thought-through or short-sighted.  We may, 
nevertheless, recognise the way that he identifies a risk and finds a familiar solution 
from within the state sphere to reassure his readers. 
 
3.8.2.3   The state-owned slaves might be stolen 
Familiarity is certainly on the side of the solution to the third risk on our list – that the 
state’s slaves might be stolen.  They would after all carry the public brand, a 
permanent symbol of security of ownership that Athenians encountered regularly.  
Thus by requiring payment in advance, providing an asset that was not vulnerable to 
theft and on terms which required return or replacement,
101
 once a customer had been 
identified there would be no financial risk to the state at all until the end of the 
contract term.   
 
3.8.2.4   The quality and quantity of slaves available may diminish  
Gauthier finds it troublesome that Xenophon does not address either the issue of the 
supply of slaves on a large scale for purchase by the Athenians, or the uncertainty of 
finding a market for them once bought, suggesting that Xenophon is more optimistic 
                                                 
99
  Gauthier 1976, pp. 148-149. 
100
  Chapter 2.4.3. 
101
  4.14. 
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than convincing.
102
  But arguably he does.  He recognises that moving too fast will 
diminish the supply and raise prices, and the solution he offers is to proceed slowly 
and with care,
103
 a clear apprehension of the way that laws of supply and demand 
could affect his scheme.  Gauthier’s point that finding slaves with sufficient technical 
skills would be difficult is well-made, but Xenophon, it should be remembered, spent 
his military career involved in engagements which inevitably ended with a large sale 
of booty – including slaves – by the winning side.104  He is demonstrably familiar with 
the mechanisms of the slave market.   
 
In practice, he argues that whatever the speed with which each plan is instigated, 
whether houses built, ships constructed or slaves purchased, each will yield income 
from the outset.
105
  This solution has a double value – it deals with the supply and 
demand issue, and also reassures any who may be uneasy about the scale of the 
project, proportionately diminishing the risk and simultaneously engineering 
acceptance.  
 
3.8.2.5   Competition from other slave owners  
Addressing a readership well-versed in the economics of slave-ownership, Xenophon 
does not need to expand on the risk that the state might not be able to hire out her 
slaves, either because of competition from private hirers (5) or because there is a lack 
of mine operators (6).  In the event that the slaves are not immediately hired out, the 
cost of feeding and housing large numbers of them would fast become onerous, and 
indeed it has been argued that the grain supply crises of the late fourth century had a 
strongly adverse effect on the mining industry as it became prohibitively expensive to 
feed the mine slaves.
106
  Thus it is necessary for the industry to expand sufficiently 
that there will be the capacity to employ multiple additions to the workforce, and to 
ensure that state slaves are offered on terms that are competitive with those offered by 
private slave owners, without saturating the rental market.  Understanding this, 
Xenophon explicitly argues that there would be no reason why anyone should hesitate 
                                                 
102
   Gauthier 1976, p. 165. 
103
   4.35-36. 
104
   For example, Xen. Hellenica 1.2.4; 1.6.14; 3.2.2 and 4.6.6 are just the references which specify 
slaves amongst captured booty; many others do not specify slaves but could be assumed to include 
them.  See chapter 2.4.3 for references to slave sales in the Anabasis.  It might of course be argued 
that such experiences as this gave Xenophon an exaggerated understanding of the possibilities of 
large-scale slave acquisition in peacetime.  
105
  4.36. 
106
   Isager and Hansen 1975, p. 200. 
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to hire from the state instead of from private individuals if the terms are the same,
107
 
although as we have just seen, his recognition of this fact of economic life is at odds 
with his proposal to elicit guarantees from hirers, which would put the state at a 
competitive disadvantage.
108
   
 
3.8.2.6   Lack of operators to hire the slaves 
The greatest risk (6), to Xenophon’s mining proposal is that individual business men 
will not want to take on the risk of opening a new mine at all, in which event no 
market will be created for slave hire and no silver will be dug.  Xenophon counters 
concerns about the market for slave leasing by building on what is already familiar 
and quoting precedent – akin perhaps to the use of ‘historical data’ in modern risk 
analysis, although the data available to him are not particularly rich.
109
  We are 
reminded of previous wealthy slave owners and the levels of income yielded by their 
slaveholdings – one obol per day per slave, just the same as the figures Xenophon 
himself is using.  He indicates that these figures have been known for so long that it 
may even seem surprising that the state has not already sought to imitate private 
enterprise.
110
  Here Xenophon prioritises financial arguments but simultaneously 
downplays the vastness of his project by citing individuals who have already achieved 
the same, presenting the figures in such a way that the reader half believes he had 
already thought of it himself.  The state has effectively become the entrepreneur – and 
would be almost foolhardy not to take up the opportunity.  As we have seen before, 
risk is once more evaluated and diminished and as the unknown becomes known, 
Xenophon builds his readers’ confidence.   
 
Nevertheless there is a further protection against the risk that insufficient operators 
will be found to hire the slaves, and it is a truly novel idea.  The ten Athenian tribes 
will each themselves go into business as mining consortia, digging for silver with 
slaves leased from the state.
111
  The tribes were essentially artificial political 
constructions, managing local sanctuaries,
112
 supplying choregoi and distributing 
                                                 
107
   4.19. 
108
   4.20 and above. 
109
  4.14 and 3.2 above. 
110
  4.14. See Baragwanath 2012 for Xenophon’s use of τὸ θαυμάζειν, discourse of wonder or 
surprise, as a stimulator of philosophical or challenging thought, here in relation to slavery. 
111
  4.30. 
112
  eg. IG II
2
 1138-1171. 
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other political and military responsibilities across the state.
113
  Whilst they were 
responsible for the administration of the leasing of sacred land,
114
 the notion that they 
could set up and run a business enterprise is not, I think, attested elsewhere.  This is an 
example of Xenophon’s ability to find an innovative approach to a familiar problem.  
Much as he uses the notion of the polis as a guarantee of safety and durability at 3.10, 
here he uses a pre-existing structure deeply entrenched in his readers’ daily lives 
which brings with it strong local and political associations of order and certainty.  In 
this way he ensures that the novelty, and risk, which his proposal holds for the tribes 
taking up mining, is wrapped up in a security blanket of familiarity.  
 
Xenophon thus ensures that the risk that there may be no rental market for the slaves 
is diminished, because the tribes will provide the purchasing capacity.
115
  And then he 
goes a stage further - the risk for each individual tribe is diminished, because even if 
not all find silver, they will share what proceeds there are equally amongst 
themselves.  This is risk buffering on a magnificent scale.  The Athenian citizen 
becomes at once a vicarious slave operator – via the state; a mine operator and slave 
lessee – via his tribe, and a benefit recipient, getting his three obols per day from the 
polis out of its profits.  The risk that there will be no market for the slaves is reduced 
and the risk for the mine operators – now become the citizens themselves in their 
tribes – is also reduced.  Fulfilling Simonides’ desire for ‘some way of raising revenue 
without hurting anyone,’116 the mass of citizens would have a stake in the silver 
industry both as supplier to it and operator in it.   
 
3.8.3   Risk and the entrepreneur 
If, at the simplest level, an entrepreneur is the person who takes decisions, receives 
profits and bears losses, then such men (or the entrepreneurial state) must pinpoint 
that moment when the opportunities outweigh the threats, and when risk reduces to a 
point where it becomes manageable.  Xenophon’s economic worldview in the Poroi is 
                                                 
113
  Ath. Pol. 21, 56.2-3 and many other references. 
114
  Papazarkadas 2011. 
115
  Jansen 2007, p. 381, n. 292, proposes that the slaves would be offered free of rental to the tribes 
and can see ‘no good reason’ why this would not be the case. But the central purpose of the 
scheme is the raising of slave lease income: offering them free of charge would not only give up a 
large part of the anticipated revenue but would give the tribes such an enormous advantage in the 
reduction of their overheads that the industry might capsize, making any other encouragement of 
entrepreneurs pointless.  
116
    Xen. Hiero 9.9.  Excepting, of course, the slaves.  
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shot through with an appreciation of this element in the commercial equation.  As we 
have seen, the scheme cannot work unless there are both men willing to become mine 
operators themselves and others to invest in the enterprise of those operators.  Yet as 
Xenophon himself tells us, ‘fewer new cuttings are being made than formerly’ and 
‘those interested in the mines are poorer.’117  Therefore he has to convince all his 
readers that silver mining as a whole can be successful, representing as they do, both 
the citizens who may benefit and the entrepreneurs who may invest.  It is an important 
facet of the manner in which Xenophon presents his arguments that they are 
formulated to assuage the doubts of both polis and individual, two actors who might 
be seen to represent opposing sides of this particular scheme, as supplier and 
customer.
118
  Several of the risks already discussed in relation to the state are similarly 
perilous for the individual entrepreneur, such as the value and quantity of available 
silver, and the cost and quality of slaves, but others are more immediately risks for the 
operator.   In the following section, we will examine three risks faced by the 
independent mine operator:  
(1) that the large number of additional slaves will lead to over-crowding;119 
(2) that the tribes will create competition;120 and 
(3) that rivals will be envious of an operator’s success.121 
It is noteworthy that the first two risks are in the economic sphere, and the last is 
culturally situated. 
 
3.8.3.1   Overcrowding in the mines  
At 4.39 Xenophon says: 
Possibly the gravest fear in everyone's mind is that the works may become 
overcrowded if the state acquires too many slaves. But we can rid ourselves of 
that fear by not putting more men in year by year than the works themselves 
require.
122
 
Thus, his revised proposal reduces risk and also ensures that the greatest capacity for 
profit is maintained.  Just as in farming, to maintain productivity labour must be 
                                                 
117
  4.28. τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ καινοτομοῦσιν; ὅτι πενέστεροι 
μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα. 
118
    See chapter 1.5.6 for a discussion of the intended readership of the Poroi. 
119
  4.39. 
120
  4.32. 
121
  4.4. 
122
   4.39.  ὃ δὲ ἴσως φοβερώτατον δοκεῖ πᾶσιν εἶναι, μή, εἰ ἄγαν πολλὰ κτήσαιτο ἡ πόλις ἀνδράποδα, 
ὑπεργεμισθείη ἂν τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τούτου τοῦ φόβου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν, εἰ μὴ πλείονας 
ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὅσους αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα προσαιτοίη κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐμβάλοιμεν.   
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allocated at levels that will sustain or increase, rather than diminish, the yield per 
man.
123
  Xenophon scales down his initial proposal, ‘to bring as much labour as we 
can into the mines’124 and the listener’s potential fear of failure is reduced, because the 
level of risk is reduced by slowing down the expansion of the project and the rate at 
which money is invested.   
 
This demonstrates a structure Xenophon uses repeatedly and to great effect.  He 
makes a proposal, raises possible objections and then explains why they are incorrect 
or how they might be overcome.  This is of course a proven rhetorical device in its 
own right,
 
continuously building and re-enforcing the strength of his arguments,
125
  
but it achieves more than that, because Xenophon understands his audience and the 
counter-arguments are specifically directed at the risks they are likely to perceive. 
They not only reassure and build confidence, but demonstrate that the plans may be 
revised to respond to changing conditions. 
 
3.8.3.2   Competition from the tribes    
As we have seen, one of the risks to the entire scheme identified by Xenophon is that 
not enough mine operators will be in business to hire the slaves, and Xenophon 
counters this by suggesting that the ten tribes go into business.  This however might 
be seen to represent a threat to private enterprise.  Not so, according to Xenophon; the 
interests of the tribes will not conflict with those of individual operators.  Just as a 
confederacy is strengthened by an increase in members, more operators simply means 
more silver.
126
  And of course, individuals can also go into partnership just as they 
always have: 
… private individuals also are able to combine on this principle and pool their 
fortunes in order to diminish the risk.
127
 
As we have seen at chapter 2.3.2, the Suda’s entry for Ἀπονομή refers to ‘a division 
amongst a multiplicity of contractors, so that each takes some part.’128  Although 
                                                 
123
   4.5. 
124
   4.11.  
125
  See Jansen 2007, pp. 70-71 for the rhetorician’s anticipation of possible objections, prokatalepsis, 
as demonstrated in the Poroi. 
126
  4.32. 
127
  4.32. 
128
   Ἀπονομή: Suda On Line, trans: David Whitehead, 8 October 2000  http://www.stoa.org/sol-
entries/alpha/3456.   
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Athenian law did not recognise a partnership as a separate legal entity,
129
 as we have 
seen in the case of Nicobulus and Evergus
130
 partnerships in mining were not 
unusual
131
 and were a regular occurrence in maritime financing, where funding might 
come from diverse sources in order to limit exposure to risk.
132
  Xenophon turns the 
threat of competition into the strength of numbers and deals with the individual’s risk 
by proposing that it is shared.  Just as the tribes will share in their enterprise, so will 
individual operators, and the combined efforts of all, far from providing competition, 
will strengthen the whole undertaking.  The point of the exercise is to dig up silver, 
and the more there are to dig, the more successful everyone will be. 
 
3.8.3.3   Envy 
Most of the objections Xenophon raises are not based on political or social issues; 
they are the sort of practical and economic considerations that a business man might 
take into account before risking his capital in a new project.  He pinpoints a potential 
risk and then shows how it can be managed and contained.  However we cannot 
assume that because he spends a certain amount of time on one specific risk that this 
necessarily relates to the level of importance that the issue holds for his reader.  Like 
any good persuader, he may skirt around tricky issues in order not to alert the reader 
to unforeseen pitfalls.  Other perils, such as the risk of becoming an object of envy, 
might be so essential to Athenian daily life that they do not need to be expounded, and 
we need to be particularly live to the cultural context in order to pick these up.  
 
For the mine operator, then, overcrowding might be a concern; envy, perhaps 
surprisingly, is another.  Silver mining, Xenophon says, is so successful that 
‘expansion of business excites no jealousy.’133  Today we might think that it is not too 
tough to have to contend with the jealousy expressed by others at our own success, but 
in 1978 Walcot showed that notions of envy and jealousy were widespread in Greek 
society and that Greeks were willing to acknowledge them openly as a motivating 
factor.
134
  It is a familiar topos in Xenophon, who recognised the power of emotion as 
                                                 
129
  E. M. Harris 1989a, p. 339. 
130
  Chapter 2.4.1. 
131
  A mining partnership is also found in Dem. Against Boeotus 2 40.52. 
132
  E. E. Cohen 1992, p. 142. 
133
  4.4.  
134
  Walcot 1978, p. 7. 
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a motivating factor in all spheres of conduct.
135
  When the Xenophontic Socrates 
considered the nature of envy,   
… he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor 
at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at 
their friends' successes … This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, 
but it is always the case with fools.
136
  
In the dialogue Hiero, Simonides proposes a programme for the tyrant Hiero, the 
outcome of which will be that he could have ‘the fairest and most blessed possession 
in the world,’ to be prosperous and happy but not be envied for it.137  But far earlier in 
Greek culture, we can see a complex picture of φθόνοϛ in its several guises emerging 
in Pindar
138
 and Hesiod describes potter in competition with potter whilst the work-
shy were envious of the wealth of the hard working.
139
  Its ambiguity in the classical 
era is highlighted by Sanders, who contends that it might even be a morally positive 
emotion when used to ‘cut someone down to size,’ the context in which it is most 
used by the orators.
140
  
 
In the Poroi however we are not dealing with an emotion deliberately roused by an 
avenging law court speech composed by a third party, but a more passive recognition 
of the success of another and what that success might be understood to imply for the 
man who feels envious.  In matters of commerce, the concept of envy was closely tied 
in to what may be described as a ‘zero sum’ mentality; that is, the idea that good 
things exist in finite quantities.  Such an ethos has been found by anthropologists in 
contemporary peasant societies  
Not only do … "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in 
addition there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available 
quantities. It is as if the obvious fact of land shortage in a densely populated 
area applied to all other desired things: not enough to go around. "Good," like 
land, is seen as inherent in nature, there to be divided and re-divided, if 
necessary, but not to be augmented.
141
   
                                                 
135
  Sanders 2012a, p. 164, citing Xen. Memorabilia 2.6.21-23. 
136
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.9.8.  
137
  Xen. Hiero 11.15.  
138
  Bulman 1992, p. 1. 
139
  Hes. W & D 25-26; 312-313, also cited by Aristotle, Rhet. 2.4.21; Isoc. 1.24-26: ‘Admit to your 
companionship, not those alone who show distress at your reverses, but those also who show no 
envy at your good fortune; for there are many who sympathise with their friends in adversity, but 
envy them in prosperity.’  In general on envy in ancient Greece see the collected papers in 
Konstan and Rutter 2003. 
140
  Sanders 2012b, pp. 374-375. 
141
  Foster, 1965, p. 296 argues that ‘this behaviour - however incompatible with national economic 
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It is important to recognise that Foster is discussing closed peasant communities 
within which, as he remarks, the possibilities for economic progression are indeed 
limited by the available local resources,
142
 but they tie in well to a society where 
reciprocity and balance in all forms of social relations are seen as essential.
143
  An 
ethos of limited good, 
easily follows the reasoning of trade-offs, but it is likely to take the results of 
cost-benefit analysis much more literally and seriously than the other mentality 
that believes in an expanding economic universe.
144
   
In a world of limited good, if you are in the same business as your neighbour, your 
success must inevitably be his loss, leading to envy on his part.  Thus in a society 
where reciprocity was an essential element in community support networks,
145
 it is 
good to have neighbours who can be happy for one’s good fortune.   
 
This is a particular example of the way that putting ourselves in Athenian shoes can 
be challenging when we are trying to understand the factors that affected their 
assessment of risk.  We have already seen, for instance, the way that the idea of the 
silver mines may have held romantic associations with Athenian glory days such as 
the victory against the Persians at Salamis.
146
  Xenophon employs precedent several 
times, and we cannot always know the associations his references bring with them.  
When he reminds his readers that Nikias owned 1,000 slaves,
147
 as he intends, they no 
doubt recall his reputed wealth and lavish dedicatory offerings,
148
 and may be 
encouraged to think that these are achievable for themselves by the same route.  But 
they are also probably reminded of the Sicilian expedition, perhaps of Nikias’ terrible 
end, of Thucydides’ description of his nobility, or even of some other tradition to 
which we lack access.
149
   It is these allusions which can be hardest to unpick as they 
affect the judgement of risk in ways that we cannot evaluate.  As we saw with the 
_______________________ 
 
growth - is not only highly rational in the context of the cognition that determines it, but that for 
the maintenance of peasant society in its classic form, it is indispensable.’ Also Gallant 1991, p. 
148 and Eidinow 2007, pp. 191-205, who interprets the ‘commercial’ curse tablets found at 
Dodona as representative of the breakdown of local relationships rather than simply a response to 
commercial competition. 
142
  Foster 1965, p. 297. 
143
  Arist. NE 1155b 34; 1162b 18; 1163a 1-10; 1163a 19; 1171b 21-4; Xen. Memorabilia 2.3.11; 
2.5.1-5. 
144
  Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 88. 
145
   See chapter 3.6.2 for support structures available to Athenians in times of crisis. 
146
   Hdt. 7.144, see chapters 2.3.1.3 and 3.3. 
147
  4.14. 
148
  Plut. Nik. 3.3-4.3; Davies 1981, pp. 41-43. 
149
  Thuc. 7.86. 
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Edwardian speculators at the start of this chapter, investment choices are guided, 
sometimes unconsciously, by a variety of factors. 
 
Beyond the cultural challenges of understanding the way that an Athenian might be 
wary of success as a signifier of a mode of commercial rivalry in which there must be 
a loser for every winner, we can see that Xenophon is here also beginning to wrestle 
with a question of economics which he identifies but cannot quite pin down on a 
theoretical level. The zero-sum mentality does not sit comfortably with a world of 
economic expansionism.
150
  Runciman argues that the Greeks’ mode of production,  
… prevented them from seeing that profit … is not zero sum: one person's gain 
need not be entirely at another's expense
151
 
I would suggest however, that in his micro-investigation of one industry and its wider 
associations, Xenophon explores this apparent conflict between limitless potential 
profit and a cultural norm within which good is finite and gain for one individual must 
entail loss by another.  As he begins to identify two theoretical categorisations of 
economic possibility, of zero sum as opposed to expanding economies, he explores 
this contradiction through analogies with farming, where putting in too many oxen or 
men simply lowers the return
152
 and in other areas of consumption where levels of 
increased production in commodities such as corn and copper work can have a 
negative effect on demand and prices, such that one man’s success can indeed be 
another’s loss.153  By contrast, in the silver industry, both supply and demand are 
apparently unceasing and prices remain stable regardless of the level of availability of 
the products.
154
  Limitless gain from the silver industry may sound charmingly naïve 
to a modern reader but economic expansion per se does not.  Yet to an ancient 
listener, it was in direct conflict with his understanding of the way the world worked.  
The wider societal idea of limited good has become bound up with the notion of 
economic growth.   
 
                                                 
150
  Jansen 2007 p. 236 suggests that Xenophon does not see commerce as zero sum because it offers 
an opportunity to strengthen inter-state relationships.  
151
   Runciman 1990, p. 351. 
152
  4.4–5; examples of the ‘variable proportions in the theory of production’ formula, also known as 
the law of diminishing returns. 
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  4.5-6.  
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3.8.4   Risk and the non-Athenian 
What reassurance against risk does the Poroi hold for the non-Athenian reader?  
Xenophon demonstrates himself to be particularly conscious of the contribution made 
by non-Athenians to Attic commercial life.  His proposals are divided between those 
targeted specifically at metics, and those which will encourage all sections of the 
mercantile community, Athenian, metic and foreign.
155
  As we have seen, the volume 
of trade passing through Piraeus in peace time was substantial
156
 and Xenophon is 
explicit in his discussion both of metics and of traders in general, that their activity 
should be encouraged in order to promote an increase in tax revenue.
157
   
 
A foreigner, investing in the mines or trading in Piraeus might be prey to just the same 
commercial risks as an Athenian citizen, but his status means that his access to redress 
and his ability to enjoy his success were both legally curtailed.  Metics were required 
to undertake military service and to pay an annual tax in return for residency; 
freedmen metics may have paid more.
158
  From their deme enrolment on, they 
maintained, probably permanently, a relationship with a prostates who may have been 
required to have some involvement in any court proceeding they were involved in; 
their cases were held in different courts from those of Athenian citizens, and they 
were subject to other non-legal handicaps because of their social status.
159
  Even when 
successful, the most respectable non-Athenian trader would be assessed for the 
eisphora on a different basis to citizens and was not allowed to own land in his 
adoptive state.
160
 
 
Of those risks which were peculiar to metics and/or foreigners, Xenophon addresses: 
(1) vulnerability to commercial disputes;161  
(2) the hazards of finding a suitable return cargo and trading in foreign 
currencies;
162
 and 
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(3) the obligation for metics to serve as hoplites.163  
 
For the trader arriving in any foreign port, opportunities to sell his cargo and to 
purchase a suitable return load might be unreliable, and a merchant might waste 
precious time waiting for the availability of the right goods.  Trading in unfamiliar 
currencies and subject to unfamiliar laws and customs, he could find himself 
unwittingly involved in protracted disputes awaiting a resolution whilst profitable 
opportunities passed him by and his cargo rotted.  Vulnerable to storms and piracy, 
and prey to navies from hostile states looking for easy pickings, sea-borne trade could 
be a hazardous calling whatever one’s nationality. 
 
3.8.4.1   Commercial disputes 
One of the obstacles to any trade which crossed between jurisdictions was that a lack 
of shared business protocols and legal structures could entail that in a commercial 
dispute no means of resolution might be available that was acceptable to both parties.  
A merchant arriving in a foreign state was inevitably at a disadvantage if there were 
not local agents and reliable witnesses to his transactions who could support his 
interests in the event of any hint of maladministration.  The markets of fourth-century 
Athens and Piraeus had structures in place to enforce lawful practice and to support 
traders in the event of a dispute.  Magistrates were responsible for overseeing the 
exchange, the pricing and quality of goods, weights and measures, and sales of barley, 
wheat and bread.
164
  If a deal turned sour, Athens boasted an accessible and robust 
legal system:   
Codified Athenian legislation helped individual Athenians, and others subject 
to Athenian rules, to weigh the likely costs and benefits of any given action 
and to be more confident in assessing the risks entailed by their own 
choices.
165
 
This was a function of the democratic state which was an advantage to both buyer and 
seller as they entered any arrangement with equal knowledge of the law and its 
sanctions.   This would lead to what we might describe as a reduction of transaction 
costs, offering traders greater protection from rogue practices and simplifying the 
expensive precautions they might otherwise need to put in place to attain the 
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knowledge necessary to ensure that a fair deal was reached.
166
  In practice however in 
the 350s access to justice, probably through the port magistrates, could be slow and 
time spent waiting for a judgement was costly.
167
   Xenophon recognised the risks 
encountered by foreign traders and looked to assuage them, encouraging faster 
turnaround of such cases by offering magistrates prizes for fair and speedy 
judgements.
168
  In the event, shortly after Xenophon wrote, processes were accelerated 
through the establishment of the δίκαι ἐμπορικαί; courts which were probably δίκαι 
ἔμμενοι, i.e. those which were obliged to make a judgement within thirty days.  The 
dikai emporikai were characterised by ‘rapidity, supra-nationality and rigor.’169  
Although not the solution he had suggested, an indication nevertheless that Xenophon 
had identified the problem and evolved a pragmatic and informed response, the 
implementation of which would make Piraeus worthy of serious consideration by any 
hard-nosed business man.   
 
3.8.4.2   Return cargo and currency exchange 
New inns and market facilities
170
 might also increase the attraction of Piraeus to 
traders from outside Attica, but Xenophon was aware that merchants did not only 
choose Athens for a comfortable night’s sleep.  The moorings were sheltered and 
should a merchant not find goods to his liking to carry back home, the silver he had 
been paid in return for his inbound cargo, was a sound export in itself.
171
  The 
vulnerability of maritime trade to storms was a major consideration to a ship-owner 
whose entire livelihood might be at risk if he lost his vessel, and the combination of 
geographical centrality and safe harbours were at the heart of Piraeus’ success as a 
marketplace.  If a merchant took payment in coin rather than bullion, the reliability of 
Athenian currency and the opportunity for its immediate testing and verification by a 
state-appointed slave
172
 was a powerful attraction, and Xenophon underlines the 
universality of Attic coinage in an era when uncertain knowledge of different 
currencies was problematic even for money-changers.
173
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3.8.4.3   Military service  
Appreciating the volume of trade and taxation income that metics attract to the city, 
Xenophon suggests that they might be relieved of their obligation to serve in the 
Athenian hoplite forces.  In an era of constant warfare this was a serious physical risk 
to have to undertake in return for the right to live and trade in Athens, placing metics 
in personal danger and requiring them to leave their trades and private affairs.
174
  That 
an entrepreneur might have to die for his adopted country as a result of his choice of 
city in which to settle is not a hazard we might immediately think of when we assess 
commercial risks but it was all too real for a resident alien.  Xenophon proposes 
exchanging this obligation for enlistment in the cavalry, an expensive undertaking and 
perhaps limited in its application, but safer and of greater prestige.
175
  We cannot 
easily judge how many metics would have the resources to keep a horse and to train 
with the cavalry; the proposal indicates that some metics at least could already afford 
a hoplite panoply and might have aspirations to roles with a higher status;
176
 it may be 
however that the very fact that some metics might be afforded such privileges would 
have the effect of raising the status of all.   
 
3.8.4.4   Non-Athenians in silver mining   
Xenophon reminds his readers that the state has already helped out non-Athenians in 
the mining industry, giving them isoteleia, equality of taxation with Athenians, in 
relation to their mining income.
177
  The evidence of the poletai leases suggests that 
this inducement may not have led to any rush by non-Athenians to take up the calling; 
surviving records show none at all prior to about 350.
178
  Shipton suggests that 
Xenophon may have exaggerated the role played by foreigners in the mines because 
he was anxious to promote their involvement.
179
  But Xenophon actually says that 
there are many Athenians and foreigners who would gladly take up the role of 
manager, not that there are already many there.
180
  Far from exaggerating their 
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involvement, (and we must remember that we have very few surviving records 
between 367/6 and the late 350s) Xenophon might be reacting against a disappointing 
lack of engagement.  Shipton notes that those foreigners we do see in the records all 
come from Siphnos, an island with a vigorous gold and silver mining heritage of its 
own.
181
  This phenomenon neatly demonstrates the conservative attitude to business 
that Xenophon is confronting: it is less daunting to stick with an industry one is 
familiar with than to take risks getting to grips with the unknown, and Shipton’s 
analysis of the relationships between lease holders particularly highlights the tendency 
for mining and mining-related investment to stay within families where expertise has 
grown over one or more generations.
182
  
 
3.8.5   Who pays? Risk and the wealthy Athenian 
The group of Athenians, one imagines, who may need the most persuasion to buy in 
to Xenophon’s mining scheme, are those who are going to have to pay for it.  The risk 
is that they may not see their money back; their greatest incentive is that future peace 
entails that they will no longer have to bear the costs of war.
183
  But there will be a 
significant outlay required to create those peaceful conditions.  When he discusses the 
raising of the large sums required to start the fund, Xenophon frames his proposals as 
a business opportunity using terminology the wealthy will recognise.
184
  Jansen argues 
convincingly that the capital will be raised through voluntary contributions by the 
wealthy in the form of epidoseis.
185
  Xenophon likens the payment to an eisphora, but 
an eisphora with a graduated level of contribution, and with a quantifiable return.
186
   
                                                 
181
  Hdt. 3.57; Paus. 10.11.2; Shipton 2000, pp. 45-50. 
182
  Shipton 2000, p. 37. 
183
   6.1. 
184
  3.9. 
185
  Jansen 2007, pp. 343-351.  
186
  Gauthier 1976, pp. 99-101, argues that Xenophon’s terminology has misled modern commentators 
and that the arguments for a voluntary contribution are not proven, however Thiel, Giglioni and 
Schütrumpf all interpret these ‘eisphora’ contributions as loans rather than tax (Giglioni 1970, p. 
LXXXIV; Thiel 1922, pp. 48-50; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 13).  For Giglioni such a forced loan is 
unexceptional in Greek finance, for Schütrumpf this interpretation as a loan is based on 
Xenophon’s use of προτελέσωσιν and προτελέσαντες (3.9; 3.10) which imply an advance (LSJ, 
p.1534: προτελέω to pay as a toll or tribute, generally to pay or expend beforehand.)  As the fund 
has in any event to be established in advance of the scheme getting under way this in itself might 
not be conclusive, and the suggestion of tribute complicates matters further. Xenophon’s own 
comparison with maritime loans (3.9), in which the principal as well as the interest is repaid, 
might tend to suggest these contributions are also loans, but his adjacent reference to raising 
money for warships (3.8) implies the opposite. Brun, in his survey of Athenian eisphora, does not 
comment on Xenophon’s use of the word in this context, although when discussing Xenophon’s 
reference to previous eisphora (3.7) he finds the use of the verb eisphorein conclusive evidence 
 
179 
 
 
 
 
Yet another round of taxation, when the city is not even at war, is hardly likely to 
prove popular, but this is a tax with a potential payback.  As Gauthier notes, having 
raised the possibility of a tax Xenophon is quick to diffuse it with the suggestion of 
future profits.
187
  Every citizen will ultimately receive three obols per day.  For 
someone who has put in five hundred drachmas, this is the equivalent of a more than 
thirty per cent return per annum.  Even a subscriber of ten minas will get almost 
twenty per cent back.  For anyone contributing at a higher rate, the return is lower, but 
for someone assessed at 100 drachmas, the annual return is almost double.  And after 
all, the scheme is underwritten by the polis, ‘the safest and most durable of human 
institutions.’188  This perhaps idealistic appeal to the character of the state may have 
been in conflict with prevailing opinion about her fiscal reliability.  It was rare for 
loans to be made to the state by individuals and there was ‘a perceived lack of 
commitment to repay.’189  Xenophon counters any doubts about the cost of the initial 
outlay or the chances of ever seeing a return by comparing the potential profits to 
those achievable on maritime loans,
190
 which attracted the highest rates of interest. 
 
The cultural context here is interesting.  Attitudes to moneylenders were ambivalent: 
Pantaenetus declares that, “the Athenians hate money-lenders”191 and for Aristotle 
usury was the ‘most hated’ method of wealth-getting, making money out of money.192  
But money-lenders were men of standing in the community who were reliant on their 
reputation for probity to be able to carry out their business effectively
193
 and, often 
overlooked, included Athenian citizens amongst their number.
194
  They were of course 
perceived to be wealthy, yet conspicuous wealth could cause envy and resentment;
195
 
it is perhaps significant that in referring to maritime loans Xenophon conjures up a 
_______________________ 
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role model who may not be Athenian and whose enjoyment of his wealth may be 
tempered by perceptions either of his social status or the antipathy of others.  Just as 
when he later uses the example of Nikias,
196
 there is an ambiguous relationship with 
the idea of personal wealth.  To entice both profit-seeking entrepreneurs and the 
Athenian wealthy it is necessary to invoke a profit motive, but Xenophon underplays 
the notion of individual profit and concentrates instead on his schemes’ redistributive 
aspects.  The implication for the concerned rich is not only that they can avoid future 
impositions of eisphorai but that even they can profit, through a proposed rate of 
return which implies that they would do so at substantially less risk than if they were 
to sink their money into other opportunities.  For the wealthy, in addition to the 
attraction of the end of unpopular eisphora impositions, the scheme is acceptably 
packaged as civic philanthropy with a potentially healthy yield attached.  
 
3.8.6   Who benefits?  Risk and the poor  
How then, might we approach risk in relation to those Athenians whose poverty is at 
the heart of the Poroi?  We might begin by noting that Xenophon does not appear to 
present an altruistic set of proposals constructed out of sympathy for the hardship of 
fellow citizens.  Rather, he argues that the poverty of those citizens – who collectively 
hold huge political influence – risks inducing a state of war.  Statistics about ancient 
populations are notoriously difficult to establish, but by way of example, fifty years 
before the Poroi was written, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, as many as 5,000 
Athenians may have been completely landless,
197
  and perhaps around 60% of the 
total citizenry fell within the lowest property class.
198
 
 
Performing the duties of a juror at a court case was rewarded by a payment of three 
obols per day, although this sum had not risen since 425 and appears to be at the lower 
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end of state pay rates for the fourth century, with assembly attendance rewarded at 
double that amount.
199
  Loomis argues that the idea that one drachma per day was an 
average wage is misguided;
200
 nevertheless if we might assume that average pay fell 
somewhere between these two figures, it would indicate that a widespread payment of 
three obols per day would make a startling difference to household economics for a 
sizeable section of the citizen population.
201
  In a society where fortifying one’s 
household against the risk of starvation was a daily obsession and ‘peasant households 
existed on the very edge of viability,’202 the opportunity simply to buy foodstuffs for 
storage and small tools in order to increase productivity would be more than welcome.  
Such a boost in income would also provide a bolster against additional expense in 
times of crisis and, importantly, provide opportunities for repaying existing debt and 
avoiding it in the future.   
 
On the surface, the impoverished citizen might have the least to lose, but the 
individual citizen was also a member of the state, and the state’s risk was de facto his 
risk too.  For every citizen, as a member of a tribe, the proposal that each tribe should 
go into business as a mine operator carried all the risk that burdened individual 
investors.  Every single citizen, poor or rich, was thus at risk through his tribe, which 
would be required to raise funds in order to operate their mines and to hire the state’s 
slaves, a risk, as we have seen, that Xenophon mitigates by proposing to share the 
profits amongst the tribes. 
 
If the mining scheme failed, who would lose out?  As we have seen, it relied 
particularly on the increased activity of individual mining lease holders.  If there were 
a general failure of the industry, it would be these men and their associated suppliers 
and refiners who would be the first to go under.  The polis and thus her individual 
citizens were each at risk only to the extent of their capital.  If the scheme had been 
going some time before its failure, then the state would be left with a large number of 
slaves to dispose of.  They would have some capital value, although this would be 
offset by their immediate maintenance and transportation costs, and there would be a 
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significant glut in the market.  But in terms of start-up costs the bulk of the apparent 
risk fell on the shoulders of the better-off citizens who would be obliged to provide 
the initial capital, and they would not see an appreciable return on their deposit until 
the scheme was running at full capacity.   
 
The extent to which the poorer citizens would be concerned at the losses of their 
richer counterparts is hard to judge, but they do appear to have had the least at stake in 
a scheme which was designed to be self-supporting.  Core state assets, the property of 
the demos, would not be risked.   
 
3.9   Conclusion 
Xenophon was not naïve about the risks involved in a project whose scale would take 
the Athenians in to uncharted territory.  He acknowledges that there will be both 
successes and mistakes which will enable them to learn as they go along.
203
  
Throughout the Poroi he undertakes a constant re-negotiation of his plans in order to 
address uncertainty, quantifying risk and proposing means by which to control it.  His 
vocabulary indicates his awareness of a middle ground to be negotiated between 
danger and safety, wherein danger can be managed and made ‘more safe’ in much the 
same way that we might apply modern forms of statistical knowledge to an 
uncertainty in order to evaluate quantifiable risk.   
 
The risks that Xenophon describes are wide ranging and for the purpose of this study 
a neutral definition of risk has been assumed in order to encompass them all without 
loading them with pre-determined theoretical baggage.  Nevertheless modern 
discussions of risk have proved valuable in helping to characterise the anthropological 
contexts and the ways in which risks are presented, perceived and resolved. 
 
3.9.1   The risks 
It is probably worth a moment to repeat in one place the risks Xenophon considers:  
the risk that poor relations with other states leads to war;
204
 the risk that the silver in 
the Laurion might run out or lose value leading to the collapse of the whole 
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industry;
205
 the risk that the quantity and quality of mine slaves available to purchase 
might decline due to over-demand;
206
 the risk that the operators hiring slaves from the 
state might default on their payments;
207
 the risk that the mining slaves might be 
stolen by their lessees;
208
 the risk of commercial competition, because the operators 
might hire from other slave owners;
209
 the risk of insufficient demand, such that the 
state may not be able to find enough people to hire the slave labour;
210
 the risk of 
becoming an object of envy
211
 and the risk that too many slaves might be put at work 
too quickly to be productive.
212
  For non-Athenians considering settling in Athens, 
there are the obligations to pay the metic tax
213
 and to undertake hoplite service;
214
 
restricted housing rights
215
 and lower social status.
216
  For traders in general, there are 
the dangers of dealing in foreign currencies;
217
 the potential lack of a viable return 
cargo;
218
 the potential lack of shared business protocols
219
 and the general physical 
hazards of sea-borne trade.  For the wealthy, the risk that continued war entails 
continued taxation, balanced against the risk that they may be expected to fund the 
entire project.
220
  This is a wide-ranging assessment from a remarkable man who is 
able to analyse an undertaking from a variety of vantage points. 
 
Working through the text of the Poroi, there is a strongly persuasive power in 
Xenophon’s presentation of a series of drawbacks countered by reassurance and 
containment, and there is no doubt that this was intentional.  But for our purposes, this 
stylistic tactic also reveals much about the way that Athenians approached risk in their 
daily endeavours and particularly in their financial and commercial undertakings.  We 
see that Xenophon has incorporated an astonishing number of risks into his 
discussion, providing us with important insights into the social, political and 
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economic considerations which were pivotal to the decision to engage in commercial 
ventures.   
 
3.9.2   Exploring uncertainties  
Xenophon explores and contains what we may call ‘uncertainties’ through the 
following approaches:  
(1) specific precedent.  Xenophon reminds us of wealthy men who have been 
successful with similar schemes in the past;
221
  
(2) general precedent – there are other successful state-run enterprises from which 
entrepreneurs may profit, such as rental of sacred land
222
 and tax farming;
223
  
(3) the reassurance of familiar, shared knowledge.  Everyone can see the extent of 
the silver region;
224
 everyone knows that foreigners and resident aliens are a 
good source of trade and tax income;
225
 everyone knows that silver has been 
mined for generations;
226
 
(4) the application of arithmetic.  Xenophon’s numbers add up.  From an initial 
outlay of thirty eight talents, all else being equal, after five or six years of 
investing the proceeds in further slaves, the state could then re-invest twenty 
talents each year and still take an income which would rise from sixty to one 
hundred talents after twelve years.
227
  These are not calculations about 
probability applied in the way that it might be applied to uncertainty in the 
modern sense, but their arithmetical reliability imposes a reassuring level of 
certainty onto an uncertain undertaking;  
(5) cultural associations and shared memories.  The silver mines have been the 
source of Athenian prosperity in the past, and can be so again; in ancestral 
times the mines were remembered equally as having always been 
successful;
228
 success in this field does not engender the envy of one’s 
neighbours; 
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(6) the security of state institutions;229 and 
(7) the contrast with the alternative.  The possible financial return is measured 
against that achievable through other investments;
230
 the cost of war is 
countered by the cost of peace.
231
  
In the parlance we have adopted from modern theory, using the preceding strategies 
Xenophon has applied ‘knowledge’ and turned ‘uncertainty’ into ‘risk.’  He then 
attempts to contain the risks he has identified, controlling perceived risk within 
specific contexts in order to make his schemes more attractive to citizens, potential 
investors and hirers of state slaves.  
  
3.9.3   Strategies 
Xenophon’s principal strategies, along with a small number of the examples we have 
discussed, are: 
(1) reduction of scale: only invest what we can afford,232 put fewer slaves into the 
mines and expand the scheme only as capacity grows;
233
 
(2) change the political system: speed up court systems,234 change dwelling 
rights;
235
 
(3) reduce physical hazards: metics need not serve as hoplites;236 Piraeus has safe 
anchorage;
237
  
(4) share the risk: the tribes will all become involved in prospecting and those 
which are successful will share their finds with those which are not;
238
   
(5) mitigate the risk: miners hiring slaves will be guarantors just like tax 
farmers;
239
   
(6) deny the risk: success in mining does not elicit envy the way that success does 
in other trades;
240
 the ore will never run out;
241
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(7) pass the risk elsewhere: entrepreneurs will not have to spend their capital on 
large slave purchases, they can rent them from the state as and when they 
require them.  The state will not become involved in mining herself but will 
benefit from risks undertaken by others;  
(8) balance risk against the prospect of social recognition: offer state honours;242 
(9) turn risk in one sphere into opportunity in another: if there were to be a war, 
there would be plenty of available manpower;
243
  
and finally 
(10) get the gods on side.  As we have seen, Greeks always had the option to call on 
the gods to come to their aid in the management of fate.   We are back to 
Timodamos and his enquiry at Dodona.  Xenophon’s last proposal is that the 
oracles of both Delphi and Dodona should be consulted, first to ask for 
consent, and then to find out which gods should be propitiated in order that the 
undertakings might prosper.
244
 
 
3.9.4   Athenian approaches to economic risk 
What this analysis has shown is that the Athenians were not naïve about economic 
decision-making.  They had a sophisticated recognition of risk and we know from 
their calculation of maritime interest rates that to a certain extent they could quantify 
it.
245
  Whilst they might not necessarily employ actuarial evaluations, risks could 
nevertheless be differentiated and ranked sufficiently to identify greater or lesser 
hazards in order to inform commercial choices, and to enable the establishment of 
arrangements to reward those who were prepared to undertake it, both militarily and 
economically speaking, to a greater degree than might be the norm.  In their economic 
planning they took into account the legal systems which affected their capacity to do 
business and in setting up a new enterprise they could put a structured plan in place 
which would enable them to employ a variety of pre-conceived strategies which 
would respond to a range of anticipated business conditions, as and when they arose.  
If the Poroi is any guide, the most frequent tactic might be a reduction of scale, but 
the resourceful entrepreneur had a range of expedients at his finger-tips.  The risk and 
                                                 
242
  3.4. 
243
  4.42. 
244
  6.2-3. 
245
  See chapter 2.5.3.    
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the burden could be shared, devolved, pledged and even brazened out if the activity 
could bear it and the gods or the law courts had failed.   
 
Thucydides, in the voice of the Corinthians, draws a contrast between the risk-averse 
Spartans who, they are told, 
have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of 
invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough, 
and the Athenians,  
addicted to innovation ... their designs are characterised by swiftness alike in 
conception and execution  ...  adventurous beyond their power, and daring 
beyond their judgment.’246   
Whatever Thucydides’ motive for this breathless encomium, as Crane demonstrates, 
its (admittedly generalised) picture allows us to consider the contrast not simply 
between the two states, but the extent to which they represent a collision between a 
conservative subsistence-ethic and a more daring and forward-looking pursuit of 
innovation.
247
  This characterisation is not only about military tactics – according to 
Pericles, the Peloponnesians were each so keen to hold on to what they had that they 
were ‘more anxious about their money than their lives.’248  By contrast, secure income 
from empire had accustomed the Athenians to take military risks without threatening 
the basic survival of her citizens.
249
  Seventy years later, Xenophon’s text implies that 
this fearless pursuit of novelty remained an essential Athenian characteristic.
250
  We 
may surmise that the continuing importance and centrality of Piraeus enabled an 
exchange of skills and an openness to new opportunity from around the Greek and 
wider world.  We have seen in chapter 2 the extent of Athens’ long exploitation of the 
silver mines, and of her citizens’ engagement on many levels with their operational 
requirements, which may well have made them more receptive to income-generating 
ideas which looked beyond traditional agriculture.  That familiarity will certainly have 
informed their understanding of Xenophon’s plans.  Those who see a Laconising 
agenda in the Poroi overlook this peculiarly Athenian combination of circumstances.   
 
                                                 
246
  Thuc. 1.70.  
247
  Crane, 1992, p. 241. 
248
  Thuc. 1.141.5, Crane 1992, pp. 231-232. 
249
  Crane, 1992, p. 252. 
250
  As we saw in chapter 1.6.2, Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977, p. 316) interpreted the Poroi as a 
diversion of Athenian military ‘enterprise and audacity’ in the pursuit of economic success and 
cautioned against mistaking it for a theory of economic development. 
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In his closing passages,
251
 Xenophon draws an enticing picture of a prosperous Athens 
as a popular trading centre visited by wealthy and successful foreigners, craftsmen, 
philosophers and poets, where festivals are celebrated with splendour, and docks, 
walls and temples are all restored.
252
  Nothing has yet changed – annual income is still 
depressed and the mining industry remains in the doldrums, and yet the future has 
become rosy.  The high level of risk in his proposals has been reduced because every 
pitfall has been addressed, quantified and countered or dismissed.  Xenophon’s 
confidence is infectious, and ultimately, that is the key to the text’s inexorable sense 
of persuasion.  But this is a far more sophisticated approach.  By systematically 
building a plan and deconstructing every apparent risk, he builds confidence in 
Athenian entrepreneurism.  And confidence is at the heart of successful enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
251
  5.3-4; 6.1. 
252
  cf. Xen. Hiero 11.2 for a similar emphasis on the importance of the adornment of the city’s public 
spaces. 
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Chapter Four - Xenophon’s use of honours 
 
Don't look down on business men, Nicomachides       
Socrates
1
 
 
4.1   Chapter introduction 
In chapter 3 we engaged with those commentators on the Poroi who have argued that 
Xenophon’s ideas were naïve, by contextualising them in some detail within the 
trading environment of fourth-century Athens, and saw that cultural, as well as 
financial, considerations influenced the appraisal of risk and subsequent decision-
making in commercial projects.
2
  In this chapter I would like to pursue one specific 
cultural factor which Xenophon brings in to play in his attempt to steer economic 
choices.  Xenophon’s suggestion that men whose commercial activities are useful to 
the city could be awarded honours by the demos has drawn frequent scholarly 
comment.  As is the case with his recognition of the potential of the silver mines, 
some of Xenophon’s ideas can be seen in practice later on in the fourth century; others 
appear ground-breaking and were never enacted.  In the course of this chapter I hope 
to unpick both earlier and later usage of honours by the Athenians, measured against 
the staging point offered by Xenophon’s text, in order to see what light that throws on 
those scholarly assessments and on Xenophon’s originality and resourcefulness.  In 
particular I will look in more detail at those of Xenophon’s proposals in the Poroi 
which have been regarded as proposing significant changes in the traditional 
structures of Athenian society.  By focusing on Xenophon’s proposals to extend the 
award of honours in order to encourage trade and investment I will argue that whilst 
                                                 
1 
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.12.  
2
  Chapter 3.2; 3.3; 3.8.3.3 and 3.9.2. 
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the Poroi is undoubtedly a product of immediate financial crisis, it neither reflects, 
nor would potentially have generated, a longer term ‘decline’ as has on occasion been 
suggested, and that Xenophon’s proposals sit innovatively yet easily within the wider 
context of Athenian society: easily, in the manner in which they align with earlier 
practices, and innovatively, in the way they gather existing mechanisms and re-focus 
them in an attempt to address wider issues of interrelated social, political and financial 
structures.  Xenophon recognises that traders whose motivations are not only profit-
driven, but also honour-driven, may offer enhanced benefits for the Athenians, and the 
importance he attaches to honours as drivers of some of his proposals indicates that 
those he hopes to engage are sensitive to social factors, indicating that it is useful to 
use the model of ‘expressive rationality’ discussed above3 when assessing fourth-
century commercial choices made by those who had the opportunity to choose where 
and with whom to trade.  In assessing how honours may relate to trade, we should 
recognise the various modes in which the exchange of goods and services might have 
operated in the fourth century.  For the purposes of his analysis of the relationship 
between honours and profit, Engen characterises the trade-related services provided 
by Athenian honorands as encompassing all the means by which Athens acquired 
resources, not simply those purchased at a market price; this is a useful distinction 
which it is important to bear in mind.
4
  The flow of imported and exported goods 
cannot be fully considered without the inclusion of goods both gifted and subsidised 
by benefactors, indeed the attempt to disregard from an analysis of trade, some of the 
bulk supplies of produce arriving in Athens as a result of such benefactions would 
give a distorted picture of the various mechanisms at play.    
 
The wider awarding of honours did not always sit comfortably with Xenophon’s 
contemporaries, as we shall see,5 and the gradual broadening of the social and 
economic profile of recipients of honours has been seen by scholars as an indication 
of ‘decline’ as well as of an erosion of traditional values.  The scholarly debate over 
fourth-century decline was at its peak in the late twentieth century, but aspects of it are 
still influential in the way that some of the Poroi is viewed today, and the nature of the 
work leaves it vulnerable to characterisations that relate it not only to immediate crisis 
                                                 
3
  See chapter 2.5 above.  
4
  Engen 2010, pp. 75-76. 
5
  Liddel forthcoming.  
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but also to a longer-term failure of internal and inter-state structures.  Therefore this 
chapter will also briefly survey that discussion where it is of relevance to an 
understanding of Xenophon’s proposals concerning honours. 
 
4.1.1   Xenophon, Socrates, honour and usefulness 
In approaching Xenophon’s ideas of honour, ability and responsibility, the perhaps 
unexpected opinion from the Xenophontic Socrates quoted at the head of this chapter 
is a useful introduction.6  The desire for honour is a preoccupation of Xenophon’s 
Socrates, underpinning Xenophon’s view of the citizen’s role in Athenian society.7  
The desire for honour is an (honourably) motivating factor.  Love of honour is an 
incentive to Athenian heroism8 and, importantly, in order to win honour, one must 
bring advantages to the city.9  Aiming for the well-being of the city is one of the 
features that, for Xenophon, distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist.10   
Significantly, Xenophon shows that honours should be earned through one’s 
usefulness to the community, and not as a result of wealth or status.  This principle is 
expounded in Memorabilia 3  
I will now explain how he [Socrates] helped those who were eager to win 
distinction by making them qualify themselves for the honours they coveted.11 
Xenophon’s Socrates argued that (even) a merchant who had been a successful 
choregos might use his management skills to command an army.  
“Really, Socrates,” cried Nicomachides, “I should never have thought to hear 
you say that a good business man would make a good general.”12 
In response, Socrates shows that the same talents are necessary to succeed in both 
                                                 
6 
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.12. The discussion is about Antisthenes, “who has never served in a 
marching regiment nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-
making,” 3.4.1; he is described as an οἰκόνομος (3.4.7 and 3.4.12). 
7
  See Gray 2000, pp. 143-145 for a discussion of honour in Xenophon. 
8
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.5.3. Socrates: “And again, the Athenians are more ambitious and more high-
minded than other peoples; and these qualities are among the strongest incentives to heroism and 
patriotic self-sacrifice.” ἀλλὰ μὴν φιλοτιμότατοί γε καὶ γε φιλοφρονέστατοι πάντων εἰσίν: ἅπερ 
οὐχ ἥκιστα παροξύνει κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος. 
9
   Xen. Memorabilia 3.6.3. Socrates: “Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honour, is it not obvious 
that you must benefit your city?”  ὦ Γλαύκων, δῆλον, ὅτι, εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελητέα σοι ἡ 
πόλις ἐστί; 
10 
 L’Allier 2012, p. 488, citing Xen. On Hunting 13.9-11. 
11
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.1.1.  ὅτι δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμελεῖς ὧν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν 
ὠφέλει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγήσομαι. 
12
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.7. καὶ ὁ Νικομαχίδης, μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ᾤμην ἐγὼ σοῦ 
ἀκοῦσαι ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἶεν. 
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battle and commerce – industriousness, the ability to punish the bad and reward the 
good, to attract and keep supporters, and to get the better of one’s enemies.13  
Xenophon demonstrates that, aside from Socrates’ interesting take on transferable 
skills, the significance of his apparently uncharacteristic generosity towards a man of 
commerce lies in his ability to be useful to his community.   
 “..but you don't say how business capacity will help when it comes to 
fighting.” 
“That is just where it will be most helpful. For the good business man, through 
his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and 
nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will 
be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid 
what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees he is strong 
enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not 
ready.”14 
As Gray points out, Xenophon tells us in the Memorabilia that Socrates opposed the 
random ballot because it was in opposition to the principle that honours should be 
awarded in return for usefulness, the ballot giving authority to the untalented and 
perhaps even the dangerous.15  Along the same line of thought, Xenophon’s Cyrus 
gives opportunities to commoners: 
Fellow-citizens of Persia, you were born and bred upon the same soil as we; 
the bodies you have are no whit inferior to ours, and it is not likely that you 
have hearts in the least less brave than our own. In spite of this, in our own 
country you did not enjoy equal privileges with us, not because we drove you 
out, but because you were obliged to earn your own livelihood. Now, however, 
with the help of the gods, I shall see to it that you are provided with the 
necessaries of life; and you are permitted, if you wish, to receive arms like 
ours, to face the same danger as we, and, if any fair success crowns our 
enterprise, to be counted worthy of an equal share with us.16  
Gray demonstrates that: 
Both commoners and elite then voluntarily chose reward for merit over equal 
                                                 
13
    Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.8-10. 
14
  Xen. Memorabilia 3.4.11. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο παρίης, ἂν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσει ἡ οἰκονομική; 
ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλεῖστον, ἔφη: ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε 
καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ 
ζημιῶδες, ὡς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσει καὶ 
παρασκευάσεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καὶ φυλάξεται, ἐνεργῶς δ᾽, 
ἂν τὴν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾷ νικητικὴν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τούτων, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, 
φυλάξεται συνάπτειν μάχην. 
15
   Gray 2000, p. 144, citing Xen. Memorabilia 1.2.9. 
16
  Xen. Cyropaedia 2.1.15. 
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reward regardless of merit (merit = use, reward = honour)17 
and that Xenophon explicitly makes equality at home depend on empire.18  For Gray, 
the ultimate outcome of this ethos is that: 
Xenophon goes beyond other ancient thinkers in having Cyrus eliminate social 
hierarchies in his promotion of the Persian commoners to equal status with the 
elite and secure the maintenance of both through the profits of empire.19 
And we can see that this approach is reflected in the Poroi.  The divide in society 
between those who are useful and those who are inactive does not follow the same 
fault line as the divide between rich and poor.  If Plutarch can be believed, idleness 
had been a transgression dealt with by the very harshest of penalties under Draco and 
was a matter for the Areopagus under Solon’s reforms,20 whilst fourth-century 
Athenian legal sanctions for the discouragement of idleness are hinted at in 
Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, in which he places in opposition a poverty-stricken 
trader and the accuser Eubulides.
21
  Rewarding those who were useful in order to 
incentivise their contribution to society thus meant expanding the categories of 
honorands in ways which entailed that traditional oppositions, citizen/non-citizen; 
wealthy elite/trader; Greek/non-Greek may become blurred.  Xenophon’s proposal to 
honour merchants and ship-owners thus follows a line of thought already expounded 
in his Socratic writings.  
 
4.1.2   Philotimia 
At 2.6, 3.4 and at 3.11, Xenophon proposes offering traders, ship-owners and 
merchants the honours and benefits of προεδρία, ξένια, ἔγκτησις and inscription as 
εὐεργέται.  
If, moreover, we granted the resident aliens the right to serve in the cavalry 
and various other privileges which it is proper to grant them, I think that we 
should find their loyalty increase and at the same time should add to the 
strength and greatness of the state.  Then again, since there are many vacant 
sites for houses within the walls, if the state allowed approved applicants to 
erect houses on these and granted them the freehold of the land [ἐγκεκτῆσθαι], 
                                                 
17
  Gray 2000, p. 145. 
18 
 Gray 2000, p. 145, citing Cyropaedia 8.3.5-8. 
19 
 Gray 2010, p. 374. 
20
  Plut. Sol. 17.1 and 22.3. 
21 
 Dem. Against Eubulides 57.32.  The exact sanction and its legal status is a matter of debate.  
Isager and Skydsgaard 1992, p. 145, arguing against Hansen’s suggestion that this was a sanction 
against ‘habitual idleness,’ propose that it was about enforcing land cultivation. 
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I think that we should find a larger and better class of persons desiring to live 
at Athens.
22
 
It would also be an excellent plan to reserve front seats in the theatre 
[προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι] for merchants and ship-owners, and to offer them 
hospitality [ξένια] occasionally, when the high quality of their ships and 
merchandise entitles them to be considered benefactors of the state [ὠφελεῖν 
τὴν πόλιν]. With the prospect of these honours [τιμώμενοι] before them they 
would look on us as friends and hasten to visit us to win the honour [τιμῆς] as 
well as the profit [κέρδους].23 
I think, too, that if their names were to be recorded in the roll of benefactors 
[ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται] for all time, many foreigners also would 
subscribe, and a certain number of states would be attracted by the prospect of 
enrolment. I believe that even kings and despots and oriental governors would 
desire to share in this reward.
24
 
As we have seen, for Xenophon it is incontestable that the public acknowledgement of 
one’s honour would be a powerful incentive.  Philotimia, love of honour, litters 
Xenophon’s other work.   He tells us early in the Cyropaedia that as well as being 
most handsome, Cyrus was ‘φιλανθρωπότατος καὶ φιλομαθέστατος καὶ 
φιλοτιμότατος.’25  His Simonides had said, ‘no human joy seems to be more nearly 
akin to that of heaven than the gladness which attends upon honours,’26 and 
Whitehead calls this speech, in which we are told that it is the striving for τιμή that 
distinguishes men not only from other animals, but from other mere human beings, 
the locus classicus of philotimia.
27
 
 
                                                 
22
  2.5-6. καὶ μεταδιδόντες δ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκοῦμεν τοῖς μετοίκοις τῶν τ᾽ ἄλλων ὧν καλὸν μεταδιδόναι 
καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ εὐνουστέρους ἂν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἅμα ἰσχυροτέραν ἂν καὶ μείζω τὴν πόλιν 
ἀποδεικνύναι [2.6] εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ 
πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι, πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι 
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως. Gauthier 1976, p. 67 
rejects Thiel’s suggestion that this proposal reflected a relocation of the population from the city 
to Piraeus. 
23
   3.4. ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ᾽ 
ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. 
ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους 
ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν. 
24
  3.11. οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε, εἰ μέλλοιεν ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, καὶ ξένους 
ἂν πολλοὺς εἰσενεγκεῖν, ἔστι δ᾽ ἃς ἂν καὶ πόλεις τῆς ἀναγραφῆς ὀρεγομένας. ἐλπίζω δὲ καὶ 
βασιλέας ἄν τινας καὶ τυράννους καὶ σατράπας ἐπιθυμῆσαι μετασχεῖν ταύτης τῆς χάριτος. 
25
  Xen. Cyropaedia 1.2.1. ‘Most loving of mankind, most fond of learning and most loving of 
honour.’ We also hear of his boyhood philotimia at 1.3.3.   
26
  Xen. Hiero 7.4. καὶ γὰρ οὐδεμία ἀνθρωπίνη ἡδονὴ τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτέρω δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς 
τιμὰς εὐφροσύνη.  
27
  Whitehead 1983, p. 57. 
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Love of honour is also an important characteristic of the good leader himself.  
Addressing philotimia as a superlative character trait of leaders as depicted and 
admired by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia, Sandridge finds that it is a complex idea 
which carries risks unless tempered by philomatheia and philanthropia
28
 but 
ultimately     
… philotimia comes to be more than liberating one’s people and winning 
everlasting glory, also known as megalopsychia.  It is the desire to fit in, to 
win the approval and gratitude of one’s peers, those in authority, and those 
who are good people.
29
   
Xenophon may not be a leader per se, but we can see that his advice to the Athenians 
shows him both demonstrating the personal pursuit of these qualities and 
manipulating the philotimia of others.   
 
But philotimia had more complex associations when used in a democratic context, and 
Whitehead suggests that Xenophon was ‘burying his head in the sand’, citing amongst 
several literary instances where philotimia was not the ideal virtue, Plutarch’s citation 
of Pindar: 
But worst of all are  
Men who court too eagerly  
Ambition in the towns:  
Manifest is the pain they bring, 
   as Pindar has it..’ 30 
Not only, as we have seen, are the rich not necessarily useful or the poor inevitably 
not so, but the ‘bad’ may strive for public commendation of their philotimia just as 
vigorously as the ‘good’.31  Individual aspirations may not coincide with the greater 
good, and self-promotion may be inappropriate in a democratic context, even if 
suffered on the inter-state stage.  A traditionally elite value, there were risks to the 
ethos of democratic equality in honouring the wealthy for their philotimia in providing 
services to their own state, which they might reasonably have been expected to do for 
love of the demos.  Whitehead finds three occasions in Thucydides where actions 
motivated by philotimia run contrary either to the best interests of the demos, or on 
one occasion, counter to the interests of the oligarchy when practised by its own 
                                                 
28
  Sandridge 2012, pp. 107-117. 
29
  Sandridge 2012, p. 120.  
30
  Pind. Sn-M 210; Plut. de cohibenda ira 8; Moralia 6.32.   
31
  I am here inevitably using the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ very loosely simply in order to elucidate the 
problem. 
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members.
32
  There was an ambiguity in a value which commended work for the public 
good, where the desire for commendation might promote ambitions counter to the 
common good, and the complex issues aroused by the honouring of individuals are 
reflected in the frequent use of the procedure of graphe paranomon as a means of 
attacking political opponents who had been honoured by decree in the fourth 
century.
33
   
 
Nevertheless philotimia, says Davies, ‘came to be used universally to denote 
ambitiously energetic public activity, sometimes pejoratively but increasingly as 
commendation.’34  Whilst we need to remain aware that the lack of inscribed records 
earlier in the fourth century can make comparisons tricky, as far as we are aware, 
when Xenophon wrote, the term euergetes, benefactor, was never formally bestowed 
on citizens but only on non-Athenians.
35
  Only later in the fourth century do we see 
the official encouragement of citizen philotimia which had by then come to be seen as 
a benefit to the city, where once the promotion of the individual pursuit of honour 
might have been seen as a threat to democratic values.
36
   
 
For his honours proposals to be effective, Xenophon assumes philotimia on the part of 
the foreign rulers, metics and Greek traders that he hopes to attract, and the word 
philotimia itself began to appear on stone from the 340s.37  Instead of relying on the 
codified beneficence of the rich through liturgies and the eisphora which had caused 
such resentment,38 Xenophon saw an opportunity to encourage traders and to reward 
munificence by appealing to the dual aspirations of both the profit-motivated and the 
well-resourced non-Athenian lover of honour.  Decrees of honours granted to non-
Athenians, inscribed or otherwise, were already a frequent occurrence,39 and Engen 
                                                 
32
  Whitehead 1983, p. 58. 
33
  See M. H. Hansen 1974 for a catalogue of such cases; also Rhodes 2010, p. 71.   
34
  Davies 1993, p. 115.  
35 
 Engen 2010, p. 49. 
36
  Lambert 2011a, p. 197 and Engen 2010, p. 133. Deene 2013, p. 81, argues that the limited access 
to citizen honours at polis level pushed competition for prestige to deme level.   
37
  Lambert 2004, p. 86. See also RO, p. 485: philotimia, which had once been ‘… perceived as a 
good quality came to be perceived as dangerous to a city, but was eventually judged to be 
acceptable if harnessed for civic purposes; the term begins to appear in Athenian decrees about the 
340s.’ 
38 
 6.1. 
39
  See eg. And. On his Return 2.23 of between 410 and 405 (for the date, Gagarin and MacDowell 
1998, p. 141); Pečírka 1966, pp. 152-155 for fifth-century grants of enktesis; Walbank 1978 for 
fifth-century grants of proxenia and Engen 2010, pp. 225-226 for honours to non-Athenians for 
 
 
197 
 
 
 
charts the use of such honours in recognition of suppliers of imported goods from as 
early as 414 - 412.  Many of these early honorands brought goods to Athens, not in 
pursuit of trade and profit but as gifts.40  Reflecting the changing motivations behind 
the large-scale supply of goods, Jansen supports Engen’s view that Xenophon was 
subversive in his proposals, and argues that Xenophon ‘aims to bring foreign traders 
into the realm of ritualized friendship.’41  In the following section we will look in a 
little more detail at the honours Xenophon discusses in order to contextualise his 
ideas. 
 
4.2   The honours and privileges Xenophon proposes 
Pleading to be admitted back into Athenian civil society some time between 410 and 
405
42
 despite his dubious role in the Mutilation of the Herms, Andocides declared:  
I often see you bestowing civic rights (πολιτείαν) and substantial grants of 
money upon both slaves and foreigners from every part of the world, if they 
prove to have done you some service. And you are acting wisely in making 
such gifts; they engender the greatest possible willingness to serve you.
43
 
Whilst entreating on his own behalf, in relating his case to the Athenian manner of 
awarding privileges to foreigners, Andocides encapsulates some of the motivating 
factors around the city’s bestowal of honours: good service from the honorand 
provokes the award of the honour which in turn engenders further willingness to 
serve.  Andocides’ rueful ‘καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ξένοις’ emphasises the 
impartiality of such awards in terms of statehood and status, if Athens’ interests might 
be thus best served.  If his, ‘And you are acting wisely in making such gifts,’ may 
sound just a little as though through gritted teeth - it was, after all, his second attempt 
at a return - he nevertheless reflected Athenian practice. In arriving at Piraeus with 
fourteen shiploads of grain in his wake, he assiduously inhabited the profile of earlier 
grateful honorands, suppliers to the city, who had trodden such a path before him. 
_______________________ 
 
trade-related services generally. 
40
  Engen 2010, pp. 101-102. 
41
  Jansen 2007, pp. 323-329; Jansen 2012, p. 744. See chapter 4.4.5 below. 
42
  Gagarin and MacDowell 1998, p. 141. 
43
  And. On his Return. 2.23 ὁρῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς πολλάκις καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ξένοις παντοδαποῖς 
πολιτείαν τε διδόντας καὶ εἰς χρήματα μεγάλας δωρείας, οἳ ἂν ὑμᾶς φαίνωνται ποιοῦντές τι 
ἀγαθόν. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι ὀρθῶς ὑμεῖς φρονοῦντες δίδοτε: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ πλείστων ἀνθρώπων 
εὖ πάσχοιτε. 
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 Andocides’ grain was not, for the moment, sufficient to sway the ekklesia, and the 
ambivalent role played by the men that he emulated is neatly demonstrated in this 
episode.  At times what was most deserving of recognition was not the character of the 
man but the nature of the service he had undertaken for the demos, and to a certain 
extent these two aspects had to be separable for the system to be effective.  But whilst 
it might be pragmatic to overlook the non-democratic credentials of foreign kings, the 
demos was far more wary of re-embracing one of its own disgraced members, just as 
it was cautious in using honours to promote one of its members above any other.44 
 
The following sections will examine the relative extent of Xenophon’s proposals and 
the way his ideas sit within the unfolding picture of Athenian honours.  First we will 
look briefly at the individual honours he mentions and the ways in which they had 
previously been awarded by the Athenians.45  
 
4.2.1   Xenia 
Xenophon suggests awarding xenia and proedria to merchants and shipowners;46  
xenia consisted of entertainment by the demos to (one) dinner in the prytaneion, the 
traditional venue where Athens gave hospitality to those she honoured, from the 
descendants of her heroes to distinguished citizens and visiting ambassadors, usually 
on the day following the decree.   
 
Similarly honoured Athenians, in contrast, received deipnon, also a one-off grant of 
dinner, rather than xenia, whilst the greatest honour, sitesis, was continuous and 
reserved for only the most worthy.47  The Athenians appear always to have maintained 
this distinction of nomenclature, although precisely what practice it reflected is harder 
to ascertain.  Miller proposes that deipnon may have involved a religious ceremony 
                                                 
44
  See the discussion of honours awarded to Athenians by Athenians at chapter 4.4.3. 
45
  Henry 1983 gives the formulae for honorific grants and Engen provides a thorough and useful 
overview of the honours and privileges awarded in fourth-century Athens; the following 
discussion of individual honours leans heavily on Engen’s helpful chapters. Engen 2010, pp. 140-
213.   
46
  3.4. See chapter 4.2.5 for proedria. 
47
  Miller 1978, pp. 4-7.  On the rare occasions when the distinction between Athenian and non-
Athenian appears not to have been upheld see Miller 1978, pp. 5-6, M. J. Osborne 1981 and 
Rhodes 1984. 
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and/or a better dinner,48 whilst M. J. Osborne suggests that Athenians got to eat with 
the members of the more select ‘club’ such as the descendants of Harmodios and 
Aristogeiton who had been awarded sitesis, whilst non-Athenians might have eaten 
separately.49  In practice, the very great majority of invitations to Athenian xenia up to 
the end of the fourth century appear, where their motivation can be discerned, to be 
political in intent, with ambassadors and proxenoi featuring heavily.  Engen 
categorises just one invitation which appears before the end of the fourth century as 
solely motivated by trade interests, although others may have had mixed concerns.50  
Xenia may no longer have been offered after 330.51  Engen remarks on ‘the costs in 
terms of traditional social values’ of granting xenia to traders in the light of the 
‘customary disdain’ in which they were held52  and sees in the maintenance of the 
distinction between deipnon, xenia and sitesis, and the care with which the categories 
were defined, an awareness of the potential social costs of crossing these boundaries.  
Foreign ambassadors had always to be invited to the prytaneion but the decision on 
inviting others, including traders, was at the behest of the demos.53  
 
4.2.2   Euergesia 
At 3.11 Xenophon suggests that benefactors be inscribed as euergetai.  Closely linked 
with awards of proxenia, the status of euergetes, a foreign benefactor of the polis, can 
be seen as early as Herodotus Book 8, in which Mardonius sends the Macedonian 
Alexander, a son of Amyntas as a messenger to Athens ‘partly because he learned that 
Alexander was a protector and benefactor (εὐεργέτης) to the Athenians.’54  Often 
associated with proxeny, and awarded only rarely on its own,
55
 the title had been 
formally granted to non-Athenians, including non-Greeks, since at least the late fifth 
century; Gauthier cautions against confusing recognition of a citizen’s demonstration 
of euergesy in his own city with the formal title given to non-Athenians by decree.  
                                                 
48
  Miller 1978, p. 6. 
49
  M. J. Osborne, 1981, pp. 153-155, discussing amongst other sources, IG II
2
 77 which gives us 
some detail of the way the Athenians awarded this honour from the 430s. 
50
  Engen 2010, p. 170; see Miller 1978, pp. 136-163 for the inscriptions and literary references for 
invitations to the prytaneion across the Greek world. 
51
  Engen 2010, p. 170, although Henry 1983, p. 262 says this claim, made by M. J. Osborne, cannot 
be maintained. 
52
  Engen 2010, p. 169. 
53
  Engen 2010, p. 170. 
54
   Hdt. 8.136. 
55
  Henry 1983, p. 129. 
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The distinction, he points out, is made clear in the Poroi at 3.2: 
Obtenir l’inscription, c’est obtenir le titre euergetes 56   
Even in the Hellenistic period the title was withheld from Athenian citizens, who 
might instead be honoured for carrying out benefactions, euergesia, during a period of 
public duty, without being granted the formal status.  In this way euergesy, the 
requirement of public benefaction as a feature of citizenship, was not undermined.  
This tension between the bestowal of honours and the expectation of citizen obligation 
was a defining aspect of the award of honours by the Athenians.
57
   
 
4.2.3   Enktesis 
The right of land ownership was one of the quintessential and most jealously guarded 
privileges of Athenian citizenship.58  A grant of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις awarded the 
right to acquire a house with land, and although some grants were solely for a house, 
they do not ever seem to have been for land alone.59  Xenophon does not use quite this 
formulation, but Jansen argues convincingly that Xenophon intended that non-
Athenians be afforded the privilege of owning as well as building on Attic soil within 
the city walls.60  The Athenians had made grants of enktesis since at least 429/8 (to the 
Thracians, for the construction of a temple to Bendis61), with the earliest known grant 
to individuals appearing in 410/0962 and possibly as early as 424/3.63  Since the 
formation of the Second Athenian League this was not, strictly speaking, a privilege 
available for Athenians to take up in the cities of their allies, although Athenian 
control of land abroad had been on an intrusively different scale to Xenophon’s 
                                                 
56
   Gauthier 1985, p. 18. Generally on the awarding of the title euergetes see Gauthier 1985, pp. 9-24. 
At p. 10, ‘De l’époque de Périclès à celle d’Auguste, aucun décret athénien n’octroie à un citoyen 
le titre d’euergétès’. 
57
   See Engen 2010, pp. 48-49, 70, 225-226.  Lambert 2006 gives Athenian euergesy decrees between 
352/1 and 322/1. 
58
  Lambert notes that, unsurprisingly, all the purchasers recorded in the Rationes Centesimarum 
accounts of the second half of the fourth century which recorded the 1% levy on Attic land sales 
were male Athenian citizens. Lambert 1997, pp. 243-244.  
59
  Henry 1983, p. 205 and p. 225, n. 10. 
60
  Jansen 2012, p. 748.  Gauthier 1976, p. 224, argues that Xenophon intended to award a house 
without land.  
61  
Thracians: IG II
2
 1283, Pečírka 1966, pp. 122-130, 137.  See the wider discussion at chapter 4.5.1. 
62
  Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others: IG I
2 
110 = IG I
3
 102 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 18-
21 = Fornara 155 = Walbank 1978, p. 488. 
63
  Herakleides: IG II
2
 8 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 22-25 = Walbank 47 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 35-55.  
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proposition for Athens.64  Marchant translates the lots Xenophon refers to simply as 
‘many vacant sites;’ however addressing ancient usage of the word οἰκόπεδα Daniel 
has recently emphasised that a more accurate translation of 2.6 than that commonly 
used would be: 
So since within the walls of the city not only are many sites devoid of houses 
but also occupied by ruins [οἰκόπεδα], if the city would give them to approved 
applicants to own for house-building, this too in my opinion would induce 
many more and far better individuals to seek residence in Athens.
65 
These are not, then, simply vacant lots, but run down sites.  A passing reference by 
Aeschines in Against Timarchos supplies some context.  In the same meeting as that at 
which the legal procedure against Timarchos was instituted (at the end of 
Skirophorion in 347/6), the Assembly had considered a proposal about dwelling 
houses on the Pnyx.66  Fisher relates this to the late fourth-century building 
programme on the Pnyx and also to the wider Lykourgan rebuilding of Athens.67  By 
later in the century the Athenians were directing their assets towards the regeneration 
of the city’s physical structures, but Xenophon’s plan ingeniously contrives that the 
resources of (approved) non-Athenians would be employed in the revival and 
redevelopment of the city towards the fulfillment of his vision of a glorious Athens.68 
 
4.2.4   Inscription 
If the honours themselves were not wholly new, wholesale inscription certainly was.69  
The mid-century marked a significant change in the practice of the honouring of both 
citizens and non-citizens.  At the time Xenophon wrote, most honorary decrees were 
not inscribed, and although the literary record and the occasional re-inscription 
demonstrate that the practice of honouring was not in itself new, by far the majority of 
                                                 
64
  RO 22.35-46. J. D. Lewis (2009, pp. 375-376) relates Xenophon’s offer of enktesis to non-
Athenians, to the Athenians’ renunciation of cleruchies in the Prospectus of the Second Athenian 
League (RO 22.25-35), the contrast (Athenians might not own foreign land of their allies, but 
foreigners could own property within the asty) thereby making the proposal radical.  But, aside 
from the fact that enktesis was already an established privilege offered, by definition, to non-
Athenians, relating these two issues takes no account of the very small scale of Xenophon’s 
proposal, which was certainly not to allow farming, and the significant issue of Athenian 
cleruchies often forcibly held, and their detrimental effect on Athenian foreign relations over the 
preceding 100 years. 
65
  Daniel 2007, p. 63. 
66
  Aesch. Against Timarchos 1.81. 
67
  Fisher 2001, date of epangelia procedure, pp. 5-6; dwelling houses, pp. 216-219.   
68
  6.1. 
69
  Lambert 2004, p. 86. 
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the now extant honorary inscriptions of the fourth century were yet to be produced.70  
The comparative number and dating of the hundreds of extant stelai representing 
honours awarded by the Athenians indicate that the inscription of honours of all 
categories mushroomed in the second half of the fourth century.   
 
Around three quarters of the (around 1,000) existing inscribed decrees of the Athenian 
Council and Assembly are honorific in nature.71  Many of the honours we know of 
from the era before the Poroi are evidenced in the literary record.  Walbank suggests 
that in the fifth century, publication was an additional privilege, usually at the expense 
of the demos, and that those instances when the honorand arranged for inscription at 
his own cost, perhaps indicated that the recipient thought more of himself than did the 
state.72 
 
Decrees honouring non-Athenians could be inscribed in their home city as well as in 
Athens, a practice begun in the fifth century but appearing with increasing frequency 
during the fourth.73  The power of the physical inscribing of honours is attested in 
Xenophon’s further suggestion that benefactors’ names be inscribed as a record for all 
time.74  After all, as Lambert points out, honours cannot exist in a vacuum, they need 
to be broadcast to have effect,75 and whilst issues of the siting of the stones amidst the 
mass of stelai on the acropolis, not to mention the levels of literacy amongst those 
who might come across them, remain important areas of debate,76 the motivation for 
the inscribing of an honour was  
to endow it with enhanced, solemn significance and validity as expression of 
                                                 
70
   Honours in the literary record: Liddel forthcoming. Reinscription: eg. IG II
2
 212 = IG II
3
 1 298 = 
RO 64 = Engen 12 = IALD 98-99, 100-101, 102 no. 3. recording both new honours and those 
awarded to earlier generations of Bosporan rulers. 
71
  Lambert 2011a, p. 194.   
72
  Walbank 1978, pp. 7-8, discussing proxeny decrees. 
73
  Liddel 2003, p. 84. 
74
  3.11. Gauthier 1976, p. 96 sees ἀναγραφήσεσθαι as ‘inscription sur une stèle’ without discussion 
of the language and LSJ pp. 101-102 gives ‘to be inscribed or entered in a public register’ citing 
this example from the Poroi. The sense of permanence offered by εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον would 
seem to endorse an interpretation of inscription for public display in this instance.  
75
  Lambert 2011a, pp. 199-201. 
76
  See eg. L. Kallet-Marx 1994, Liddel 2003 and Lambert 2011a, pp. 200-201; also more generally 
on literacy, Yunis 2003, Minchin 2008 and most recently Missiou 2011, arguing for wider literacy 
than hitherto understood on the basis of analysis of ostraka inscriptions and inter-deme tribal 
communications. 
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the collective Athenian will.
77
   
In proposing inscription Xenophon refers specifically to those making a contribution 
to the ‘capital fund,’ reflecting an expectation that inscription would in itself be an 
attraction separate and additional to any honours.  Lambert finds this suggestion 
echoed in an inscription nominating Eudemos of Plataia as a benefactor of the 
Athenians for his offer of financial help in the event of war and assistance with 
building the Panathenaic stadium and theatre.78  If the vast disproportion in the 
numbers of extant honorary decrees dating from the second half of the fourth century 
is anything to go by, Xenophon was not alone in appreciating the significance to the 
honorands of the public recognition afforded by the permanent recording of 
honourable actions. 
 
4.2.5   Proedria 
Proedria, awarding its recipient with a permanently reserved theatre seat, was one of 
the three megistai timai originally given to the descendants of the tyrannicides, along 
with a statue in the agora and sitesis at the prytaneion.79  Xenophon proposes that it 
be awarded to merchants and ship-owners,80 although at the time it was generally, but 
not only, afforded to Athenian officials such as taxiarchs, hipparchs and phylarchs.81  
Jansen stresses the lifelong character of proedria and that it provided entrance, 
possibly ceremonial, at all the city’s contests.82   
 
In practice when the Athenians did begin to award a theatre seat to non-Athenians 
later in the fourth century, rather than give proedria, they evolved a lesser privilege, 
thea, which was awarded for one occasion only, and there are only four extant 
instances of its use, one of which was to a trader.83    
 
                                                 
77
  Lambert 2011a, p. 202. 
78
  Eudemos of Plataia, IG II2 351+624 = IG II3 1 352 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 68-70 = RO 94 = IALD 
121 no. 42, 319, 339-43, 352-55 no. 5, 402. 
79
  Gauthier 1985, p. 81. 
80
  3.4. 
81
  Henry 1983, p. 291 and Engen 2010, pp. 174-175. 
82
  Jansen 2012, p. 743. 
83
  Trader: Sopatros of Akragas: IG II
3
 1 432 = Camp 3 = Reed 55 = Engen 17 = IALD 120 no. 37 
(see chapter 4.5.2); non-traders: IG II
2
 456 (307/6); IG II² 466 (307/6); IG II² 567 (late fourth 
century); Henry 1983, p. 292; Engen 2010, p. 174. 
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4.2.6   Further aspects of Athenian honours  
Trade was not the only realm in which Athens was later to use honours to compete on 
an international basis.  The Poroi may represent the first written recognition of the 
importance of attracting entrepreneurial skill, but just as for grain, in the realm of 
theatre Athens was beginning to compete within a larger market.  In order to attract 
the best theatre practitioners, from at least the 330s Athens began to employ both 
financial and honorific incentives to encourage the very best non-Athenian performers 
to the City Dionysia.  Such awards could be displayed on the Acropolis or by the 
theatre of Dionysos.  Currently, ten such decrees are known, very similar numbers to 
those offered to grain traders in the same period.84  It is interesting to note that honour 
and honours alone were no longer sufficient, and that financial reward became 
acceptable for participation in religious activity.  Xenophon’s wish to see poets 
attracted to the city and festivals celebrated with more splendour85 was ultimately also 
to be achieved with the same mix of honours and profit that he had advocated for the 
promotion of trade.  What had been activities undertaken (superficially at least) for 
honour alone – religious theatrical performances, the provision of substantial grain 
supplies – now needed the additional inducement of profit to enable Athens to attract 
sufficient resources to fulfil the city’s requirements.  Xenophon may not have 
proposed extending honours in relation to theatre this way, but his ideas indicate a 
strong prescience that a mix of honour-driven and financial motivation was to become 
an acceptable aspect of the way that the city promoted herself. 
 
4.2.7   The introduction of the hortatory intention clause  
Not only were honorific decrees increasingly being inscribed; from shortly after the 
mid-century a specific purpose is ascribed to the granting of the decree itself, 
broadcast in the so-called ‘hortatory intention clause.’  Lambert cites the inscription to 
Herakleides of Salamis from 330/29: 
To praise Herakleides son of Charikleides of Salamis and crown him with a 
gold crown of 500 drachmas and permit him to seek from the People what 
good he can, so that others also may behave in an honour-seeking way 
(φιλοτιμῶνται), knowing that the Council honours and crowns those who 
                                                 
84 
 Lambert 2008, pp. 60-61. 
85  
5.4, 6.1. 
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behave in an honour-seeking way (τοὺς φιλοτιμουμένους).86 
As we have seen, Andocides had described this enduring reciprocal relationship 
between Athens and her honorands in the late fifth century.87  Lambert argues that the 
phrase, ‘so that others also may behave in an honour-seeking way’ makes explicit that 
the intention of the decree is to set an example to others and to encourage future 
benefaction by the honorand, reflecting motivations which were already implicit in the 
awarding of honours, and long-held ideology in which the benefaction and the honour 
were two halves of the same reciprocal relationship:88    
Honorific decrees not only recognised past benefactions, they were intended to 
influence future behaviour… not only of honorands, but also of others, who, 
after c. 350, are often explicitly encouraged to emulate the honorands in order 
to attract similar honours for themselves.
89
   
It seems clear from Xenophon’s suggestion at 3.11 that the offer of simple inscription 
as euergetes would be an additional means of attracting investment, and that this 
additional level of recognition, not just honouring, but publicly advertised honouring 
as a means of attracting other benefactors, was already understood by the Athenians as 
a method of securing new benefactions as Lambert suggests, even before the hortatory 
intention clause overtly publicised the city’s motivation.  Liddel, however, draws our 
attention to Athenian anxiety behind the awarding of honorific decrees which is 
evident in the contrast between the stated intention displayed in inscriptions, and the 
private and political motivations behind some proposals of honours insinuated in 
oratory, to the extent even of being against the best interests of Athens.  Demosthenes 
pointed out that at times the Athenians honoured bad as well as good men90 and 
                                                 
86
  Herakleides of Salamis: IG II
2
 360 = IG II
3
 1 367 = RO 95 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 165-182 = Reed 
60 = Engen 27 = IALD 98-99, 121 no. 43, 131-34, 278, 394 n. 23, cited at Lambert 2011a, p. 194.  
Henry 1996 provides a comprehensive analysis of the different varieties of the hortatory intention 
formula. 
87
  And. On His Return 2.23 and chapter 4.2 above. 
88
  Lambert 2011a, p. 195. 
89
  Lambert 2006, pp. 116-117. 
90
  Liddel forthcoming, citing Dem. Against Leptines 20.39, ‘For it is the custom of all nations, for 
the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the 
worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit 
them,’ and Dem. Against Aristocrates 23.141, ‘Once upon a time, on a certain occasion, you gave 
your citizenship to Ariobarzanes, and also, on his account, to Philiscus … Philiscus  … began to 
use the power of Ariobarzanes by occupying Hellenic cities. He entered them and committed 
many outrages, mutilating free-born boys, insulting women, and behaving in general as you would 
expect a man, who had been brought up where there were no laws, and none of the advantages of 
a free constitution, to behave if he attained to power.’  
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Demosthenes himself was accused of taking bribes in return for proposing honours.91  
Motivating potential benefactors by appealing to their philotimia might produce 
reciprocal honours without actually provoking honourable behaviour.  ‘Bad’ men 
might perform ‘good’ deeds if they will be rewarded by a change in nomenclature, 
even if that change does not reflect the benefactor’s true nature.  This is a useful 
reminder that had any of Xenophon’s proposals been implemented, they might have 
been manipulated for self-interest, and that manipulation was an inherent aspect of a 
system which incentivised certain actions motivated by self-interest.92  As we have 
noted elsewhere his ideas, whilst proposed in the interests of the city, are reliant for 
their success on individuals’ desire for self-promotion and profit.   
 
Liddel’s discussion of the way that references to honours in literary texts (mis)align 
with the physical evidence has shown how Athenians remained aware of the tensions 
inherent in the honouring of both citizens and non-citizens.  In particular the literary 
evidence demonstrates the manner in which self-interested parties might use the 
nomination procedure, whereby individual citizens proposed honours for third parties, 
with a variety of more or less straightforward motives.
93
  There is undoubtedly a 
relationship between the proposer and the honorand that is worthy of some attention, 
and Moreno has suggested that the proposal of honours by an individual Athenian to 
be awarded to the leaders of non-democratic states might raise doubts about the 
democratic credentials of the proposer.  His reading of the award to the Bosporan 
Kings proposed by Androtion is a useful reminder that the inscriptions alone reveal 
very little of the web of relationships and political concerns within which these 
awards took place.
94
  What we will see, I believe, is that within his proposals, 
Xenophon set boundaries to the wider awarding of honours so as not to undermine 
established institutions by making them available only to non-citizens who had met 
specific criteria. 
 
                                                 
91
  Din. Against Demosthenes 1.41-45.  
92
  cf. Christ 2006, p. 35, ‘Shrewdness and self-interest go hand-in-hand in Hellenic culture, and not 
least in the way Athenians approached their civic duties and represented their civic behaviour to 
others.’ 
93
  Liddel forthcoming. 
94
  Moreno 2007a, pp. 260-269. 
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4.3   The Poroi and fourth-century decline? 
Lambert  relates the emergence of the hortatory intention clause to a ‘heightened sense 
of decline,’ suggesting that Athenian awareness of the rise of Macedon and the 
weakening of the Second Athenian League led to the city exercising her power  to 
make her decrees as effective as possible.  He draws a parallel with the Poroi whose 
package of measures after the Social War ‘was certainly a “response to decline”.’ 95  
This is by no means an unusual characterisation of the Poroi.  A substantial extract 
from the text appears in Austin and Vidal-Naquet’s seminal Economic and Social 
History of Ancient Greece within the section ‘The Time of Crises,’96 and the wider 
awarding of honours by the Athenians from the middle of the fourth century has been 
viewed as representing a decline of the institutions themselves.97  ‘Crisis’, as we shall 
see, is a word which appears frequently in characterisations of fourth-century Athens, 
and although the intensity of the scholarly debate over fourth-century crisis has to 
some extent diminished since the end of the last century, the discussion has become 
instead about assessing change and the way it affected older social and political 
structures, complemented by case studies of individual aspects of politics and 
society.98  Fourth-century crisis has even been seen reflected in Xenophon’s promotion 
of hunting by the individual, as opposed to hunting by groups of young men 
belonging to a particular age and class.99  
 
Given the Poroi’s particular context, its timing as Athens was getting to grips with the 
implications of her loss of allies and income, its attempt to understand a wider set of 
financial, intra and inter-state relationships and the insight it offers into Athens’ view 
of herself, it is well situated to help in the analysis of a period when change is not only 
an inevitability but a necessity.  In the following sections we will review some of the 
scholarship around the issue in order to further contextualise the discussion of 
Xenophon’s proposals.  
 
To understand whether or how ‘crisis’ and ‘decline’ are evidenced in the Poroi we 
                                                 
95
  Lambert 2011a, p. 196. 
96
  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 362-368. 
97
  See eg Gauthier 1985, pp. 131-140 for bibliography and refutation of the argument that an 
increase in the number of awards implies a ‘decline’ in the institution of proxeny.   
98
  See collections such as Eder 1995, Linke, Meier and Strothman 2010, Herman 2011a and Azoulay 
and Ismard 2011. 
99
  L’Allier 2012, pp. 493-494 discussing Xen. On Hunting. 
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need to unpick the apparent indicators as seen both by modern scholars and ancient 
observers.  For Austin and Vidal-Naquet, fourth-century crises had their roots in the 
Peloponnesian War.  Careful to disclaim any general crisis of the Greek world, they 
see a crisis of the polis evidenced by an increasing gap between the ideal of political 
and military independence, self-sufficiency and citizen concord, and a fourth-century 
reality of social and political conflicts, the threat from external powers such as 
Macedon and Persia, and the challenges of economic self-reliance, particularly for the 
larger cities in commodities such as grain and metals.100  It is tempting, en passant, to 
note that these are all factors we can identify in the fifth century, and that they bear 
some similarity to Isocrates’ glum version of the rack and ruin towards which he 
believed his contemporaries were travelling; I am, however concerned here to look at 
the way that some of Xenophon’s proposals sit within ideas about fourth-century 
evolution and change. 
 
It is perhaps too easy to project back from Chaeroneia and observe features in 
Athenian society which foreshadowed the rise of Macedon even before the rest of the 
Greek world had really started to understand the level of threat posed by Philip.  
Evidence for the beginning of the end of the Greek polis and thus a crisis wider than 
simply the challenge of Attic cash flow tends to be taken from a broader span of the 
fourth century with projections back into the fifth for specific issues, but often without 
precise reference to the chronology of contemporary events, which can lead to a 
somewhat skewed analysis by attributing a variety of - perhaps disconnected - features 
to an apparent path of decline.  This can imply an interrelatedness that may not be 
demonstrable, and which may have been neither apparent nor predictable in the 350s.   
 
Athens had recently seen military defeat, the loss of her allies and financial difficulty, 
but this was not the first time that she had been in such a situation; it was pretty much 
an unavoidable outcome of the Greek way of managing inter-state relationships and is 
not sufficient reason for a characterisation of decline over a longer period.101  
Separating those features which would have been apparent to Xenophon and his 
                                                 
100
  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 131-132.  See Davies 1995 for a discussion of the scholarship 
of fourth-century crisis.  
101
  Although Low 2007, p. 255 has shown that interstate politics were more complex than simple 
‘internecine squabbling’.  
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contemporaries, from those which we may or may not infer with hindsight, is essential 
in any analysis of Xenophon’s prescience.  In the light of scholarship on fourth-
century crisis, decline and change, and the various reassessments of the Poroi and of 
Xenophon’s political astuteness, my hope in the following section is not so much to 
answer the question about decline but to see to what extent the roots of any decline 
were already evident in the work of Xenophon in 355.  
 
4.3.1   Isocrates and decline 
‘Decline’ is an emotive and, to some extent subjective word with pejorative 
connotations and a wide range of applications - moral, physical, social, economic, 
political and institutional.  It is a state which requires a series of measurements against 
a yardstick of some apparently more successful era, begging endless questions about 
how such benchmarks are evaluated and quantified.  We should perhaps be careful to 
document change rather than to characterise it descriptively.  Decline is a word, 
however, of which Isocrates might have approved.  Writing contemporaneously with 
Xenophon’s Poroi as the Athenians considered peace proposals towards the end of the 
Social War, his political analysis of the contemporary Athenian state and the ills 
inherited by any who attempt to wield empire is made against a strict comparison 
between a former military and political golden age and the excesses of his day.     
If you will go over these and similar questions in your minds, you will 
discover that arrogance [τὴν ἀκολασίαν] and insolence [τὴν ὕβριν] have been 
the cause of our misfortunes [τῶν κακῶν] while sobriety and self-control [τὴν 
σωφροσύνην] have been the source of our blessings.102    
Hirsch argues that Isocrates’ judgement of the Persian barbarian, represented in a 
sequence of acid generalisations in his Panegyricus, did not represent the thinking of 
most of his contemporaries and suggests that Isocrates may not even have fully 
believed what he said himself.103  But finding a common enemy is a strategy that has 
served nefarious politicians well for the subsequent 2,300 years, and in calling on the 
Greeks to lead a hegemony against Persia,104 and identifying Philip as the leader to 
unite them,105 Isocrates’ Greek-oriented outlook palpably failed to identify the true 
                                                 
102
  Isoc. On the Peace 8.119.  ἢν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξίητε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, εὑρήσετε τὴν 
μὲν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τὴν ὕβριν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν γιγνομένην, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 
103
  Hirsch 1985, p. 3, discussing Isoc. Panegyricus 4.150–158. 
104 
 Isoc. Panegyricus 4.184-185; Isoc. Panathenaicus 12.13-14.  
105 
 Isoc. 5 To Philip. 
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threat which came ultimately, not from Persia and the east but from within the Greek 
world in the form of the very saviour to whom Isocrates’ appeals were addressed.  
Greece was ultimately united by Philip and his son in a way Isocrates did not foresee: 
as Gray remarks, ‘Political realities regularly fall short of models.’106 
 
For Isocrates, decline had started way back, at least under the leadership of Pericles, if 
not earlier.107  The power and temptations of empire brought ruin to any who tried to 
pursue them, Spartans included: 
For in place of the ways of life established among them it filled the citizens 
with injustice, indolence, lawlessness and avarice and the commonwealth with 
contempt for its allies, covetousness of the possessions of other states, and 
indifference to its oaths and covenants.
108
   
Athens’ current poverty was unquestionably the fault of her citizens, (mis)led by men 
such as Chares and Aristophon,109 who despite the state’s lack of resources, employed 
mercenaries to fight on their behalf on land and who took along cushions if they were 
required to man the triremes in person.110  Isocrates accused his opponents of 
characterising the war/anti-war debate as democratic versus oligarchic interests, 
despite the fact that war had twice led to the overthrow of the democracy.  In a manner 
very different to Xenophon’s encouragement of the skills of those of other poleis,111 
he decried Athens’ welcoming attitude to non-Athenians.112  Xenophon demonstrated 
a far more nuanced view of individual Persians and a more pragmatic approach to 
relations with Persia,113 and when we examine the Poroi in the context of this 
suggestion of decline, Xenophon’s outlook becomes all the more remarkable.  His 
language in the Poroi is constantly present tense and forward facing about the glories 
and resources of the city, reflecting neither a sense of a downward trajectory nor a 
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  Gray 2000, p. 154. 
107
  Davidson 1990, p. 21 on the debate as to the origins of decline as seen by Isocrates. On the Peace 
8.75-80. 
108
  Isoc. On the Peace 8.96.  ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστώτων παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας 
ἐνέπλησεν ἀδικίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροψίας μὲν τῶν 
συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὀλιγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. 
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   Isoc. On the Peace 8.50, 53-55. 
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   Isoc. On the Peace 8.48. 
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  2.1. 
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  Isoc. On the Peace 8.50, 88. 
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  See eg. Hirsch 1985, p. 37: ‘the Anabasis is not about Persian deceit, but about deceit in human 
affairs,’ and Millender 2012, p. 396. ‘Nevertheless Xenophon’s participation in Cyrus’ expedition, 
his account of his exemplary behaviour at Cunaxa (1.8.15) and repeated allusions to Cyrus’ 
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connections between Greeks and Persians as Isocrates.’ 
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reactionary call for the simple reinstatement of past moral standards, but a resourceful 
and pragmatic utilisation of changing socio-economic modes of operation to rebuild a 
more robust city.  
 
4.3.2   Crisis and decline?  
The ‘classical’ view of fourth-century crisis in Athens takes certain features evidenced 
in contemporary sources and builds a picture of wide ranging social, economic and 
political tensions.  Two important staging posts of the discussion of fourth-century 
crisis and decline are Pečírka’s ‘The crisis of the Athenian Polis in the fourth century 
B.C.’ of 1976114  and Davies’ 1995 article ‘The Fourth Century Crisis: What 
Crisis?’115  Conveniently summarising their individual views on the debate within 
their respective titles, between them they provide a thorough survey of the late 
twentieth-century scholarship.  Both take the work of Claude Mossé116 as the starting 
point, encompassing within their analyses that Mossé herself changed her views over 
the course of her work.117  Mossé had argued that following the Peloponnesian War, 
land was increasingly controlled by a smaller number of people and exploited through 
the more widespread use of slave labour.  This had led to the greater urbanisation of 
the population and the rise in mercenary service of a class who could no longer make 
their living from small landholdings.  The emergence of competition for trade in 
artisanal products from expanding poleis at the fringes of the Greek world saw in 
addition the loss of markets for Athenian goods, whilst a widening gulf between rich 
and poor increased the burden of taxation on the rich.  
 
The 1992 conference featured in Eder’s collection Die athenische Demokratie im 4. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr. in which Davies’ paper appeared, apparently included the word 
crisis ‘prominently’ in its brief.118  Yet just twenty years later, it could be said of a 
2011 collection of papers dedicated to Fuks,119 a leading proponent of theories of 
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  Pečírka 1976. 
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  Davies 1995. 
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  Mossé 1962, 1972, 1973a.  
117
  Pečírka 1976, p. 20, encapsulates Mossé’s revised view: ‘it was incorrect to postulate an economic 
crisis in order to explain the social and political problems Athens had to face in the fourth 
century.’ 
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fourth-century crisis, that  
it seems somewhat ironic that the consensus of the papers, according to 
Herman, is that Athens enjoyed "unusual stability" under almost two centuries 
of democratic rule.
120
 
Undoubtedly at the point the Poroi was written, Athenian finances were in a parlous 
state, but throughout the 350s there is evidence of a lively engagement in democratic 
debate and in the decades immediately following the Social War we see the revival of 
Athenian trade, the speedy improvement of her finances121 and her continued military 
and political engagement with the rest of the Greek world.  As Pečírka pointed out in 
1976, a closer analysis of the individual sources for evidence of decline does not 
always bear out the wider argument.122  Pečírka’s conclusion, that it was right to speak 
of a crisis in the fourth century in a limited sense, was based on three specific 
findings: one, that new fortunes were increasingly being made that were monetary in 
nature and not land-based, leading to a significant change in the balance of social 
relationships; two, that slave-ownership, which was not restricted to citizens in the 
same way as land-ownership, was a significant factor in the increase in wealth of non-
citizens; and three, building on Mossé’s observation of an erosion of the difference 
between citizens and metics, a new social structure grew up based on ‘economic’ 
wealth which was not bound to status.123    
 
Writing shortly after Pečírka, Austin and Vidal-Naquet characterise fourth-century 
crises under several headings: war, a state of war becoming more or less permanent 
along with the development of military techniques such as the use of light armed 
infantry; the rise of the military specialist and the development of mercenary 
service,124 which had long-term fatal consequences for the poleis ‘since they gradually 
lost control of warfare;’125 social conflicts and the impoverishment of the masses as 
the gulf between rich and poor widened, aggravated by ambiguously defined ideas of 
egalitarianism and rooted in the abandonment of the country for the city by Pericles; 
the oligarchies of the end of the fifth century; and an increase in the number of thetes 
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  Forsdyke 2012. 
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  Athenian income increasing from 130 talents as Xenophon was writing, to 400 talents in 346. 
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  Pečírka 1976, p. 9. 
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  Pečírka 1976, pp. 26-29. 
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and a growing reliance on misthoi.126  They also identified internal aspects of the 
decline in Athens, with family feelings more openly expressed127 and politics ceasing 
to play a dominant role, giving way to private affairs.128  Xenophon, with his well-
known restraint at the fate of his son Gryllus129 and his sustained interest well into old 
age in the affairs of the polis, can be accused of neither of these tendencies.  And 
whilst there may well be evidence of change of practice, evidence of change is not 
necessarily evidence of crisis.  
 
The characterisation of fourth-century Athens as a hotbed of social and economic 
unrest is encapsulated in Fuks’ 1984 Social conflict in Ancient Greece, a 
posthumously published collection of his papers.  Taking his evidence from the 
orators and philosophers, and most particularly from Isocrates, Fuks’ paper, ‘Isokrates 
and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece,’ presents a picture of a city unable to 
create lasting alliances with her allies, internally divided by the resentment of 
wealth130 and the disdain for the poor,131 threatened by an influx of non-Athenians, 
and whose ability to secure peaceful relations with her neighbours was threatened by 
roving bands of mercenaries and their dependent families.132  But Fuks’ analysis is 
perhaps too strongly influenced by the firmly held views of Isocrates.133  We should 
question the extent to which Isocrates’ description truly reflected Athenian concerns as 
evidenced in daily social intercourse. 
 
Runciman, writing in 1990, took a broader organisational approach, examining the 
entrenched structures of the Greek poleis, comparing them with Rome and Venice in 
order to establish why some city states had had the ability to expand their authority 
and create sustainable empires, whilst the Greek poleis had not proved able to adapt 
sufficiently that any one of them could sustain in the face of the encroaching power of 
Macedon.  He found the Greek poleis both anti-monarchical and strongly populist: 
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  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 140. 
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  Evidenced, for instance, by the increasing appearance of white ground funerary lekythoi from the 
last third of the fifth century. 
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  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 144-145. 
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  Xen. Hellenica 7.5.15-17; Plut. Consolatio ad Apollonium 33. 
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  Fuks 1984, p. 22 citing Isoc. Antidosis 15.159–160.  
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Against this background, the change in the mode of coercion from militia to 
mercenaries which all commentators agree to be significant could hardly fail to 
work more against the adaptation – that is, augmentation of power – of the 
poleis than in favour of it.134    
Runciman’s conclusions are essentially about the control of power within each polis, 
arguing that the full exploitation of the modes of production, persuasion and coercion 
were hampered by an ethos which took a dim view of the rise of individual ambition, 
which he describes as a ‘collective jealousy’135 of the concentration of authority being 
held by a single inheritance group:   
the poleis were all, without exception, far too democratic … In terms of a 
close concentration of economic, ideological, and coercive power in the hands 
of a compact, self-reproducing elite, no Greek polis ever came anywhere near 
the degree of oligarchy which characterized the institutions of both Rome and 
Venice during the period of their achievement of world power status.136 
In response, Davies argued that Athens was not more obviously democratic in the 
fourth century than the fifth.  There was change, but it was gradual and non-disruptive 
and ran side by side with a great advancement in intellectual thought. Nevertheless 
there was a tension between slowly altering practice, contemporary political theory 
and the ideology of static institutions in a society which looked back to a lawgiver. 
Davies highlighted the issue of technology transfer, as other poleis caught up with 
Athenian expertise not just in warfare but in the efficient administration of regional 
resources. Ultimately, he argued, the actual crisis was about how to manage interstate 
relationships and where necessary, to pool resources and reach agreement about 
command structure:137   
… contemporary political perceptions saw hegemonies in the sense of 
combinations of resources of several states as no longer necessary – a mood 
which Xenophon with his Poroi and Isokrates with his Peace both caught and 
distilled.
138
 
The Poroi however does not so much see hegemony as unnecessary; Xenophon after 
all suggests a wide military alliance to defend Delphi.139  Rather he sees war as 
unprofitable140 and hegemony, as previously practised, not to be ultimately fruitful in 
                                                 
134
  Runciman 1990, p. 353. 
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the retention of allies.141   He speaks warmly of the Athenian-led alliances of the past 
and specifically highlights Athenian re-ascendency at the behest of the islands after 
her loss of arche due to the harshness of her authority.142  What he certainly had seen 
was that the endless reconfiguring of inter-poleis alliances had not brought peace, and 
his solution seems to be that restraint and goodwill were the key to successful 
hegemonic relationships.143  The Poroi picks at the edges of the issues Davies 
discusses – Xenophon recognised the value of intellectual and entrepreneurial 
resources available in other states,144 and he certainly recognised the need to find 
different ways to manage external relationships.  The mechanisms he chooses 
however, obviating the need for the oppressive demand for tribute and promoting 
relationships with individual benefactors, were respectively too lengthy to establish 
and too small in their application, to be able to address the wider problems that Davies 
identifies.  
 
4.4   Athenian honouring in practice  
Addressing the second of the above themes, relationships with individual benefactors, 
in this section we will look in some detail at evidence for the awarding of honours by 
the Athenians in order further to contextualise Xenophon’s proposals.  
 
4.4.1   Honours to non-Greeks 
Until 330, the only attested non-Greeks awarded honours by the Athenians in relation 
to the provision of goods are the Persian Orontes, Satrap of Mysia, who was awarded 
a gold crown and citizenship in 349/8 for the provision of grain,
145
 the Bosporans, 
Satyros I and his sons, and later on his own account, Satyros himself, his son and 
successor Leukon with his sons in turn.  Leukon’s successors Spartokos and 
Pairisades, with Apollonios, were then also awarded honours in 347/6, all these 
honours demonstrating the immense importance of north-west Asia Minor for the 
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provision of grain to Athens.
146
  This aspect of the relationship between Athens and 
the Bosporan kings was a part of a more complex web of connections between 
Bosporan and Athenian aristocracy which included marriage ties, the education of 
sons of the Bosporan nobility and the provision of refuge to Athenians in need of 
temporary shelter.
147
  The Bosporan inscription indicates that Spartokos II and 
Pairisades II had themselves asked for confirmation that the honours granted to their 
father would remain in place,
148
 and also refers to hyperesiai provided to the 
Bosporans by Athens,
149
 Athenian naval expertise furnishing an important aspect of 
what was clearly more than a symbolic or one-sided relationship.  
 
When awarded to non-Greeks for the provision of goods then, as far as we can see 
from this limited evidence, honours had been offered only to those of notably high 
status.  The elaborate relief at the top of IG II 2 212 is testament to the prominence of 
both the Bosporan honorands per se and the considerable significance of their 
relationship with Athens.150  However, whilst these non-Greeks, who were honoured 
in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, were foreign leaders who had provided vital 
resources in serious quantities, there are other suppliers, non-Athenian Greeks of 
lesser status, who received not crowns, but honours such as proxenia, euergesia, 
sailing privileges, asylia, citizenship and ateleia from around 414.151  We will look at 
these again in due course.   
 
4.4.2.   Honours and trade  
To provide some context for the discussion that follows, two particular aspects of the 
debate about Athenian honours are worthy of particular consideration: issues within 
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Xenophontic scholarship around the status of traders, and then, briefly, the actual 
practice of the later fourth century.  
 
4.4.2.1   Traders and status 
Scholars have noted the way in which honorific decrees favouring traders later in the 
fourth century echoed Xenophon’s writing.152  Engen determined it ‘possible but 
unlikely’ that the Poroi was responsible for Athens’ later decision to award thea to 
traders,153 and Cawkwell saw the increase in the awarding γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις as a 
likely implementation by Eubulus of Xenophon’s idea.154  The awarding of honours 
and privileges to non-Athenians was not in itself controversial, but the Poroi’s 
proposed recipients of such awards have raised eyebrows.  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 
distinguish between the ‘non-commercial motivations’ underlying Xenophon’s 
suggestion that merchants would visit Athens in order to win honour, as against the 
‘strictly commercial criteria’ relating to their desire for profit, but this is surely too 
simple a distinction to make between motivating factors which must both have played 
their part in a merchant’s choice of destination. Most might not choose Athens if they 
could not also expect to make a profit, but considerations such as honour and trading 
and ancillary facilities might be another deciding factor.  If the dating of the Pistiros 
inscription attributed to a ‘Thracian dynast’ of shortly after 359 is correct, other 
polities were also beginning to see the benefits of granting privileges to traders.155  
Austin and Vidal-Naquet argued that Xenophon’s suggestion to offer proedria to 
traders was ‘deeply subversive’156 because honorific seats were an award made 
hitherto only to Athenian magistrates and high status priests.  Much of the discussion 
of trade-honours, whether or not about Xenophon, has been bound up with the status 
issues which have affected the study of economic history.  Discussing the proposal to 
grant enktesis to non-Athenians, Austin and Vidal-Naquet say,  
Xenophon is probably not well aware of the profoundly subversive aspects of 
some of his proposals, notably the proposal to extend for the benefit of the 
metics the right to own land in the city
157
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Pečírka, by contrast, thought the idea  
a very serious - and I should say very enlightened - attempt to change, though 
very partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real 
economic role in fourth-century Athens.
158
 
As we have earlier noted, Xenophon suggests only that the state should consider 
offering enktesis to approved or worthy applicants, not to the metic population as a 
whole, and one might think that he was better positioned to assess the degree of 
subversiveness of his ideas than commentators over 2,000 years later.159  Enktesis was 
already granted to non-resident, non-Athenians and the extent to which Xenophon was 
suggesting that it might be extended is arguable as we shall shortly see.   
 
Austin and Vidal-Naquet also found the proposal to offer xenia to traders ‘again 
deeply subversive’ because traders were to be given what they called the ‘exceptional 
honour’ of dining at the prytaneion ‘simply in relation to the importance of their 
cargo.’160  On the other hand, in quite startling contrast, Lambert describes hospitality 
at the prytaneion and theatre tickets as ‘minor’ honours, whilst in practice he suggests 
that crowns and the title of euergetes are not only symbolic but ‘ubiquitous.’161  
Austin and Vidal-Naquet are placing Xenophon’s proposals within the context of 
earlier practice, and Lambert is assessing them in terms of status and of their 
frequency in the later fourth century and so this opposition is not quite as 
straightforward as it might seem.  The way, however, in which Athenians changed 
their practice as the century progressed would suggest that Xenophon’s ideas were not 
quite so subversive as Austin and Vidal-Naquet indicate, whilst as we shall see, there 
were already some instances of awarding honours which set precedents for 
Xenophon’s proposals.   
 
Gauthier is certain that Xenophon’s intention in offering theatre seats is to offer 
honours only to non-Athenian Greeks,
162
 but this distinction between Greek and non-
Greek is not clear from the text, which refers only to emporoi and naukleroi. As a rule 
Xenophon appears inclusive in his approach to non-Athenians, Greek or otherwise – 
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elsewhere he is clear that the resident alien community he wishes to encourage 
includes ‘Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large 
part of our alien population consists’163 whilst those who would be inscribed on his 
list of benefactors include kings, tyrants and satraps.
164
  Nevertheless the high status 
of this second list should not go unnoticed, whilst the former group, although offered 
the opportunity to serve in the cavalry, (which may come with the unspoken caveat 
that they would have to be wealthy enough to afford it), would also improve the 
quality of the hoplite forces by their absence.  Xenophon is by no means misty-eyed 
about the non-citizens on whom his plans depend.  What is important is not 
nationality, but wealth and enterprise.   
 
In his detailed study of the Athenian practice of honouring the city’s benefactors, 
Engen argues that in overseas trade, exchange had two goals, honour and profit and 
that Xenophon (and Aristotle) recognised the dynamic relationship between the two, 
the degree of significance of each varying according to the status and relative wealth 
of individual traders.165  But Engen also describes  
… the corrosive effect that granting … honours for trade-related services had 
on traditional values.
166
   
‘Corrosive’ is a striking and negative description of what might also have been the 
outcome of a policy that forms one of the central planks of the Poroi and this 
judgement merits some analysis.  Contrary to what Engen describes as ‘the 
Finley/Hasebroek model’, his analysis of honours granted by Athens in return for 
trade-related services shows that the socio-economic statuses of those involved in 
trade were very diverse, and that Xenophon recognised that Athens needed to look 
after the interests of all involved in trade, ranging from traders of modest means to 
foreign potentates.167   He sees in Xenophon’s proposal to offer honours to emporoi 
and naukleroi recognition that  
… contrary to the view of Finley, such men would not simply benefit as 
unintended by-products of Athenian policy; the satisfaction of their interests 
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was integral to the success of Athenian trade policy.168  
Discussing the changes that occurred in the granting of honours for trade-related 
services over the course of the fourth century, Engen states: 
… granting honors such as gold crowns for trade-related as well as political 
and military services required an adjustment to long-held social values.  This 
was especially true when the trade-related service was the simple importation 
of grain for sale at the going price, since in the absence of Athenian honors, 
such an act was motivated solely by profit seeking on the part of the honorand.  
Perhaps even worse for traditional Greek values, all the honorands who had 
performed trade-related services were foreigners, and some of them were 
common professional traders.169 
This juxtaposition of value, motivation by ‘monetary gain’ set against ‘traditional 
values’, is difficult either to uphold or to deny, since the scales are manifestly 
different, and Engen provides little evidence of the ‘corrosive effect’ itself, his 
conclusions being taken essentially from the internal evidence of the extant honours 
rather than a wider analysis of any demonstrable effect within society.170  Given 
Xenophon’s education, his career in Persia, his subsequent exile by, and delicate 
relationship with, the Athenians, the recent loss of his son and his detailed knowledge 
of Greek politics of the preceding decades, it is hard to imagine that Xenophon would 
be either deliberately subversive or could realistically be accused of naïvety or a lack 
of awareness in his understanding of the complexities of Athenian social and 
hierarchical structures.  As we have seen, every proposal is situated within existing 
Athenian legal and democratic structures.171  We should also note that whilst he is 
clearly making new proposals, he sees no reason to apologise for them; he believes 
they are worthy, but nothing in his tone suggests that he believes that his listeners 
would think them shocking. 
 
In relation to proxeny, Gauthier offers a useful case study against the argument that 
the increased awarding of honours in the second half of the fourth century is an 
indicator of decline.  He shows that attempts to see decline in the use of the institution 
over time through the literary sources, and the simple numeric analyses of 
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inscriptions, do not take sufficient account of the nature of the relative historians.  
Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon were dealing with ‘fratricidal cities’ whilst 
Polybius and Diodorus were envisaging a ‘world history’ in which Kings and Romans 
held sway, thus their comparative degree of focus on politics at a civic level is 
inevitably different.  An increase in honours awarded to non-Athenians from the fifth 
down to the third century might be reflective of the more intensive nature of relations 
between cities, whilst the very survival of such institutions implies a flourishing and 
persistent relevance, albeit with a diminution of prestige.
172
   
 
Nevertheless the view that an apparently broader application of honours has some 
level of harmfulness, either for society or for the institution of the honour itself, 
persists.  In the granting of traditional honours, Engen sees an attempt by the 
Athenians ‘to mask traditionally disesteemed economic activities by representing 
them in traditional terms of esteem.’173  He views Athens as a state whose chief 
interest in trade was in consumption and where the increasing numbers of trade-
related honours awarded in the fourth century were essentially about the 
encouragement of vital imports.  Whilst tax revenue would also have been a welcome 
result, he argues that honours were not aimed at encouraging general growth in the 
quantities of both incoming and outgoing commodities.
174
  This seems to me to be 
directly contradicted at 3.2, where Xenophon describes how traders have at Athens, 
‘the opportunity of exchanging their cargo and exporting very many classes of goods 
that are in demand,’ in addition to her silver.175  The attraction of goods on offer for 
export is surely one of the reasons for what Xenophon calls her ‘vast land trade.’176 
 
This sense of a thriving trade which might be manipulated for the wider benefit of 
Athenians is quite contrary to any idea of ‘decline’ and decline is not what I believe 
prompted Xenophon to write the text, nor do I believe that his proposals themselves 
either reflect or potentially engender it. 
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4.4.2.2   Honours awarded to traders in the later fourth century 
To whom, then, and to what extent, did the Athenians award honours to traders later in 
the fourth century after Xenophon had written the Poroi? 
Lambert gives us an interesting overview of the relative proportions of the different 
concerns of the demos as represented in the 270 inscribed laws and decrees that 
survive from the thirty or so years after Xenophon wrote, 352/1 to 322/1.  150 honour 
foreigners; of these, the context of sixty can be deduced, and around half of those are 
military/political in nature. Ten are related to the theatre, and twelve honour grain 
traders.177  A glance at Engen’s analysis of honours for trade-related services which 
includes those found in the literary sources confirms this heavy bias towards the 
encouragement of grain importers throughout the century, and is supported by Culasso 
Gastaldi’s discussion of fourth-century Athenian proxenies in Asia Minor.  Of twenty 
eight known fourth-century decrees recorded within Engen’s broader category of 
trade-related services, twenty two are for the provision of grain, five cannot be certain 
and one is for the supply of fish.178  Lambert notes that such trade-related honours do 
not significantly appear in our records until after Chaeroneia:179   
the systematic honouring of grain traders was a new policy after Chaironeia, a 
product of Athens' sudden loss of international power and influence following 
the defeat and the consequent dissolution of the Second Athenian League, and 
a response to increased vulnerability to the acute supply problems of the 30s 
and 20s.180 
This is not, then, the wide encouragement of import and export trade in all 
commodities that Xenophon proposed, and certainly not an immediate implementation 
of his treatise, but a more measured response to Athens’ specific supply needs.  It does 
however indicate that his suggestion was not out of keeping with Athenian thinking on 
the ways that honours could bring essential benefits to the city.   
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4.4.3   Honours for Athenians 
So where do Xenophon’s proposals for prizes for magistrates181 sit within the evolving 
practice of Athenian honours?  Although there had been Athenian decrees honouring 
citizens for outstanding undertakings earlier in the fourth century,182 this was unusual; 
Lambert points out that out of over 250 surviving Athenian decrees from between 403 
and 352, not one has the honouring of an Athenian as its ‘main purpose’.  We receive 
the impression from Demosthenes’ Against Androtion that a mechanism was in place 
for honouring a successful boule with crowns at the point of departure should they ask 
for it, and Demosthenes’ attack on Androtion, whilst confessedly personally 
motivated, does reveal that such honours could not be awarded unless the incumbents 
had achieved certain requirements such as the minimum refitting of the navy that was 
essential both to Athenian naval pre-eminence and to her self-esteem.183  From the 
340s, however, it became more common to honour Athenian citizens for carrying out 
their public duties.184  Lambert suggests that concern about the ability and probity of 
Athenian officials and the need to encourage them may have been a factor, so that the 
punishment of under-performing officials had to be countered by public praise for 
those who undertook their duties well.185  For Liddel this awarding of prizes indicates 
a recognition of the importance of individual participation in the Athenian 
administration.186  Thus those Athenians who we see honoured from the 340s were 
likely to be recognised for carrying out (sometimes routine) official duties rather than 
for their political status187 and inscribed state decrees honouring Athenians were not 
usually decorated,188 both features reflecting the concern that the honouring of citizens 
might unbalance the notion of democratic duty which made the fulfillment of civic 
responsibility both an obligation and an honour in itself.   
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Building on Ober’s observations that elite values were appropriated to the purposes of 
democracy,189 Engen sees Athenian concern for the integrity of the democracy as a far 
stronger explanation of the earlier disinclination to award honours to Athenians than 
any judgments about the social acceptability of trade.190  These scholarly views all 
emphasise the concern of the demos that the notions of citizen equality should not be 
undermined by the injudicious awarding of honours.  Turning to Xenophon, we see 
that alongside his proposals for honours to be offered to non-Athenians, he suggests a 
new Athenian magistracy, a board of guardians of aliens similar to the guardians of 
orphans, who would compete to attract the greatest number of metics, and that both 
this magistracy and the already existing market magistrates would receive recognition 
in the form of honour [τιμή] or prizes [ἆθλα] for the effective fulfilment of their 
duties.
191
  
 
In suggesting prizes for magistrates, Xenophon operates within established practice in 
the honouring of Athenians for the conscientious completion of democratic duties. 
Good practice of regular, state-managed activity would be rewarded but however 
exceptional, Athenians would not be honoured for activity outside their democratic 
responsibilities in the way that non-Athenians might be.  Xenophon’s Athenian 
honours proposal sits unobtrusively within the pattern of the granting of honours to 
Athenians for the completion of regular duties.  
 
4.4.4   The language of praise 
Over the course of the century, the manner in which terms of praise were applied also 
evolved, with terms that had hitherto only been applied to non-citizens slowly 
appearing in praise of citizens too.192  Alongside the first appearance of philotimia as 
an explicit motivator,193 there was a continuing clear distinction between the way that 
Athens honoured her own citizens, and the manner in which she honoured non-
Athenian Greeks and foreigners.  Terms of praise such as aner agathos/andres agathoi 
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(good man/men), chresimos (useful), arete (excellence/virtue), eunoia, eunous (good 
will/goodwilled) and philotimia (love of honour) make their first appearances in the 
records at different times from the mid-fifth down to the mid-fourth century.  But in 
the case of all except philotimia, the term is applied at the earliest to non-Athenians, 
then later to non-Athenians in respect of trade-related services, (with six out of twenty 
five extant decrees honouring traders using the terms aner agathos/andres agathoi, all 
of whom were foreigners, although some had been naturalised),194 and finally only to 
Athenians in the 340s and 330s.  Eunoia and eunous were not used in referring to 
Athenians until the last decade of the century.195  As we have seen, inscription as 
euergetes is only suggested by Xenophon for foreigners contributing to his ‘capital 
fund’ and not to be offered to Athenians;196 Xenophon does not transgress a strict 
distinction.  J. D. Lewis says of this proposal that honouring foreigners in this way 
‘would have been major steps towards extending to foreigners some of the special 
distinctions reserved for free-born Athenian males.’  But as inscription as euergetes 
had only hitherto been offered to non-Athenians and not to Athenians, and was not 
afforded to Athenians even in the Hellenistic era, this view is misjudged.197   
 
In his discussion of the evolution of Greek cardinal virtues, Whitehead notes that once 
it has become familiar and apparently even formulaic, it is difficult for us to 
appreciate the impact that approbatory language had when it was first used.  
Examining the honorific vocabulary Athenians began to use in the fourth century, he 
observes that when words such as andres agathoi were applied to an entire population, 
as they were in 451/450 to the people of Sigeion,198 honorary vocabulary previously 
applied to the dead was now being applied to the living.  Stressing the, ‘caution, even 
inhibition,’ that would have surrounded the application to the living of language 
previously used to describe Athens’ deceased heroes, Whitehead wonders, ‘what 
stages of thought were needed - conceptual stages if not chronological ones - before it 
became acceptable to call the men of Sigeion ‘noble’ in 451/450?’  This was after all a 
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Homeric phrase implying both heroism and status, later applied by the Athenians to 
the dead of Thermopylae and Plataia but later still, as Whitehead puts it, to a soldier 
who came home, ‘not on his shield, but with it!’199   
 
Pursuing the term a little further, by 407 we see it applied to Archelaos of Macedon on 
the proposal (perhaps) of Alcibiades, for his support of Athenian ships at Pydna, 
support which included the provision of timber and oar spars.200  Meiggs and Lewis 
suggest that this decree illustrates, ‘the boldness and originality of Alcibiades,’ with its 
provision to send shipbuilders out to Macedon for the faster construction of new ships, 
urgently needed.201   
 
Archelaos may be ‘noble’ in birth, and his help to the Athenians essential when the 
fleet is reduced and timber transportation dangerous, but his services are different 
again to those of the steadfast men of Sigeion, and this decree falls into the category 
of those first, very late fifth-century awards of honours in return for essentially 
material provisions.   
 
What Whitehead’s discussion and this later example show us is the manner in which 
the demos reconfigured its use of language to articulate Athens’ relationship with 
living, non-Athenians where previously it had been used to commemorate her own 
heroic dead.  One hundred years before Xenophon's text, honorary language 
previously reserved for men of a certain status began to be applied to those in a very 
different category, for the benefit of the polis.  Fifty years later, Alcibiades’ inventive 
proposal changed its use again.  The precise sequence, of course, is conjecture – when 
it comes to the epigraphic record, there are ‘unknown unknowns.’  And as Whitehead 
says, we cannot know the stages of thought through which such usage changed, 
nevertheless it seems clear that precisely the sort of political expediency which 
motivates Xenophon’s proposals, also motivated Alcibiades, and would have similarly 
inspired the earliest usage of what had previously been more familiar in a funerary 
context.  By the middle of the fourth century, broadening the reach of honorary 
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language was not new, and in the application of the honorific lexicon, perhaps never 
had been.  The use of honorary language evolved with time, always controlled by the 
demos for its own specific purposes, whether to encourage the heroism of Athenian 
soldiers or the support of her allies.  The carefully differentiated deployment of 
terminology between Athenian and non-Athenian tends to support Ober’s contention 
that ‘aristocratic ideals were made to conform to the needs of the democratic state.’202  
Whoever may have proposed the awarding of honours and the wording to be 
proffered, the evolving use of honorific language was always mediated by the demos.  
Xenophon’s suggestion that subscribers to his fund be awarded the title euergetes 
continues a tradition of shaping the use of Athenian honorary language to achieve the 
optimum results for the polis just as previous generations had done.  
  
4.4.5   The quality of ships and merchandise 
Xenophon specifically ties the bestowal of proedria and xenia on emporoi and 
naukleroi to the high quality of their ships and merchandise.203  We might wonder why 
he would be concerned about the quality of the ships?  Austin and Vidal-Naquet relate 
the honours to ‘the importance of their cargo.’204  Gauthier’s broader interpretation is 
that the essential thing for Xenophon was that the merchants were useful for the city 
and responded to her needs – he remembered the decrees made by the city ‘en temps 
de crises’ in which some merchant had brought the city an important cargo. In 
particular, says Gauthier, Xenophon would have remembered other decrees granted in 
times of crisis such as war and famine, recognising that important cargoes had been 
delivered in the time of greatest need.205 
 
Undoubtedly this is correct, but it goes further than that.  By restricting qualification 
for these awards in this manner, Xenophon is not suggesting honouring just any 
common trader, but those who are ship-owners and/or who possess the means to 
import such significant quantities of high-quality merchandise that they are of use to 
the city.  Such men might not be of traditionally elite status, but they would be 
unlikely to be men whose businesses only survived from one cargo to another, 
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transported in a boat owned by somebody else who let out space to an assortment of 
traders.  Xenophon’s allocation of honours is within carefully prescribed boundaries.   
 
Jansen argues that Xenophon intended to ‘moralise’ commercial exchange by 
incorporating short term market-based relationships within long term friendship 
categories in order to try to militate against the uncertainties of the market that might 
otherwise lead traders to take their merchandise elsewhere.206  Whilst the bestowal of 
honours might well be expected to create a greater sense of obligation towards the 
granter on the part of the honorand, this analysis is based on an overly simplistic 
division between types of exchange.  Describing market-based relationships as ‘short-
term’ does not recognise the network of interactions and transactions involved in 
acquiring, shipping and disposing of commodities over long distances, or the 
importance of the maintenance of personal reputation in a society where maritime 
trade in particular was hazardous and without written records to identify loans or other 
agreements, made or broken.  In practice the sort of men who might benefit from the 
honours Xenophon suggests would already be likely to have their own network of 
suppliers, carriers and customers, relationships built up over the course of trading, 
possibly over generations.  The significant change would be that awarding them 
honours would build on those relationships by raising them from the personal to state 
level.   
 
A further complexity appears when we consider that some of the Athenian wealthy 
might have been more heavily involved in trade than has been hitherto understood.  
Through an analysis of the rhetoric of the speeches of Demosthenes, Andocides and 
others, Moreno has suggested that an Orwellian ‘doublethink’ may have been in play.  
Despite (and also because of) a lack of evidence other than in Andocides207 he 
suggests that there was ‘a careful and complicated use of rhetoric to dress up the 
entrenched role of an elite few in a system that simultaneously benefited the entire 
community.’208  The gap between the ship-owner/merchant and certain members of 
the elite who were themselves involved in the grain trade as importers was evidenced 
in their knowledge of the trade, whilst elite relationships with the Bosporan kingdom 
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were essential to keep the grain supply to Athens flowing.209  In this scenario, an 
honorary recognition of the quality of ships and merchandise would directly enhance 
the general perception of grain importers, some of whom may have been Athenian.  
Moreno specifically dissociates importers from the dealers within the city, showing an 
opposition between those shipping the grain to the city and the powerful local dealers 
who could collectively influence the price paid in the market place.210  This has 
implications, indeed, for any argument founded on the suggestion that Xenophon’s 
proposed honouring of merchants would have given greater than usual status to those 
involved in trade as it indicates that at least some of those involved in this 
‘disesteemed’ activity were already members of the wealthy elite.  But in any case 
Xenophon may not, perhaps, be proposing something new.  Engen draws our attention 
to one decree of between 390 and 377 which proposes honours apparently to a 
Megarian ‘common professional trader’, although for services that are not identified 
and which may also, Engen conjectures, have included those of a political or military 
nature.211  Engen suggests that this decree, taken with a slightly different reading of 
3.4, indicates that far from being naïve in his proposal, Xenophon was already aware 
that honours might be awarded to such men and that the Poroi was intended to imply 
his approval of the practice.  Rather than translate 3.4 ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ 
προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, 
as ‘It would also be an excellent plan’ as per Marchant, (my italics), Engen 
convincingly proposes ‘It is also a good and fine thing...’  (Engen’s italics).  
Translators, he suggests, have taken the optative mood in the preceding and following 
passages as their guide, but the lack of an explicit use of the verb ‘to be’ in the 
sentence leaves the interpretation open.   For Engen, this inscription absolves 
Xenophon from the charge of naïvety.212  But supported by other evidence as we shall 
see, sadly, and perhaps more tellingly, it may also relieve him of some of the burden 
of originality.   
 
Further examination of the list of attested emporoi and naukleroi in Reed’s study of 
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maritime traders, reveals two more probable traders who were awarded proxenia and 
euergesy still earlier than the Megarian: Lykon of Achaia,213 awarded proxenia and 
euergesia in the period 414 - 412, and Pythophanes,214 whose decree orders the re-
inscription of a previous award of proxenia and euergesia, and is dated to the late fifth 
century.  Engen describes both men as ‘moderately wealthy professional traders.’  A 
ship-owning naukleros may well have been wealthier and of higher status than an 
emporos such as the Megarian trader of IG II2 81 who perhaps would not have 
undertaken the significant capital outlay involved in the purchase of a vessel, but these 
three examples from fifty years before Xenophon wrote, indicate that his proposals 
build on pre-established precedents.  The awarding of honours to a man who carried 
goods in return for profit was not in itself a new idea.  
 
4.5   Enktesis again 
In the following section I will look again at fifth- and fourth-century grants of enktesis 
in order to contextualise Xenophon’s proposal and assess both its intended reach and 
degree of innovation.  
 
4.5.1   Enktesis for religious and community groups 
The earliest grant of enktesis for which we have evidence is for religious purposes, 
permitting the Thracians to put up a temple to Bendis in Piraeus in around 429/8.215  
The inscription recording the original grant was made in the third century, but income 
from the cult of Bendis came within the orbit of the Treasurers of the Other Gods at 
least as early as 429/8216 and so the cult had already been introduced into Attica at the 
point the grant of enktesis was made, whilst its manner of celebration may have 
expanded around 410.217  Like many Athenians, Xenophon was familiar with the 
temple of Bendis.  In the Hellenica he had vividly described how the troops of the 
Thirty had mustered in Piraeus ready to meet the men led by Thrasybulus, filling the 
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road from the Hippodamian market place to the sanctuary of Bendis in Munychia, 
events that he quite possibly witnessed.218  The Bendideia celebration with its horse-
back torch-race evocatively set the opening scene of the Republic,219 and by the 330s 
it was being observed in extravagant style with sacrifices on a large scale, perhaps 
even with a hecatomb.220  Addressing the speed with which we begin to see the 
involvement of the Athenian state, Parker suggests a geopolitical angle in Athens’ 
admission of the cult if, indeed, they had not actually founded it themselves and then 
given it to the Thracians to take care of.  In this immediate period he points to the 
importance of Thrace in Athenian eyes.  Sadokos, the son of Sitalces, king of the 
Odrysian Thracians, was given Athenian citizenship in 431, just as the Athenians were 
looking to Sitalces for military help.221  In the longer term, the expansion of the 
celebration may reflect the ‘ambiguous’ status of Thrace: 
A savage country and home of a savage people, but one with which it was 
indispensable for economic and strategic reasons constantly to grapple.222  
A century later, in 333/332 merchants from the Phoenician city of Citium in Cyprus 
were granted the right to acquire a plot of land in order to found a sanctuary to 
Aphrodite in Piraeus.223  This later honouring of merchants with a grant of land is an 
interesting echo of Xenophon’s idea because it is made to a group of traders, although 
the grant is not to enable private occupation of city space.  Austin and Vidal-Naquet 
suggest that the way that the request is worded as ‘by the men of Kition’ indicates that 
the grant was made to them as members of the demos of Kition rather than as 
metics.224  But they are clearly traders, οἱ ἔνποροι οἱ Κιτιεῖς,225 and whatever the 
residency status of these Cypriot worshippers (and they could after all have been a 
mixture of residents and regular visitors), they stayed in Athens often enough and for 
lengthy enough stretches of time to be concerned about proper religious observance.  
They are also of sufficient number and probably economic power to wield enough 
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influence to initiate a proboulema226 in relation to their supplication for the land.  
Should their economic clout still be in any doubt, they must presumably have been 
confident in their ability to raise the funds to found and maintain a new sanctuary, and 
the Athenians too must have imagined that they had a fair chance of succeeding.  They 
may have included a range of socio-economic backgrounds amongst their number, but 
in total they had financial confidence, and it seems a fair bet that whilst some might 
have been small-scale traders surviving on a shoestring, those with the ear of 
Lykourgos, the proposer of the decree, will have been wealthy providers of the goods 
which made Athenian life more comfortable. 
 
The status of the Thracians who had established their temple to Bendis one hundred 
years earlier is less clear.  Describing the Thracians of Athens as ‘bafflingly 
unknown,’ Parker finds small evidence of them, spread thinly in different strata of 
Athenian life.227  Thracian slaves and passing mercenaries might not wield sufficient 
influence to merit much consideration by the Athenians, nor would they have the 
resources to build and maintain a temple, but others such as Sosias, the slave owner of 
the Poroi, and the resident Thracians who may have provided the horses for the torch 
race of the Bendideia, were clearly better off, and Archibald suggests that they may 
have been members of leading Thracian families rather than traders.228  Nevertheless, 
more than sixty years later, the temple and festival are likely to have become a focal 
point for worshippers from all levels of Thracian society passing through the city.  
Like the men of Citium there may well have been both wealthy metics and non-
resident traders with sufficient power both at home and in Athens to be worth 
pandering to for the sake of relations with a region that was a constant focus of 
Athenian policy, but it has proved difficult to establish a political reason for the 
adoption of the cult.229  Xenophon himself had benefited from the sense of kinship 
between Athens and Thrace when in Thrace with the army of the ten thousand, 
although this could be a movable (if not repayable) feast; Mitchell’s entertaining 
account of Athenian-Thracian relationships shows that on a personal scale Xenophon 
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had ended up the loser in the gift-exchange game with Seuthes230 and that despite 
prolonged efforts to manoeuvre the relationship to their advantage, the Athenians 
never truly understood Thracian society and the differences between Thracian and 
Athenian ideas of exchange:  
… the awarding of … honours did not always produce the desired results, and 
even placed the Athenians in the embarrassing situation of being openly at war 
with their own honorands.
231
 
At some time between the founding of these temples to Bendis and Aphrodite, and 
recently enough for the Lykourgan decree to refer to it as an exemplar, the Egyptians 
had also been allocated land on which to build a temple to Isis.232  Of these putative 
worshippers we know still less, but the same financial pre-conditions might 
reasonably apply – sufficient numbers for their case to be convincingly and 
influentially made, and the possession, by some at least, of the means to enable the 
establishment and upkeep of a temple.   
 
The themes that seem to emerge from this analysis are three-fold.  First and most 
obviously, the awarding of land to non-Athenians identified primarily by their trading 
activities (rather than, say, as proxenoi) as suggested by Xenophon is not new.  
Secondly, the Athenians continue the practice through the fourth century, but in these 
examples, only on the basis of a grant to an ethnic group, not to individual traders.  
Thirdly, the religious and community-focused grant of enktesis for the temple of 
Bendis, may seem an unlikely precursor to Xenophon’s proposal given that 
Xenophon’s suggestion was essentially about private occupation to allow metics to 
live in the asty, but given the political and economic power of Thrace, what seems 
both likely and significant in this context is the way in which the grant of enktesis has 
been used not just to allow Thracians resident or passing through to worship their god, 
but as part of a wider policy to encourage good political and financial relations 
between the two states.  This is precisely the way in which Xenophon suggests using 
enktesis - not simply to promote trade, but the promotion of trade as a component part 
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of his wider policy to use healthier finances to smooth inter-state relationships. 
 
4.5.2   Enktesis for individuals 
Between these three religious and community-focused grants of enktesis, there are 
grants which are remarkably similar to those such as Xenophon recommends, made to 
private individuals.  Of these, the first we are aware of is dated by Pečírka, in his 
authoritative survey of Athenian grants of enktesis, to 410/9.  As well as enktesis it 
grants euergesia, oikesis and epimeleia to seven men, Agoratos, Komon, Simos, 
Philinos and three others, probably metics, who had been involved in the assassination 
of the oligarch Phrynichos,233 activities very different to those for which Xenophon 
suggests enktesis as a reward.  The majority of such grants recorded by Pečírka both 
before and after Xenophon wrote, are to proxenoi, and the first awarded to someone 
clearly a metic and not a proxenos, came after the appearance of the Poroi, in 330/29.  
It is nevertheless awarded to a man of substantial means. Eudemos of Plataia is 
praised for his offer of a contribution of 4,000 drachmas to the war effort against 
Macedonia, and the provision of 1,000 yoke of oxen to assist the building of the 
Panathenaic stadium and theatre.234  Lambert remarks on the similarity of Eudemos’ 
offer of financial support to Xenophon’s proposal of a capital fund,235 and in other 
ways, the case of Eudemos, granted an olive crown, euergesia, and financial and 
military equality with Athenian citizens, wraps together most of the honours 
Xenophon proposes.236  Eudemos himself probably also matches Xenophon’s desired 
profile of ‘a better class of persons desiring to live at Athens.’237  
 
Engen identifies four grants of enktesis for trade-related services in the 330s and 320s, 
arguing that, ‘Athens granted enktesis to both metics and xenoi without 
discrimination, and this is probably true for trade-related as for other types of 
services.’238  Between 331-324 there is a grant to Apses of Tyre and his son in return 
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for the provision of grain239 and a second, first published after the appearance of 
Pečírka’s seminal work, is the award of proxenia, euergesia, enktesis, xenia and a seat 
at the Dionysia, to the Sicilian trader Sopatros of Akragas.240  Dating can be narrowed 
no further than the known dates of the letter cutter, 337-324,241 but proposed by 
Lykourgos in recognition of Sopatros’ assistance with supplies of grain, this award 
reflects Xenophon’s proposals to a quite remarkable degree.242  
 
Camp relates the award to Sopatros to the famine of these years,243 and the final two 
of these four awards of enktesis may also reflect the challenges of this period, granted 
to Apollonides of Sidon for unknown services (323/322)244 and to Herakleides of 
Salamis, the subject of five decrees between 330/29 and 325/4 (but inscribed only 
once), for the repeated supply of grain and the gift of money with which to buy it.245  
Reed includes Apollonides on his list of honorands for whom the status of naukleros 
or emporos was ‘too implausible,’246 but Engen points out that, recommended for his 
honours by emporoi and naukleroi, his services are likely to have been related to 
trade.247 
 
It may be noted that even at the earliest of those dates, this would place a hiatus of 
almost twenty years between the composition of the Poroi and the award of these 
honours, and that these very occasional grants were unlikely to have ensured that a 
better class of residents grew very much larger.  But what we are certainly starting to 
see in the 330s and 320s is that traders begin to be awarded enktesis, a fulfilment of 
Xenophon’s idea.  Just how innovative was it?  In order to achieve a wider picture of 
the pre-existing links between enktesis and trade, there is some value in an 
_______________________ 
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examination of the Athenian use of the award most regularly associated with enktesis, 
that of proxeny.    
4.5.3   Enktesis and proxenia 
The great majority of recorded awards of enktesis made before the 330s, eleven out of 
sixteen, are to proxenoi, and seven or eight of these pre-date the Poroi.248  As a general 
rule, proxenoi were men of elite status,249 living at home in their native cities where 
they were expected to look after the interests of the honouring city.  This classic 
profile of a proxenos was reason enough for Walbank to date the Athenians’ honouring 
of Apses of Tyre to a date before that city was destroyed in 332.250  If we see 
Xenophon’s proposed extension of the award of enktesis from men such as these, of 
high status, resident abroad and powerful enough in their own lands to safeguard 
Athenian interests, to the common professional trader, a politically powerless 
foreigner possibly resident in Athens, we are indeed looking at a significant proposal.  
But there is good reason to see Xenophon’s ideas as far less ground-breaking and 
much more pragmatic.  
 
Burke notes that in the classical era the award of proxeny moves away from its archaic 
mainland origins, to a focus on the coastal and island states of the Aegean which were 
active in maritime commerce;251 it is interesting to consider the link between proxeny 
and trade.  There has long been thought to be a correspondence between the two,252 
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and indeed the honour of proxenia was only granted when the honorand had provided 
a city with some sort of euergesia to the polis, often in kind, even if not profit-
motivated;253 there are five or six recorded Athenian awards of proxenia for trade-
related services between 414 and 349.254  One of these, awarded between 390 and 
378/7, is to the common professional trader from Megara which was discussed 
above.255   
 
Proxeny was an award dating back at least to the 480s,256 reflecting the far older 
institution of ritualised guest-friendship.  Walbank lists ninety four known Athenian 
grants for the fifth century alone.  Eleven out of thirty four of the known honorands 
for trade-related services before 307 received the award of proxeny and a further 
twelve of those thirty four honorands either already had proxenia or were becoming 
citizens.257  Fifth-century awards of proxeny attracted the additional award of enktesis 
only rarely,258 but it is an interesting pattern of grants of enktesis in the fourth-century 
that they were almost always accompanied by proxeny, (even if proxeny did not 
always attract enktesis).259  As we have seen above, we only have evidence for four 
overtly trade-related awards of enktesis.260  Marek, in his survey of awards of proxeny 
across the Greek world, was adamant that proxeny was neither trade-related nor a 
plank of any polis’ trade policy.  Addressing some of the aspects of this argument for a 
link between proxeny and trade, such as the identity of the honorands themselves, the 
increasing mobility of the Hellenistic world and the archaeological evidence of coins 
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and traded goods between poleis, he could find no evidence within the decrees that 
confirmed a link, except in the very specific circumstances of a city’s recognition of 
the securing of grain supply by a proxenos, sometimes at a loss of income to 
himself.261  But Marek’s analysis is very narrowly focused.  Walbank’s emphasis is 
quite different: 
Because each state reserved to its own citizens the privilege and the protection 
of its laws, its courts, and its gods, foreigners were forced to make use of 
citizens of the host-city to plead their causes before the courts or the 
Assembly, to sponsor them at religious observances, to witness documents, or 
to act as agents, commercial or otherwise.
262 
This broader view of the sort of functions that could be expected of a proxenos, as 
opposed to the formula of his grant, is surely a better way to understand his place in 
the social, economic, political and religious life of the polis.  Reed lists nine men 
awarded proxeny, euergesy, crowns and enktesis in Athenian honorary decrees who 
are probably local proxenoi resident in their home state (rather than travelling 
merchants) whose decrees imply that they have given assistance to Athenian 
merchants or looked after Athenian interests, sometimes in the form of ‘regular, 
sustained assistance and protection’ thus providing just such support to the trading 
community as Walbank describes.263  Reed discusses these men because they might 
otherwise have been candidates as naukleroi or emporoi, and he argues that if they had 
been active traders, they would not have been able to be on hand in their home cities 
to offer their services to visiting Athenians during the sailing season.  But the link 
between proxeny and trade interests more generally is implied by the nature of their 
decrees, whilst the idea that a proxenos must be permanently stationed in his home 
town, on hand to support visiting Athenians, has come under some scrutiny.  As 
Gauthier points out, the accepted existence of multiple proxenies of one state are 
implied in both Thucydides and in Aristophanes’ Birds,264 and so it was by no means 
necessary that to be a proxenos one must never leave home, as it is likely that there 
may have been others who could fulfill the same functions in one’s absence.  
Discussing an award of proxeny and enktesis made to Theogenes son of Xenocles of 
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Naukratis in 349/8,265 Pečírka suggests that whilst Theogenes would be unlikely to 
settle in Attica, the grant of enktesis being for a house and not land, he might still use 
the house for visits or ‘business negotiations.’   
 
Engen makes a case against the proxeny/trade connection as it had been made by 
earlier scholars, arguing that just because proxenoi were appointed from cities on trade 
routes there is no proven link between the appointments and trade.  Although he 
concludes that Athens used proxeny in an honorary manner to reward those who had 
provided trade, as well as political and military services, he rejects the suggestion that 
the state ‘set up an intercity trading network.’  He suggests that some proxenoi 
appeared to live in Athens and therefore could not have been available to offer help in 
their home cities; that even if they did live in their home cities, there is not always 
evidence of trade between the city making the award and the recipient’s polis, and that 
even where a proxenos is securely identified as a professional trader, the relationship 
between proxenos and Athens was that between a state and an individual, not between 
two states.266 
 
These are all reasonable arguments against the suggestion that the state used the award 
of proxeny as part of a concerted policy to encourage trade.  But there is no reason to 
suppose that all proxenoi should always be required to stay in their home city, (or that 
at any given time there might not be one in Athens, another at home and a third 
elsewhere…).  Indeed it is most unlikely that they would always do so; they are, after 
all, likely to be the citizens used by their polis as ambassadors, and are most likely to 
be effective if they have visited the state they represent and have a working 
relationship with their patrons.  Given the huge numbers of Greek states able to 
furnish proxenoi, and Attica’s attraction as a trading centre, there is every possibility 
of a blurring at the margins between a wealthy man who stayed at home, using his role 
simply to lobby for his patron city with his fellow citizens, and one whose interest in 
his patron-city was more material, and whose materiality demanded occasional or 
even regular visits.  If Athens had a trade policy reflected in her proxeny decrees, 
there was no reason why it should not be aimed at the individuals who supplied the 
necessary commodities.  Agreements at inter-state level would only be necessary 
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when the handling of exports was actually controlled at state level, as we see in the 
honours awarded to the Bosporan Kings.  And whilst the geographical spread of 
awards alone may not prove a motivation related to trade, it certainly does not 
disprove it.  Such arguments do not undermine the idea of a more organic relationship 
between individual traders and proxenoi, a network of interpersonal relations around a 
nexus of honorary, religious, personal and commercial concerns which need not imply 
that the proxenos himself was a trader, without discounting that he might play a 
pivotal role in the commercial life of a city. 
 
4.5.4   Proxenia and metics 
Why is this discussion of proxeny significant given that proxenia was not one of the 
honours that Xenophon proposed?  The key is in the very close link between enktesis 
and proxeny in the fourth century, and the way they relate to honours for traders, both 
non-resident and metic.   
 
As we have seen, as well as the more familiar profile of proxenoi as high-status 
residents of their own poleis, Engen has suggested that they might not live in their 
home state, and he further proposed that they might on occasion even be metics, living 
in Athens rather than representing her in their home cities.267  He finds four exceptions 
to the rule that proxenoi could not be metics, two early and two late: Phanosthenes and 
Antiochides, circa 410 – 407/6,268 Herakleides, honoured in 330/29 and 325/24,269 and 
Hieron with his son Apses of Tyre, honoured after 330.270  In addition he concludes 
that Sopatros of Akragas, awarded enktesis and proxenia between 337 and 325 for 
trade-related services, whilst clearly a non-citizen, might be a metic, although he 
could not be conclusively identified either as a xenos or a metic.271  Reed is dubious 
about the metic status of the later honorands,272 whilst admitting that scholars have 
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tended to see Herakleides as a metic, including Pečírka273 who finds metic status not 
certain but ‘very probable’.  However a part of Reed’s case in each instance is that the 
grants of enktesis (for Herakleides) and proxenia (for Hieron and Apses) demonstrate 
that they were not Athenian residents, so by pre-supposing that enktesis cannot be 
granted to Athenian residents, the arguments here are rather circular for our purposes.   
Reed thus argues that possession of enktesis and proxenia together demonstrates that 
the honorand could not be a resident of Athens, whereas, with Engen, I would argue 
that the mobility of the Greek world meant that it could be entirely possible to have 
both awards and to live in Athens, taking advantage of the award of enktesis which in 
this event, would not be simply symbolic. 
 
But what is perhaps more significant is the practice prior to the time Xenophon wrote.  
Phanosthenes was honoured twice between 410 and 407/6, the first time with 
Antiochides and the second time alone.274  On the first occasion, both he and 
Antiochides were inscribed as proxenos and euergetes in recognition of the provision 
of oar spars and timber, either at market price or as a gift, the language is unclear.  
Given that Phanosthenes was then awarded citizenship and that by 407/6 he was 
serving as an Athenian general, Engen argues that it is likely that he had previously 
been a metic and that the grant of citizenship was due to services related to trade. 275   
As we have discussed, in 410/9 a grant of enktesis was made to a group, some or all of 
whom were non-Athenians and probably metics, Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos 
and three others.276  Xenophon would have been a youth when it was granted, but the 
decree and the honours it records were controversial enough in their day to generate a 
speech from Lysias.277  Thus at around the same time we see Phanosthenes and 
Antiochides as well as Agoratos and his six associates, all Greek non-citizens and 
some if not all metics, awarded enktesis and living in Athens. 
 
                                                 
273
  Pečírka 1966, p. 72; Reed 2003, p. 129. 
274
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4.5.5   Enktesis conclusion 
These few examples of Greek non-citizens and metics imply a less clear-cut division 
between what had seemed apparently distinct categories.  Proxenoi were not always of 
high social status, and might even be a metics.  A proxenos was not always 
permanently resident away from Athens, and could still carry out his duties if he also 
traded abroad.  When it was allied to proxeny, enktesis was not only granted as an 
honorary award, as we have clear evidence of proxenoi who were awarded enktesis 
and yet were resident in Athens.  In addition we see proxeny, with its allied grant of 
enktesis, as closely associated with trade, and metics awarded enktesis as early as the 
late fifth century.  This picture suggests a far more fluid use of enktesis and proxenia 
both by the awarding city and by the honorand than that of a purely symbolic grant. 
 
Not only was there a precedent for a grant of enktesis to metics, Gauthier has shown 
that there may already have been a mechanism in place for the regular request by 
metics themselves for such a grant.  Gauthier draws our attention to a hint in the 
Poroi: 
‘if the state allowed approved applicants to erect houses on these and granted 
them the freehold of the land…’ 
εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι 
δοκῶσιν εἶναι’278  
and he also highlights the use of αἴτησις [request, demand] in later honorific 
inscriptions, suggesting that non-Athenians might have been able to make a formal 
request to the boule, perhaps at given dates, for the right of enktesis.
279
   
 
As we have noted, Xenophon carefully qualifies his suggestion: he does not say that 
enktesis could be awarded to metics, as some commentators have implied, but that it 
could be given to worthy or approved applicants, in order to produce ‘a larger and 
better class of persons desiring to live in Athens.’280  This means that an existing level 
of control, duly approved by the demos, is immediately in place around who might 
receive such an award, and Xenophon might reasonably assume that those involved in 
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  2.6  
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the awarding of enktesis would not radically change their standards in choosing 
recipients, albeit that the pool of applicants might slightly increase.
281
  
On their own, the examples we have discussed present only very limited evidence and 
this argument can be tentative only.  If at the time Xenophon wrote, however, 
proxenoi based in their home countries had already been taking a role, even if 
marginal, in the support of visiting or resident traders arriving from Athens, receiving 
enktesis among other privileges in return, and conducting business interests of their 
own from time to time in Athens, then it is a much less significant leap to think of 
extending that right to live in the city to carefully selected traders themselves.  
Similarly for the Athenians, as the century progressed and the difficulties in securing 
essential supplies became more intense, it was evidently not unthinkable to begin to 
award various honours to traders.   
 
4.6   Aeneas Tacticus  
We should note briefly that, writing probably contemporaneously with Xenophon,282 
Aeneas Tacticus recommends honouring merchants in time of shortage: 
When the city is short of corn, oil or other supplies, a premium [τόκους] 
proportionate to the value of his cargo should be offered to any merchant who 
brings in a consignment, and also a wreath as a mark of honour, while the 
captain should be granted exemption from harbour dues.
283
 
Whitehead wonders whether one writer influenced the other.284  It is unlikely we can 
ever know, but two possible conclusions may be drawn; first, that if either did indeed 
know of the other’s work, the suggestion of honours for trade was immediately 
understood as an idea worthy of promulgation and thought likely to be well-received 
and second, that if they did not, then both independently recognised not only that such 
a proposition was a practical proposal, but also that the prevailing social and political 
mood would deem it worthy of consideration.    
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4.7   Chapter conclusion 
So how ‘enlightened’285 was Xenophon in his suggestions about honours, and how 
‘subversive’?286  We have seen that Xenophon’s ideas in relation to honour are pre-
figured in the Cyropaedia and in his Socratic writing, where he shows that the 
possession of honour crosses the traditional elite/non-elite boundaries and that 
‘honours for use’ in particular, are an important aspect of the way he sees honour 
attributed across all strata of society.  As we have seen in earlier chapters, Xenophon’s 
proposals relied heavily on the manipulation of individual ambition, native or 
otherwise, for the benefit of the Athenian polis, both through the pursuit of individual 
philotimia and the enticement of personal profit and public honours.  But philotimia 
could have challenging implications for citizen equality unless exercised within a 
carefully bounded democratic context, and where Athenian citizens are concerned 
Xenophon’s proposal reinforces Athenian practice by offering rewards to Athenians 
only for the successful completion of their democratic duties. 
 
In this chapter we have undertaken a closer examination of the dynamic relationship 
between Athenian and non-Athenian elites, recognised for instance in the awards to 
the Bosporan kingdom; grants of enktesis for religious purposes made to resident non-
Athenians, and the flexible relationship between the old honour of proxeny with trade.  
This appraisal begins to demonstrate that in Xenophon’s proposals we are not looking 
at a straightforward shift from honours granted to exclusively foreign elites for non-
profit related endeavours, to honours granted to non-elites for commercial activity.  
We have seen that, on at least three occasions that we know of before Xenophon 
wrote, honours had been granted by the Athenians to suppliers of goods who were of a 
different status to the familiar elite foreign honorands, and importantly given the 
reactions of some scholars to the Poroi, these are men who would have profited from 
the sale of their goods.287  Xenophon’s potential honorands are strongly qualified, 
restricted to men whose goods and ships have helped the polis.  One might reasonably 
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think that quantities of any goods in some bulk would have been necessary to meet 
such a benchmark; ship-owners or merchants trading in important cargoes of 
sufficient size and quality to attract the grateful attention of the city must have been of 
substantial means and were probably not two a penny.   
 
The proposal to offer enktesis, which has attracted such notoriety from commentators, 
is qualified.  After all, a procedure may well already have been in place to allow non-
Athenians to apply for the grant, and Xenophon is not suggesting that metics be 
allowed to occupy or farm agricultural land.  Awards of enktesis had already begun to 
blur the boundaries between those for whom such grants were honorary in nature only, 
and those who might well take up the opportunity to use Athenian residence for 
private and commercial purposes. The work of both Gauthier and Daniel on the 
wording at 2.6 shows that in proposing such settlement, solely by approved 
applicants, of sites occupied by ruins, Xenophon’s intention is twofold: the 
redevelopment of run-down areas of the city and the encouragement of carefully 
selected non-Athenians.  Not only will useful members of the wider Athenian 
community be encouraged to stay, but ruined sites will be rebuilt, adding to the glory 
of the city.  
 
Addressing Aristotle’s conception of those who were indispensable to the 
citizenship,288 Pečírka points by way of example to three wealthy non-citizens, whose 
awards of honours were in recognition of their considerable contributions to the city’s 
finances,289 thus demonstrating that some wealthy men were indispensable to the polis 
and yet were not, as per Aristotle’s ideal state, citizens of it.290  Such men symbolised 
the contradiction between the growing importance of wealthy metics and their status, 
which for Pečírka was ‘one of the important factors in the crisis of fourth-century 
Athens.’291  Like Finley,292 Pečírka describes Xenophon’s suggestion that enktesis be 
offered to traders as ‘a bold, if at the same time half-way, remedy.’  The proposals did 
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not happen, he argues, because ‘it would have meant massive encroachment upon one 
of the basic principles of the Greek city-state: to reserve the right to own real property 
to the citizen population.’293 
 
But Xenophon does not by any means suggest a ‘massive’ awarding of enktesis.294  As 
we have seen, he limits it to suitable candidates who must go through an application 
procedure of some sort and meet Xenophon’s high criteria.  Indeed the honorands 
cited by Pečírka are quite exceptionally wealthy euergetes, financial benefactors and 
voluntary liturgists who would hardly be representative of the majority of metics and 
other non-Athenians trading in Athens.  The awards to these prosperous examples are 
separated by almost thirty years.  Granting enktesis to men of such status would 
hardly risk a housing crisis, let alone an upheaval in the Athenian social fabric.  
 
Miller describes the energetic Athenian awarding of hospitality in the prytaneion as 
‘an exhibition of the vitality of the city in international politics’295 and it is important 
to recognise xenia as a political tool in its own right with an established place in the 
consolidation of inter-state relations.  In applying the honour to trade, Xenophon is 
not simply offering a one-off symbolic moment; he is inviting selected men of 
commerce to become a part of a complex nexus of relationships.  Here as elsewhere 
he reconfigures the link between the political and the economic, refocusing the 
application of honours in order to reinforce the connection and recognising that 
commercial men of substantial means have an increasingly influential role to play 
within both their native and Athenian societies.  By 330 we see Aeschines 
complaining about the wider awarding of sitesis to less worthy recipients,296 but in the 
invitation to the prytaneion, as in most instances, Xenophon was careful to maintain 
the pre-existing distinction between honours awarded to citizens, such as deipnon, and 
those awarded to non-citizens, such as xenia and euergesy.297    
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Perhaps Xenophon’s most prescient suggestion is that of the inscription of the names 
of benefactors.  His recognition of the power of the publication of honours is 
unsurprising, given the importance he attaches to philotimia and to honours as a 
public validation of one’s usefulness to the community.  Xenophon picked up on a 
desire for such acknowledgement which was about to receive widespread 
endorsement in stone as the polis began to acknowledge the importance of public 
recognition for the encouragement of future benefactions.  The inscribing of Athenian 
honours mushroomed from the 340s with a frequency well beyond anything with 
which Xenophon would have been familiar.  Writing on the cusp of a significant 
change in practice, as we have seen elsewhere Xenophon shows himself to be closely 
in touch with popular sentiment.298   
 
Xenophon’s proposed extension of honours is also carefully bounded.  What he left 
out throws some further light on what he included.  Proxeny, as we have seen, was 
already appearing in decrees for traders by the 350s,
299
 but does not feature in 
Xenophon’s list.  Grants of ateleia, whether symbolic or practical,300 are excluded, 
and it is noteworthy that whilst Xenophon suggests honours specifically to reward the 
importation of good quality commodities, he does not go so far as to suggest ateleia, 
perhaps because the waiving of tax-income would have been at odds with a 
programme intended to increase revenues, or perhaps more likely, that the grant 
remained controversial following the introduction of Leptines’ law removing 
exemptions from taxation the previous year.  Nor do we hear of gold crowns, and 
certainly not statues, which in the early half of fourth-century Athens were still rare 
and set up only in commemoration of military success.301  When he wrote, in the 
context of trade, gold crowns appear only to have been afforded to foreign rulers; we 
only have evidence for such a grant to the Bosporans.302  Xenophon does not break 
this precedent, even though such a move was to become acceptable as the century 
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progressed.  By the end of the century, the status of those receiving gold crowns was 
far broader, encompassing both wealthy and common professional traders.303  Perhaps 
most significantly, citizenship does not feature.  After all, as Gauthier argues, in 
Xenophon’s eyes, privileges granted by the Athenians were still greatly appreciated by 
foreigners, and there was not any obvious need to extend them further.304  But foreign 
traders, particularly if they were not resident, had no opportunity for direct political 
engagement in the running of the city, a correspondingly lesser reciprocal stake in her 
wider success and not necessarily any commitment to her wellbeing beyond the extent 
to which they could profit from it.  Athens’ disinclination to extend her citizenship 
thus risked disaffecting those on whom she had now increasingly come to rely.   
 
For Davies, Athens’ vulnerability when she was unable to recreate her fifth-century 
empire is linked to the political impasse between the Greek states and their joint 
inability to withstand the advance of Macedon.  As other regions acquired the skills 
that had once made Athens pre-eminent, the failures of hegemony had left Athens 
unable and unwilling to create structures within which states could share resources 
and resist external aggression.305  Looking to identify the sort of direction in which 
Athenian institutions might more successfully have evolved, Davies identifies two 
avenues which had they been explored, might have strengthened the state: the failure 
to restructure the tribes and the boule, and the lack of recognition that the citizen/non-
citizen boundary was under stress.   
 
Xenophon began to identify the second problem, but his solution was not radical 
enough to have made a substantial difference, even were his countrymen to have 
accepted it.  Given that Xenophon clearly did see the importance of encouraging the 
loyalty and integration of emporoi and naukleroi into Athenian society, this omission 
may be an indication of Xenophon’s conservatism.  If so, then he was by no means 
alone in his short sightedness.  Despite protestations such as those discussed above by 
Andocides at the very end of the fifth century
306
 and that of Demosthenes in 352 that 
citizenship had become a worthless honour,
307
 the evidence suggests that Athenian 
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citizenship continued to be awarded only very sparingly until at least the second 
century and probably beyond.
308
 
 
Nevertheless the change in the Athenian pattern of the awarding of honours in the 
second half of the fourth century has been seen as an indicator of ‘decline’.  The mid-
century appearance of the Poroi, with its apparently novel framework for granting 
honours, offers a useful point in time for us to take stock of the practice against the 
background of both earlier and later awards. The task is made more complex by the 
virtually simultaneous emergence of the honorific epigraphical habit, which provides 
us with a large amount of evidence for the period following the Poroi but much less to 
compare it against for the earlier period.  Rather than being able to judge for 
ourselves, we are thus sometimes reliant on literary evidence to tell us what was 
unusual or shocking, and legal contexts in particular come with their own agendas.  
The two speeches just discussed309 stand as a warning against taking either the chance 
survival of inscriptions or the jaundiced view of the orators alone at face value.  
Meyer has recently argued that the ‘honor-soaked epigraphic habit’ reflected a 
specifically Athenian view that the good governance of the city was approved by the 
gods.  Thus the permanent records of the many functions of democratic life placed in 
carefully chosen positions in the agora adjacent to temples and to monuments such as 
the Tyrannicides, were de facto honours for the gods themselves.310  Lambert however 
interprets the introduction of hortatory intention clauses as an indication of the city’s 
sense of her own decline, ‘an expression of the city’s exerting herself, straining to 
make the decrees as efficacious as possible.’311  For Lambert this sense of decline is a 
strongly motivating factor both in the inclusion of the hortatory intention clause and in 
the appearance of decrees in which Athens honoured her own citizens:  
Because, I suggest, it is in the 340s that the Athenians are gripped by an 
intensified sense of the decline of their polis, decline in comparison with the 
glory days of the fifth century, decline in the face of the rise of Macedon, and 
by an acute sense that the performance of the polis is crucially dependent on 
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the performance of its officials.
312
 
But this reading of Athenian lack of confidence in their officials, and of their 
understanding of their own status vis à vis their glorious past and their overweening 
northern neighbours has a very different timbre to the words of Xenophon.  In 
contrast, Meyer’s interpretation of the epigraphic habit as a representation of Athenian 
confidence in her democratic achievements is far closer to Xenophon’s tone.  Looking 
at the period just after the appearance of the Poroi, Lambert’s analysis suggests that 
the state’s decrees produce a picture of an Athens uncertain how to manage foreign 
relations, with interstate diplomacy looking to foreign individuals as a means to 
exercise control:  
Both before Chaironeia and for a few years after, and again after the Lamian 
War, it [Athenian diplomacy] is concerned with providing for opponents of 
Macedon who, in consequence of their opposition, are in exile at Athens from 
their home cities.
313
 
Lambert (with Fisher), dates the start of this ‘downward trajectory’ to 346, coinciding 
with the Peace of Philocrates between Macedon and Athens of 346,314 and although 
Lambert also characterises the Poroi as ‘certainly a “response to decline,” ’315 his 
discussion of decline points essentially to evidence from the 340s.  The Poroi may 
well be a response to immediate financial difficulty, underpinned by a long term 
attempt to understand the evolving relationship between personal and state economics 
and its repercussions for inter-state relations, but it does not reflect from its author any 
sense of long-term decline. 
 
For Pečírka, one aspect of the fourth-century crisis was the conflict between the rise in 
wealth of certain metics, without a concomitant rise in status, and Xenophon’s 
proposal to offer enktesis to some traders was an honest recognition of this problem 
and a creditable attempt to find a solution to it.316  For Engen, conversely, the broader 
award of honours in itself was a symptom of the complexity and dynamism of the 
Greek economy, but achieved at a ‘social cost’ to Athenian society as Athens adapted 
her awards system rather than create ‘new public institutions that would acknowledge 
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the economic needs of the state.’  But whilst Engen refers several times to what he 
calls the ‘corrosive’ effect of the wider award of honours, because it involved adapting 
traditional honours for application to ‘traditionally disesteemed market-oriented, 
profit seeking behavior from lowly outsiders,’ 317  he does not, as far as I can see, 
provide evidence demonstrating this effect.  I would argue instead that Xenophon’s 
approach enables us to see that wider honouring could be viewed, by one Athenian at 
least (and an elite Athenian at that), not to have a corrosive effect, but to constitute an 
inclusive adaptation of a robust institution.  If we follow Moreno’s argument for the 
discreet involvement of the Athenian elite in trade, then the description of trade as 
‘traditionally disesteemed’ requires a re-evaluation.318  Where Pečírka sees the rise of 
monetary (rather than landed) fortunes, slave-ownership in non-traditional hands and a 
societal structure based on economic wealth, 319 one might argue that Xenophon notes 
the potential of these phenomena and attempts to appropriate them to the state.  In one 
sense, there was a Solonic precedent even for this.  Although Xenophon was far too 
conservative to think on such a scale, wealth had been the basis of the reassessment of 
status-driven political categories once before,320 and what Athens probably most 
required was (re-) thinking on a similar scale.  
 
Xenophon’s proposals to honour worthy traders may not ultimately have been fulfilled 
in all their detail, but they were clearly a strong reflection of current thinking and they 
were built on precedent.  As the fourth century progressed, the use of honours to 
promote trade increased enormously.  Land was awarded to merchants from Citium 
for a temple; Eudemos of Plataia received strikingly similar honours to those 
Xenophon had proposed.  However whilst honours continued to be used for political 
purposes: inviting ambassadors to the prytaneion, recognising the support of foreign 
powers,321 those honours that were awarded in relation to trade appear not to have been 
given with a view to the wider encouragement of trade per se, but for the specific 
purpose of securing grain supplies and on occasion, fish.  
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Although Xenophon’s proposals may have been built on earlier practice, they were 
innovative in their purpose and direction – improving the class of resident aliens, 
increasing trade with its concomitant financial benefits and renewing the cultural life 
of the city.  The oft-quoted occasions on which Athenians did appear to implement or 
echo them indicate nevertheless a more conservative and cautious approach by the 
demos.  It is very difficult to extrapolate wider policy from a relatively small base of 
inscriptions spread over a period of more than fifty years, but the honours granted by 
the Athenians over the remainder of the fourth century (some of them under a very 
different political climate) do not imply a substantial enough change of strategy to 
enable the significant evolution of the profile of individual resident and non-resident 
traders in Athens by this means alone, nor to initiate a consistent encouragement of 
their commercial activity.  After the Social War, if Athens was to thrive, and on 
occasion even to feed herself, she would now be reliant on the goodwill of non-citizen 
individuals, rather than the coerced co-operation of other states.  Whilst a flourishing 
city would be advantageous to their individual enterprises, so might any other busy 
place of exchange, and Xenophon saw the importance of finding ways to attract and 
retain such men and to give them a stake in the fortunes of the city.  There may not be 
quite enough evidence to establish a ‘trend’, but there is certainly evidence that the 
apparently clear split between the non-Greek potentates honoured in the fifth century 
and the ‘common professional trader’ honoured from the 340s is not as clear cut as it 
might appear.  With conservative caution Xenophon was remodeling and entrenching 
practices that were already evolving, just as they had done in the fifth century and as 
they would in the way that the city was later to use financial and honorific incentives 
to attract the best actors to her religious festivals. 
 
 If Xenophon was ‘subversive’ to offer enktesis to traders, then how might one 
categorise the Athenian extension of that most esteemed award, the grant of sitesis, to 
non-Athenians from 314/3?322  Times had indeed changed.  But then they always had.  
What this brief overview has shown above all is the evolving nature of honours and 
the way the Athenians had always used them as a reflection of political and economic 
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in the grant.’  
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circumstances.  Their strength lay both in their appeal as an apparently stable and 
unchanging reflection of historic practice, and in their adaptability in times of need. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusion 
 
In 1603 a French visitor to Spain reported that the Spanish had a proverb, ‘Everything 
is dear in Spain, except silver.’1  Two thousand years after the Poroi, European states 
could still fail to anticipate or manage the consequences of the arrival of large 
quantities of a highly valued commodity.  The contextualisation of Xenophon’s 
treatise within its social, political and economic setting has been central to my 
reappraisal, but such occasional comparators can still provide a useful reminder that it 
is not always reasonable to criticise an ancient writer for a failure to forecast the 
practical outcome of the implementation of what appears on the surface to be a fine 
idea.  Xenophon may not theorise about the economy, but his writing is peppered with 
appreciation of economic causes and effects, allied to a nascent recognition that the 
anthropological concept of limited good, when evolved into the economic concept of 
zero sum, is in conflict with the idea of an expanding economy that is reflected in his 
treatise.  This thesis has argued for the first time that he furnishes us with detailed 
evidence of the Athenians’ understanding of the mechanics of their business 
enterprises and their ability to make economically rational decisions which, in 
particular circumstances for those possessing the level of wealth which enabled them 
to make choices, may or may not also have involved the consideration of social 
factors.  The Poroi nevertheless sits apart from contemporaneous endeavours to 
manage deficiencies in state income in discrete spheres of liturgical default and one-
off levies, in its audacious attempt to manipulate individual commercial enterprise for 
the benefit of the state and the rebuilding of foreign alliances, recognising that the 
collective need of the demos for resources was a primary motivator for war and 
looking to satisfy that need through the exploitation of internal assets.  The goodwill 
of other states was essential to peace, and the financial self-sufficiency necessary to 
achieve that goodwill would be reliant on the collective friendship of individual men 
                                                 
1
  Braudel 1992, p. 171.  
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in Athens and abroad, a rebuilding, even re-inventing, of interstate relationships 
through the medium of myriad personal connections between Athenians and non-
Athenians whose individual transactions, whether within the commercial, religious or 
intellectual domain, would provide the bulwark against future aggression.  Despite 
looking to the location and resources of Attica for the revenues Athens required, the 
Poroi goes on to demonstrate that exploitation of those resources depended heavily on 
non-Athenians as trading partners, making pure autarkeia an impossibility.  What 
becomes apparent, as commentators have always noted, is the extent to which, at the 
micro level, Athens needs the engagement of non-Athenians both at home and abroad 
and at the macro-level looks to other states not only for financial and political support 
but for approbation.  But these are not relationships in which the Athenians 
unilaterally benefit from the labours of others in activities which Athenians 
themselves disdain.  Instead I have argued that the extent to which Xenophon goes to 
mitigate the disadvantages to the non-Athenian of operating within her immediate 
commercial arena, demonstrates that these are trading and commercial relationships 
between equal partners both within and beyond Attica, providing consumers for Attic 
silver and products from Athenian farms and workshops in return for imported goods. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is not particularly relevant whether the Poroi is an 
entirely political or an entirely economically-focused treatise.  What is important is 
that it furnishes an insight into the way that the Athenians understood their economic 
activity and that for the first time in our records, one Athenian analysed and applied 
this understanding in order to control wider political power relationships.  Xenophon 
combines a recognition of Attica’s underused resources with a comprehension of the 
underlying economic forces that engender individual actions, such as the stability of 
silver and the immediate lure of potential profits allied with the attraction of 
additional social benefits, in a city which already has the technical expertise, 
manufacturing experience and trading infrastructure to capitalise on her assets.  Thus 
offering limited honours in return for usefulness to society regardless of status does 
not reflect a sense of Athenian decline or risk promoting social degeneration.  Rather 
it sits entirely within both the city’s evolving traditions and Xenophon’s earlier 
thinking.  In particular I have argued that the Poroi’s proposals build on existing 
relationships between trade and honours evidenced not only in the overt offering of 
privileges to occasional recipients engaged in large-scale commerce, but on an 
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underlying pattern of relationships between elite individuals representing the interests 
of external states, and the visiting citizens of those states, associations that will have 
evolved over generations on a personal as well as on a political basis.  Such 
relationships had long been acknowledged at state level by awards of proxenia and 
enktesis, the latter not always simply honorary.  Although we do not have wide 
evidence of a subsequent granting of honours precisely on the model that Xenophon 
proposes, we have seen that the Poroi sits within a more fluid tradition of the granting 
of honours than has hitherto been acknowledged.  But what is innovative about his 
proposals is that he comprehends that economic activity is initiated and influenced by 
a variety of manageable external factors and that he wraps together the many 
structures which can affect economic behaviour and hones them into a policy with the 
specific aim of economic regeneration.   
 
This study has looked at the way that two aspects of economic motivation are 
represented within one example of ancient thought: the undertaking of risk for profit 
entirely unencumbered by social considerations of worth and status, and undertakings 
which are motivated or directed by considerations of honour above or equally to those 
of profit.  The honours Xenophon proposes for non-Athenians would have been 
awarded only in very carefully controlled circumstances to individuals of exceptional 
worth to the polis, in situations where the attraction of honours might sway the 
choices of those individuals towards an economic relationship with Athens.  But the 
bulk of the Poroi is about the mine-slave scheme, and here honours are not proposed.  
For the potential speculator in the silver mines, alternative investments were 
available,
2
 and Xenophon not only recognises this but promotes the better return 
available through his own scheme by comparison with maritime investment.
3
  Profit 
alone is expected to motivate individual Athenians and non-Athenians to set up in the 
silver industry as customers for his state slaves, and some of those operators, at least, 
may be personally expected to manage their own enterprises.  There may be prizes for 
Athenian magistrates who can acquire the greatest number of metics, but no such 
incentives are required for silver-prospecting.  Just as Athenian citizens with cash to 
invest were engaged in money-lending and perhaps the grain trade, they also invested 
in the mining industry in a variety of different ways, such as small scale slave leasing.  
                                                 
2
  Christesen 2003, p. 48.  
3
  3.9. 
257 
 
 
 
Of the leading figures in Against Pantaenetus not all truly want to be hands-on mine 
operators.  Nicobulus was dismayed when he thought he might have to run the mine 
himself,
4
 and there were plenty of men like him for whom the attraction of a return on 
money-lending alone was sufficient, whilst its means of achievement did not dent 
either their own, or their community’s, evaluation of their status or self-worth.  But 
there remained many others, such as Pantaenetus and the ultimate buyers of his 
business, who were willing to get involved in the daily management and decision-
making of mine-operation.  Such men had the pressures of meeting regular 
repayments to lenders and the state, of covering their overheads and feeding their 
workers, and of constant supervision and fine judgements as to the quality of the ore 
and the means of refinement.  Contrary to those scholars who have seen Xenophon’s 
proposals as evidence of an elite Athenian desire to live in leisure off the labours of 
non-citizens, I consider that successful mine-operation in such instances was not a 
hands-off, rentier lifestyle, and without such men, the system was unsustainable.    
 
Whether they are evaluating his proposals as opportunists or as beneficiaries, 
Xenophon is asking his audience to engage in economically rational decision-making, 
whilst appealing to a complex self-esteem which wraps together Athenian aspirations 
to slave ownership with pride in her commercial centrality, in her historical leadership 
of the Greeks and in her religious and civic structures.  The majority of his proposals 
centre on her silver resources, which held a particular place in Athenian collective life 
both because of the semi-mythologised role of silver in the Greek victory over the 
Persians more than a century earlier and thanks to her citizens’ wide engagement with 
multitudinous aspects of the industry.  In assessing his analysis of a variety of types of 
risk, I have shown that Athenian commercial planning was dependent on other 
indicators than are provided by record-keeping alone.  Building on Christesen’s 
demonstration that the Greeks had a surprising capacity to forecast stratified financial 
returns on investments in various enterprises,
5
 I have shown some of the ways such 
projections were supported by a sophisticated ability to recognise, manage and 
mitigate business risks.  We have further seen that Xenophon addresses a wide range 
of dangers throughout the exploration of his projects, and when we add in those 
considerations for merchants and entrepreneurs which do not even entail risk, such as 
                                                 
4
  Dem. Against Pantaenetus 37.10.  
5
  Christesen 2003, p. 52.  
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harbour facilities and the comparative poverty of mine operators,
6
 we can see that the 
Poroi reveals, not naivety, but a breathtakingly thorough exploration of the social, 
financial, physical and psychological barriers to Athenian economic development.  
 
It is important to contextualise the Poroi within the Xenophontic corpus, but any 
apparent political subtext need not be prioritised at the expense of recognising its 
social and cultural setting.  We should not forget that Xenophon was the resourceful 
improviser of the Anabasis and the careful manager of the Oikonomikos.  I have 
suggested that hitherto, scholarship has failed to acknowledge the extent to which the 
daily experiences of his readers will have enriched contemporary readings with a 
detailed knowledge of the commercial and industrial life of Attica that we cannot 
reconstruct.  Athenian pre-existing recognition of the importance of individual 
entrepreneurs to the silver industry is evidenced in the exemption of mine operators 
from tax even at a time of significant hardship when the citizen base for symmories 
had been broadened and other liturgical exemptions had been reduced.  Jansen 
discusses the evidence for the fifth-century poristai who oversaw revenues, and their 
formal or informal continuation into the fourth century, noting that at the least, the 
office demonstrates an expectation that ‘politicians and statesmen’ were involved in 
the search for income-raising strategies.
7
  Continuous, rather than crisis-led, 
approaches to revenue generation had been enmeshed within the political structure 
and the consciousness of its lead actors for some time.   
 
Was Xenophon then pragmatic, recognising real problems and applying soldierly 
solutions; subversive, offering controversial upheaval to the social order; or simply 
picking up on a prevailing zeitgeist and employing it within the limited setting of 
immediate issues?  From the Ath. Pol.8 we learn that when in full operation, the 
mechanics of Athenian democracy might require payments to 20,000 citizens.  
Xenophon’s solution to the stalemate of the preceding decades was to propose a shift 
from income-acquisition through thalassocracy, with its substantial demand on 
resources for naval maintenance and crewing, to the exploitation of land-based 
income sources, neighbourly trade and individual entrepreneurship.  This in itself was 
                                                 
6
  4.12; 4.24. 
7
  Jansen 2007, pp. 73-77. 
8
  Ath. Pol. 24.3. 
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almost certainly controversial even in an era when political payments may not have 
been regularly met and when others were also calling for a reassessment of imperial 
ambitions.  The schemes are certainly practical and thought through; innovative rather 
than subversive, and yet worked out within established conventions.  Demosthenes 
and Isocrates offer plentiful evidence of contemporary attempts to improve Athenian 
finances and to change her foreign policy, whilst Aeneas Tacticus demonstrates that 
Xenophon’s ideas about honours were not necessarily as controversial as has been 
suggested.  What is original is his synthesis of these concerns within a continuous 
tradition of citizen political engagement to create a work of political economy. 
 
These then, are the contributions that I hope this discussion has made to the study of 
the Poroi and to wider discussions of the Attic economy.  In particular I have argued 
(1) that Xenophon was writing for a wider audience than his fellow citizens alone; (2) 
that we cannot appreciate the ancient reception of the text without recognising that the 
shared knowledge of the Laurion of many of its local, contemporary readers from elite 
investors to artisan suppliers enriched their reading, and that given the extent to which 
the silver industry permeated Athenian life, much of what may appear ‘naïve’ would 
have been read quite differently by an audience with daily experience of the web of 
activity that supported and profited from it.  Analysis of the text has enabled (3) the 
broadening of the scholarly discussion of risk in the ancient world, demonstrating that 
Athenians could undertake a sophisticated appraisal and management of risk as a 
factor which contributed to their ability to make economically-rational decisions in 
commercial environments unhampered by the lack of sophisticated record-keeping.  
Xenophon had extensive experience of the large-scale acquisition and disposal of 
slaves, and an examination of comparative evidence, the experience of slaves in 
ancient mining and a review of his other texts shows that (4) both in the practical 
activities he reports and in his references to slavery elsewhere, any interpretation of 
the Poroi as a proposal for a beneficent regime in which slaves live with semi-
autonomy in a charis relationship wherein the state would treat them as quasi-
euergetai cannot be sustained.  
 
Recognition of the continuity of citizen engagement with economic affairs, 
Xenophon’s view of the role of the leader as advisor, and his promotion of the 
awarding of ‘honours for use,’ when allied with the immediate financial crisis, 
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demonstrate that (5) the Poroi contrasts directly with the notion of Athenian mid-
century decline, broadly defined, identified by certain of his contemporaries and 
subsequent scholars.  Rather (6) his use of prizes and honours sits within democratic 
structures and builds on earlier patterns of use which have been seen to be more 
flexible than hitherto recognised in their relevance to trade, reflecting established 
relationships between the Athenians and those who can offer something of value to 
the state.    
 
It is indicative of the extent to which the Poroi has been subject to opposing 
interpretations over time, to note that in 1933 Andreades could contend that 
Xenophon’s slave purchase scheme was not realised because of the humanity of the 
Athenians, a reading which put Xenophon and the Athenians at odds, with Xenophon 
appearing the more exploitative.  By 2012, Jansen’s reading exactly reversed the two 
positions, Xenophon offering ‘a degree of freedom and autonomy’ to the slaves and 
appearing more enlightened than his contemporaries.
9
  But Xenophon’s attitude to 
slavery was doubtless in tune with that of his fellow citizens and more than likely, 
neither interpretation applied.  Caution, lack of collective will, preoccupation with 
immediate events, all would hamper the progress of a plan that required a refocusing 
of the demos and the persuasive confidence to steer through a scheme of immense 
magnitude.  But on the smaller scale, as we have seen, many of the text’s ideas took 
shape, with the refurbishment of harbour facilities, the extension of the theoric fund 
and the honouring of certain suppliers.  The economic potential of the silver mines 
and the entrepreneurship of Athenians and others inevitably combined without the 
need for a state facilitator.  Within ten years, acrimonious court encounters over 
significant sums of money reflect the rejuvenation of the silver industry and within a 
further decade annual state income had tripled without the exploitation of empire.  On 
the political stage, Athenian external relationships continued to be complex, but as 
Xenophon predicted, with the arrival of peace, and even without some of the support 
his plan had proposed, the Attic economy began to expand once more. 
  
                                                 
9
  Andreades 1933, pp. 388-389; Jansen 2012, p. 737. 
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